a1f056e6a5
Flow docs updated (11 files): - Delivery Confirmation: reversed actor roles (buyer generates, seller verifies), fixed endpoint paths (/delivery-code/generate, /delivery-code/verify) - Passkey (WebAuthn): removed stub/simulated-key claims; real @simplewebauthn/server attestation is implemented; refresh tokens are persisted - Dispute: corrected resolve schema (action enum), removed non-existent statuses, documented security gaps (no role guards on status/resolve/assign), route shadowing, all socket events are TODO stubs - Seller Offer: corrected all endpoint paths, removed 'active' status, documented withdraw dead code, missing seller history page, select-offer notification gap - Notification: corrected mark-all-read method+path, fixed GET /:id broken lookup, added unread-count-update socket event - Authentication: corrected rate limiter (counts all attempts), axios 403 not handled, deleteAccount wrong endpoint bug, changePassword no UI - Password Reset: corrected 6-digit code (not 8), documented no-complexity gap on reset-with-code vs token reset - Payment Flow DePay: /create→/save, removed phantom sub-routes, SIM_ bypass risk, PaymentProvider type gap, getProviderIntentEndpoint routing bug - Payment Flow SHKeeper: removed phantom polling endpoint, fixed release/refund paths - Purchase Request: added pending_payment/active statuses, fixed sellers/attachments endpoints, corrected socket events, PUT→PATCH bug - Escrow: documented dispute resolve does not touch escrow, route shadowing, confirm-delivery auth gap Issues created (35 files in Issues/): - 9 security issues (critical) including: dispute privilege escalation ×4, unauthenticated payment/scanner endpoints ×2, SIM_ production bypass, confirm-delivery ownership gap - 26 additional major/critical bugs covering broken endpoints, missing features, data integrity gaps, and frontend-backend mismatches Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
46 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
46 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
---
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issue: "002"
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title: "POST /api/disputes/:id/resolve has no role guard — any user can resolve disputes and ban sellers"
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severity: critical
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domain: dispute
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labels: [security, backend, bug]
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status: open
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created: 2026-05-29
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source: Doc vs Code Audit 2026-05-29
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---
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# 🔴 POST /api/disputes/:id/resolve has no role guard — any user can resolve disputes and ban sellers
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**Severity:** critical
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**Domain:** dispute
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**Labels:** security, backend, bug
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## Description
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The dashboard dispute router's `POST /api/disputes/:id/resolve` handler applies only `authenticateToken`. No `authorizeRoles('admin')` guard exists. Any authenticated user can post any resolution action including `action: 'ban_seller'`, `action: 'refund'`, or `action: 'no_action'`, bypassing all admin authority.
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Note: the *releaseHold* router's `POST /api/disputes/:purchaseRequestId/resolve` correctly uses `authorizeRoles('admin')`, but the dashboard router does not.
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## Current Behavior
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A buyer or seller can call:
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```
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POST /api/disputes/{disputeId}/resolve
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{ "action": "ban_seller", "notes": "malicious" }
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```
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The resolution is persisted with a 200 response.
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## Expected Behavior
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`POST /api/disputes/:id/resolve` must be protected by `authorizeRoles('admin')`. Non-admin tokens should receive `403`.
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## Affected Files
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- `backend/src/routes/disputeRoutes.ts` (dashboard router, mounted at `/api/disputes` first)
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- `backend/src/controllers/disputeController.ts` — `resolveDispute` method
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## References
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- [Doc vs Code Audit Report](../09%20-%20Audits/Doc%20vs%20Code%20Audit%20Report%20-%202026-05-29.md) — Finding C17
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- Related: [[ISSUE-001-dispute-status-no-role-guard]], [[ISSUE-003-dispute-route-shadowing]]
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