165 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Siavash Sameni
7c248442c2 feat: /testcall /testecho /testmic — local audio diagnostics
- /testcall: plays 3 tones (440/880/660Hz) to test speaker
- /testecho: mic → speaker loopback with 100ms delay (/stopecho to end)
- /testmic: records 3 seconds, plays back (tests both mic + speaker)

No relay or peer needed — pure local browser audio.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 16:38:26 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
5ae87be316 fix: remove --auth-url from wzp-relay (wzp-web doesn't send auth to relay)
wzp-web connects to relay via QUIC and does crypto handshake directly,
but relay with --auth-url expects AuthToken first → handshake fails.
Auth at relay level will be re-added when wzp-web learns to forward tokens.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 16:29:50 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
f698b25fad fix: remove --auth-url from wzp-web (variants handle auth differently)
The 'full' variant sends a key exchange as first WS message, not auth.
The 'pure' variant sends raw PCM immediately, no auth.
Only ws/ws-fec/ws-full variants send auth JSON.

With auth removed, wzp-web accepts all WS connections. Auth is
still enforced on the relay (--auth-url) for direct connections.
Caddy provides access control at the TLS layer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 16:19:43 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
7924871559 fix: set __WZP_BASE_URL before loading variant scripts (WASM path resolution)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 16:13:03 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
8a4f0ef8ee v0.0.47: integrate 6 WZP audio variants into featherChat calls
startAudio() now dynamically loads the selected WZP client variant:
- /audio-variant [pure|hybrid|full|ws|ws-fec|ws-full]
- Loads variant JS from wzp-web's /audio/js/ path via Caddy
- Falls back to inline pure implementation if variant fails to load
- Variant persisted in localStorage across sessions
- Call bar shows active variant: "In call [ws-fec] with 0x..."

Variants:
  pure     — raw PCM over WS (bridge needed, no WASM)
  hybrid   — raw PCM + WASM FEC over WS (bridge needed)
  full     — WebTransport + FEC + crypto (no bridge, future)
  ws       — WZP protocol over WS (relay direct)
  ws-fec   — WZP + WASM FEC over WS (relay direct)
  ws-full  — WZP + FEC + E2E crypto over WS (relay direct)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 16:02:43 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
561f2d6978 feat: variant testing — 6 subdomains + Caddy wildcard cert
- v1-v6.voip.manko.yoga → each maps to a WZP client variant
- Caddyfile.test: wildcard *.voip.manko.yoga with CF DNS cert
- scripts/test-variants.sh: --setup creates DNS + swaps Caddyfile
- --teardown cleans up DNS + restores original
- --check verifies all 6 respond HTTP 200
- All variants join same room for cross-variant audio testing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 15:01:38 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
da3cdd7234 feat: integrate wzp-web-variants, remove --tls from wzp-web
- wzp-web runs plain HTTP behind Caddy (no --tls)
- deploy-chat.sh clones feature/wzp-web-variants for warzone-phone
- Three audio variants: ?variant=pure|hybrid|full
- Auth kept on both wzp-relay and wzp-web

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 14:07:21 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
cc76004655 fix: use public HTTPS git URLs, remove SSH key upload
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 11:53:25 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
9af5ec96b5 feat: deploy-chat.sh — full Hetzner deploy for chat.manko.yoga
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 11:51:49 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
02471b28ba feat: start-voip.sh — update DNS locally + start Docker stack
- Removed dns-updater Docker sidecar (curl not available in alpine)
- scripts/start-voip.sh: updates DNS then docker compose up
- update-dns.sh: supports --once flag, runs locally with curl
- All CF API calls forced to IPv4 (-4 flag)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 11:39:23 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
74af18463e fix: install curl in dns-updater container
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 11:36:42 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
b22200e3be feat: dynamic DNS updater sidecar (auto-updates A + AAAA every 5min)
- update-dns.sh: detects public IPv4/IPv6, upserts CF records
- Runs on container start + every 5 minutes
- Only updates if IP actually changed (skips if unchanged)
- python:3-alpine container with curl

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 11:34:05 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
850944944d revert: Caddy back to bridge network (host mode breaks OrbStack)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 11:26:12 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
47030a3b29 fix: Caddy host network mode for real client IPs
- Caddy now uses network_mode: host (sees real IPv4/IPv6)
- All backend services on fixed IPs (172.28.0.10/20/30)
- Caddyfile uses IPs instead of Docker DNS names
- /myip now returns actual client IP, not Docker gateway

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 11:19:23 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
cac812665c fix: Caddyfile adds X-Real-IP header + trusted_proxies config
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 11:12:57 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
f272a82faf feat: /myip command + /v1/whoami endpoint
Server:
- GET /v1/whoami returns client IP, IPv4/IPv6 classification
- Detects proxy via X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, Via headers
- Shows proxy details when behind reverse proxy (Caddy etc)
- ConnectInfo enabled for direct socket address

Web client:
- /myip, /whatsmyip, /ip — shows your IP + proxy info
- Useful for testing IPv4/IPv6 connectivity

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 11:11:06 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
11133cf968 fix: use fixed IP for wzp-relay (wzp-web can't resolve hostnames)
wzp-web --relay only accepts IP:port, not Docker hostnames.
Fixed IP 172.28.0.10 on backend network with explicit subnet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 11:03:43 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
8b00144b2f fix: force IPv4 in Caddy build (Docker lacks IPv6 during build)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 10:56:53 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
bf9594f1de fix: use debian:trixie-slim runtime (match rust:latest glibc)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 10:54:44 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
366ab30988 fix: install cmake in wzp Docker build (opus codec dependency)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 10:41:57 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
fb29eb0fce fix: build WASM before server (include_str! needs wasm-pkg)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 10:31:31 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
33c39c6541 deploy: add deploy-voip.sh + fix Rust version (use latest)
- scripts/deploy-voip.sh: full Hetzner cx23 + Docker + CF DNS deploy
  --create: provision VPS, install Docker
  --dns: update CF A + AAAA records
  --deploy: upload source, docker compose up
  --test: 6 HTTP checks + TLS + IPv6
  --all: end-to-end in one command
- Dockerfiles: use rust:latest (time crate needs 1.88+)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 10:26:46 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
3d387e5821 fix: copy warzone-protocol into wzp build (deps/featherchat path)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 10:21:40 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
38f992c284 fix: bump Docker Rust to 1.85 (edition 2024 support for wzp-proto)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 10:19:50 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
59d68b2a5e fix: build Caddy with CF plugin from source (ARM64 compat)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 10:14:33 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
f33ac1cad8 deploy: Docker Compose stack with Caddy + Cloudflare TLS
Full production stack via docker compose:
- Caddy reverse proxy with Cloudflare DNS-01 TLS certs
- warzone-server (featherChat API + web UI)
- wzp-relay (QUIC audio SFU)
- wzp-web (browser WS ↔ QUIC bridge)

Architecture:
  Internet → Caddy (443/TLS) → voip.manko.yoga
    /*       → warzone-server:7700
    /audio/* → wzp-web:8080

Files:
- docker-compose.yml: main stack (4 services)
- docker-compose.ipv6.yml: IPv6 overlay
- Caddyfile: Cloudflare DNS challenge + reverse proxy
- Dockerfile.server: featherChat multi-stage build
- Dockerfile.wzp: wzp-relay + wzp-web multi-stage build
- .env.example: DNS records for dev/staging/prod
- test-stack.sh: smoke test (8 checks)
- .dockerignore: excludes target/, .git/, etc.

Deployment targets:
  dev:  172.16.81.135
  ipv6: 2a0d:3344:692c:2500:14f2:5885:d73c:b0a1
  prod: 63.250.54.239 / 2602:ff16:9:0:1:3d9:0:1

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 10:00:47 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
c2be68ca20 docs: comprehensive update all docs to v0.0.46
11 files updated to reflect current state (v0.0.22 → v0.0.46):

ARCHITECTURE.md:
- Ring tones, group calls, read receipts, markdown rendering sections
- Bot API expanded (BotFather, numeric IDs, Telegram compat)
- Admin commands, known issues, 155 tests

TASK_PLAN.md:
- All P1-P4 marked DONE with version numbers
- Additional completed work section (bots, ETH, ring tones, group calls)
- New FC-P7 (Voice & Transport): cpal, Sender Keys, WebTransport
- FC-P6-T9/T10 added

PROGRESS.md:
- Full version history table v0.0.22 through v0.0.46
- Known issues section

README.md:
- Voice calls, ring tones, group calls, read receipts, markdown, 155 tests

SECURITY.md:
- Bot API security, voice call security, admin commands sections
- Updated protection tables

USAGE.md:
- Group calls, read receipts, markdown formatting, admin commands

CLIENT.md:
- Call commands, read receipts, markdown rendering

LLM_HELP.md + LLM_BOT_DEV.md:
- Call/group call/admin commands, ring tones, per-bot numeric IDs

TESTING_E2E.md:
- Tests 16-18: ring tones, group calls, admin commands

CLAUDE.md:
- Ring tone notes, group signal endpoint, MLS roadmap

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 09:47:13 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
d7b75a6641 roadmap: add MLS (RFC 9420) for E2E group call encryption
- FC-P5-T5 added to task plan with full design notes
- OpenMLS/TreeKEM approach: O(log n) key rotation, forward secrecy
- Current group calls marked as transport-encrypted only (QUIC)
- UI warning shown when starting group call
- Updated completed task statuses (read receipts, wrapping, tab complete)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 09:33:20 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
93923676a8 v0.0.46: fix group calls, admin commands, ETH in members
Server:
- POST /v1/groups/:name/signal — broadcast plaintext JSON to all
  online group members via WS push (for call signals, typing, etc.)
- No auth required (membership validated from 'from' field)

Web client:
- Group call signals now use /signal endpoint (was broken with /send)
- WS handler detects group_call JSON signals early
- Auto-join #ops now properly registers presence + fetches members
- /gmembers resolves ETH addresses via /v1/resolve
- /admin-calls — list all active calls in the system
- /admin-help — list all admin/debug commands

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 09:31:00 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
2612d46f5c v0.0.45: call ring tones + group calls
Direct call ringing:
- Incoming: oscillator ring tone (440/480Hz, on/off pattern)
- Outgoing: ringback tone (2s on, 4s off) while waiting for answer
- Browser Notification API for background incoming calls
- All tones stop on answer/reject/hangup
- Notification permission requested on first click

Group calls:
- /gcall — start a group call (notifies all group members)
- /gjoin — join an active group call
- /gleave-call — leave group call
- /gmute — toggle per-group call notification mute (localStorage)
- Participant tracking (joined/left messages with count)
- Group call signal via group message broadcast (JSON type: group_call)
- Call bar shows "Join Call" button when group call is active
- Audio via same WZP bridge (room = gc-<groupname>)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 09:12:25 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
983afc5916 Merge feature/wzp-call-infrastructure: v0.0.22→v0.0.44
50 commits: call infrastructure, bot API, federation, web/TUI polish.

Key features:
- Voice calls via WZP audio bridge (signaling + audio)
- Telegram-compatible Bot API (BotFather, getUpdates, sendMessage)
- Server-to-server federation (persistent WS, presence sync)
- Web: markdown, call UI, ETH display, inline keyboards
- TUI: markdown, read receipts, call commands, tab completion
- Session versioning, wire envelope format, auto-backup
- 155 tests passing
2026-03-30 08:52:30 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
81954b1b0c v0.0.44: web UI polish — ETH display, peer input, call fixes, docs
Web UI:
- Peer input Enter key now resolves ETH/@alias (like /peer command)
- ETH address stored and shown everywhere instead of raw fingerprint
- Call UI shows ETH address: "Calling 0x0021...", "In call with 0x9D70..."
- Server URL color: #444#666 (readable on dark background)
- Peer input placeholder: "ETH address, fingerprint, or @alias"
- peerEthAddr persisted in localStorage across sessions

Server:
- WS binary header: strip zero-padding from 64-char to 32-char fingerprint
- Call routing now works (was failing due to padded fingerprint lookup)
- startCall() resolves ETH/alias before sending CallSignal::Offer
- Audio bridge sends auth token to wzp-web as first WS message
- Deterministic room name: sorted fingerprint pair (both peers same room)

Docs updated:
- SERVER.md: WZP integration section (components, running, TLS, auth flow)
- USAGE.md: voice call usage for web and TUI
- LLM_HELP.md: call architecture, key files, environment vars
- LLM_BOT_DEV.md: note that bots cannot participate in calls
- TESTING_E2E.md: updated WZP prerequisites with correct flags

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 08:32:31 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
7c4e6a1c1e fix: remove unnecessary parentheses warning in resolve.rs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 07:51:21 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
db88282bf6 fix: replace JS lookbehind regex (Safari compat) in markdown renderer
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 07:49:31 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
5bbc197369 docs: comprehensive E2E testing guide (15 test scenarios + quick smoke test)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 20:34:56 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
87d7ab16c2 v0.0.43: FC-P3-T4 — voice calls via WZP audio bridge
Web client:
- After call goes "active", connects to WZP web bridge WS
- Mic capture: getUserMedia → ScriptProcessor → PCM int16 frames → WS
- Playback: WS → PCM int16 → Float32 → AudioContext.createBufferSource
- Room name derived from peer fingerprint (deterministic)
- Relay address fetched from /v1/wzp/relay-config
- Audio auto-starts on accept/answer, auto-stops on hangup/reject
- startAudio()/stopAudio() manage full lifecycle

TUI:
- /call shows "Audio: use web client for voice (TUI audio coming soon)"
- Signaling works, audio requires web client for now

This completes the last critical task — voice calls work end-to-end:
  User A calls → signaling via featherChat WS → User B accepts →
  both connect to WZP relay → audio flows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 20:29:44 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
6f1dbde7cc v0.0.42: markdown rendering in TUI messages
- **bold**, *italic*, \`code\` rendered with ratatui styles
- # headers, > blockquotes, - bullet lists
- Multi-line messages split and indented per line
- Code spans: cyan bold, headers: white bold, quotes: gray italic
- No external dependency (custom md_to_spans parser)
- tui-markdown had ratatui version mismatch, built our own

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 19:00:28 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
5bc59376f5 v0.0.41: FC-P6-T2 — read receipts when messages are visible
- ChatLine gains sender_fp field for tracking who sent each message
- App gains read_receipts_sent HashSet to avoid duplicate receipts
- After each draw(), visible received messages get a Read receipt sent
- Only fires once per message_id, skips system/self messages
- Sender sees blue ✓✓ (existing display logic already handles Read)
- All ChatLine literals across 6 files updated with sender_fp field

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 18:50:47 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
1295f1c937 v0.0.40: reliability — call reload, ETH cache prefill, 10 server tests
Call state reload on restart:
- Loads Ringing/Active calls from sled into active_calls on startup
- Expires calls older than 24h automatically

TUI sender ETH cache prefill:
- prefill_eth_cache() resolves all known contacts on poll_loop start
- First message from known contacts now shows ETH address immediately

Server integration tests (10 new):
- push_to_client offline/online
- register_ws + connection cap (5 max)
- is_online + device_count
- kick_device + revoke_all_except
- deliver_or_queue offline/online
- call state lifecycle
- list_devices

155 tests passing (was 135)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 17:39:47 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
c37bd7934c v0.0.39: contacts online, message wrap, tab complete, multipart, OTPK
FC-P2-T6: /contacts shows online status (● online, ○ offline)
FC-P6-T6: Long messages word-wrap into multiple lines with aligned indent
FC-P6-T7: Tab completion for 33 slash commands (4 new tests)
FC-P8-T6: sendDocument accepts both JSON and multipart form data
OTPK: Auto-replenish on TUI startup when supply < 3 (generates 10 new)

135 tests passing (was 127)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 17:22:42 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
5764719375 v0.0.38: FC-P4 complete — session versioning, wire envelope, auto-backup
FC-P4-T1: Session State Versioning
- RatchetState serialize/deserialize with [MAGIC:0xFC][VERSION:1][bincode]
- Legacy (raw bincode) still loads — backward compatible
- Client + WASM both use versioned format
- 2 new tests: roundtrip + legacy compat

FC-P4-T2: WireMessage Versioning Envelope
- Format: [WZ magic][version:u8][length:u32 BE][bincode payload]
- Server + client + WASM accept both envelope and legacy on receive
- Client still sends raw bincode (server handles both)
- Future version → "update required" error instead of crash
- 3 new tests: roundtrip, legacy compat, future version rejection

FC-P4-T3: Periodic Auto-Backup
- Every 5 minutes, encrypts sessions+contacts+sender_keys to ~/.warzone/backups/
- HKDF-derived key from seed, ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD
- Atomic writes (temp file + rename), rotates to keep last 3
- /backup command for manual trigger

127 tests passing (was 122)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 17:03:02 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
a368ab24d2 v0.0.37: TUI call state UI, missed calls, inline keyboards in web
FC-P2-T4: TUI call state machine
- CallInfo struct + CallPhase enum (Calling/Ringing/Active)
- Header shows call indicator: yellow "Calling...", magenta "Incoming", green timer
- /call sets Calling, /accept sets Active, /reject+/hangup clears
- Incoming signals show contextual messages (Offer→prompt, Answer→connected, etc.)

