a1f056e6a5
Flow docs updated (11 files): - Delivery Confirmation: reversed actor roles (buyer generates, seller verifies), fixed endpoint paths (/delivery-code/generate, /delivery-code/verify) - Passkey (WebAuthn): removed stub/simulated-key claims; real @simplewebauthn/server attestation is implemented; refresh tokens are persisted - Dispute: corrected resolve schema (action enum), removed non-existent statuses, documented security gaps (no role guards on status/resolve/assign), route shadowing, all socket events are TODO stubs - Seller Offer: corrected all endpoint paths, removed 'active' status, documented withdraw dead code, missing seller history page, select-offer notification gap - Notification: corrected mark-all-read method+path, fixed GET /:id broken lookup, added unread-count-update socket event - Authentication: corrected rate limiter (counts all attempts), axios 403 not handled, deleteAccount wrong endpoint bug, changePassword no UI - Password Reset: corrected 6-digit code (not 8), documented no-complexity gap on reset-with-code vs token reset - Payment Flow DePay: /create→/save, removed phantom sub-routes, SIM_ bypass risk, PaymentProvider type gap, getProviderIntentEndpoint routing bug - Payment Flow SHKeeper: removed phantom polling endpoint, fixed release/refund paths - Purchase Request: added pending_payment/active statuses, fixed sellers/attachments endpoints, corrected socket events, PUT→PATCH bug - Escrow: documented dispute resolve does not touch escrow, route shadowing, confirm-delivery auth gap Issues created (35 files in Issues/): - 9 security issues (critical) including: dispute privilege escalation ×4, unauthenticated payment/scanner endpoints ×2, SIM_ production bypass, confirm-delivery ownership gap - 26 additional major/critical bugs covering broken endpoints, missing features, data integrity gaps, and frontend-backend mismatches Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
47 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
47 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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issue: "004"
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title: "fetch-tx, auto-fetch-missing, and debug payment endpoints have no authentication"
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severity: critical
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domain: payment
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labels: [security, backend, bug]
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status: open
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created: 2026-05-29
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source: Doc vs Code Audit 2026-05-29
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---
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# 🔴 fetch-tx, auto-fetch-missing, and debug payment endpoints have no authentication
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**Severity:** critical
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**Domain:** payment
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**Labels:** security, backend, bug
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## Description
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Three backend payment endpoints are mounted with **no `authenticateToken` middleware**, despite being documented as admin-only:
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1. `POST /api/payment/payments/:id/fetch-tx` — triggers on-chain transaction fetch for a payment
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2. `POST /api/payment/payments/auto-fetch-missing` — triggers bulk on-chain fetch for all pending payments
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3. `GET /api/payment/payments/:id/debug` — returns full payment document including blockchain metadata and wallet monitor state
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Any unauthenticated caller (no Authorization header needed) can call all three endpoints.
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## Current Behavior
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```bash
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curl -X POST https://api.example.com/api/payment/payments/anyId/fetch-tx
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# Returns 200 and triggers on-chain state write
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```
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## Expected Behavior
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All three endpoints should require `authenticateToken` + `authorizeRoles('admin')` and return `401` without credentials.
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## Affected Files
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- `backend/src/routes/paymentRoutes.js` — route definitions for `fetch-tx`, `auto-fetch-missing`, `debug`
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## References
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- [Doc vs Code Audit Report](../09%20-%20Audits/Doc%20vs%20Code%20Audit%20Report%20-%202026-05-29.md) — Findings C28, M40
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- Related: [[ISSUE-005-scanner-status-no-auth]]
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