Files
nick-doc/Issues/ISSUE-113-scanner-rpc-response-bodies-read-without-size-limit-oom.md
Siavash Sameni dceaf82934 audit: 2026-05-30 full-codebase audit — report, issues, docs, runbooks
Full-codebase-audit 2026-05-30 outputs:
- Audit report: 09 - Audits/Full Codebase Audit - 2026-05-30.md
- 81 issue files ISSUE-055..135 (decisions + 1 skipped no-brainer).
- Scanner docs from scratch (was zero): architecture, data model, API ref, payment
  flow, operations runbook + repo README.
- Doc-sync updates across API reference, data models, flows, design system.
- Secret Rotation Runbook (08 - Operations) for the exposed credentials.
- Reusable workflow guide (07 - Development) + .claude/workflows/full-codebase-audit.js.

Issues remain status:open intentionally — the code fixes are uncommitted-then-committed
working-tree changes per repo and aren't "resolved" until merged/deployed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-30 18:48:04 +04:00

41 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown

---
issue: 113
title: "Scanner/backend: RPC response bodies read without size limit — OOM risk"
severity: medium
domain: Scanner
labels: [security, scanner, oom]
status: open
created: 2026-05-30
source: Full Codebase Audit 2026-05-30
---
# Scanner/backend: RPC response bodies read without size limit — OOM risk
**Severity:** medium
**Domain:** Scanner
**Labels:** security, scanner, oom
## Description
NB-42 applied a `LimitReader` as a mechanical guard with a default cap, but the exact byte limit per endpoint was not decided. Choosing the wrong cap (too small) breaks legitimate large responses; too large offers little protection. A malicious RPC node can still exhaust memory if the cap is too generous.
## Options
1. Wrap `resp.Body` in `io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxBytes)` with a generous per-endpoint cap (applied as NB-42).
2. Use `http.MaxBytesReader`-style enforcement and error on exceed.
3. Stream-parse JSON with a bounded decoder.
## Recommendation
Review the default cap applied by NB-42 against actual maximum RPC response sizes for each chain (EVM batch, Tron page, TON jetton response). Adjust per-endpoint caps and error explicitly when the limit is exceeded rather than silently truncating.
## Affected Files
- `scanner/chain.go:96`
- `scanner/tron_chain.go:116`
- `scanner/ton_chain.go:106`
## References
- [Full Codebase Audit 2026-05-30](../09%20-%20Audits/Full%20Codebase%20Audit%20-%202026-05-30.md) — DEC-72