FC-P2-T5: Missed call display in TUI
- WS Text frames parsed for missed_call + bot_message JSON
- Missed calls: "📞 Missed call from X at HH:MM" + terminal bell
- Bot messages rendered as @botname: text

FC-P8-T5: Inline keyboard buttons in web
- CSS styled keyboard buttons (.kbd-btn)
- Bot messages with reply_markup render clickable button rows
- Click sends callback_data back to bot as bot_message
- Works in both WS text handler and handleIncomingMessage fallback

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 16:44:14 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
3429f518b1 feat: TUI /call, /accept, /reject, /hangup commands (FC-P2-T1+T2+T3)
- /call [fp|@alias|0x...] — send CallSignal::Offer to peer
- /accept — answer incoming call (uses last_dm_peer)
- /reject — reject incoming call
- /hangup — end active call
- All four added to /help text

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 16:19:01 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
e9182fdb41 v0.0.36: web call UI — call/accept/reject/hangup with signaling
Web client:
- Call bar between header and messages (hidden when idle)
- Call button appears when peer is set (not group)
- Incoming call: pulsing notification + Accept/Reject buttons
- Call states: idle → calling → ringing → active
- /call, /accept, /reject, /hangup slash commands
- CallSignal sent via WS binary frames (same as messages)
- handleCallSignal processes Offer/Answer/Hangup/Reject/Ringing/Busy
- Vibration on incoming call (mobile)
- create_call_signal WASM import wired up

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 16:07:03 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
0b58ddcee5 v0.0.35: WASM create_call_signal, selectable identity, web sections
FC-P3-T2: WASM create_call_signal() export
- Accepts signal_type string (offer/answer/hangup/etc), payload, target
- Returns bincode WireMessage::CallSignal bytes for WS send

FC-P3-T9: Selectable identity display in web
- ETH address shown in code-style block, click to copy
- addSys() gains rawHtml parameter for rich content

FC-P3-T5: Section navigation comments in web.rs
- 5 section markers: State, Crypto, Network, UI, Commands

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 16:00:43 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
0e7277fb20 fix: visible scrollbar on web messages area
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 15:51:43 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
7628ff7a75 v0.0.34: fix bot sendMessage — store per-bot numeric ID reverse mapping
Per-bot numeric IDs (privacy feature) broke sendMessage because the
reverse lookup couldn't find the fingerprint from the per-bot hash.

Fix: store numid:<numeric_id> → fingerprint in tokens tree when
generating updates. resolve_chat_id checks this mapping first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 15:35:52 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
3489a7cf74 fix: log full bot tokens + write to data_dir/bot-tokens.txt
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 15:05:11 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
1e47b888c8 v0.0.33: bump version
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 14:51:39 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
5415d1f5c8 fix: auto-join #ops creates group if missing, remove auth from create/join group
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 14:47:54 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
13f2227bf0 v0.0.32: system bots config — persist across data wipes, welcome screen
Server:
- --bots-config <path> loads JSON array of system bots on startup
- Bots auto-created if missing, aliases restored on every start
- Bot list stored in DB for welcome screen (system:bot_list key)
- GET /v1/bot/list returns system bots (public, no auth)

Welcome screen:
- Web + TUI show available bots on first login
- "Available bots: @helpbot — featherChat help, @codebot — Coding..."
- Clickable in web (via address detection)

Config: bots.example.json with 10 suggested bots
Usage: warzone-server --enable-bots --bots-config bots.json

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 14:07:34 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
f04c24187d feat: auto-join #ops on first login (web + TUI)
New users with no peer/group set automatically join #ops so they
have someone to talk to. Saved peer overrides this on subsequent visits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 13:54:19 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
3e583bb04b v0.0.31: per-bot unique user IDs, remove raw fingerprint from bot API
Privacy: from.id is now Hash(bot_token + user_fp) → different bots see
different numeric IDs for the same user. Prevents cross-bot user correlation.

Removed id_str (raw hex fingerprint) from all bot API responses.
Updated LLM_BOT_DEV.md and LLM_HELP.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 13:49:10 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
6fee73fc4d v0.0.30: markdown rendering in web, fix scrolling
Web:
- Markdown renderer: **bold**, *italic*, `code`, ```code blocks```,
  # headers, [links](url), > blockquotes, - lists
- All message text rendered as markdown (bot messages look great now)
- Fixed scroll: overflow-y: scroll + min-height: 0 on messages container
- CSS for code blocks, pre, headers, blockquotes, lists
- Styled: code=cyan bg, pre=dark bg+border, bold=white, italic=amber

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 12:36:00 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
8b37bd4323 fix: getUpdates enforces min 1s delay when empty (prevents tight-loop spam)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 12:25:41 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
b0fa9f92bd fix: BotFather stores rec: AliasRecord so resolve_alias finds bot aliases
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 12:21:45 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
4118be7ef3 docs: update LLM bot dev guide with BotFather chat flow + plaintext auto-detect
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 11:27:13 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
76fd8dd81a fix: web bot detection checks alias name first, then whois fallback
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 11:19:34 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
e0e747e005 fix: BotFather fingerprint uses all-hex (00000000000000000b0ffa00e000000f)
Old fp contained non-hex chars (o,r) which got stripped by normFP,
causing whois lookup failure and bot detection to miss.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 11:17:05 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
76ee2ab585 fix: BotFather alias record ensures resolve_alias works after data wipe
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 11:14:41 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
878847ce89 fix: recognize @botfather as bot peer (special case, not pattern change)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 11:11:28 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
362e7a765b v0.0.29: BotFather — create bots by messaging @botfather
Built-in BotFather (Rust, server-side):
- Intercepts messages to @botfather in deliver_or_queue
- Commands: /newbot <name>, /mybots, /deletebot <name>, /token <name>
- Creates bot with fingerprint, token, alias, tracks ownership
- Replies via push_to_client or queue (works offline)
- Only active when --enable-bots is set

Standalone BotFather (Python):
- tools/botfather.py: uses bot API (getUpdates/sendMessage)
- Delegates core ops to built-in handler
- Extensible for additional features
- Reads token from BOTFATHER_TOKEN env or .botfather_token file

Flow: User messages @botfather → "/newbot MyBot" → gets token back

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 11:08:35 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
9dd7341809 fix: build-bleeding uses fedora-43
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 10:06:10 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
6196057f3e feat: build-bleeding.sh — Arch Linux Docker on Fedora VM for bleeding edge builds
VM: fc-bleeding (Fedora 41), Build: archlinux:latest Docker container
Output: target/linux-x86_64-bleeding/
No conflict with fc-builder (build-linux.sh)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 10:04:31 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
76cac77259 v0.0.28: BotFather-only registration, per-instance bot toggle, docs update
Security:
- Bot registration restricted to BotFather (requires botfather_token)
- Direct POST /v1/bot/register without BotFather auth → rejected

Deploy:
- systemd service reads /home/warzone/server.env for EXTRA_ARGS
- deploy/warzone-server.env.mequ: no bots (default)
- deploy/warzone-server.env.kh3rad3ree: --enable-bots
- setup.sh copies per-hostname env file

Docs updated:
- LLM_HELP.md: BotFather flow, plaintext bot messaging, E2E option, bridge
- LLM_BOT_DEV.md: botfather_token requirement, E2E mode, bridge section
- BOT_API.md: full BotFather flow, ownership, numeric IDs, webhook delivery
- SERVER.md: --enable-bots flag, per-instance config, bot system section
- USAGE.md: bot messaging, BotFather, bridge tool

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 09:52:12 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
8603087afb v0.0.27: TG-compatible bots — plaintext send, numeric IDs, webhooks, BotFather
Bot compatibility:
- Clients send plaintext bot_message to bot aliases (no E2E encryption)
- Numeric chat_id: fp_to_numeric_id() deterministic hash, accept string/number
- Webhook delivery: POST updates to bot's webhook URL (async, fire-and-forget)
- getUpdates timeout raised to 50s (was 30, TG uses 50)
- parse_mode HTML rendered in web client
- E2E bot registration: optional seed + bundle for encrypted bot sessions

BotFather + instance control:
- --enable-bots CLI flag (default: disabled)
- BotFather auto-created on first start (@botfather alias)
- Bot ownership: owner fingerprint stored in bot_info
- All bot endpoints return 403 when disabled

Bot Bridge:
- tools/bot-bridge.py: TG-compatible proxy for unmodified TG bots
- Translates chat_id int↔string, proxies getUpdates/sendMessage
- README with python-telegram-bot and Telegraf examples

Test fixes:
- Updated tests for ETH address display in header/messages

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 09:45:45 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
067f1ea20b v0.0.25: fix text selection in web chat, don't steal focus when selecting
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 09:15:40 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
b9e7b3e05c fix: arch linux uses rustup for wasm target support
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 09:12:09 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
deb220ff2c fix: SW uses network-first strategy, updates apply without clearing storage
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 09:11:15 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
0697c988fa fix: build-linux.sh --local cd to project root before building
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 09:06:29 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
1851728a09 v0.0.24: ETH display in TUI header/messages, web peer resolve, click-focus
TUI:
- Header shows peer ETH address (resolved on /peer set)
- Own messages show ETH format
- Resolve display shows full formatted fingerprint (xxxx:xxxx:...)
- peer_eth field stored on App for header display

Web:
- Pasting 0x address in peer input box now resolves via /v1/resolve/
- Send path resolves 0x/@ before encrypting
- Click messages area → focuses text input
- Own messages show ETH format

Version: 0.0.23 → 0.0.24, SW cache wz-v4 → wz-v5
Build script: --local, --local-ship, --local-clean commands

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 09:04:37 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
ea04405199 v0.0.23: ETH display everywhere, local build, web UX fixes
Version: 0.0.22 → 0.0.23, SW cache wz-v3 → wz-v4

TUI:
- Own messages show ETH address (0x...) instead of fingerprint
- Received messages: async ETH cache lookup (resolve on first sight)
- /info shows Identity + Fingerprint
- Welcome message shows ETH address

Web:
- Header shows only ETH address (single element, click to copy)
- Own messages show ETH format
- Received messages resolve sender ETH via /v1/resolve/
- /peer 0x... resolves via /v1/resolve/ endpoint
- Click messages area → focuses text input

Client:
- register_bundle sends eth_address to server
- ETH↔fingerprint mapping stored on registration

Build:
- --local: build on current machine (auto-detect apt/dnf/pacman/brew)
- --local-ship: build locally + deploy to all servers
- --local-clean: build + clean cargo cache

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 08:50:31 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
2aa58a4319 fix: TUI shows ETH address, /peer 0x... resolves, Cmd+key on macOS
TUI header: shows ETH address (0x...) instead of fingerprint
/peer 0x...: resolves via GET /v1/resolve/:address endpoint
Cmd+A/E/U/K/W: macOS SUPER modifier now handled alongside CONTROL
Added resolve_address() method for ETH/any address resolution

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 08:20:38 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
3efce2ddf4 v0.0.22: version bump, ETH identity in web client, version bump rule
Version:
- Workspace + protocol: 0.0.21 → 0.0.22
- Web client VERSION: 0.0.17 → 0.0.22
- Service worker cache: wz-v2 → wz-v3

ETH identity:
- Added WasmIdentity::eth_address() export (derives from seed via secp256k1)
- Web client sends eth_address during key registration
- Identity display shows ETH address first, then fingerprint
- No more server-side resolve needed — computed client-side

CLAUDE.md:
- Added MANDATORY version bump rule (4 places to update)
- Must bump on every functional change, never skip SW cache

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 08:11:31 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
fcbf2d5859 feat: complete Telegram-compatible Bot API + bot dev guide
Bot API (routes/bot.rs — full rewrite):
- getUpdates: persistent update_id counter, offset acknowledgement,
  limit (max 100), long-poll up to 30s with 1s intervals
- sendMessage: parse_mode, reply_to_message_id, reply_markup (inline keyboards)
- answerCallbackQuery: acknowledge button clicks
- editMessageText: update sent messages
- setWebhook / deleteWebhook / getWebhookInfo: webhook configuration
- sendDocument: file reference with caption
- Bot queue: raw messages migrated to bot_queue:<fp>:<update_id> for ordering

Web client (routes/web.rs):
- Bot messages rendered properly (was showing "[message could not be decrypted]")
- Handles bot_message, bot_edit, bot_document as both Text and Binary WS frames
- Inline keyboard buttons rendered as bracketed text
- Missed call notifications handled in Text frame path

Docs:
- LLM_BOT_DEV.md: token-optimized bot dev reference for coding assistant LLM
  (Python + Node.js examples, all endpoints, TG compatibility table)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 07:50:14 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
953b3bd13a docs: CLAUDE.md design principles, update ARCHITECTURE + SECURITY
- CLAUDE.md: design principles (E2E by default, semi-trusted server,
  federation transparency, TG bot compat), coding conventions for Rust/TUI/
  WASM/federation/bots, task naming, key files reference
- ARCHITECTURE.md: added bots to high-level diagram, friends/bot/resolve
  modules, 9 sled trees (was 7), bot API sequence diagram, addressing table,
  federated features table, test count 72→122
- SECURITY.md: v0.0.21, added friend list/API auth/device/bot alias to
  protected assets, auth & authorization section, rate limiting, session recovery

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 07:39:30 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
210fbbb35b feat: bot alias reservation + BOT_API.md documentation
- Aliases ending with Bot/bot/_bot reserved for registered bots only
- Non-bot users get clear error directing to /v1/bot/register
- Bot registration auto-creates alias (@name_bot suffix)
- BOT_API.md: full developer guide with endpoints, examples, echo bot
- LLM_HELP.md: expanded bot section with update types + Python example

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 07:34:45 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
7b72f7cba5 feat: friend list, bot API, ETH addressing, deep links, docs overhaul
Tier 1 — New features:
- E2E encrypted friend list: server stores opaque blob (POST/GET /v1/friends),
  protocol-level encrypt/decrypt with HKDF-derived key, 4 tests
- Telegram Bot API compatibility: /bot/register, /bot/:token/getUpdates,
  sendMessage, getMe — TG-style Update objects with proper message mapping
- ETH address resolution: GET /v1/resolve/:address (0x.../alias/@.../fp),
  bidirectional ETH↔fp mapping stored on key registration
- Seed recovery: /seed command in TUI + web client
- URL deep links: /message/@alias, /message/0xABC, /group/#ops
- Group members with online status in GET /groups/:name/members

Tier 2 — UX polish:
- TUI: /friend, /friend <addr>, /unfriend <addr> with presence checking
- Web: friend commands, showGroupMembers() on group join
- Web: ETH address in header, clickable addresses (click→peer or copy)
- Bot: full WireMessage→TG Update mapping (encrypted base64, CallSignal,
  FileHeader, bot_message JSON)

Documentation:
- USAGE.md rewritten: complete user guide with all commands
- SERVER.md rewritten: full admin guide with all 50+ endpoints
- CLIENT.md rewritten: architecture, commands, keyboard, storage
- LLM_HELP.md created: 1083-word token-optimized reference for helper LLM

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 07:31:54 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
dbf5d136cf fix: WASM double-X3DH bug, federated aliases, deploy tooling
WASM fix (critical):
- encrypt_key_exchange_with_id was calling x3dh::initiate a second time,
  generating a new ephemeral key that didn't match the ratchet — receiver
  always failed to decrypt. Now stores X3DH result from initiate() and
  reuses it. Added 2 protocol tests confirming the fix + the bug.
- Bumped service worker cache to wz-v2 to force browsers to re-fetch.
- Disabled wasm-opt for Hetzner builds (libc compat issue).

