nick-doc/Issues/ISSUE-022-rate-limit-counts-all-attempts.md at 9698ec580905641a0b1f09dc73ebb25ef6e04a1f

Files

Siavash Sameni a1f056e6a5 docs: align flow docs with code reality + create 35 implementation issue files

Flow docs updated (11 files):
- Delivery Confirmation: reversed actor roles (buyer generates, seller verifies),
  fixed endpoint paths (/delivery-code/generate, /delivery-code/verify)
- Passkey (WebAuthn): removed stub/simulated-key claims; real @simplewebauthn/server
  attestation is implemented; refresh tokens are persisted
- Dispute: corrected resolve schema (action enum), removed non-existent statuses,
  documented security gaps (no role guards on status/resolve/assign), route shadowing,
  all socket events are TODO stubs
- Seller Offer: corrected all endpoint paths, removed 'active' status, documented
  withdraw dead code, missing seller history page, select-offer notification gap
- Notification: corrected mark-all-read method+path, fixed GET /:id broken lookup,
  added unread-count-update socket event
- Authentication: corrected rate limiter (counts all attempts), axios 403 not handled,
  deleteAccount wrong endpoint bug, changePassword no UI
- Password Reset: corrected 6-digit code (not 8), documented no-complexity gap on
  reset-with-code vs token reset
- Payment Flow DePay: /create→/save, removed phantom sub-routes, SIM_ bypass risk,
  PaymentProvider type gap, getProviderIntentEndpoint routing bug
- Payment Flow SHKeeper: removed phantom polling endpoint, fixed release/refund paths
- Purchase Request: added pending_payment/active statuses, fixed sellers/attachments
  endpoints, corrected socket events, PUT→PATCH bug
- Escrow: documented dispute resolve does not touch escrow, route shadowing, confirm-delivery auth gap

Issues created (35 files in Issues/):
- 9 security issues (critical) including: dispute privilege escalation ×4,
  unauthenticated payment/scanner endpoints ×2, SIM_ production bypass,
  confirm-delivery ownership gap
- 26 additional major/critical bugs covering broken endpoints, missing features,
  data integrity gaps, and frontend-backend mismatches

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-05-29 14:47:49 +04:00

1.6 KiB

Raw Blame History

issue, title, severity, domain, labels, status, created, source

issue

title

severity

domain

labels

status

created

source

022

major

auth

backend

bug

open

2026-05-29

Doc vs Code Audit 2026-05-29

Severity: major Domain: auth Labels: backend, bug

Description

rateLimitService.checkLoginAttempts() calls checkLimit() which calls redisService.incr — incrementing the counter on every invocation, before password comparison. The counter is only reset after a full successful login (password verified + session created).

With the limit at 5 attempts/15 min, a user who makes 4 correct logins in quick succession (e.g., testing on multiple devices) followed by 1 wrong password will be locked out immediately, even though they never "failed" 5 times in the intended sense.

Current Behavior

5 total login attempts within 15 minutes (any combination of correct/incorrect passwords) triggers 429 TOO_MANY_ATTEMPTS.

Expected Behavior

The counter should only increment on failed password comparison, not on every attempt. Alternatively, the behaviour should be clearly documented so UX can warn users appropriately.

Affected Files

backend/src/services/auth/rateLimitService.ts — checkLoginAttempts / checkLimit — counter increment should move to after password comparison in authController.ts

References

Doc vs Code Audit Report — Finding M3

1.6 KiB Raw Blame History

🟠 Login rate limiter counts all attempts (not just failures) — users can be locked out after correct logins