Flow docs updated (11 files): - Delivery Confirmation: reversed actor roles (buyer generates, seller verifies), fixed endpoint paths (/delivery-code/generate, /delivery-code/verify) - Passkey (WebAuthn): removed stub/simulated-key claims; real @simplewebauthn/server attestation is implemented; refresh tokens are persisted - Dispute: corrected resolve schema (action enum), removed non-existent statuses, documented security gaps (no role guards on status/resolve/assign), route shadowing, all socket events are TODO stubs - Seller Offer: corrected all endpoint paths, removed 'active' status, documented withdraw dead code, missing seller history page, select-offer notification gap - Notification: corrected mark-all-read method+path, fixed GET /:id broken lookup, added unread-count-update socket event - Authentication: corrected rate limiter (counts all attempts), axios 403 not handled, deleteAccount wrong endpoint bug, changePassword no UI - Password Reset: corrected 6-digit code (not 8), documented no-complexity gap on reset-with-code vs token reset - Payment Flow DePay: /create→/save, removed phantom sub-routes, SIM_ bypass risk, PaymentProvider type gap, getProviderIntentEndpoint routing bug - Payment Flow SHKeeper: removed phantom polling endpoint, fixed release/refund paths - Purchase Request: added pending_payment/active statuses, fixed sellers/attachments endpoints, corrected socket events, PUT→PATCH bug - Escrow: documented dispute resolve does not touch escrow, route shadowing, confirm-delivery auth gap Issues created (35 files in Issues/): - 9 security issues (critical) including: dispute privilege escalation ×4, unauthenticated payment/scanner endpoints ×2, SIM_ production bypass, confirm-delivery ownership gap - 26 additional major/critical bugs covering broken endpoints, missing features, data integrity gaps, and frontend-backend mismatches Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1.9 KiB
issue, title, severity, domain, labels, status, created, source
| issue | title | severity | domain | labels | status | created | source | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 007 | SIM_ transaction bypass active in production — no NODE_ENV guard on wallet connection fallback | critical | payment |
|
open | 2026-05-29 | Doc vs Code Audit 2026-05-29 |
🔴 SIM_ transaction bypass active in production — no NODE_ENV guard on wallet connection fallback
Severity: critical Domain: payment Labels: security, frontend, backend, bug
Description
frontend/src/web3/context/web3-provider.tsx (lines ~225 and ~232) generates SIM_ prefixed transaction hashes when wallet connection fails, and passes these to the backend as real transaction hashes.
The backend's payment service skips all on-chain verification for any paymentHash starting with SIM_. This bypass is controlled only by the hash prefix — there is no process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development' check in either the frontend or backend.
In production, if a user's wallet connection times out or throws (e.g., network error, MetaMask not responding), the frontend will submit a SIM_ hash. This can result in a payment record being created as completed without any actual on-chain transaction.
Current Behavior
Wallet connection failure → frontend generates SIM_xxxxxxxx hash → sends to backend → backend skips on-chain verification → payment created as completed.
Expected Behavior
- Frontend:
SIM_hash generation should be gated onprocess.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production' - Backend:
SIM_bypass should additionally check an environment flag (e.g.,process.env.ALLOW_SIM_PAYMENTS !== 'true')
Affected Files
frontend/src/web3/context/web3-provider.tsx— lines ~225, ~232backend/src/services/payment/— SIM_ prefix check in payment verification logic
References
- Doc vs Code Audit Report — Finding M39