a1f056e6a5
Flow docs updated (11 files): - Delivery Confirmation: reversed actor roles (buyer generates, seller verifies), fixed endpoint paths (/delivery-code/generate, /delivery-code/verify) - Passkey (WebAuthn): removed stub/simulated-key claims; real @simplewebauthn/server attestation is implemented; refresh tokens are persisted - Dispute: corrected resolve schema (action enum), removed non-existent statuses, documented security gaps (no role guards on status/resolve/assign), route shadowing, all socket events are TODO stubs - Seller Offer: corrected all endpoint paths, removed 'active' status, documented withdraw dead code, missing seller history page, select-offer notification gap - Notification: corrected mark-all-read method+path, fixed GET /:id broken lookup, added unread-count-update socket event - Authentication: corrected rate limiter (counts all attempts), axios 403 not handled, deleteAccount wrong endpoint bug, changePassword no UI - Password Reset: corrected 6-digit code (not 8), documented no-complexity gap on reset-with-code vs token reset - Payment Flow DePay: /create→/save, removed phantom sub-routes, SIM_ bypass risk, PaymentProvider type gap, getProviderIntentEndpoint routing bug - Payment Flow SHKeeper: removed phantom polling endpoint, fixed release/refund paths - Purchase Request: added pending_payment/active statuses, fixed sellers/attachments endpoints, corrected socket events, PUT→PATCH bug - Escrow: documented dispute resolve does not touch escrow, route shadowing, confirm-delivery auth gap Issues created (35 files in Issues/): - 9 security issues (critical) including: dispute privilege escalation ×4, unauthenticated payment/scanner endpoints ×2, SIM_ production bypass, confirm-delivery ownership gap - 26 additional major/critical bugs covering broken endpoints, missing features, data integrity gaps, and frontend-backend mismatches Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
39 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
39 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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issue: "022"
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title: "Login rate limiter counts all attempts (not just failures) — users can be locked out after correct logins"
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severity: major
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domain: auth
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labels: [backend, bug]
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status: open
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created: 2026-05-29
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source: Doc vs Code Audit 2026-05-29
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---
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# 🟠 Login rate limiter counts all attempts (not just failures) — users can be locked out after correct logins
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**Severity:** major
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**Domain:** auth
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**Labels:** backend, bug
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## Description
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`rateLimitService.checkLoginAttempts()` calls `checkLimit()` which calls `redisService.incr` — incrementing the counter on **every invocation**, before password comparison. The counter is only reset after a full successful login (password verified + session created).
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With the limit at 5 attempts/15 min, a user who makes 4 correct logins in quick succession (e.g., testing on multiple devices) followed by 1 wrong password will be locked out immediately, even though they never "failed" 5 times in the intended sense.
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## Current Behavior
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5 total login attempts within 15 minutes (any combination of correct/incorrect passwords) triggers `429 TOO_MANY_ATTEMPTS`.
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## Expected Behavior
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The counter should only increment on **failed** password comparison, not on every attempt. Alternatively, the behaviour should be clearly documented so UX can warn users appropriately.
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## Affected Files
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- `backend/src/services/auth/rateLimitService.ts` — `checkLoginAttempts` / `checkLimit` — counter increment should move to after password comparison in `authController.ts`
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## References
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- [Doc vs Code Audit Report](../09%20-%20Audits/Doc%20vs%20Code%20Audit%20Report%20-%202026-05-29.md) — Finding M3
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