7a616744f4
Remaining docs updated to match code (the docs that the first pass had not covered):
- Flows: Chat, Referral, Rating, Registration, Google OAuth, Negotiation, Payout,
Trezor Safekeeping — corrected endpoints, socket events, status enums, auth gaps
- API Reference: User API, Trezor API — admin route prefix/verb/status corrections,
added undocumented endpoints (ton-proof challenge, profile email verify,
GET /trezor/account, POST /trezor/verify-operation)
- Data Models: Chat, Notification, Payment, PointTransaction, User — corrected
enums (PaymentProvider, escrowState, PointTransaction.type, User.status),
90-day notification TTL, soft-delete semantics, wallet fields
Trezor "zero frontend" finding (audit C31/C32) corrected as STALE:
- Verified current code HAS a full frontend Trezor implementation (admin/trezor
page, TrezorSettingsView, trezorConnector via @trezor/connect-web,
TrezorSignDialog, actions/trezor.ts building the {message,signature} object)
- Fixed Trezor Safekeeping Flow doc (removed false "no frontend" warnings)
- Reclassified ISSUE-012 as invalid/superseded with explanation
Issue set reconciled to a single canonical numbering (ISSUE-001..054):
- Adopted the comprehensive 51-issue set (long-slug, fully indexed)
- Removed 35 superseded short-slug duplicates from the first pass
- Removed a duplicate ISSUE-046 file
- Added 3 issues the 51-set lacked: ISSUE-052 (completed-not-counted-in-stats),
ISSUE-053 (axios 401-only interceptor), ISSUE-054 (rate limiter counts all attempts)
- Regenerated Issues Index: 53 open (14 critical, 39 major) + 1 invalid
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
38 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
38 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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issue: 029
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title: "No brute-force protection on delivery code verification endpoint — 900,000 combinations are enumerable"
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severity: major
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domain: Delivery
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labels: [security, bug, backend, major, brute-force]
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status: open
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created: 2026-05-29
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source: Doc vs Code Audit 2026-05-29
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---
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# 🟠 No brute-force protection on delivery code verification endpoint — 900,000 combinations are enumerable
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**Severity:** major
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**Domain:** Delivery
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**Labels:** security, bug, backend, major, brute-force
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## Description
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The 6-digit delivery code verify endpoint (routes.ts lines 2790-2847) has no rate limiting, lockout counter, or attempt count maximum. Failed attempts are recorded to deliveryInfo.deliveryAttempts[] but no enforcement exists. A malicious actor could attempt all 900,000 combinations without being blocked.
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## Current Behavior
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Unlimited guesses are permitted. No rate limiting or lockout is applied to the verify endpoint.
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## Expected Behavior
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After N failed attempts (e.g., 5), the endpoint should return 429 or lock the code for a period. The deliveryAttempts[] array already tracks attempts — enforcement just needs to be added.
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## Affected Files
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- `backend/src/routes/routes.ts`
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- `backend/src/services/deliveryService.ts`
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## References
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- [Doc vs Code Audit Report](../09%20-%20Audits/Doc%20vs%20Code%20Audit%20Report%20-%202026-05-29.md)
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