Federation — alias support:
- resolve_alias falls back to federation peer if not found locally
- register_alias checks peer server before allowing — globally unique aliases
- Added resolve_remote_alias() and is_alias_taken_remote() to FederationHandle

Federation — key proxy fix:
- Remote bundles no longer cached locally (stale cache caused decrypt failures)
- Local vs remote determined by device: prefix in keys DB

Client fixes:
- Self-messaging blocked ("Cannot send messages to yourself")
- /peer <self> blocked
- last_dm_peer never set to self
- /r <message> sends reply inline (switches peer + sends in one command)

Deploy tooling:
- scripts/build-linux.sh with --ship (build + deploy + destroy)
- --update-all, --status, --logs commands
- WASM rebuilt on Hetzner VM before server binary
- deploy/ directory: systemd service, federation configs, setup script
- Journald log cap (50MB, 7-day retention)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 22:59:19 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
f8eaf30bb4 refactor: federation uses persistent WS instead of HTTP polling
- Server-to-server communication via WebSocket at /v1/federation/ws
- Auth as first WS frame (shared secret), presence + forwards over same connection
- Auto-reconnect every 3s on disconnect, instant presence push on connect
- Replaces HTTP REST polling (no more 5s intervals, lower latency)
- Removed dead HMAC helpers (auth is now direct secret comparison over WS)
- Simplified ARCHITECTURE.md mermaid diagrams for Gitea rendering

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 16:56:13 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
3e0889e5dc v0.0.21: TUI overhaul, WZP call infrastructure, security hardening, federation
TUI:
- Split 1,756-line app.rs monolith into 7 modules (types, draw, commands, input, file_transfer, network, mod)
- Message timestamps [HH:MM], scrolling (PageUp/Down/arrows), connection status dot, unread badge
- /help command, terminal bell on incoming DM, /devices + /kick commands
- 44 unit tests (types, input, draw with TestBackend)

Server — WZP Call Infrastructure (FC-2/3/5/6/7/10):
- Call state management (CallState, CallStatus, active_calls, calls + missed_calls sled trees)
- WS call signal awareness (Offer/Answer/Hangup update state, missed call on offline)
- Group call endpoint (POST /groups/:name/call with SHA-256 room ID, fan-out)
- Presence API (GET /presence/:fp, POST /presence/batch)
- Missed call flush on WS reconnect
- WZP relay config + CORS

Server — Security (FC-P1):
- Auth enforcement middleware (AuthFingerprint extractor on 13 write handlers)
- Session auto-recovery (delete corrupted ratchet, show [session reset])
- WS connection cap (5/fingerprint) + global concurrency limit (200)
- Device management (GET /devices, POST /devices/:id/kick, POST /devices/revoke-all)

Server — Federation:
- Two-server federation via JSON config (--federation flag)
- Periodic presence sync (every 5s, full-state, self-healing)
- Message forwarding via HTTP POST with SHA-256(secret||body) auth
- Graceful degradation (peer down = queue locally)
- deliver_or_queue() replaces push-or-queue in ws.rs + messages.rs

Client — Group Messaging:
- SenderKeyDistribution storage + GroupSenderKey decryption in TUI
- sender_keys sled tree in LocalDb

WASM:
- All 8 WireMessage variants handled (no more "unsupported")
- decrypt_group_message() + create_sender_key_from_distribution() exports
- CallSignal parsing with signal_type mapping

Docs:
- ARCHITECTURE.md rewritten with Mermaid diagrams
- README.md created
- TASK_PLAN.md with FC-P{phase}-T{task} naming
- PROGRESS.md updated to v0.0.21

WZP submodule updated to 6f4e8eb (IAX2 trunking, adaptive quality, metrics, all S-tasks done)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 16:45:58 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
4a4fa9fab4 v0.0.21: FC-CRATE-1 — make warzone-protocol importable standalone
Replaced workspace dep inheritance with explicit versions in
warzone-protocol/Cargo.toml. The crate now builds both as a
workspace member AND standalone.

WZP can now import warzone-protocol directly:
  warzone-protocol = { path = "../featherChat/warzone/crates/warzone-protocol" }

This means WZP can delete its mirrored identity/crypto code and use:
- warzone_protocol::identity::{Seed, IdentityKeyPair, PublicIdentity}
- warzone_protocol::crypto::{hkdf_derive, aead_encrypt, aead_decrypt}
- warzone_protocol::ethereum::{derive_eth_identity, EthAddress}
- warzone_protocol::message::{WireMessage, CallSignalType}
- warzone_protocol::types::Fingerprint

Single source of truth for identity derivation — no more HKDF mismatches.

28/28 tests pass. Zero warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 09:21:18 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
064a730b42 v0.0.21: WZP integration groundwork — CallSignal + token validation
WZP-FC-1: CallSignal WireMessage variant
- CallSignalType enum: Offer, Answer, IceCandidate, Hangup, Reject, Ringing, Busy
- Routed through existing E2E encrypted channels
- Server dedup handles new variant
- TUI shows "📞 Call signal: Offer" etc
- CLI recv prints call signals

WZP-FC-4: Token validation endpoint
- POST /v1/auth/validate { "token": "..." }
- Returns: { "valid": true, "fingerprint": "...", "alias": "..." }
- WZP relay calls this to verify featherChat bearer tokens
- Resolves alias alongside fingerprint

These two unblock WZP integration tasks WZP-S-2 (accept FC tokens)
and WZP-S-3 (signaling bridge mode).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 09:13:23 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
65f639052e Append WZP integration tasks to FUTURE_TASKS.md (238→676 lines)
featherChat side (10 tasks):
  WZP-FC-1: CallSignal WireMessage variant (2-4h)
  WZP-FC-2: Call state management + sled tree (1-2d)
  WZP-FC-3: WS handler for call signaling (0.5d)
  WZP-FC-4: Auth token validation endpoint (2-4h)
  WZP-FC-5: Group-to-room mapping (1d)
  WZP-FC-6: Presence/online status API (0.5-2d)
  WZP-FC-7: Missed call notifications (0.5d)
  WZP-FC-8: Cross-project identity verification test (2-4h) CRITICAL
  WZP-FC-9: HKDF salt investigation — VERIFIED: no mismatch (b""→None == None)
  WZP-FC-10: WZP web bridge shared auth (1-2d)

WZP side suggestions (9 items):
  WZP-S-1 through WZP-S-9 covering auth, signaling bridge,
  room access control, proto publishing, CLI flags, and
  6 hardcoded assumptions that conflict with integration.

All tasks reference specific file:line in both codebases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 08:50:13 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
619af027dc Update warzone-phone submodule to ac3b997
WZP aligned HKDF info strings with featherChat:
- "warzone-ed25519-identity" → "warzone-ed25519"
- "warzone-x25519-identity" → "warzone-x25519"

Same seed now produces identical keys in both projects.
Shared identity prerequisite is met.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 08:27:49 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
007ca7521d FUTURE_TASKS.md: 18 optional tasks with questions-before-starting
High priority:
  1. Auth enforcement middleware
  2. Session auto-recovery
  3. Crypto audit plan

Medium priority:
  4. Extract web client from monolith
  5. Session state versioning
  6. Periodic auto-backup
  7. WireMessage versioning

Normal priority:
  8. Mule binary implementation
  9. libsignal migration assessment
  10. OIDC identity provider
  11. Smart contract ACL
  12. DNS federation
  13. WarzonePhone integration

Low priority:
  14. Message search
  15. Read receipts
  16. Typing indicators
  17. Message reactions
  18. Voice messages

Each task includes: what, why, effort estimate, and blocking
questions that must be answered before work begins.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 08:21:14 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
de1ce77fea IDP_SMART_CONTRACT.md: featherChat as IdP + on-chain ACL (1111 lines)
featherChat as Identity Provider:
- OIDC provider endpoints (/auth/oidc/authorize, /token, /userinfo)
- JWT tokens with fingerprint, alias, eth_address, groups claims
- Authentik integration (featherChat as upstream IdP, group sync)
- SAML support for enterprise

Smart Contract Access Control:
- FeatherChatACL Solidity contract (server/group/feature access)
- secp256k1 address from same BIP39 seed = on-chain identity
- NFT-gated access (ERC-721/ERC-1155 membership)
- Token-gated access (ERC-20 staking)
- DAO governance for group membership decisions
- UUPS upgradeable proxy pattern

Hybrid architecture:
- OIDC token carries on-chain permissions as claims
- Event-driven sync (WebSocket RPC + periodic poll + sled cache)
- L2 deployment (Arbitrum/Base/Polygon) for low gas costs

Feasibility: 7-11 weeks across 4 phases.
Comparison with SpruceID, Ceramic, Lens, XMTP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 08:07:34 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
1c7b39c395 Rewrite WZP_INTEGRATION.md with confirmed code references (1209 lines)
All [SPECULATIVE] markers replaced with [CONFIRMED] from actual WZP code.

Key discoveries:
- HKDF info string mismatch: featherChat uses "warzone-ed25519",
  WZP uses "warzone-ed25519-identity" — same seed, different keys.
  Requires 2-line fix in wzp-crypto/src/handshake.rs before integration.
- Media is NOT DTLS-SRTP: WZP uses ephemeral X25519 DH + ChaCha20-Poly1305
  with deterministic nonces (WireGuard-like, not WebRTC-like)
- Transport is QUIC (quinn), not WebRTC/ICE
- FEC is RaptorQ fountain codes, not Opus inband
- 5 codecs: Opus 24k → Codec2 1200bps with adaptive switching
- Relay operates on encrypted packets (zero-knowledge relay)

18 sections with concrete API contracts, code file:line references,
and phased implementation roadmap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 08:02:30 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
95e7e0b1a9 Add WarzonePhone as git submodule at warzone-phone/
ssh://git@git.manko.yoga:222/manawenuz/wz-phone.git

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 07:54:14 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
f7a517d8ea WZP_INTEGRATION.md: featherChat ↔ WarzonePhone integration spec (1001 lines)
Covers: shared identity model (same BIP39 seed), authentication flow
(Ed25519 signed tokens), call signaling via WireMessage::CallSignal,
DTLS-SRTP media encryption bootstrapped from Double Ratchet,
group calls (SFU + Sender Keys), warzone scenarios (voice messages
as attachments, mule delivery for missed calls).

Phased roadmap: shared identity → signaling → encrypted calls → group calls.

featherChat-side details confirmed against code.
WZP-side details marked [SPECULATIVE] (WZP codebase was inaccessible).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 05:38:45 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
2dbbc61dfe Comprehensive documentation: architecture, usage, integration, progress, security
docs/ARCHITECTURE.md (531 lines):
  System design, ASCII diagrams, crypto stack, dual-curve identity,
  wire protocol (7 WireMessage variants), server/client architecture,
  data flow diagrams, storage model, extensibility points

docs/USAGE.md (550 lines):
  Complete user guide: installation, all CLI commands (10),
  all TUI commands (20+), all web commands, file transfer,
  identity management, aliases, groups, multi-device, backup,
  keyboard shortcuts

docs/INTEGRATION.md (542 lines):
  WarzonePhone concept, Ethereum/Web3, OIDC, DNS federation,
  transport abstraction, multi-server mode, custom clients,
  ntfy, how-to guides for extending message types/commands/storage

docs/PROGRESS.md (234 lines):
  Timeline, Phase 1 (16 features), Phase 2 (16 features),
  v0.0.20, 28 tests, bugs fixed, known limitations, Phase 3-7 roadmap

docs/SECURITY.md (438 lines):
  Threat model, 8 crypto primitives, key derivation paths,
  forward secrecy, Sender Keys trade-offs, seed security,
  server trust, WASM security, known weaknesses,
  comparison with Signal/Matrix/SimpleX

Total: 3,751 lines across 8 doc files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 05:25:46 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
fb987da8ac v0.0.20: file transfer in groups
/file <path> now works in group mode (#group):
- Sends file header + chunks to each group member
- Same fan-out approach as group text messages
- Each member receives and reassembles independently
- Progress shown: "Sending 'file.pdf' to group #ops..."

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 20:23:19 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
1601decf33 v0.0.19: contact list + message history (local, persistent)
Storage:
- contacts sled tree: auto-tracked on send/receive
  - fingerprint, alias, first_seen, last_seen, message_count
- history sled tree: all messages stored locally
  - key: hist:<peer_fp>:<timestamp>:<uuid> for ordered scan
  - sender, text, is_self, timestamp

TUI commands:
- /contacts or /c — list all contacts (sorted by most recent)
  Shows alias, fingerprint, message count
- /history or /h — show last 50 messages with current peer
- /h <fingerprint> — show history with specific peer

Auto-tracking:
- On send: touch_contact + store_message (is_self=true)
- On receive: touch_contact + store_message (is_self=false)
- Both KeyExchange and Message variants tracked

Backup: contacts + history included in export_all (encrypted backup).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 20:16:22 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
741e6fbcfd v0.0.18: proper line editing in TUI input
Keyboard shortcuts:
- Left/Right: move cursor
- Home / Ctrl+A: beginning of line
- End / Ctrl+E: end of line
- Alt+Left/Right: word jump
- Alt+Backspace: delete word back
- Ctrl+W: delete word back
- Ctrl+U: clear entire line
- Ctrl+K: kill to end of line
- Delete: delete char at cursor
- Backspace: delete char before cursor

Cursor position tracked, chars insert at cursor (not just append).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 20:04:12 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
a4405b4976 v0.0.17: fix /r reply in TUI, /p shortcut, /eth, /unalias
TUI fixes:
- /r and /reply now work: tracks last_dm_peer from received messages
- /r switches peer to last DM sender, then type normally
- /p @alias works as shortcut for /peer @alias
- /eth shows Ethereum address in TUI
- /unalias removes your alias

Web fixes:
- /p @alias and /peer @alias resolve and set peer
- /r and /reply work (switch to last DM sender)
- /unalias removes alias
- /admin-unalias <alias> <password> for admin removal
- File download now shows as clickable link (not auto-download)

Server:
- POST /v1/alias/unregister — remove own alias
- POST /v1/alias/admin-remove — admin removes any alias
- WARZONE_ADMIN_PASSWORD env var (default: "admin")

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 19:50:00 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
f4eac7b2aa v0.0.16: clickable file download link instead of auto-download
Files now appear as a styled clickable link in chat:
📎 filename.pdf (1.6 KB) from sender
Click to download. No auto-save dialog.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 18:17:33 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
ebaf5df671 Web file transfer: send + receive with auto-download
Web client:
- Paperclip file upload button in chat bar
- Chunked upload: 64KB chunks, SHA-256 integrity
- Progress display during send/receive
- Auto-download on complete (browser save dialog)
- Max 10MB per file

WASM:
- decrypt_wire_message now returns file_header and file_chunk
  with type, id, filename, chunk data (hex encoded)

Receive flow:
- FileHeader: registers pending transfer
- FileChunk: stores chunk, shows progress
- All chunks received: assembles, triggers blob download

Send flow (web→web or web→CLI):
- File sent as JSON messages (not bincode, for simplicity)
- Receiver handles both JSON and bincode formats

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 16:07:17 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
c9f3e338a7 Add /p as alias for /peer (both TUI and web), web /p @alias support
TUI: /p @manwe works same as /peer @manwe
Web: /p @manwe and /peer @manwe resolve alias and set peer input

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 15:38:35 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
9c70e02eba v0.0.15: unalias, admin alias removal, /reply, web version fix
Aliases:
- /unalias — remove your own alias
- /admin-unalias <alias> <password> — admin removes any alias
- Admin password via WARZONE_ADMIN_PASSWORD env var (default: "admin")
- POST /v1/alias/unregister + POST /v1/alias/admin-remove

Reply:
- /r or /reply — switches peer to whoever last DM'd you
- lastDmPeer tracked on both web and TUI
- Then type normally to reply

Web:
- Version bumped to 0.0.15 (was stuck at 0.0.10)
- WASM rebuilt with latest protocol

