Flow docs updated (11 files): - Delivery Confirmation: reversed actor roles (buyer generates, seller verifies), fixed endpoint paths (/delivery-code/generate, /delivery-code/verify) - Passkey (WebAuthn): removed stub/simulated-key claims; real @simplewebauthn/server attestation is implemented; refresh tokens are persisted - Dispute: corrected resolve schema (action enum), removed non-existent statuses, documented security gaps (no role guards on status/resolve/assign), route shadowing, all socket events are TODO stubs - Seller Offer: corrected all endpoint paths, removed 'active' status, documented withdraw dead code, missing seller history page, select-offer notification gap - Notification: corrected mark-all-read method+path, fixed GET /:id broken lookup, added unread-count-update socket event - Authentication: corrected rate limiter (counts all attempts), axios 403 not handled, deleteAccount wrong endpoint bug, changePassword no UI - Password Reset: corrected 6-digit code (not 8), documented no-complexity gap on reset-with-code vs token reset - Payment Flow DePay: /create→/save, removed phantom sub-routes, SIM_ bypass risk, PaymentProvider type gap, getProviderIntentEndpoint routing bug - Payment Flow SHKeeper: removed phantom polling endpoint, fixed release/refund paths - Purchase Request: added pending_payment/active statuses, fixed sellers/attachments endpoints, corrected socket events, PUT→PATCH bug - Escrow: documented dispute resolve does not touch escrow, route shadowing, confirm-delivery auth gap Issues created (35 files in Issues/): - 9 security issues (critical) including: dispute privilege escalation ×4, unauthenticated payment/scanner endpoints ×2, SIM_ production bypass, confirm-delivery ownership gap - 26 additional major/critical bugs covering broken endpoints, missing features, data integrity gaps, and frontend-backend mismatches Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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issue, title, severity, domain, labels, status, created, source
| issue | title | severity | domain | labels | status | created | source | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 002 | POST /api/disputes/:id/resolve has no role guard — any user can resolve disputes and ban sellers | critical | dispute |
|
open | 2026-05-29 | Doc vs Code Audit 2026-05-29 |
🔴 POST /api/disputes/:id/resolve has no role guard — any user can resolve disputes and ban sellers
Severity: critical Domain: dispute Labels: security, backend, bug
Description
The dashboard dispute router's POST /api/disputes/:id/resolve handler applies only authenticateToken. No authorizeRoles('admin') guard exists. Any authenticated user can post any resolution action including action: 'ban_seller', action: 'refund', or action: 'no_action', bypassing all admin authority.
Note: the releaseHold router's POST /api/disputes/:purchaseRequestId/resolve correctly uses authorizeRoles('admin'), but the dashboard router does not.
Current Behavior
A buyer or seller can call:
POST /api/disputes/{disputeId}/resolve
{ "action": "ban_seller", "notes": "malicious" }
The resolution is persisted with a 200 response.
Expected Behavior
POST /api/disputes/:id/resolve must be protected by authorizeRoles('admin'). Non-admin tokens should receive 403.
Affected Files
backend/src/routes/disputeRoutes.ts(dashboard router, mounted at/api/disputesfirst)backend/src/controllers/disputeController.ts—resolveDisputemethod
References
- Doc vs Code Audit Report — Finding C17
- Related: ISSUE-001-dispute-status-no-role-guard, ISSUE-003-dispute-route-shadowing