Remaining docs updated to match code (the docs that the first pass had not covered):
- Flows: Chat, Referral, Rating, Registration, Google OAuth, Negotiation, Payout,
Trezor Safekeeping — corrected endpoints, socket events, status enums, auth gaps
- API Reference: User API, Trezor API — admin route prefix/verb/status corrections,
added undocumented endpoints (ton-proof challenge, profile email verify,
GET /trezor/account, POST /trezor/verify-operation)
- Data Models: Chat, Notification, Payment, PointTransaction, User — corrected
enums (PaymentProvider, escrowState, PointTransaction.type, User.status),
90-day notification TTL, soft-delete semantics, wallet fields
Trezor "zero frontend" finding (audit C31/C32) corrected as STALE:
- Verified current code HAS a full frontend Trezor implementation (admin/trezor
page, TrezorSettingsView, trezorConnector via @trezor/connect-web,
TrezorSignDialog, actions/trezor.ts building the {message,signature} object)
- Fixed Trezor Safekeeping Flow doc (removed false "no frontend" warnings)
- Reclassified ISSUE-012 as invalid/superseded with explanation
Issue set reconciled to a single canonical numbering (ISSUE-001..054):
- Adopted the comprehensive 51-issue set (long-slug, fully indexed)
- Removed 35 superseded short-slug duplicates from the first pass
- Removed a duplicate ISSUE-046 file
- Added 3 issues the 51-set lacked: ISSUE-052 (completed-not-counted-in-stats),
ISSUE-053 (axios 401-only interceptor), ISSUE-054 (rate limiter counts all attempts)
- Regenerated Issues Index: 53 open (14 critical, 39 major) + 1 invalid
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1.3 KiB
1.3 KiB
issue, title, severity, domain, labels, status, created, source
| issue | title | severity | domain | labels | status | created | source | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 028 | delivery-code-generated socket event broadcasts raw 6-digit code to entire request room including seller | major | Delivery |
|
open | 2026-05-29 | Doc vs Code Audit 2026-05-29 |
🟠 delivery-code-generated socket event broadcasts raw 6-digit code to entire request room including seller
Severity: major Domain: Delivery Labels: security, bug, backend, major, delivery
Description
DeliveryService.generateDeliveryCode emits 'delivery-code-generated' with the raw 6-digit code to the room request-{id}. Both buyer and seller are subscribers of this room. A seller with socket access can intercept the code before physical handoff, defeating the security purpose of the code-based handoff verification.
Current Behavior
DeliveryService.ts line 55 broadcasts {requestId, code, expiresAt, timestamp} to all room subscribers. Seller receives the code via socket before physically receiving the goods.
Expected Behavior
The code should only be emitted to the buyer's personal room (user-{buyerId}), not the shared request room.
Affected Files
backend/src/services/deliveryService.ts