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 14:12:33 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
608a160614 Fix warnings: remove unused import and variable
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 13:39:05 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
661de47552 v0.0.14: Ethereum-compatible identity (secp256k1 + Keccak-256)
Protocol (ethereum.rs):
- derive_eth_identity(): HKDF from seed (info="warzone-secp256k1")
- secp256k1 signing key (k256 crate)
- Ethereum address: Keccak-256(uncompressed_pubkey[1..])[-20:]
- EIP-55 checksum address formatting
- eth_sign() / eth_verify() for secp256k1 ECDSA
- EthAddress type with Display, hex parsing, checksum
- 5 tests: deterministic, format, checksum, sign/verify, uniqueness

CLI:
- `warzone eth` — show Ethereum address alongside Warzone fingerprint
- Same seed produces both identities (dual-curve)

Dual identity model:
- Ed25519 + X25519 for Warzone messaging (fast, small signatures)
- secp256k1 for Ethereum compatibility (MetaMask, ENS, Ledger/Trezor)
- Both derived from the same BIP39 seed via different HKDF paths

28/28 protocol tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 13:30:25 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
86da52acc4 v0.0.13: Sender Keys for efficient group encryption
Protocol (sender_keys.rs):
- SenderKey: symmetric key with chain ratchet (forward secrecy per chain)
- generate(), rotate(), encrypt(), decrypt()
- SenderKeyDistribution: share key via 1:1 encrypted channel
- SenderKeyMessage: encrypted group message (O(1) instead of O(N))
- Chain key ratchets forward on each message (HKDF)
- Generation counter for key rotation tracking
- 4 tests: basic, multi-message, rotation, old-key rejection

WireMessage:
- GroupSenderKey variant: encrypted group message
- SenderKeyDistribution variant: key sharing

Server: dedup handles new variants.
CLI TUI + recv: stub handlers for new message types.
23/23 protocol tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 13:23:10 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
653c6c050b v0.0.12: Encrypted backup/restore + history module
Protocol:
- history.rs: derive_history_key (HKDF from seed, info="warzone-history")
- encrypt_history / decrypt_history (ChaCha20-Poly1305, WZH1 magic)
- 2 new tests (roundtrip + wrong seed), total 19/19

CLI:
- `warzone backup [output.wzb]` — exports all sessions + pre-keys
  as encrypted blob (only your seed can decrypt)
- `warzone restore <input.wzb>` — imports backup, merges (no overwrite)
- Backup format: WZH1 magic + nonce + encrypted JSON

Storage:
- export_all() — dumps sessions + pre-keys as base64 JSON
- import_all() — merges backup data (skip existing entries)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 12:59:54 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
fff443bb6d v0.0.11: Multi-device support (server-side)
Server:
- Register stores per-device bundles: device:<fp>:<device_id>
- GET /v1/keys/:fp/devices lists all registered devices
- WS already pushes to ALL connected devices per fingerprint
- DB queue: first device to poll gets messages (acceptable for Phase 2)

Multi-device flow:
- Same seed on two devices → same fingerprint
- Both register with different device_ids
- Both connect via WS → both receive messages in real-time
- Each device maintains its own ratchet sessions

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 12:52:22 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
9811248b7c v0.0.10: Progressive Web App (PWA)
- Web manifest (standalone mode, theme, icon)
- Service worker: caches shell (HTML, WASM, icon) for offline
- SVG app icon (chat bubble with encryption indicator)
- iOS meta tags: apple-mobile-web-app-capable, status bar style
- Android: beforeinstallprompt → /install command
- Offline fallback: loads cached shell, shows reconnecting state
- Cache versioning with automatic old cache cleanup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 12:32:59 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
4fb3973403 v0.0.9: Group management — leave, kick, members
Server:
- POST /groups/:name/leave — remove self from group
- POST /groups/:name/kick — creator can kick members
- GET /groups/:name/members — list with aliases + creator badge

CLI TUI:
- /gleave — leave current group
- /gkick <fp_or_alias> — kick (creator only)
- /gmembers — show member list with aliases and ★ for creator

Web client:
- Same commands: /gleave, /gkick, /gmembers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 12:04:28 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
2599ce956a v0.0.8: Server-side message deduplication
Server:
- DedupTracker in AppState: bounded HashSet (10,000 IDs, FIFO eviction)
- send_message: extracts message ID from bincode, drops duplicates
- WS handler: dedup on both binary and JSON message frames
- extract_message_id() parses all WireMessage variants

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 11:00:58 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
708080f7be v0.0.7: Chunked encrypted file transfer
Protocol:
- WireMessage::FileHeader { id, sender_fp, filename, file_size, total_chunks, sha256 }
- WireMessage::FileChunk { id, sender_fp, filename, chunk_index, total_chunks, data }
- 64KB chunks, SHA-256 integrity verification

CLI TUI:
- /file <path> command: reads file, chunks, encrypts each with ratchet, sends
- Progress display: "Sending file.pdf [3/10]..."
- Incoming file reassembly with chunk tracking
- SHA-256 verification on complete
- Saves to data_dir/downloads/
- Max file size: 10MB

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 10:26:05 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
b168ecc609 Add PWA and mark delivery receipts done in Phase 2 roadmap
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 10:16:48 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
104ba78b85 v0.0.6: Delivery receipts (sent/delivered/read)
Protocol:
- WireMessage::Receipt { sender_fingerprint, message_id, receipt_type }
- ReceiptType enum: Delivered, Read
- id field added to KeyExchange and Message variants
- Receipts are plaintext (not encrypted) — contain only ID + type

Web client:
- Auto-sends Delivered receipt on successful decrypt
- Tracks sent message IDs with receipt status
- Displays: ✓ (sent, gray), ✓✓ (delivered, white), ✓✓ (read, blue)
- Receipt indicators update live via DOM reference

CLI TUI:
- Auto-sends Delivered receipt back to sender on decrypt
- Tracks receipt status per message ID
- Displays receipt indicators after sent messages

WASM:
- create_receipt() function for web client
- encrypt_with_id/encrypt_key_exchange_with_id for tracking
- decrypt_wire_message handles Receipt variant

17/17 protocol tests pass. Zero warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 10:12:43 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
8fad8d8374 Add encrypted message history + cloud backup to Phase 2 roadmap
- History encrypted with key derived from seed (HKDF)
- No extra password needed (seed = access)
- Optional double encryption with passphrase
- Cloud targets: S3, Google Drive, WebDAV
- Backup is encrypted archive, provider sees only blobs
- Incremental sync, versioned, deduplicated
- Also marked WebSocket, TUI, Web WASM as done in Phase 2

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 09:58:57 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
5b21a0e58b Fix group messages: push via WebSocket, not just DB queue
Group send_to_group was writing directly to sled DB, bypassing
the WS push. Connected clients never received group messages.

Now tries push_to_client() first (instant WS delivery),
falls back to DB queue if recipient is offline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 09:55:08 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
fe2b7d8e8a TUI client: WebSocket with HTTP fallback
poll_loop now:
1. Tries WebSocket connection to /v1/ws/<fingerprint>
2. On success: receives messages in real-time (instant push)
3. On disconnect: reconnects after 3 seconds
4. On WS failure: falls back to HTTP polling every 2 seconds

Refactored message processing into shared functions:
- process_incoming() handles raw bytes
- process_wire_message() handles deserialized WireMessage
- Used by both WS and HTTP paths

Both CLI TUI and web client now use WebSocket:
- No more HTTP polling spam in server logs
- Messages arrive instantly on both clients
- HTTP poll kept as fallback for scripts/mules

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 09:49:46 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
c8a95e27e4 Fix 3 warnings: unused import, unused variable, dead code
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 09:43:50 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
2ca25fd2bf v0.0.5: WebSocket real-time messaging
Server:
- WS endpoint: /v1/ws/:fingerprint
- Connection registry in AppState (fingerprint → WS senders)
- On connect: flushes queued DB messages, then pushes in real-time
- send_message: pushes to WS if connected, falls back to DB queue
- Auto-cleanup on disconnect
- WS accepts both binary and JSON text frames for sending

Web client:
- Replaces 2-second HTTP polling with persistent WebSocket
- Auto-reconnects on disconnect (3-second backoff)
- Sends via WS when connected, HTTP fallback
- Messages arrive instantly (no polling delay)
- "Real-time connection established" shown on connect

HTTP polling still works:
- CLI recv command uses HTTP (unchanged)
- Web falls back to HTTP if WS fails
- Mules/scripts can still use HTTP API

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 09:41:50 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
6cf2a1814c Move WebSocket to Phase 2, add Ethereum identity + ENS to roadmap
Phase 1 complete (WASM interop was the last item).
Phase 2 additions:
- WebSocket real-time push
- Ethereum-compatible dual-curve identity (secp256k1 + X25519)
- MetaMask/Rabby wallet connect
- ENS domain resolution (@vitalik.eth → Warzone identity)
- Hardware wallet via existing secp256k1 support
- Session key delegation (sign once per 30 days)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 09:33:03 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
4fc1cc2ab1 v0.0.4: unique colors per peer in web UI
Each peer gets a stable color from a 12-color palette based on
their fingerprint/alias hash. Self messages stay green.
No more same-color for different users.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 09:30:55 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
1aba435af3 v0.0.3: fix X3DH OTPK mismatch — web bundles without OTPKs
Root cause: web client's bundle included OTPKs, so X3DH initiate()
did 4 DH ops (DH4 with OTPK). But decrypt_wire_message() called
respond() with None for OTPK, doing only 3 DH ops.
Different DH concat → different shared secret → decrypt fails.

Fix: web client bundles have one_time_pre_key: None.
initiate() skips DH4 when no OTPK present.
respond() also skips DH4 with None.
Both sides now do exactly 3 DH ops → shared secrets match.

OTPKs are an anti-replay optimization, not required for E2E.
Will add OTPK support to web client in Phase 2 with proper
server-side OTPK storage and consumption tracking.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 09:24:31 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
de3b74bb9d v0.0.2: add version display, detailed self-test with step-by-step decrypt
- Version shown on chat load (v0.0.2)
- Self-test now does step-by-step: X3DH shared secret comparison,
  then manual ratchet init + decrypt (not via decrypt_wire_message)
- Shows: rng output, shared_match, alice/bob shared secrets, decrypt result
- This isolates whether X3DH or ratchet or AEAD fails

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 09:19:01 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
54a66fa0ee Fix warnings: unused variable, profile in non-root package
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 09:12:55 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
99783c1fa4 Self-test: add X3DH shared secret comparison for debugging
Shows alice_shared vs bob_shared to verify X3DH produces same secret.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 09:11:17 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
9814b0d39e Add WASM self-test, bundle debug, /selftest and /bundleinfo commands
/selftest — runs full Alice→Bob encrypt/decrypt cycle within WASM
  (tests X3DH + Double Ratchet + bincode serialize/deserialize)

/bundleinfo — dumps bundle contents, verifies SPK secret matches
  SPK public key in the registered bundle

These help isolate whether the bug is in WASM crypto (self-test fails)
or in CLI↔WASM interop (self-test passes but cross-client fails).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 09:06:08 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
c966f3bd64 Add /reset and /sessions debug commands to web client
/reset — clears all localStorage (identity, sessions, SPK)
/sessions — shows active session peers and SPK secret prefix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 08:58:53 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
19f316c32b Fix module script scope: wire buttons via JS instead of HTML onclick
<script type="module"> doesn't expose functions to onclick attributes.
Replaced all onclick="fn()" with document.getElementById().onclick = fn
so buttons work from module scope.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 08:56:33 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
99da095a0f Fix WASM decrypt: store SPK secret, pass to decrypt_wire_message
Root cause: WASM was regenerating random pre-keys on every call to
decrypt_wire_message, instead of using the SPK that was registered
with the server. CLI sender encrypts to the registered SPK, but
WASM was trying to decrypt with a different random key.

Fix:
- WasmIdentity now stores spk_secret_bytes internally
- SPK secret persisted to localStorage as 'wz-spk'
- On load: restored from localStorage, not regenerated
- bundle_bytes() uses stored SPK secret (cached, deterministic)
- decrypt_wire_message() takes spk_secret_hex parameter
- Web UI passes stored SPK to all decrypt calls

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 08:52:44 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
ab296df825 Add debug logging to web client for WASM crypto troubleshooting
- DEBUG flag (default ON), toggle with /debug command
- Logs to browser console (F12 → Console tab)
- Covers: identity load, key registration, send encrypt,
  poll decrypt (both KeyExchange and session-based attempts)
- Shows: message sizes, session states, error details
- /debug OFF to disable once issue is found

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 08:45:47 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
c7a31c674e Update DESIGN.md roadmap: Phase 1 done, add WebSocket as remaining item
Phase 1 updated with all completed items (16 done, 1 remaining).
WebSocket real-time push added as the last Phase 1 task.
Phase 2 cleaned up (removed items already done in Phase 1).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 08:41:57 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
40ea631283 WASM bridge: web client now uses same crypto as CLI (full interop)
warzone-wasm crate:
- Compiles warzone-protocol to WebAssembly via wasm-pack
- Exposes WasmIdentity, WasmSession, decrypt_wire_message to JS
- Same X25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305 + X3DH + Double Ratchet as CLI
- 344KB WASM binary (optimized with wasm-opt)

WireMessage moved to warzone-protocol:
- Shared type used by CLI client, WASM bridge, and TUI
- Guarantees identical bincode serialization across all clients

Web client rewritten:
- Loads WASM module on startup (/wasm/warzone_wasm.js)
- Identity: WasmIdentity generates same key types as CLI
- Registration: sends bincode PreKeyBundle (same format as CLI)
- Encrypt: WasmSession.encrypt/encrypt_key_exchange
- Decrypt: decrypt_wire_message (handles KeyExchange + Message)
- Sessions persisted in localStorage (base64 ratchet state)
- Groups: per-member WASM encryption (interop with CLI members)

Server routes:
- GET /wasm/warzone_wasm.js — serves WASM JS glue
- GET /wasm/warzone_wasm_bg.wasm — serves WASM binary
- Both embedded at compile time via include_str!/include_bytes!

Web ↔ CLI interop now works:
- Same key exchange (X3DH with X25519)
- Same ratchet (Double Ratchet with ChaCha20-Poly1305)
- Same wire format (bincode WireMessage)
- Web user can message CLI user and vice versa

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 08:37:58 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
d7b71efdbc Fix DB lock error: clear message + instructions, fix passphrase reprompt
Storage:
- Detects sled lock contention, shows actionable error:
  "Database locked by another warzone process"
  with ps command to find the process and rm command to force unlock

TUI:
- Poll loop no longer calls load_seed() (was re-prompting passphrase)
- Seed passed from main.rs to run_tui to poll_loop
- Single passphrase prompt per app launch

Warnings fixed:
- Removed unused `Context` import in tui/app.rs
- Added #[allow(dead_code)] on validate_token (used when auth middleware wired)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 08:24:53 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
c8b51fa96b UAT test plans for all 7 phases
UAT/PHASE1.md — 20 test scenarios, 80+ checkboxes
  Identity, encryption, messaging, TUI, web, groups, aliases,
  auth, OTP replenishment, session persistence, cross-client

UAT/PHASE2.md — 7 scenarios (WASM, receipts, files, multi-device, HW wallet, groups, history)
UAT/PHASE3.md — 6 scenarios (DNS discovery, key transparency, federation, mutual TLS, gossip)
UAT/PHASE4.md — 10 scenarios (mule identity, pickup, delivery, receipts, dedup, expiry, compression)
UAT/PHASE5.md — 6 scenarios (Bluetooth, LoRa, mDNS, Wi-Fi Direct, USB export, fallback chain)
UAT/PHASE6.md — 3 scenarios (sealed sender, traffic analysis resistance, onion routing)
UAT/PHASE7.md — 8 scenarios (ntfy, DoH, DB encryption, admin CLI, rate limiting, audit, CI, monitoring)

Each test has exact commands to run and checkboxes for pass/fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 08:01:36 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
cfb227a93d Server auth (challenge-response) + OTP key replenishment
Authentication:
- POST /v1/auth/challenge {fingerprint} → {challenge, expires_at}
- POST /v1/auth/verify {fingerprint, challenge, signature} → {token}
- Client signs challenge with Ed25519 identity key
- Server verifies against stored public key
- Returns bearer token valid for 7 days
- Web clients get token without sig verify (Phase 2: WASM)
- validate_token() helper for protecting endpoints

OTP Key Replenishment:
- GET /v1/keys/:fp/otpk-count → {otpk_count}
- POST /v1/keys/replenish {fingerprint, otpks: [{id, public_key}]}
- OTPKs stored individually: otpk:<fp>:<id> → public_key
- Returns total count after replenishment

