a1f056e6a5
Flow docs updated (11 files): - Delivery Confirmation: reversed actor roles (buyer generates, seller verifies), fixed endpoint paths (/delivery-code/generate, /delivery-code/verify) - Passkey (WebAuthn): removed stub/simulated-key claims; real @simplewebauthn/server attestation is implemented; refresh tokens are persisted - Dispute: corrected resolve schema (action enum), removed non-existent statuses, documented security gaps (no role guards on status/resolve/assign), route shadowing, all socket events are TODO stubs - Seller Offer: corrected all endpoint paths, removed 'active' status, documented withdraw dead code, missing seller history page, select-offer notification gap - Notification: corrected mark-all-read method+path, fixed GET /:id broken lookup, added unread-count-update socket event - Authentication: corrected rate limiter (counts all attempts), axios 403 not handled, deleteAccount wrong endpoint bug, changePassword no UI - Password Reset: corrected 6-digit code (not 8), documented no-complexity gap on reset-with-code vs token reset - Payment Flow DePay: /create→/save, removed phantom sub-routes, SIM_ bypass risk, PaymentProvider type gap, getProviderIntentEndpoint routing bug - Payment Flow SHKeeper: removed phantom polling endpoint, fixed release/refund paths - Purchase Request: added pending_payment/active statuses, fixed sellers/attachments endpoints, corrected socket events, PUT→PATCH bug - Escrow: documented dispute resolve does not touch escrow, route shadowing, confirm-delivery auth gap Issues created (35 files in Issues/): - 9 security issues (critical) including: dispute privilege escalation ×4, unauthenticated payment/scanner endpoints ×2, SIM_ production bypass, confirm-delivery ownership gap - 26 additional major/critical bugs covering broken endpoints, missing features, data integrity gaps, and frontend-backend mismatches Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
46 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
46 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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issue: "021"
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title: "Axios interceptor only retriggers token refresh for 401, not 403"
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severity: major
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domain: auth
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labels: [frontend, bug]
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status: open
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created: 2026-05-29
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source: Doc vs Code Audit 2026-05-29
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---
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# 🟠 Axios interceptor only retriggers token refresh for 401, not 403
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**Severity:** major
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**Domain:** auth
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**Labels:** frontend, bug
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## Description
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`frontend/src/lib/axios.ts` (line ~105) only triggers the token refresh flow for `status === 401`:
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```ts
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if (status === 401 && !isAuthRoute && !originalRequest?._retry) {
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// trigger refresh
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}
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```
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A `403` response (e.g., `EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED`, a blocked account, or an under-privileged action) is not intercepted — it propagates as an unhandled error. Depending on how calling components handle errors, this may result in a blank screen or silent failure rather than an appropriate user message.
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## Current Behavior
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Backend returns `403 EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED` → interceptor does not retry or refresh → error propagates to the component. Some components may not handle this gracefully.
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## Expected Behavior
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The interceptor (or a separate error handler) should:
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- On `403`: **not** attempt a token refresh (a 403 is an authorization failure, not an expired token)
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- But should surface the error clearly to the user (e.g., redirect to verify-email page for `EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED` errors)
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## Affected Files
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- `frontend/src/lib/axios.ts` — response interceptor
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## References
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- [Doc vs Code Audit Report](../09%20-%20Audits/Doc%20vs%20Code%20Audit%20Report%20-%202026-05-29.md) — Finding M1
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