dceaf82934
Full-codebase-audit 2026-05-30 outputs: - Audit report: 09 - Audits/Full Codebase Audit - 2026-05-30.md - 81 issue files ISSUE-055..135 (decisions + 1 skipped no-brainer). - Scanner docs from scratch (was zero): architecture, data model, API ref, payment flow, operations runbook + repo README. - Doc-sync updates across API reference, data models, flows, design system. - Secret Rotation Runbook (08 - Operations) for the exposed credentials. - Reusable workflow guide (07 - Development) + .claude/workflows/full-codebase-audit.js. Issues remain status:open intentionally — the code fixes are uncommitted-then-committed working-tree changes per repo and aren't "resolved" until merged/deployed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
41 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
41 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
---
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issue: 056
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title: "Backend: verifyPayment and paymentCallback routes unauthenticated — payment completion exploitable"
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severity: critical
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domain: Payment
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labels: [security, backend, authentication, webhook]
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status: open
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created: 2026-05-30
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source: Full Codebase Audit 2026-05-30
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---
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# Backend: verifyPayment and paymentCallback routes unauthenticated — payment completion exploitable
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**Severity:** critical
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**Domain:** Payment
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**Labels:** security, backend, authentication, webhook
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## Description
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`POST /payments/verify` and `POST /payments/callback` are registered without `authenticateToken` middleware. Additionally, a non-web3 bypass path (`isWeb3Payment === false`) allows marking a payment completed without any verifiable on-chain or provider proof.
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An unauthenticated actor can call `/payments/verify` for any payment ID and trigger the completion side-effects (status change, offer acceptance, escrow release) without owning that payment. The callback endpoint is similarly unguarded, allowing fake webhook injection.
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## Options
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1. Require `authenticateToken` + ownership check on `/verify`; enforce HMAC signature verification on `/callback` as a provider webhook; remove the `isWeb3Payment=false` bypass so completion always requires verifiable proof.
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2. Treat `/callback` as a provider webhook with HMAC only; add auth+ownership for `/verify`.
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3. Remove the non-web3 bypass so payments without a verifiable tx cannot be marked completed.
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## Recommendation
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Add `authenticateToken` + ownership to `/verify`, enforce HMAC/on-chain verification on `/callback` as a webhook endpoint, and remove the `isWeb3Payment=false` bypass so completion always requires verifiable proof.
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## Affected Files
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- `backend/src/services/payment/paymentControllerRoutes.ts` — lines 20–21
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## References
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- [Full Codebase Audit 2026-05-30](../09%20-%20Audits/Full%20Codebase%20Audit%20-%202026-05-30.md) — DEC-23
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