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featherChat/warzone/docs/PROGRESS.md
Siavash Sameni 3e0889e5dc v0.0.21: TUI overhaul, WZP call infrastructure, security hardening, federation 
TUI:
- Split 1,756-line app.rs monolith into 7 modules (types, draw, commands, input, file_transfer, network, mod)
- Message timestamps [HH:MM], scrolling (PageUp/Down/arrows), connection status dot, unread badge
- /help command, terminal bell on incoming DM, /devices + /kick commands
- 44 unit tests (types, input, draw with TestBackend)

Server — WZP Call Infrastructure (FC-2/3/5/6/7/10):
- Call state management (CallState, CallStatus, active_calls, calls + missed_calls sled trees)
- WS call signal awareness (Offer/Answer/Hangup update state, missed call on offline)
- Group call endpoint (POST /groups/:name/call with SHA-256 room ID, fan-out)
- Presence API (GET /presence/:fp, POST /presence/batch)
- Missed call flush on WS reconnect
- WZP relay config + CORS

Server — Security (FC-P1):
- Auth enforcement middleware (AuthFingerprint extractor on 13 write handlers)
- Session auto-recovery (delete corrupted ratchet, show [session reset])
- WS connection cap (5/fingerprint) + global concurrency limit (200)
- Device management (GET /devices, POST /devices/:id/kick, POST /devices/revoke-all)

Server — Federation:
- Two-server federation via JSON config (--federation flag)
- Periodic presence sync (every 5s, full-state, self-healing)
- Message forwarding via HTTP POST with SHA-256(secret||body) auth
- Graceful degradation (peer down = queue locally)
- deliver_or_queue() replaces push-or-queue in ws.rs + messages.rs

Client — Group Messaging:
- SenderKeyDistribution storage + GroupSenderKey decryption in TUI
- sender_keys sled tree in LocalDb

WASM:
- All 8 WireMessage variants handled (no more "unsupported")
- decrypt_group_message() + create_sender_key_from_distribution() exports
- CallSignal parsing with signal_type mapping

Docs:
- ARCHITECTURE.md rewritten with Mermaid diagrams
- README.md created
- TASK_PLAN.md with FC-P{phase}-T{task} naming
- PROGRESS.md updated to v0.0.21

WZP submodule updated to 6f4e8eb (IAX2 trunking, adaptive quality, metrics, all S-tasks done)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 16:45:58 +04:00