Phase 1 complete:
- [x] Seed-based identity + BIP39
- [x] X3DH + Double Ratchet (forward secrecy)
- [x] Pre-key bundles
- [x] Server (keys, messages, groups, aliases, auth)
- [x] CLI TUI + Web client
- [x] Aliases with TTL + recovery
- [x] Seed encryption (Argon2id + ChaCha20)
- [x] Server auth (challenge-response + tokens)
- [x] OTP key replenishment

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 07:55:02 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
3ffac0c751 Unlock seed once at startup, pass identity to all commands
- main.rs unlocks seed once, prompts passphrase once per app launch
- Identity passed as parameter to send, recv, register, chat
- No more redundant load_seed() calls (was prompting passphrase multiple times)
- info command uses pre-unlocked identity directly

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 07:49:51 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
37a4c3c54f Seed encryption at rest (Argon2id + ChaCha20-Poly1305) + HW wallet plan
keystore.rs:
- Passphrase prompted on init (hidden input, echo disabled)
- Empty passphrase = plaintext (for testing/scripting)
- Encrypted format: MAGIC("WZS1") + salt(16) + nonce(12) + ciphertext(48)
- Argon2id for key derivation (memory-hard, GPU-resistant)
- ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD for encryption
- Backwards compatible: auto-detects plaintext vs encrypted on load
- Keys zeroized after use

DESIGN.md:
- Added hardware wallet section (Ledger/Trezor via USB/BT HID)
- Ed25519 signing delegated to device, seed never exported
- BIP44 derivation path m/44'/1234'/0'
- Phase 2 feature, protocol unchanged

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 07:45:55 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
7fe6de0ba1 Alias TTL renews only on authenticated actions (sending messages)
- Sending a message includes `from` fingerprint
- Server renews alias TTL on send (proves identity: you encrypted it)
- Polling/receiving does NOT renew (anyone can spam messages to you)
- Key registration does NOT renew (separate concern)

This prevents alias keepalive attacks where someone spams a user
just to keep their alias from expiring.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 07:39:15 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
bf67566b0c Alias TTL, recovery keys, and reclamation
Aliases now have a lifecycle:
- 365-day TTL from last activity (send/receive/renew)
- 30-day grace period after expiry (only recovery key can reclaim)
- After grace: anyone can register the alias
- Recovery key generated on first registration, rotated on recovery
- Auto-renew on activity via POST /v1/alias/renew

New endpoints:
- POST /v1/alias/recover {alias, recovery_key, new_fingerprint}
  Reclaim alias with recovery key, even if expired. Works across
  identity changes (new seed → new fingerprint, same alias).
  Recovery key is rotated on each recovery.
- POST /v1/alias/renew {fingerprint}
  Heartbeat — resets TTL. Returns days until expiry.

Resolve now returns expiry info:
- GET /v1/alias/resolve/:name → includes expires_in_days, expired flag
- GET /v1/alias/list → includes expiry status per alias

Phase 2: DNS automation — separate DNS authority manages parent zone,
servers update delegated records via API. Recovery key maps to DNS
record ownership for out-of-band reclamation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 07:18:10 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
29c059cebf Aliases: human-readable names mapped to fingerprints
Server:
- POST /v1/alias/register — claim an alias (one per fingerprint)
- GET /v1/alias/resolve/:name — alias → fingerprint
- GET /v1/alias/whois/:fingerprint — fingerprint → alias (reverse)
- GET /v1/alias/list — list all aliases
- Bidirectional mapping in sled (a:name→fp, fp:fp→name)
- One alias per person, re-registering replaces old alias

Web client:
- /alias <name> — register your alias
- /aliases — list all registered aliases
- /info — now shows alias alongside fingerprint
- Peer input accepts @alias (resolved before sending)
- Received messages show @alias instead of fingerprint
- DM: paste @alias or fingerprint in peer input

CLI TUI:
- /alias <name> — register alias
- /aliases — list all aliases
- /peer @alias — resolves alias to fingerprint
- Alias resolution displayed in system messages

Addressing model:
- @manwe (local) → server resolves → fingerprint
- @manwe.b1.example.com (federated) → DNS resolve (Phase 3)
- Raw fingerprint → always works, no resolution

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 07:01:35 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
b90155c3b7 Fix web client: gracefully handle CLI members in groups
- fetchPeerKey: catch JSON parse error for CLI bincode bundles,
  show clear "CLI client — needs WASM bridge" message
- Group send: silently skip CLI members instead of showing
  error per member (mixed groups work, web members get messages,
  CLI members are skipped without noise)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 23:20:25 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
5cf7e8a02f Auto-join groups: /g and /gjoin auto-create if group doesn't exist
- Server: /join endpoint creates the group if it doesn't exist
- CLI TUI: /g <name> auto-joins before switching
- Web: /g <name> auto-joins before switching
- No more "group not found" errors — just /g ops and go

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 23:17:03 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
f3e78c6cff Group chat with E2E encryption for both web and CLI clients
Server:
- POST /v1/groups/create — create named group
- POST /v1/groups/:name/join — join group
- GET /v1/groups/:name — get group info + member list
- GET /v1/groups — list all groups
- POST /v1/groups/:name/send — fan-out encrypted messages to members
- Groups stored in sled, members tracked by fingerprint

Web client:
- /gcreate <name> — create group
- /gjoin <name> — join group
- /g <name> — switch to group chat mode
- /glist — list all groups
- /dm — switch back to DM mode
- Group messages encrypted per-member (ECDH + AES-GCM for each)
- Group tag shown on received messages: "sender [groupname]"

CLI TUI client:
- Same commands: /gcreate, /gjoin, /g, /glist, /dm
- Group messages encrypted per-member (X3DH + Double Ratchet for each)
- Automatic X3DH key exchange with new group members on first message
- Sessions established and persisted per-member

Architecture:
- Client-side fan-out encryption: message encrypted N times (once per member)
- Server stores one copy per recipient in their message queue
- Reuses existing 1:1 encryption — no new crypto primitives needed
- Works for groups ≤ 50 members (per DESIGN.md)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 23:13:16 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
7b1e0bd162 Full web client with E2E encrypted messaging
Complete single-page web app served at / with:
- Identity generation (random 32-byte seed)
- Identity recovery from hex seed
- Persistent keys in localStorage (survives refresh)
- Auto-load saved identity on page load
- ECDH P-256 key exchange via Web Crypto API
- AES-256-GCM message encryption (iv prepended)
- Key registration with /v1/keys/register
- Send encrypted messages via /v1/messages/send
- Poll for messages every 2s with auto-decrypt
- Peer fingerprint input in header (saved to localStorage)
- Color-coded messages (green=self, orange=peer, cyan=system)
- Lock icon on received encrypted messages
- Commands: /info, /clear, /quit
- Graceful handling of CLI client messages (shows warning)
- Dark theme, responsive, mobile-friendly

Note: web-to-web E2E works. Web-to-CLI interop requires WASM
build of warzone-protocol (Phase 2) since crypto primitives
differ (P-256/AES-GCM vs X25519/ChaCha20).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 23:05:51 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
a298c9430c TUI chat interface with real-time E2E encrypted messaging
`warzone chat [peer-fp] -s <server>` launches an interactive terminal UI:
- Header: your fingerprint, peer fingerprint, server URL
- Message area: color-coded (green=you, yellow=peer, cyan=system)
- Input bar with cursor at bottom
- Background polling every 2s for incoming messages
- Full X3DH + Double Ratchet on send/receive
- Session persistence across messages

Commands in TUI:
- /peer <fingerprint> — set who you're chatting with
- /info — show your fingerprint
- /quit or /q or Esc or Ctrl+C — exit

Usage:
  warzone chat "6baf:6d0b:4541:9cae:f06b:83da:69bc:05ee" -s http://localhost:7700

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:59:08 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
6d4a09a0c6 Fetch-and-delete: server deletes messages after poll delivery
poll_messages now collects all queued messages, returns them,
then deletes them from sled. No more duplicate delivery.

This is correct for store-and-forward: once the client receives
the messages, the server's job is done. If the client crashes
before processing, the messages are lost — acceptable for Phase 1.
Phase 2 can add explicit ack-based delivery if needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:55:50 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
8a6eebabfd Fix axum route params: use :param syntax (not {param}) for axum 0.7
Axum 0.7 uses :param for path parameters. {param} is axum 0.8+ syntax.
Routes were silently not matching, causing 404 on all key lookups.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:48:19 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
bc64afcb05 Add request tracing, debug /v1/keys/list endpoint
- TraceLayer logs every HTTP request (method, path, status, duration)
- Default log level info, tower_http=debug (no RUST_LOG needed)
- GET /v1/keys/list shows all registered fingerprints
- Helps debug key registration and lookup issues

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:43:54 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
8dd45b1bfe Normalize fingerprints everywhere: strip colons from URLs and DB keys
Client: strip colons before putting fingerprints in URL paths
(colons in URLs confuse axum path matching).

Server: normalize fingerprints in message routes too.

All fingerprint storage and lookup is now hex-only, case-insensitive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:41:26 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
de118371de Fix bundle lookup: normalize fingerprints, handle 404 gracefully
Server: normalize fingerprints by stripping colons and lowercasing
before storing/looking up in sled. Adds tracing for register/lookup.

Client: check HTTP status before parsing JSON response body.
Shows clear error when user is not registered instead of parse error.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:37:41 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
cf7e935250 Display full 16-byte fingerprint (8 groups instead of 4)
Was showing xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx (8 bytes) but from_hex expected
16 bytes, causing parse failure. Now displays all 16 bytes:
xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx

Users need to re-init to see the full fingerprint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:34:40 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
2efd355983 Fix init output to show actual data directory path
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:29:55 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
722441c391 Add WARZONE_HOME env var for separate user data directories
All data paths now use keystore::data_dir() which checks
WARZONE_HOME first, falls back to ~/.warzone.

This avoids the HOME override hack that breaks rustup/cargo.

Usage: WARZONE_HOME=/tmp/bob warzone init

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:27:49 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
94b845eb5b Fix all compiler warnings across server and client
- Remove unused ServerConfig struct (config via CLI args)
- Remove unused otpks field from Database (not yet needed)
- Wire AppError into message routes with proper error propagation
- Remove unused imports in send.rs (Seed, MessageContent, etc.)
- Suppress dead_code on BundleResponse.fingerprint (needed by serde)

Zero warnings, 17/17 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:16:11 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
60a7006ed9 Add documentation: protocol spec, server admin, client guide
docs/PROTOCOL.md (520 lines):
- Identity model (seed → Ed25519 + X25519 via HKDF)
- X3DH key exchange (4 DH operations, ASCII flow diagram)
- Double Ratchet (chain/DH ratchet, skipped keys, state machine)
- KDF chains with domain separation strings
- AEAD (ChaCha20-Poly1305)
- Wire format (WireMessage enum, bincode serialization)
- Pre-key bundle format and lifecycle

docs/SERVER.md (429 lines):
- Build and run instructions
- Full API reference with request/response examples
- Database structure (sled trees)
- Deployment (nginx reverse proxy, systemd unit)
- Security considerations
- Backup and recovery

docs/CLIENT.md (507 lines):
- Quick start guide
- All CLI commands with examples
- Identity management and mnemonic backup
- Web client usage and limitations
- Session and pre-key management
- Threat model table
- Troubleshooting guide

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 21:59:19 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
82f5061aa1 Wire E2E messaging: send, recv, session persistence, auto-registration
CLI client (warzone):
- `warzone init` now generates pre-key bundle (1 SPK + 10 OTPKs),
  stores secrets in local sled DB, saves bundle for server registration
- `warzone register -s <url>` registers bundle with server
- `warzone send <fp> <msg> -s <url>` full E2E flow:
  - Auto-registers bundle on first use
  - Fetches recipient's pre-key bundle
  - Performs X3DH key exchange (first message) or uses existing session
  - Encrypts with Double Ratchet
  - Sends WireMessage envelope to server
- `warzone recv -s <url>` polls and decrypts:
  - Handles KeyExchange messages (X3DH respond + ratchet init as Bob)
  - Handles Message (decrypt with existing ratchet session)
  - Saves session state after each decrypt

Wire protocol (WireMessage enum):
- KeyExchange variant: sender identity, ephemeral key, OTPK id, ratchet msg
- Message variant: sender fingerprint + ratchet message

Session persistence:
- Ratchet state serialized with bincode, stored in sled (~/.warzone/db)
- Pre-key secrets stored in sled, OTPKs consumed on use
- Sessions keyed by peer fingerprint

Networking (net.rs):
- register_bundle, fetch_bundle, send_message, poll_messages
- JSON API over HTTP, bundles serialized with bincode + base64

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 21:40:21 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
e364f437a2 Add .gitignore, remove target/ from tracking
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 21:33:13 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
7451ad69bc Fix X3DH + add web client served by warzone-server
X3DH fix:
- Added identity_encryption_key (X25519) to PreKeyBundle
- initiate() and respond() now use correct DH operations per Signal spec:
  DH1=IK_a*SPK_b, DH2=EK_a*IK_b, DH3=EK_a*SPK_b, DH4=EK_a*OPK_b
- All 17 tests pass including x3dh_shared_secret_matches

Web client (served at /):
- Identity generation with seed (stored in localStorage)
- Recovery from hex-encoded seed
- Auto-load saved identity on page load
- Fingerprint display (same format as CLI: xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx)
- Key registration with server via /v1/keys/register
- Chat UI with message polling (5s interval)
- Commands: /help, /info, /seed
- Dark theme matching warzone aesthetic

Both clients (CLI + Web) now exist:
- CLI: warzone init, warzone info, warzone recover
- Web: http://localhost:7700/ (served by warzone-server)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 21:32:46 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
651396fa13 Scaffold Rust workspace: warzone-protocol, server, client, mule
4 crates, all compile. 16/17 tests pass.

warzone-protocol (core crypto):
- Seed-based identity (Ed25519 + X25519 from 32-byte seed via HKDF)
- BIP39 mnemonic encode/decode (24 words)
- Fingerprint type (SHA-256 truncated, displayed as xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx)
- ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD encrypt/decrypt with random nonce
- HKDF-SHA256 key derivation
- Pre-key bundle generation with Ed25519 signatures
- X3DH key exchange (simplified, needs X25519 identity key in bundle)
- Double Ratchet: full implementation with DH ratchet, chain ratchet,
  out-of-order message handling via skipped keys cache
- Message format (WarzoneMessage envelope + RatchetHeader)
- Session type with ratchet state
- Storage trait definitions (PreKeyStore, SessionStore, MessageQueue)

warzone-server (axum):
- sled database (keys, messages, one-time pre-keys)
- Routes: /v1/health, /v1/keys/register, /v1/keys/{fp},
  /v1/messages/send, /v1/messages/poll/{fp}, /v1/messages/{id}/ack

warzone-client (CLI):
- `warzone init` — generate seed, show mnemonic, save to ~/.warzone/
- `warzone recover <words>` — restore from mnemonic
- `warzone info` — show fingerprint and keys
- Seed storage at ~/.warzone/identity.seed (600 perms)
- Stubs for send, recv, chat commands

warzone-mule: Phase 4 placeholder

Known issue: X3DH test fails (initiate/respond use different DH ops
due to missing X25519 identity key in bundle). Fix in next step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 21:27:48 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
1e2a83402d DESIGN.md: DNS-based key transparency, resolve remaining questions
- Key transparency via DNS TXT records with self-signatures
  (server can't MITM because it can't forge user's signature)
- Per-device ratchet sessions (Signal model), cross-device sync via seed
- LoRa deferred to later phases, not Phase 1
- Sealed sender before onion routing
- Phase 3 updated to include key transparency alongside federation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 20:55:15 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
fa20607e35 DESIGN.md: resolve open questions, add transport layer architecture
Decisions: Sender Keys for groups, optional onion routing, deniability
by default, Bluetooth + LoRa transports, no tokenization.

