7a616744f4
Remaining docs updated to match code (the docs that the first pass had not covered):
- Flows: Chat, Referral, Rating, Registration, Google OAuth, Negotiation, Payout,
Trezor Safekeeping — corrected endpoints, socket events, status enums, auth gaps
- API Reference: User API, Trezor API — admin route prefix/verb/status corrections,
added undocumented endpoints (ton-proof challenge, profile email verify,
GET /trezor/account, POST /trezor/verify-operation)
- Data Models: Chat, Notification, Payment, PointTransaction, User — corrected
enums (PaymentProvider, escrowState, PointTransaction.type, User.status),
90-day notification TTL, soft-delete semantics, wallet fields
Trezor "zero frontend" finding (audit C31/C32) corrected as STALE:
- Verified current code HAS a full frontend Trezor implementation (admin/trezor
page, TrezorSettingsView, trezorConnector via @trezor/connect-web,
TrezorSignDialog, actions/trezor.ts building the {message,signature} object)
- Fixed Trezor Safekeeping Flow doc (removed false "no frontend" warnings)
- Reclassified ISSUE-012 as invalid/superseded with explanation
Issue set reconciled to a single canonical numbering (ISSUE-001..054):
- Adopted the comprehensive 51-issue set (long-slug, fully indexed)
- Removed 35 superseded short-slug duplicates from the first pass
- Removed a duplicate ISSUE-046 file
- Added 3 issues the 51-set lacked: ISSUE-052 (completed-not-counted-in-stats),
ISSUE-053 (axios 401-only interceptor), ISSUE-054 (rate limiter counts all attempts)
- Regenerated Issues Index: 53 open (14 critical, 39 major) + 1 invalid
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
41 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
41 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
---
|
|
issue: 015
|
|
title: "Simulated transaction SIM_ bypass has no environment guard — can fire in production on wallet connection failure"
|
|
severity: critical
|
|
domain: Payment
|
|
labels: [security, bug, critical, payment, frontend, bypass]
|
|
status: open
|
|
created: 2026-05-29
|
|
source: Doc vs Code Audit 2026-05-29
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
# 🔴 Simulated transaction SIM_ bypass has no environment guard — can fire in production on wallet connection failure
|
|
|
|
**Severity:** critical
|
|
**Domain:** Payment
|
|
**Labels:** security, bug, critical, payment, frontend, bypass
|
|
|
|
## Description
|
|
|
|
src/web3/context/web3-provider.tsx lines 225 and 232 generate SIM_ prefixed transaction hashes when wallet connection fails. The backend skips on-chain verification for any paymentHash starting with 'SIM_' — controlled only by hash prefix, not an environment flag. The frontend generates SIM_ hashes in an error fallback path that can trigger in production.
|
|
|
|
## Current Behavior
|
|
|
|
In production, if a wallet connection times out or throws, the fallback generates a SIM_ hash that passes backend verification and creates a completed payment record without any real on-chain transaction.
|
|
|
|
## Expected Behavior
|
|
|
|
SIM_ hash generation should be guarded by process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production' check. Backend SIM_ bypass should also be gated by NODE_ENV.
|
|
|
|
## Reproduction Steps
|
|
|
|
Simulate a wallet connection failure in staging — observe that a SIM_ hash is generated and check if a completed payment record is created in the database.
|
|
|
|
## Affected Files
|
|
|
|
- `frontend/src/web3/context/web3-provider.tsx`
|
|
|
|
## References
|
|
|
|
- [Doc vs Code Audit Report](../09%20-%20Audits/Doc%20vs%20Code%20Audit%20Report%20-%202026-05-29.md)
|