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# Warzone Messenger (featherChat) — Progress Report
**Current Version:** 0.0.21
**Last Updated:** 2026-03-28
---
## Project Timeline
### Phase 0 — Python Prototype (pre-Rust)
The project began as `chat.py`, a Python WebSocket chat with basic features:
- Basic chat server + web UI
- WebSocket SSH tunnel
- Nginx reverse proxy + ArvanCloud deployment
- ECDH + AES-GCM DMs (no forward secrecy)
- Group chat with passwords
- PWA support
- File upload
### Phase 1 — Identity & Crypto Foundation (Rust Rewrite)
The Rust rewrite established the cryptographic foundation:
| Feature | Version | Status |
|------------------------------------------|---------|--------|
| Cargo workspace scaffold (5 crates) | 0.0.1 | Done |
| Seed-based identity (Ed25519 + X25519) | 0.0.2 | Done |
| BIP39 mnemonic generation and recovery | 0.0.2 | Done |
| Seed encryption at rest (Argon2id + ChaCha20-Poly1305) | 0.0.3 | Done |
| Pre-key bundle generation and storage | 0.0.4 | Done |
| X3DH key exchange implementation | 0.0.5 | Done |
| Double Ratchet for 1:1 messaging | 0.0.6 | Done |
| Basic server: axum, sled DB, store-and-forward | 0.0.4 | Done |
| CLI client with subcommands | 0.0.5 | Done |
| WASM bridge (warzone-wasm crate) | 0.0.8 | Done |
| Server auth (challenge-response, bearer tokens) | 0.0.9 | Done |
| OTP key replenishment | 0.0.9 | Done |
| Fetch-and-delete delivery | 0.0.7 | Done |
| Aliases with TTL, recovery keys | 0.0.10 | Done |
| 17 protocol tests | 0.0.10 | Done |
| CLI ↔ Web interop verified | 0.0.10 | Done |
### Phase 2 — Core Messaging
Built on the Phase 1 foundation to deliver a complete messaging experience:
| Feature | Version | Status |
|------------------------------------------|---------|--------|
| TUI client (ratatui + crossterm) | 0.0.7 | Done |
| Web client (WASM) | 0.0.8 | Done |
| WebSocket real-time push | 0.0.11 | Done |
| Delivery receipts (sent/delivered/read) | 0.0.12 | Done |
| File transfer (chunked, SHA-256 verified)| 0.0.13 | Done |
| Group chat (server fan-out) | 0.0.10 | Done |
| Group management (create/join/leave/kick)| 0.0.14 | Done |
| Sender Keys for group encryption | 0.0.15 | Done |
| Message deduplication (bounded FIFO) | 0.0.16 | Done |
| Ethereum-compatible identity (secp256k1) | 0.0.14 | Done |
| Encrypted backup/restore | 0.0.17 | Done |
| Local message history (sled) | 0.0.17 | Done |
| Contact list with message counts | 0.0.17 | Done |
| Alias auto-renewal on activity | 0.0.18 | Done |
| Multi-device key registration | 0.0.18 | Done |
| DB lock handling with user-friendly errors | 0.0.19 | Done |
| Readline-style TUI editing (Ctrl-A/E/U/W)| 0.0.19 | Done |
| Reply shortcut (/r, /reply) | 0.0.19 | Done |
| 28 protocol tests | 0.0.20 | Done |
### Phase 2.5 — WZP Integration & TUI Overhaul (v0.0.21)
| Feature | Version | Status |
|------------------------------------------|---------|--------|
| warzone-protocol standalone-importable | 0.0.21 | Done |
| CallSignal WireMessage variant | 0.0.21 | Done |
| Auth token validation endpoint | 0.0.21 | Done |
| TUI modular split (7 modules from 1) | 0.0.21 | Done |
| TUI message timestamps [HH:MM] | 0.0.21 | Done |
| TUI message scrolling (PageUp/Down/arrows) | 0.0.21 | Done |
| TUI connection status indicator | 0.0.21 | Done |
| TUI unread message badge | 0.0.21 | Done |
| TUI /help command | 0.0.21 | Done |
| TUI terminal bell on incoming DM | 0.0.21 | Done |
| 44 TUI unit tests (types, input, draw) | 0.0.21 | Done |
| Call state management (server) | 0.0.21 | Done |
| WS call signaling awareness | 0.0.21 | Done |
| Group-to-room mapping + group call API | 0.0.21 | Done |
| Presence/online status API | 0.0.21 | Done |
| Missed call notifications | 0.0.21 | Done |
| WZP relay config + CORS | 0.0.21 | Done |
| WZP submodule: all 9 S-tasks done | 0.0.21 | Done |
| 72 total tests (28 protocol + 44 client) | 0.0.21 | Done |
---
## Current Version: v0.0.21
### Codebase Statistics
| Metric | Value |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|
| Crates | 5 (protocol, server, client, wasm, mule) |
| Total tests | 72 (28 protocol + 44 client) |
| Server routes | 12 files, 9 new endpoints |
| TUI modules | 7 (split from 1 monolith) |
| Rust edition | 2021 |
| Min Rust version | 1.75 |
| License | MIT |
### Protocol Crate Modules
| Module | Approximate Scope |
|---------------|---------------------------------------|
| identity | Seed, keypair derivation, fingerprints|
| crypto | HKDF, ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD |
| prekey | Signed + one-time pre-keys |
| x3dh | Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman |
| ratchet | Double Ratchet state machine |
| message | WireMessage (8 variants incl. CallSignal)|
| sender_keys | Sender Key encrypt/decrypt/rotate |
| history | Encrypted backup format |
| ethereum | secp256k1, Keccak-256, EIP-55 |
| types | Fingerprint, DeviceId, SessionId |
| mnemonic | BIP39 encode/decode |
| store | Storage trait definitions |
| errors | Error types |
### Feature Summary
**Working end-to-end:**
- 1:1 encrypted DMs with forward secrecy (X3DH + Double Ratchet)
- Group messaging with Sender Keys
- WebSocket real-time delivery + offline queue
- File transfer (up to 10 MB, chunked, SHA-256 verified)
- Delivery and read receipts
- TUI client with full command set
- Web client (WASM) with identical crypto
- Alias system with TTL, recovery, admin
- Challenge-response authentication
- Ethereum address derivation from same seed
- Encrypted backup and restore
- Contact list and message history
- Multi-device support (basic)
---
## Test Suite
72 tests across protocol + client crates:
### Protocol Tests (28)
| Module | Tests | Coverage |
|---------------|-------|---------------------------------------------|