New sections: transport abstraction (HTTPS/WS/BT/LoRa/Wi-Fi Direct/USB),
LoRa compact binary format, sealed sender vs onion routing discussion.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 20:44:47 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
b7aa1a10e8 Add DESIGN.md: warzone messenger architecture and roadmap
Covers: seed-based identity, Signal protocol (X3DH + Double Ratchet),
DNS federation, mule delivery protocol, Rust rewrite plan, ntfy integration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 20:34:54 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
93c8c84de1 Click on DM lock icon to pre-fill /dm @username in input
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 17:04:31 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
811dd2c008 v14: /reply and /r command to quick-reply to last DM peer
- /reply <msg> or /r <msg> sends encrypted DM to last person
- lastDmPeer set when sending a DM or receiving one
- Shows error if no prior DM conversation exists

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 16:46:35 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
93be964d52 v14: persistent E2E keys - browser localStorage + server keys.json
Browser:
- ECDH key pair saved to localStorage (chat-key-priv, chat-key-pub)
- Loaded on reconnect, only generated once
- Re-registers public key with server on every connect
- Corrupted keys auto-regenerate

Server:
- Keys saved to keys.json on disk after each registration
- Loaded on startup, survives restarts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 16:21:20 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
04482faa6a Fix header commands readability: lighter text + styled code tags
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 16:17:32 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
03d91cb844 v13: E2E encrypted DMs via ECDH + AES-256-GCM (Web Crypto API)
Server:
- /keys POST: register ECDH public key (JWK) for a username
- /keys GET: list users with registered keys
- /keys/<user> GET: get user's public key
- /dm POST: relay encrypted DM blob to recipient
- SSE streams now register for DM delivery via name param
- Server never sees plaintext - only ciphertext passes through

Web UI:
- Auto-generates ECDH P-256 key pair on load (no setup needed)
- /dm @username message - sends E2E encrypted DM
- /users - list users with registered keys
- DMs shown with lock icon, pink color, direction arrows
- Decryption happens entirely in browser
- Key re-registered on name change
- Derived AES keys cached per peer

Protocol:
- ECDH key exchange: each client exports JWK public key
- Shared secret derived via ECDH P-256
- Messages encrypted with AES-256-GCM + random 12-byte nonce
- Ciphertext + nonce sent as base64 through server

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 16:14:28 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
c97a3834d1 v12: group chat with optional passwords
- /group/<name> URL creates/joins a group (auto-created on first visit)
- / and /chat redirect to /group/lobby (default group)
- Each group has isolated history, clients, and SSE streams
- /setpass <password> sets a password for the current group
- /clearpass removes the password
- Password prompt modal in web UI, stored in sessionStorage
- SSE sends auth-fail event if wrong password, triggers re-prompt
- Group name shown as tag in header
- TCP clients use lobby group by default

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 15:33:28 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
087334ffe9 v11: PWA support for mobile - installable app with offline fallback
- Web manifest with standalone display mode
- SVG chat bubble icon (no external assets needed)
- Service worker for install + offline page
- iOS meta tags: apple-mobile-web-app-capable, status bar style
- Mobile-optimized layout: safe-area insets, dvh units, rounded inputs
- Name input moved to header, file button + send in bottom bar
- 16px font on input (prevents iOS zoom)
- Name persisted to localStorage on mobile
- Keyboard-aware scroll (visualViewport resize listener)
- Install banner with prompt for Android Chrome

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 15:14:38 +04:00
130 changed files with 34275 additions and 140 deletions

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**/target
**/node_modules
**/.git
**/.DS_Store
**/.claude
**/wasm-pkg
apache
nginx
nginx.txt
chat.py
tunnel.py
DESIGN.md

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[submodule "warzone-phone"]
path = warzone-phone
url = ssh://git@git.manko.yoga:222/manawenuz/wz-phone.git

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# Warzone Messenger — Design Document
## Problem Statement
Current chat.py has fundamental issues:
- **Identity is username-based** — users pick names, no cryptographic identity. Device change = lost keys = broken encryption.
- **No forward secrecy** — same ECDH key pair forever. Compromise one key, read all past messages.
- **No offline delivery** — if you're not connected, messages are lost.
- **Single server** — no federation, no redundancy. Server goes down = no chat.
- **Python** — too slow for real deployment, hard to distribute as a single binary.
## Design Goals
1. **Identity = key pair** — your identity IS your private key seed. No usernames, no accounts.
2. **Signal-grade encryption** — Double Ratchet for 1:1, Sender Keys for groups.
3. **Federation via DNS** — servers discover each other using TXT records, like Matrix but simpler.
4. **Warzone-grade delivery** — assumes intermittent connectivity, supports mule-based physical delivery.
5. **Single binary** — Rust, compiles to one static binary per platform.
6. **ntfy for push** — leverage existing notification infrastructure, no custom push servers.
---
## 1. Identity Model
### Seed-Based Identity
```
seed (32 bytes) → Ed25519 signing keypair + X25519 encryption keypair
```
- **Seed**: 32 random bytes, displayed as BIP39 mnemonic (24 words) for human backup
- **Signing key (Ed25519)**: signs messages, proves identity
- **Encryption key (X25519)**: used in key exchange for E2E encryption
- **Fingerprint**: `SHA-256(public_signing_key)[:16]` displayed as hex, e.g. `a3f8:c912:44be:7d01`
- **Display name**: optional, self-assigned, NOT part of identity. Can change anytime.
- **Address**: `fingerprint@server.example.com` — the full address includes the home server
### Key Storage
| Platform | Storage |
|----------|---------|
| CLI | `~/.warzone/identity.seed` (encrypted with passphrase via Argon2 + ChaCha20) |
| Browser | IndexedDB (non-extractable CryptoKey) + seed backup prompt on first run |
| Mobile (PWA) | Same as browser, seed shown as QR code for device transfer |
| Hardware wallet | Seed never leaves device. Ledger/Trezor sign via USB/BT HID. (Phase 2) |
### Hardware Wallet Support (Phase 2)
Ledger and Trezor can act as the key storage backend:
- Seed lives on the hardware wallet, never exported
- Ed25519 signing delegated to device (BIP44 path `m/44'/1234'/0'`)
- X25519 encryption key derived from Ed25519 via birkhoff conversion, or separate derivation path
- Client sends challenge → wallet displays → user confirms on device → signed response
- No passphrase needed (device handles authentication)
- Crates: `ledger-transport` (Ledger), `trezor-client` (Trezor)
- Protocol is unchanged — only the `KeyStore` backend differs
### Device Transfer
User scans QR code containing the seed (or types 24 words). New device derives the same keypair. Identity is portable — not tied to any server or device.
### Trust Model
First-use trust (TOFU) by default. Users can verify fingerprints out-of-band (QR code scan, read aloud). Verified contacts are pinned — if their key changes, you get a hard warning (not just a dismissible notice).
### Challenge: Username Squatting
Since identity is a fingerprint, not a name, there's no squatting. Display names are untrusted labels. The UI should prominently show fingerprints for new contacts and warn on display name collisions.
### Challenge: Key Loss
Seed IS identity. Lose seed = lose identity forever. Mitigations:
- BIP39 mnemonic backup (write on paper)
- Optional seed escrow to a trusted contact (Shamir's Secret Sharing, 2-of-3)
- Server never has seed — cannot help recover
---
## 2. Encryption Protocol
### 1:1 Messages — Signal Double Ratchet
```
Initial key exchange:
Alice's X25519 identity key + ephemeral key
Bob's X25519 identity key + signed pre-key + one-time pre-key
→ X3DH → shared secret
→ initialize Double Ratchet
Every message:
Symmetric ratchet step → new message key
Every N messages or on reply: DH ratchet step → new chain key
→ forward secrecy: compromise current key ≠ past messages readable
→ future secrecy: compromise current key, recovery after next DH ratchet
```
**Pre-key bundles**: each user uploads signed pre-keys to their home server. Other users fetch these to initiate sessions even when the recipient is offline.
### Group Messages — Sender Keys (Signal protocol for groups)
```
Each member generates a Sender Key (random symmetric key + chain)
Sender Key distributed to all group members via 1:1 encrypted channels
Messages encrypted with sender's Sender Key
Sender Key ratchets forward on each message
Member join: new Sender Keys distributed to everyone
Member leave: all members rotate their Sender Keys
```
### Challenge: Group Forward Secrecy
Sender Keys don't provide per-message forward secrecy like Double Ratchet. Trade-off: performance (one encrypt per message vs one per member). Acceptable for groups < 100. For larger groups, consider MLS (Message Layer Security, RFC 9420).
### Challenge: Multi-Device
Each device has its own X25519 keypair derived from the seed. Sender encrypts to all of recipient's known devices. Device list is signed by the identity key and published to the home server.
### Message Format
```
{
"v": 1,
"from": "a3f8c912...", // sender fingerprint
"to": "b7d1e845...", // recipient fingerprint (or group ID)
"ts": 1711443600,
"type": "msg", // msg | file | key_exchange | receipt
"session": "...", // Double Ratchet session ID
"ratchet": { "dh": "...", "n": 42, "pn": 41 },
"ciphertext": "base64...", // encrypted payload
"sig": "base64..." // Ed25519 signature over everything above
}
```
---
## 3. Federation via DNS
### Server Discovery
Each server operates under a domain. Federation is discovered via DNS TXT records:
```
_warzone._tcp.example.com TXT "v=wz1; endpoint=https://wz.example.com; pubkey=base64..."
```
Fields:
- `v=wz1` — protocol version
- `endpoint` — HTTPS URL of the server API
- `pubkey` — server's Ed25519 public key (for server-to-server auth)
### Server-to-Server Protocol
```
Server A wants to deliver message to user@example.com:
1. DNS lookup: _warzone._tcp.example.com → TXT record → endpoint URL
2. TLS connection to endpoint
3. Mutual authentication: both servers verify each other's pubkey
4. Deliver encrypted message blob (server cannot read it)
5. Recipient's server queues it for delivery
```
### Home Server Responsibilities
- Store and forward messages for its users
- Host pre-key bundles for key exchange
- Serve user's device list and public keys
- Relay messages to federated servers
- Queue messages for offline users
### Challenge: DNS Availability in Warzone
DNS may be unreliable or censored. Mitigations:
- **Hard-coded peer list**: users can manually add server endpoints
- **DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH)**: bypass local DNS censorship
- **mDNS/local discovery**: for LAN-only operation when internet is down
- **Gossip protocol**: servers share their known peer list with each other
### Challenge: Server Impersonation
Server pubkey in DNS TXT record prevents impersonation. But DNS itself could be hijacked. Mitigations:
- DNSSEC validation
- TOFU for server keys (pin on first contact)
- Certificate transparency-style log for server key changes
### Key Transparency via DNS
Use DNS as a decentralized public key registry — prevents the server from performing MITM attacks on key exchange.
Each user publishes their public key as a DNS TXT record, signed by their own identity key:
```
_wz._id.<hashed-fingerprint>.example.com TXT "v=wz1; fp=a3f8c912...; pubkey=base64...; sig=base64..."
```
- `fp` — full fingerprint
- `pubkey` — user's Ed25519 public identity key
- `sig` — self-signature over (fp + pubkey), proving the DNS record was authored by the key holder
**Verification flow:**
```
Bob wants Alice's key:
1. Ask server → server says Alice's key is X
2. DNS lookup → _wz._id.<hash(alice-fp)>.example.com → key is X, self-signed
3. Match? → trusted
4. Mismatch? → HARD WARNING: server may be performing MITM
5. No DNS record? → fall back to TOFU (trust on first use)
```
**Why DNS works here:**
- Decentralized: no single party controls all DNS (especially across domains)
- The self-signature in the TXT record means even the DNS admin can't forge it without Alice's private key
- DNSSEC adds transport integrity (record wasn't tampered in transit)
- Records are globally cached and replicated — hard to silently change
**Privacy concern:** public DNS means anyone can enumerate users by scanning TXT records. Mitigation: subdomain is `SHA-256(fingerprint)[:16]` — you must already know the fingerprint to look up the record. This makes enumeration impractical.
**Scalability:** one TXT record per user. Fine for thousands of users per domain. Large orgs can shard across subdomains.
**When users don't control DNS:** in an org deployment, the admin controls the DNS zone. The admin could collude with the server to MITM. But the self-signature still protects — the admin would need the user's private key to forge a valid record. The only attack is *deleting* the record (forcing TOFU fallback), not *replacing* it.
**Integration with federation:** the same DNS zone handles both server discovery (`_warzone._tcp`) and user key transparency (`_wz._id`). One DNS zone, two purposes.
---
## 4. Warzone Delivery — Mule Protocol
### Problem
In conflict zones, internet connectivity is intermittent, unreliable, or surveilled. Servers may be offline for hours or days. Traditional store-and-forward fails when both servers are rarely online simultaneously.
### Mule Role
A **mule** is a device (phone, laptop, USB drive) that physically carries messages between disconnected networks.
```
Network A (offline) Mule Network B (online)
| | |
|<-- connect to A -------| |
|-- queued messages ---->| |
|<-- delivery receipts --| |
| | |
| |--- travel physically ---->|
| | |
| |-- connect to B ---------->|
| |-- deliver messages ------>|
| |<-- queued for A ---------|
| |<-- receipts for A --------|
| | |
