a1f056e6a5
Flow docs updated (11 files): - Delivery Confirmation: reversed actor roles (buyer generates, seller verifies), fixed endpoint paths (/delivery-code/generate, /delivery-code/verify) - Passkey (WebAuthn): removed stub/simulated-key claims; real @simplewebauthn/server attestation is implemented; refresh tokens are persisted - Dispute: corrected resolve schema (action enum), removed non-existent statuses, documented security gaps (no role guards on status/resolve/assign), route shadowing, all socket events are TODO stubs - Seller Offer: corrected all endpoint paths, removed 'active' status, documented withdraw dead code, missing seller history page, select-offer notification gap - Notification: corrected mark-all-read method+path, fixed GET /:id broken lookup, added unread-count-update socket event - Authentication: corrected rate limiter (counts all attempts), axios 403 not handled, deleteAccount wrong endpoint bug, changePassword no UI - Password Reset: corrected 6-digit code (not 8), documented no-complexity gap on reset-with-code vs token reset - Payment Flow DePay: /create→/save, removed phantom sub-routes, SIM_ bypass risk, PaymentProvider type gap, getProviderIntentEndpoint routing bug - Payment Flow SHKeeper: removed phantom polling endpoint, fixed release/refund paths - Purchase Request: added pending_payment/active statuses, fixed sellers/attachments endpoints, corrected socket events, PUT→PATCH bug - Escrow: documented dispute resolve does not touch escrow, route shadowing, confirm-delivery auth gap Issues created (35 files in Issues/): - 9 security issues (critical) including: dispute privilege escalation ×4, unauthenticated payment/scanner endpoints ×2, SIM_ production bypass, confirm-delivery ownership gap - 26 additional major/critical bugs covering broken endpoints, missing features, data integrity gaps, and frontend-backend mismatches Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
43 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
43 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
---
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issue: "007"
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title: "SIM_ transaction bypass active in production — no NODE_ENV guard on wallet connection fallback"
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severity: critical
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domain: payment
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labels: [security, frontend, backend, bug]
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status: open
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created: 2026-05-29
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source: Doc vs Code Audit 2026-05-29
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---
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# 🔴 SIM_ transaction bypass active in production — no NODE_ENV guard on wallet connection fallback
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**Severity:** critical
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**Domain:** payment
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**Labels:** security, frontend, backend, bug
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## Description
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`frontend/src/web3/context/web3-provider.tsx` (lines ~225 and ~232) generates `SIM_` prefixed transaction hashes when wallet connection fails, and passes these to the backend as real transaction hashes.
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The backend's payment service skips all on-chain verification for any `paymentHash` starting with `SIM_`. This bypass is controlled **only by the hash prefix** — there is no `process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development'` check in either the frontend or backend.
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In production, if a user's wallet connection times out or throws (e.g., network error, MetaMask not responding), the frontend will submit a `SIM_` hash. This can result in a payment record being created as `completed` without any actual on-chain transaction.
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## Current Behavior
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Wallet connection failure → frontend generates `SIM_xxxxxxxx` hash → sends to backend → backend skips on-chain verification → payment created as completed.
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## Expected Behavior
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- Frontend: `SIM_` hash generation should be gated on `process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production'`
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- Backend: `SIM_` bypass should additionally check an environment flag (e.g., `process.env.ALLOW_SIM_PAYMENTS !== 'true'`)
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## Affected Files
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- `frontend/src/web3/context/web3-provider.tsx` — lines ~225, ~232
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- `backend/src/services/payment/` — SIM_ prefix check in payment verification logic
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## References
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- [Doc vs Code Audit Report](../09%20-%20Audits/Doc%20vs%20Code%20Audit%20Report%20-%202026-05-29.md) — Finding M39
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