| identity | 3 | Deterministic derivation, mnemonic roundtrip, fingerprint format |
| crypto | 4 | AEAD roundtrip, wrong key, wrong AAD, HKDF determinism |
| x3dh | 1 | Shared secret match between Alice and Bob |
| ratchet | 5 | Basic, bidirectional, multiple, out-of-order, 100 messages |
| sender_keys | 4 | Basic encrypt/decrypt, multiple messages, rotation, old key rejection |
| ethereum | 5 | Deterministic derivation, address format, checksum, sign/verify, different seeds |
| history | 2 | Roundtrip encryption, wrong seed rejection |
| prekey | 3 | SPK verify, tamper detection, OTPK generation |
| mnemonic | 1 | BIP39 roundtrip |
### Client Tests (44)
| Module | Tests | Coverage |
|---------------|-------|---------------------------------------------|
| tui::types | 10 | App init, scroll/connected defaults, ChatLine timestamps, normfp, add_message |
| tui::input | 25 | 8 text editing, 7 cursor movement, 2 quit, 8 scroll keybindings |
| tui::draw | 9 | Rendering smoke, header fingerprint, connection dot (red/green), timestamps, scroll show/hide, unread badge |
---
## Bugs Fixed
| Bug | Version Fixed | Description |
|-----|---------------|-------------|
| X3DH OTPK mismatch | 0.0.8 | Web client regenerated SPK on each page load, causing X3DH failures. Fixed by persisting SPK secret in localStorage and restoring on load. |
| Axum route syntax | 0.0.11 | Route path parameters used wrong syntax for axum 0.7. Updated to `/:param` format. |
| WASM SPK regeneration | 0.0.12 | WasmIdentity regenerated pre-keys on every `bundle_bytes()` call. Fixed by caching the bundle and storing SPK secret bytes. |
| DB lock handling | 0.0.19 | sled database lock caused cryptic panic when another warzone process was running. Added user-friendly error message with recovery instructions. |
| Dedup overflow | 0.0.16 | Dedup tracker grew unbounded. Fixed with FIFO eviction at 10,000 entries. |
| Alias normalization | 0.0.18 | Fingerprints with colons caused lookup failures. Added `normalize_fp()` to strip non-hex characters. |
| Receipt routing | 0.0.12 | Receipts sent to wrong fingerprint when switching peers in TUI. Fixed by including correct sender_fingerprint in Receipt wire messages. |
---
## Known Issues and Limitations
### Current Limitations
1. **No perfect forward secrecy in groups:** Sender Keys provide forward secrecy within a chain but not per-message PFS like Double Ratchet. Acceptable for groups under 50 members.
2. **No sealed sender:** The server sees sender and recipient fingerprints in message routing metadata. Planned for Phase 6.
3. **No server-at-rest encryption:** The sled database on the server is unencrypted. Message content is E2E encrypted, but metadata (fingerprints, timestamps, group membership) is visible to the server operator.
4. **Auth tokens in memory:** Challenge-response tokens are partially stored in memory (challenges are in a static HashMap). Production deployment should use the DB for all auth state.
5. **No rate limiting:** No protection against message flooding or registration spam. Planned for Phase 7.
6. **Single server only:** No federation between servers yet. Planned for Phase 3.
7. **No push notifications:** Users must keep a WebSocket connection open or poll. ntfy integration planned for Phase 7.
8. **Web client: no OTPKs:** The web client does not generate one-time pre-keys (cannot reliably store secrets). X3DH works without DH4, but replay protection is slightly weaker.
9. **Web client: localStorage only:** Seed and session data stored in browser localStorage. Clearing browser data = lost identity.
10. **No message ordering guarantees:** Messages may arrive out of order. The Double Ratchet handles this for decryption, but the UI does not reorder displayed messages.
---
## Roadmap: What's Next
### Phase 3 — Federation & Key Transparency (next priority)
- DNS TXT record format for server discovery
- User self-signed key publication to DNS
- Key verification: server vs DNS cross-check
- Server-to-server mutual TLS
- Federated message delivery
- Server key pinning (TOFU)
- Gossip-based peer discovery
### Phase 4 — Warzone Delivery
- Mule protocol specification and implementation
- Mule authentication and authorization
- Message pickup with capacity declaration
- Delivery receipt enforcement
- Outer encryption layer (hide metadata from mule)
- Bundle compression (zstd)
- Mule CLI binary
### Phase 5 — Transport Fallbacks
- Bluetooth mule transfer (phone-to-phone)
- LoRa transport layer (compact binary format)
- mDNS / LAN discovery for local mesh
- Wi-Fi Direct for nearby device sync
### Phase 6 — Metadata Protection
- Sealed sender (server doesn't know the sender)
- Onion routing between federated servers (opt-in)
- Padding and traffic shaping
- Traffic analysis resistance
### Phase 7 — Polish & Operations
- ntfy push notification integration
- DNS-over-HTTPS for censored networks
- Admin CLI for server management
- Rate limiting and abuse prevention
- Monitoring and health checks
- Audit logging
- Server-at-rest encryption (optional `--encrypt-db` flag)
- Cross-compilation CI (Linux x86/ARM, macOS, Windows, WASM)
- PWA: service worker, offline shell, install prompt
### Priority Order (Updated v0.0.21)
1. **Security (FC-P1)** — auth enforcement, rate limiting, device revocation
2. **TUI call integration (FC-P2)** — /call, /accept, /hangup commands
3. **Web call integration (FC-P3)** — WASM CallSignal + browser call UI
4. **Protocol hardening (FC-P4)** — session/message versioning
5. Federation (Phase 3) — multi-server deployment
6. Mule protocol (Phase 4) — physical delivery
7. Polish (FC-P6) — search, reactions, typing indicators
See `TASK_PLAN.md` for the detailed task breakdown with IDs and dependencies.
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