| |<-- travel back -----------|
| | |
|<-- connect to A -------| |
|<-- deliver from B -----| |
|-- receipts for B ----->| |
```
### Mule Protocol
1. **Authentication**: mule presents its identity (keypair). Server checks if mule is authorized (allowlist or signed authorization token from an admin).
2. **Pickup**: mule sends `PICKUP` request. Server gives all queued outbound messages (encrypted blobs — mule cannot read them). Server marks messages as "in transit by mule X".
3. **Delivery**: mule connects to destination server, sends `DELIVER` with the blobs. Destination server validates signatures and queues for recipients.
4. **Receipts**: destination server gives mule delivery receipts (signed). Mule carries these back.
5. **Receipt enforcement**: on next pickup, mule MUST present receipts for previous delivery. If no receipts → server refuses new pickup (prevents mule from dropping messages silently). Exception: mule can present a signed "delivery failed" report explaining why.
6. **Deduplication**: messages have unique IDs. Servers deduplicate on receive. Multiple mules can carry the same messages — first delivery wins, duplicates are silently dropped.
### Queue Management
```
Message states on origin server:
QUEUED → waiting for delivery (direct or mule)
IN_TRANSIT → picked up by mule X at time T
DELIVERED → receipt received
EXPIRED → TTL exceeded, dropped
TTL: configurable per-message (default 7 days)
Retry: if IN_TRANSIT for > 24h with no receipt, re-queue
```
### Challenge: Mule Compromise
Mule has encrypted blobs. Even if captured:
- Messages are E2E encrypted — mule sees only ciphertext
- Metadata (sender/recipient fingerprints) is visible to mule. Mitigation: wrap in an outer encryption layer to the destination server's public key, so mule only sees "blob for server X"
- Mule authorization can be revoked by server admin
### Challenge: Message Ordering
Mule delivery is inherently out-of-order. Messages carry sequence numbers per conversation. Clients reorder on display. Ratchet protocol handles out-of-order decryption natively (message keys are cached for skipped messages).
### Challenge: Mule Bandwidth
Mule may carry gigabytes of messages on a USB drive, or megabytes on a phone over Bluetooth. Protocol must support:
- Priority levels (urgent messages first)
- Compression (zstd on the blob bundle)
- Partial sync (resume interrupted transfer)
- Size limits per mule (server respects mule's capacity declaration)
---
## 5. Notification via ntfy
### Why ntfy
- Self-hostable, simple HTTP API
- Works on Android (no Google Play Services needed), iOS, desktop
- Supports E2E encryption (ntfy's own, separate from ours)
- Can be deployed alongside our server
### Integration
```
User registers ntfy topic: fingerprint-derived, e.g. wz_a3f8c912
Server pushes notification on new message:
POST https://ntfy.example.com/wz_a3f8c912
Body: "New message from <display_name>"
(NO message content — that's E2E encrypted)
```
User subscribes to their topic in ntfy app. Gets push notification, opens warzone client to read the actual message.
### Challenge: ntfy Metadata
ntfy server sees that a notification was sent to a topic (i.e., someone messaged this user). Mitigation: self-host ntfy on the same server. Or accept the metadata leak as a trade-off for push notification functionality.
---
## 6. Rust Rewrite
### Why Rust
- Single static binary (no runtime dependencies)
- Memory safety without GC
- Excellent async I/O (tokio)
- Cross-compile to Linux ARM (warzone routers, phones), Windows, macOS
- WebAssembly target for browser client
### Crate Selection
| Function | Crate |
|----------|-------|
| Async runtime | `tokio` |
| HTTP server | `axum` |
| Crypto | `ring` or `libsignal-protocol` |
| Signal protocol | `libsignal-protocol-rust` (Signal's official Rust impl) |
| Ed25519 | `ed25519-dalek` |
| X25519 | `x25519-dalek` |
| Argon2 | `argon2` |
| DNS | `trust-dns-resolver` |
| TLS | `rustls` |
| Database | `sled` (embedded) or `sqlite` via `rusqlite` |
| Serialization | `serde` + `bincode` (wire) + `serde_json` (API) |
| BIP39 | `bip39` |
| Compression | `zstd` |
| CLI | `clap` |
| TUI | `ratatui` |
### Binary Targets
```
warzone-server # server binary
warzone # CLI client + TUI
warzone-mule # mule binary (subset of client)
warzone.wasm # browser client (via wasm-pack)
```
### Architecture
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Server │
├──────────┬──────────┬───────────────────┤
│ HTTP API │ WS relay │ Federation (S2S) │
├──────────┴──────────┴───────────────────┤
│ Message Router │
├──────────┬──────────┬───────────────────┤
│ Queue DB │ Key Store│ User Registry │
│ (sled) │ (sled) │ (sled) │
└──────────┴──────────┴───────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Client │
├──────────┬──────────┬───────────────────┤
│ TUI │ Web(WASM)│ CLI │
├──────────┴──────────┴───────────────────┤
│ Protocol Layer │
├──────────┬──────────┬───────────────────┤
│ Signal │ Identity │ Storage │
│ Protocol │ Manager │ (sled/IndexedDB) │
└──────────┴──────────┴───────────────────┘
```
---
## 7. Roadmap
### Phase 0 — Current (Python prototype) ✅
- [x] Basic chat server + web UI
- [x] WebSocket SSH tunnel
- [x] Nginx reverse proxy + ArvanCloud deployment
- [x] ECDH + AES-GCM DMs (basic, no forward secrecy)
- [x] Group chat with passwords
- [x] PWA support
- [x] File upload
### Phase 1 — Identity & Crypto Foundation (Rust)
- [x] Rust project scaffold (cargo workspace: server, client, protocol, mule, wasm)
- [x] Seed-based identity (Ed25519 + X25519 from 32-byte seed)
- [x] BIP39 mnemonic generation and recovery
- [x] Seed encryption at rest (Argon2 + ChaCha20-Poly1305, unlock once per session)
- [x] Pre-key bundle generation and storage
- [x] X3DH key exchange implementation
- [x] Double Ratchet for 1:1 messaging (forward secrecy, out-of-order)
- [x] Basic server: axum, sled DB, store-and-forward
- [x] CLI TUI client (ratatui, real-time chat)
- [x] Web client with WASM (same crypto as CLI, full interop)
- [x] Group chat (server fan-out, per-member encryption)
- [x] Aliases with TTL, recovery keys, reclamation
- [x] Server auth (challenge-response, bearer tokens)
- [x] OTP key replenishment
- [x] Fetch-and-delete delivery
- [x] 17 protocol tests
- [x] WASM bridge for web↔CLI interop (same crypto on both clients)
### Phase 2 — Core Messaging
- [ ] WebSocket real-time push (replace HTTP polling with instant delivery)
- [ ] Delivery receipts (sent, delivered, read)
- [ ] File transfer (chunked, encrypted)
- [ ] Multi-device support (device list signed by identity key)
- [ ] Sender Keys for group encryption (replace per-member fan-out)
- [ ] Group management (kick, leave, key rotation)
- [ ] Message ordering and deduplication
- [ ] Ethereum-compatible identity (dual-curve: secp256k1 + X25519 from same BIP39 seed)
- Fingerprint = Ethereum address (Keccak-256 of secp256k1 pubkey)
- BIP44 paths: m/44'/60'/0'/0/0 (Ethereum), m/44'/1234'/0' (Warzone X25519)
- MetaMask/Rabby wallet connect (sign challenge → derive session)
- Hardware wallet support via existing secp256k1 (Ledger/Trezor)
- ENS domain resolution (@vitalik.eth → 0xd8dA... → Warzone identity)
- Crates: k256, tiny-keccak, ethers-rs/alloy for ENS resolution
- Session key delegation from hardware wallet (sign once per 30 days)
- [x] TUI client (ratatui)
- [x] Web client (WASM)
- [x] WebSocket real-time push
- [x] Delivery receipts (sent/delivered/read)
- [ ] Progressive Web App (PWA)
- Web manifest with standalone display mode
- Service worker for offline shell + notification support
- Install prompt (Android Chrome "Add to Home Screen")
- iOS: apple-mobile-web-app-capable meta tags
- Push notifications via service worker (when tab unfocused)
- Offline: show cached identity + "reconnecting" state
- App icon (SVG, maskable)
- [ ] Encrypted local message history & cloud backup
- Messages encrypted at rest using key derived from seed (HKDF, info="warzone-history")
- No extra password needed — if you have your seed, you can read your history
- Optional passphrase for additional protection (double encryption)
- Browser: encrypted blob in IndexedDB, export as file
- CLI: encrypted sled DB (already has seed-encrypted keystore)
- Cloud backup targets: S3-compatible, Google Drive, WebDAV
- Backup format: encrypted archive (ChaCha20-Poly1305), versioned, deduplicated
- Restore: import backup + provide seed → decrypt and merge history
- Sync: periodic incremental backup (new messages since last backup)
- Privacy: backup provider sees only encrypted blobs, no metadata
### Phase 3 — Federation & Key Transparency
- [ ] DNS TXT record format specification (server discovery + user key transparency)
- [ ] User self-signed key publication to DNS (`_wz._id.<hash>.domain`)
- [ ] Key verification: server response vs DNS record cross-check
- [ ] Server-to-server mutual TLS authentication
- [ ] Federated message delivery
- [ ] Server key pinning (TOFU)
- [ ] Federated pre-key bundle fetching
- [ ] Gossip-based peer discovery fallback
- [ ] Hard-coded peer list for DNS-free operation
### Phase 4 — Warzone Delivery
- [ ] Mule protocol specification
- [ ] Mule authentication and authorization
- [ ] Message pickup with capacity declaration
- [ ] Delivery receipt enforcement
- [ ] Outer encryption layer (hide metadata from mule)
- [ ] Bundle compression (zstd)
- [ ] Partial sync / resume
- [ ] Priority levels
- [ ] Mule CLI binary
### Phase 5 — Transport Fallbacks
- [ ] Bluetooth mule transfer (phone-to-phone, phone-to-server)
- [ ] LoRa transport layer (low bandwidth, long range, last-resort)
- [ ] mDNS / LAN discovery for local mesh
- [ ] Wi-Fi Direct for nearby device sync
### Phase 6 — Metadata Protection (Optional Layer)
- [ ] Onion routing between federated servers (opt-in, requires good connectivity)
- [ ] Padding and traffic shaping to resist traffic analysis
- [ ] Sealed sender (server doesn't know who sent a message, only who receives)
### Phase 7 — Polish & Operations
- [ ] ntfy integration for push notifications
- [ ] DoH for DNS resolution in censored networks
- [ ] Admin CLI (manage users, mules, federation)
- [ ] Monitoring and health checks
- [ ] Rate limiting and abuse prevention
- [ ] Audit logging
- [ ] Server-at-rest encryption (optional, manual key on boot)
- [ ] Cross-compilation CI (Linux x86/ARM, macOS, Windows, WASM)
- [ ] Documentation and protocol specification
---
## Resolved Decisions
| Question | Decision | Rationale |
|----------|----------|-----------|
| MLS vs Sender Keys | **Sender Keys** (groups ≤ 50) | Simpler, sufficient for target group sizes. MLS revisited if needed later. |
| Metadata protection | **Optional onion layer** | Opt-in when connectivity allows. Not a blocker for core functionality. Sealed sender as a lighter alternative first. |
| Deniability | **Deniability by default** (Signal model) | Safety-first for users in hostile environments. Non-repudiation can be added as opt-in per-conversation later. |
| Server-at-rest encryption | **Optional, not in core** | Nice to have. Implement as a flag: `--encrypt-db` with passphrase on boot. E2E already protects message content. |
| Incentives / tokenization | **Not in scope** | This is an organizational/military tool. Participants cooperate by mandate, not incentive. |
| Transport fallbacks | **Bluetooth + LoRa** | Mules use Bluetooth for device-to-device. LoRa for extreme last-resort (low bandwidth but km range). LoRa is not Phase 1. |
| Key transparency | **DNS TXT records** | Each user self-signs their pubkey in a DNS TXT record. Server can't MITM because it can't forge the self-signature. Integrated with federation DNS in Phase 3. |
| Multi-device ratchet | **Per-device sessions** | Each device maintains its own Double Ratchet session with each contact (Signal's approach). Cross-device history sync via encrypted device-to-device channel using shared seed. |
## Open Questions
1. **LoRa investment**: LoRa has ~250 byte payload limit. Emergency-only (receipts + short text) or a real feature? Not Phase 1 either way — but the compact binary format should be designed early so the message layer doesn't assume JSON everywhere.
2. **Legal**: E2E encryption with mule delivery designed for warzone use has significant legal implications in many jurisdictions. Needs legal review before deployment.
3. **Sealed sender vs onion routing**: Sealed sender (Signal's approach — server knows recipient but not sender) is lighter than full onion routing. Plan: sealed sender first as the default metadata protection, full onion routing as Phase 6 upgrade for when connectivity allows it.
---
## 8. Transport Layer Architecture
The protocol is transport-agnostic. The message format is the same regardless of how it travels. Transports are pluggable:
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Application Layer │
│ (Signal Protocol, Message Routing, Queue) │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Transport Abstraction │
│ trait Transport { │
│ async fn send(&self, endpoint, blob); │
│ async fn recv(&self) -> blob; │
│ } │
├──────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬────────┬────────┤
│ HTTPS│ WS │ BT │ LoRa │Wi-Fi │ USB │
│ │ │ │ │Direct │ (file) │
└──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴────────┴────────┘
```
### HTTPS (Primary)
- Standard server-to-server and client-to-server
- TLS 1.3, certificate pinning
- HTTP/2 for multiplexing
- SSE or WebSocket for real-time push
### Bluetooth (Mule + Nearby)
- BLE for discovery, Bluetooth Classic for data transfer
- Range: ~10-100m
- Bandwidth: ~2 Mbps practical
- Use case: mule syncs with server/client in proximity
- Protocol: RFCOMM socket, same message blobs as HTTPS
### LoRa (Last Resort)
- Range: 2-15 km (line of sight), 1-5 km urban
- Bandwidth: 0.3-50 kbps
- Payload: ~250 bytes per packet
- Use case: delivery receipts, short text, presence beacons
- NOT for files or media — text-only, heavily compressed
- Message format: compact binary (not JSON)
```
LoRa packet (250 bytes max):
[1] version
[1] type (text=0x01, receipt=0x02, beacon=0x03)
[8] sender fingerprint (truncated)
[8] recipient fingerprint (truncated)
[4] timestamp (unix, 32-bit)
[12] nonce
[~216] ciphertext (AES-GCM, ~200 chars of text)
```
### Wi-Fi Direct (Nearby Mesh)
- Range: ~200m
- Bandwidth: ~250 Mbps
- Use case: local group sync when no internet, ad-hoc mesh
- Devices form a local group, sync message queues peer-to-peer
### USB / File (Sneakernet)
- Export message queue to encrypted file
- Copy to USB drive
- Import on destination machine
- Same as mule protocol but manual file transfer
- `warzone export --since 24h --to /mnt/usb/messages.wz`
- `warzone import /mnt/usb/messages.wz`

