dceaf82934
Full-codebase-audit 2026-05-30 outputs: - Audit report: 09 - Audits/Full Codebase Audit - 2026-05-30.md - 81 issue files ISSUE-055..135 (decisions + 1 skipped no-brainer). - Scanner docs from scratch (was zero): architecture, data model, API ref, payment flow, operations runbook + repo README. - Doc-sync updates across API reference, data models, flows, design system. - Secret Rotation Runbook (08 - Operations) for the exposed credentials. - Reusable workflow guide (07 - Development) + .claude/workflows/full-codebase-audit.js. Issues remain status:open intentionally — the code fixes are uncommitted-then-committed working-tree changes per repo and aren't "resolved" until merged/deployed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
41 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
41 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
---
|
|
issue: 081
|
|
title: "Frontend: auth tokens stored in localStorage — XSS-accessible"
|
|
severity: medium
|
|
domain: Authentication
|
|
labels: [security, frontend, session]
|
|
status: open
|
|
created: 2026-05-30
|
|
source: Full Codebase Audit 2026-05-30
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
# Frontend: auth tokens stored in localStorage — XSS-accessible
|
|
|
|
**Severity:** medium
|
|
**Domain:** Authentication
|
|
**Labels:** security, frontend, session
|
|
|
|
## Description
|
|
|
|
`src/auth/context/jwt/action.ts:100` stores access and refresh tokens in `localStorage`. Any XSS vulnerability can steal these tokens and impersonate the user. The risk is compounded by the lack of a Content-Security-Policy (see ISSUE-083).
|
|
|
|
## Options
|
|
|
|
1. Move refresh token to HttpOnly cookie, keep short-lived access token in memory — strong, but requires backend cookie + CSRF work.
|
|
2. Keep localStorage but add strict CSP + sanitization to reduce XSS surface — cheaper, weaker.
|
|
3. Full cookie-based session with `SameSite=strict` — strongest, largest change to axios/socket auth.
|
|
|
|
## Recommendation
|
|
|
|
Plan a migration to HttpOnly refresh cookie + in-memory access token, coordinated with backend. This is a large, cross-cutting change that breaks many call sites — treat as a deliberate project.
|
|
|
|
## Affected Files
|
|
|
|
- `frontend/src/auth/context/jwt/action.ts:100`
|
|
- `frontend/src/lib/axios.ts` — auth header injection
|
|
|
|
## References
|
|
|
|
- [Full Codebase Audit 2026-05-30](../09%20-%20Audits/Full%20Codebase%20Audit%20-%202026-05-30.md) — DEC-4
|
|
- [[ISSUE-083-frontend-no-content-security-policy-header-in-next-config|ISSUE-083]]
|