Task 4 Backend Security Architecture Verification Report

Taskmaster task 4 is complete as an advisory architecture and handoff package. The task defines how the backend security/refactor assessment is converted into implementation criteria without rewriting or disrupting the current backend model.

1. Deliverable map

Taskmaster item	Deliverable
4.1 Security ownership and launch criteria	Security Ownership and Launch Decision Criteria
4.2 Escrow platform threat model	Threat Model - Amanat Escrow Platform
4.3 Funds ledger and escrow state machine	Funds Ledger and Escrow State Machine Specification
4.4 REST and Socket.IO authorization matrix	Authorization Matrix - REST and Socket.IO, Realtime Authorization Spec
4.5 Session, passkey, and admin step-up architecture	Session and Authentication Architecture Decision
4.6 Webhook security and payment adapter contracts	Webhook Security Spec, Payment Provider Adapter Spec
4.7 Secure build and supply-chain policy	Secure Build and Supply-Chain Policy
4.8 Backend-core stack decision	Backend Core Stack Decision Record - 2026-05-24
4.9 Migration and operational runbooks	Backend Funds Migration and Operational Runbooks

2. Architecture decisions verified

The current TypeScript/Node backend remains the production delivery path for the next security-hardening phase.
A full backend rewrite is explicitly out of scope until ledger, webhook, provider, auth/session, and reconciliation contracts are stable and observable.
Payment providers are optional and provider-neutral behind adapter contracts.
Webhooks must use raw-body signature verification, replay prevention, idempotency, and dead-letter capture.
Funds movement must be derived from the canonical ledger and escrow state machine, not provider metadata.
Admin release, refund, payout, role, and destructive account operations require step-up authentication and audit logging; high-risk payouts require two-person approval.
Socket.IO room membership must be server-derived and authorization checked, with global financial broadcasts prohibited.

3. Verification commands

Executed from nick-doc on 2026-05-24:

npx task-master show 4
npx task-master set-status --id=4.6 --status=done
npx task-master set-status --id=4.7 --status=done
npx task-master set-status --id=4.8 --status=done
npx task-master set-status --id=4.9 --status=done
npx task-master set-status --id=4.3 --status=done
npx task-master set-status --id=4.4 --status=done
npx task-master set-status --id=4.5 --status=done
npx task-master set-status --id=4 --status=done
node - <<'NODE'
const fs=require('fs');
const data=JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('.taskmaster/tasks/tasks.json','utf8'));
const t=data.master.tasks.find(x=>String(x.id)==='4');
console.log(JSON.stringify({
  task:t.status,
  subtasks:t.subtasks.map(s=>({id:s.id,status:s.status,title:s.title}))
}, null, 2));
NODE

A one-off Node link checker also parsed Task 4 wiki links and verified they resolve to markdown files; threat IDs such as [[T05]] were treated as allowed shorthand references.

4. Verification result

Taskmaster JSON reports task 4 as done.
Taskmaster JSON reports subtasks 4.1 through 4.9 as done.
Authorization Matrix - REST and Socket.IO now links directly to Realtime Authorization Spec.
Task 4 wiki links resolve to existing markdown files, excluding threat-ID shorthand references such as [[T05]].
Incident ownership in the task 4 runbook was replaced with explicit role owners that can be mapped to named responders before production launch.
Remaining implementation tests belong to follow-up backend tasks because task 4 is a documentation and architecture handoff task.

5. Follow-up implementation test requirements

Implementation tasks derived from task 4 must include:

ledger invariant unit tests for every escrow transition,
payment provider adapter contract tests for SHKeeper, Request Network, manual wallet, and disabled-provider modes,
webhook signature, replay, duplicate, and DLQ tests,
REST authorization tests for every gap listed in the authorization matrix,
Socket.IO handshake, room authorization, targeted emission, and rate-limit tests,
session rotation, revocation, passkey disabled/enabled, and admin step-up tests,
runbook drills for provider outage, leaked webhook secret, stuck release, suspicious payment proof, and compromised admin.

6. Residual risk

This report verifies the Task 4 architecture package, not production behavior. Backend implementation work must still enforce these controls before launch.

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