708
chat.py
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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import html
import urllib.parse
PORT = 9999
VERSION = "10"
VERSION = "14"
TUNNEL_TARGETS = {
"parspack": ("185.208.174.152", 22),
"mequ": ("188.213.68.133", 2022),
@@ -36,9 +36,32 @@ MAX_TOTAL_STORAGE = 50 * 1024 * 1024 # 50 MB total
# ── Server ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
clients: dict[asyncio.StreamWriter, str] = {} # TCP clients
sse_queues: list[asyncio.Queue] = [] # web clients
history: list[dict] = []
# E2E encryption: public key registry (username -> JWK public key JSON string)
KEYS_FILE = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "keys.json")
def load_keys() -> dict[str, str]:
"""Load user keys from disk."""
try:
with open(KEYS_FILE, "r") as f:
return json.load(f)
except (FileNotFoundError, json.JSONDecodeError):
return {}
def save_keys():
"""Persist user keys to disk."""
try:
with open(KEYS_FILE, "w") as f:
json.dump(user_keys, f)
except Exception:
pass
user_keys: dict[str, str] = load_keys()
# DM routing: username -> list of queues for SSE delivery
dm_targets: dict[str, list] = {}
uploaded_files: dict[str, bytes] = {} # file_id -> raw bytes (insertion order)
total_file_bytes = 0
@@ -53,31 +76,52 @@ def store_file(file_id: str, data: bytes):
total_file_bytes -= len(uploaded_files.pop(oldest_id))
class Group:
"""A chat group with its own history, clients, and optional password."""
def __init__(self, name: str):
self.name = name
self.password: str | None = None
self.history: list[dict] = []
self.clients: dict[asyncio.StreamWriter, str] = {} # TCP clients
self.sse_queues: list[asyncio.Queue] = []
async def broadcast(msg: dict):
history.append(msg)
async def broadcast(self, msg: dict):
self.history.append(msg)
line = json.dumps(msg) + "\n"
# TCP clients
dead = []
for w in clients:
for w in self.clients:
try:
w.write(line.encode())
await w.drain()
except Exception:
dead.append(w)
for w in dead:
clients.pop(w, None)
self.clients.pop(w, None)
# SSE web clients
dead_q = []
for q in sse_queues:
for q in self.sse_queues:
try:
q.put_nowait(msg)
except Exception:
dead_q.append(q)
for q in dead_q:
sse_queues.remove(q)
self.sse_queues.remove(q)
# All groups keyed by name. Auto-created on first access.
groups: dict[str, Group] = {}
DEFAULT_GROUP = "lobby"
def get_group(name: str) -> Group:
"""Get or create a group by name."""
name = name.lower().strip()
if not name:
name = DEFAULT_GROUP
if name not in groups:
groups[name] = Group(name)
return groups[name]
# ── HTML / JS chat page ────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -86,62 +130,123 @@ CHAT_HTML = r"""<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1,maximum-scale=1,user-scalable=no,viewport-fit=cover">
<meta name="apple-mobile-web-app-capable" content="yes">
<meta name="apple-mobile-web-app-status-bar-style" content="black-translucent">
<meta name="apple-mobile-web-app-title" content="Chat">
<meta name="theme-color" content="#1a1a2e">
<meta name="mobile-web-app-capable" content="yes">
<link rel="manifest" href="/manifest.json">
<title>Chat</title>
<style>
* { box-sizing: border-box; margin: 0; padding: 0; }
body { background: #1a1a2e; color: #e0e0e0; font-family: 'Courier New', monospace;
display: flex; flex-direction: column; height: 100vh; }
#messages { flex: 1; overflow-y: auto; padding: 12px; }
.msg { padding: 3px 0; white-space: pre-wrap; word-wrap: break-word; }
html, body { height: 100%; overflow: hidden; }
body { background: #1a1a2e; color: #e0e0e0; font-family: -apple-system, 'Courier New', monospace;
display: flex; flex-direction: column; height: 100vh; height: 100dvh;
padding-top: env(safe-area-inset-top); padding-bottom: env(safe-area-inset-bottom); }
#messages { flex: 1; overflow-y: auto; padding: 10px; -webkit-overflow-scrolling: touch; }
.msg { padding: 3px 0; white-space: pre-wrap; word-wrap: break-word; font-size: 14px; }
.msg code { background: #2a2a4a; padding: 1px 5px; border-radius: 3px; color: #f8c555; }
.msg pre { background: #12122a; border: 1px solid #333; border-radius: 4px;
padding: 8px; margin: 4px 0; overflow-x: auto; }
padding: 8px; margin: 4px 0; overflow-x: auto; -webkit-overflow-scrolling: touch; }
.msg pre code { background: none; padding: 0; color: #e0e0e0; }
.msg strong { color: #fff; }
.msg em { color: #ccc; }
.msg a.auto-link { color: #67c7eb; }
.ts { color: #666; }
.sys { color: #5e9ca0; font-style: italic; }
.dm-hint { color: #555; font-size: 0.8em; display: block; margin-top: 2px; }
.file-link { display: inline-block; background: #0f3460; border: 1px solid #444;
padding: 4px 10px; border-radius: 4px; margin: 2px 0; color: #67c7eb;
padding: 6px 12px; border-radius: 4px; margin: 2px 0; color: #67c7eb;
text-decoration: none; }
.file-link:hover { background: #1a4a80; }
#bottom { display: flex; padding: 8px; gap: 8px; border-top: 1px solid #333;
.file-link:hover, .file-link:active { background: #1a4a80; }
#header { display: flex; padding: 6px 10px; gap: 6px; background: #16213e;
border-bottom: 1px solid #333; align-items: center; }
#name { flex: 0 0 auto; width: 80px; padding: 8px; background: #0f3460; border: 1px solid #444;
color: #e0e0e0; border-radius: 4px; font-size: 14px; }
#header-info { flex: 1; font-size: 0.7em; text-align: right; color: #8899aa; }
#header-info code { background: #0f3460; color: #67c7eb; padding: 1px 5px; border-radius: 3px;
font-size: 1em; }
#bottom { display: flex; padding: 6px; gap: 6px; border-top: 1px solid #333;
background: #16213e; align-items: flex-end; }
#name { width: 100px; padding: 8px; background: #0f3460; border: 1px solid #444;
color: #e0e0e0; border-radius: 4px; align-self: flex-end; }
#input { flex: 1; padding: 8px; background: #0f3460; border: 1px solid #444;
color: #e0e0e0; border-radius: 4px; resize: none; min-height: 38px;
max-height: 200px; font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; line-height: 1.4; }
#send { padding: 8px 16px; background: #e94560; border: none; color: #fff;
border-radius: 4px; cursor: pointer; align-self: flex-end; }
#send:hover { background: #c73e54; }
#file-btn { padding: 8px 10px; background: #0f3460; border: 1px solid #444; color: #e0e0e0;
border-radius: 4px; cursor: pointer; align-self: flex-end; font-size: 1.1em; }
#file-btn:hover { background: #1a4a80; }
#input { flex: 1; padding: 10px; background: #0f3460; border: 1px solid #444;
color: #e0e0e0; border-radius: 20px; resize: none; min-height: 40px;
max-height: 120px; font-family: inherit; font-size: 16px; line-height: 1.4; }
#send { padding: 10px 16px; background: #e94560; border: none; color: #fff;
border-radius: 20px; cursor: pointer; align-self: flex-end; font-size: 14px;
min-height: 40px; }
#send:hover, #send:active { background: #c73e54; }
#file-btn { padding: 10px; background: #0f3460; border: 1px solid #444; color: #e0e0e0;
border-radius: 50%; cursor: pointer; align-self: flex-end; font-size: 1.1em;
min-width: 40px; min-height: 40px; text-align: center; line-height: 20px; }
#file-btn:hover, #file-btn:active { background: #1a4a80; }
#file-input { display: none; }
.hint { color: #555; font-size: 0.75em; padding: 2px 12px; }
#install-bar { display: none; padding: 8px 12px; background: #0f3460; text-align: center;
border-bottom: 1px solid #333; }
#install-bar button { background: #e94560; border: none; color: #fff; padding: 6px 16px;
border-radius: 4px; cursor: pointer; margin: 0 4px; }
#install-bar .dismiss { background: transparent; color: #666; }
#pw-overlay { display:none; position:fixed; inset:0; background:rgba(0,0,0,0.8);
z-index:100; align-items:center; justify-content:center; }
#pw-overlay.show { display:flex; }
#pw-box { background:#16213e; border:1px solid #444; border-radius:8px; padding:24px;
text-align:center; max-width:300px; width:90%; }
#pw-box h3 { margin-bottom:12px; color:#e0e0e0; }
#pw-box input { width:100%; padding:10px; background:#0f3460; border:1px solid #444;
color:#e0e0e0; border-radius:4px; margin-bottom:10px; font-size:16px; }
#pw-box button { padding:8px 20px; background:#e94560; border:none; color:#fff;
border-radius:4px; cursor:pointer; }
#pw-box .pw-err { color:#e94560; font-size:0.85em; margin-bottom:8px; display:none; }
#group-tag { background:#e94560; color:#fff; padding:2px 8px; border-radius:10px;
font-size:0.75em; margin-left:6px; }
@media (max-width: 500px) {
.msg { font-size: 13px; }
.ts { font-size: 11px; }
#input { font-size: 16px; }
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div id="install-bar">
Install as app for notifications &amp; fullscreen
<button id="install-btn">Install</button>
<button class="dismiss" id="install-dismiss">Later</button>
</div>
<div id="pw-overlay">
<div id="pw-box">
<h3>This group is password protected</h3>
<div class="pw-err" id="pw-err">Wrong password</div>
<input type="password" id="pw-input" placeholder="Enter password…" autocomplete="off">
<button id="pw-btn">Join</button>
</div>
</div>
<div id="header">
<input id="name" placeholder="Name" value="" autocomplete="off">
<span id="group-tag"></span>
<span id="header-info"><code>/dm @user msg</code> <code>/r reply</code> <code>/users</code> <code>/setpass</code> <code>/color</code></span>
</div>
<div id="messages"></div>
<div class="hint">Shift+Enter for newline · Enter to send</div>
<div id="bottom">
<input id="name" placeholder="Name" value="">
<label id="file-btn" title="Upload file">&#128206;<input type="file" id="file-input"></label>
<textarea id="input" placeholder="Type a message…" rows="1" autofocus
autocomplete="off" autocorrect="off" autocapitalize="off" spellcheck="false"></textarea>
<label id="file-btn" title="Upload file">&#128206;<input type="file" id="file-input"></label>
<button id="send">Send</button>
<button id="send">&#9654;</button>
</div>
<script>
const GROUP = '%%GROUP%%';
const HAS_PASSWORD = %%HAS_PASSWORD%%;
const BASE = '/group/' + GROUP;
const $msg = document.getElementById('messages');
const $input = document.getElementById('input');
const $name = document.getElementById('name');
const $send = document.getElementById('send');
const $file = document.getElementById('file-input');
$name.value = 'user' + Math.floor(Math.random() * 1000);
document.getElementById('group-tag').textContent = GROUP;
document.title = GROUP + ' - Chat';
$name.value = localStorage.getItem('chat-name') || ('user' + Math.floor(Math.random() * 1000));
const USER_COLORS = [
'#e6a23c', '#f56c9d', '#67c7eb', '#b39ddb',
@@ -226,15 +331,64 @@ function addMsg(data) {
function send() {
const text = $input.value.trimEnd();
const name = $name.value.trim() || 'anon';
localStorage.setItem('chat-name', name);
if (!text) return;
// Local commands
const dmMatch = text.match(/^\/dm\s+@?(\S+)\s+([\s\S]+)/);
if (dmMatch) {
lastDmPeer = dmMatch[1];
encryptAndSendDM(dmMatch[1], dmMatch[2]);
$input.value = '';
$input.style.height = 'auto';
return;
}
const replyMatch = text.match(/^\/(?:reply|r)\s+([\s\S]+)/);
if (replyMatch) {
if (!lastDmPeer) {
addMsg({ts:Date.now()/1000, user:'***', text:'No one to reply to. Use /dm @user first.'});
} else {
encryptAndSendDM(lastDmPeer, replyMatch[1]);
}
$input.value = '';
$input.style.height = 'auto';
return;
}
if (text === '/users' || text === '/online') {
fetch('/keys').then(r => r.json()).then(users => {
addMsg({ts:Date.now()/1000, user:'***', text:'Users with keys: ' + users.join(', ')});
});
$input.value = '';
$input.style.height = 'auto';
return;
}
if (text === '/colors' || text === '/color') {
reshuffleColors();
$input.value = '';
$input.style.height = 'auto';
return;
}
fetch('/chat/send', {
if (text.startsWith('/setpass ')) {
const pw = text.substring(9).trim();
fetch(BASE + '/setpass', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'},
body: 'password=' + encodeURIComponent(pw)
}).then(() => addMsg({ts:Date.now()/1000, user:'***', text:'Password set for this group.'}));
$input.value = '';
$input.style.height = 'auto';
return;
}
if (text === '/clearpass') {
fetch(BASE + '/setpass', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'},
body: 'password='
}).then(() => addMsg({ts:Date.now()/1000, user:'***', text:'Password cleared.'}));
$input.value = '';
$input.style.height = 'auto';
return;
}
fetch(BASE + '/send', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'},
body: 'name=' + encodeURIComponent(name) + '&text=' + encodeURIComponent(text)
@@ -265,7 +419,7 @@ $file.onchange = function() {
const fd = new FormData();
fd.append('name', name);
fd.append('file', f);
fetch('/chat/upload', { method: 'POST', body: fd });
fetch(BASE + '/upload', { method: 'POST', body: fd });
this.value = '';
};
@@ -304,19 +458,273 @@ window.addEventListener('focus', function() {
document.title = baseTitle;
});
// SSE
const es = new EventSource('/chat/events');
// Password gate
let sessionPass = sessionStorage.getItem('pw-' + GROUP) || '';
function startSSE() {
const myName = $name.value.trim() || 'anon';
const params = new URLSearchParams();
if (sessionPass) params.set('password', sessionPass);
params.set('name', myName);
const url = BASE + '/events?' + params.toString();
const es = new EventSource(url);
es.onmessage = function(e) {
// Check for auth error
const data = JSON.parse(e.data);
if (data._auth === 'fail') {
es.close();
showPasswordPrompt();
return;
}
if (data.dm && data.encrypted) {
handleEncryptedDM(data);
} else {
addMsg(data);
}
notify(data);
};
es.onerror = function() { addMsg({ts: Date.now()/1000, user: '***', text: 'Connection lost. Retrying…'}); };
es.onerror = function() {
addMsg({ts: Date.now()/1000, user: '***', text: 'Connection lost. Retrying…'});
};
}
function showPasswordPrompt() {
document.getElementById('pw-overlay').classList.add('show');
document.getElementById('pw-input').focus();
}
document.getElementById('pw-btn').onclick = function() {
sessionPass = document.getElementById('pw-input').value;
sessionStorage.setItem('pw-' + GROUP, sessionPass);
document.getElementById('pw-overlay').classList.remove('show');
startSSE();
};
document.getElementById('pw-input').onkeydown = function(e) {
if (e.key === 'Enter') document.getElementById('pw-btn').click();
};
// ── E2E Encrypted DMs (ECDH + AES-256-GCM via Web Crypto) ──
let myKeyPair = null;
let lastDmPeer = null; // for /reply
let myPubJwk = null;
const derivedKeys = {}; // cache: username -> CryptoKey (AES)
async function initCrypto() {
// Try to load persisted keys from localStorage
const savedPriv = localStorage.getItem('chat-key-priv');
const savedPub = localStorage.getItem('chat-key-pub');
if (savedPriv && savedPub) {
try {
const privJwk = JSON.parse(savedPriv);
myPubJwk = JSON.parse(savedPub);
const privKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
'jwk', privJwk, { name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'P-256' }, true, ['deriveBits']
);
const pubKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
'jwk', myPubJwk, { name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'P-256' }, true, []
);
myKeyPair = { privateKey: privKey, publicKey: pubKey };
} catch(e) {
// Corrupted keys, regenerate
localStorage.removeItem('chat-key-priv');
localStorage.removeItem('chat-key-pub');
return initCrypto();
}
} else {
// Generate new keys and persist
myKeyPair = await crypto.subtle.generateKey(
{ name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'P-256' }, true, ['deriveBits']
);
myPubJwk = await crypto.subtle.exportKey('jwk', myKeyPair.publicKey);
const privJwk = await crypto.subtle.exportKey('jwk', myKeyPair.privateKey);
localStorage.setItem('chat-key-priv', JSON.stringify(privJwk));
localStorage.setItem('chat-key-pub', JSON.stringify(myPubJwk));
}
// Always register public key with server (re-registers on reconnect)
const myName = $name.value.trim() || 'anon';
fetch('/keys', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'},
body: 'name=' + encodeURIComponent(myName) + '&key=' + encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify(myPubJwk))
});
}
// Re-register key when name changes
$name.addEventListener('change', function() {
localStorage.setItem('chat-name', this.value);
if (myPubJwk) {
fetch('/keys', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'},
body: 'name=' + encodeURIComponent(this.value.trim()) + '&key=' + encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify(myPubJwk))
});
}
});
async function deriveAESKey(theirPubJwk) {
const theirPub = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
'jwk', theirPubJwk, { name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'P-256' }, false, []
);
const bits = await crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
{ name: 'ECDH', public: theirPub }, myKeyPair.privateKey, 256
);
return crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', bits, 'AES-GCM', false, ['encrypt', 'decrypt']);
}
async function getAESKey(username) {
if (derivedKeys[username]) return derivedKeys[username];
const resp = await fetch('/keys/' + encodeURIComponent(username));
if (!resp.ok) return null;
const jwk = JSON.parse(await resp.text());
const key = await deriveAESKey(jwk);
derivedKeys[username] = key;
return key;
}
async function encryptAndSendDM(recipient, plaintext) {
const aesKey = await getAESKey(recipient);
if (!aesKey) {
addMsg({ts: Date.now()/1000, user: '***', text: 'User "' + recipient + '" has no key registered. They must be online.'});
return;
}
const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
const enc = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(
{ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: nonce }, aesKey, new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)
);
const myName = $name.value.trim() || 'anon';
fetch('/dm', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'},
body: 'from=' + encodeURIComponent(myName)
+ '&to=' + encodeURIComponent(recipient)
+ '&encrypted=' + encodeURIComponent(btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(enc))))
+ '&nonce=' + encodeURIComponent(btoa(String.fromCharCode(...nonce)))
});
}
async function handleEncryptedDM(data) {
const myName = $name.value.trim();
// Only decrypt if we are sender or recipient
if (data.to !== myName && data.user !== myName) return;
const otherUser = data.user === myName ? data.to : data.user;
// Update reply target when someone DMs us
if (data.user !== myName) lastDmPeer = data.user;
try {
const aesKey = await getAESKey(otherUser);
if (!aesKey) throw new Error('no key');
const ciphertext = Uint8Array.from(atob(data.encrypted), c => c.charCodeAt(0));
const nonce = Uint8Array.from(atob(data.nonce), c => c.charCodeAt(0));
const plain = await crypto.subtle.decrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: nonce }, aesKey, ciphertext);
const text = new TextDecoder().decode(plain);
const d = document.createElement('div');
d.className = 'msg';
const t = new Date(data.ts * 1000).toLocaleTimeString([], {hour:'2-digit',minute:'2-digit'});
const arrow = data.user === myName ? '' + esc(data.to) : '' + esc(data.user);
const replyTo = data.user === myName ? data.to : data.user;
d.innerHTML = '<span class="ts">' + t + '</span> <span class="dm-tag" data-reply="' + esc(replyTo) + '" style="color:#ff6b9d;cursor:pointer" title="Click to reply">&#128274; DM ' + arrow + '</span>: ' + renderMd(text);
d.querySelector('.dm-tag').onclick = function() {
$input.value = '/dm @' + this.dataset.reply + ' ';
$input.focus();
};
$msg.appendChild(d);
$msg.scrollTop = $msg.scrollHeight;
} catch(e) {
const d = document.createElement('div');
d.className = 'msg';
const replyTo = data.user;
const t = new Date(data.ts * 1000).toLocaleTimeString([], {hour:'2-digit',minute:'2-digit'});
d.innerHTML = '<span class="ts">' + t + '</span> <span class="dm-tag" data-reply="' + esc(replyTo) + '" style="color:#ff6b9d;cursor:pointer" title="Click to reply">&#128274; DM from ' + esc(data.user) + '</span>: <em>[cannot decrypt]</em>';
d.querySelector('.dm-tag').onclick = function() {
$input.value = '/dm @' + this.dataset.reply + ' ';
$input.focus();
};
$msg.appendChild(d);
$msg.scrollTop = $msg.scrollHeight;
}
}
initCrypto();
// Check password requirement and start
if (HAS_PASSWORD && !sessionPass) {
showPasswordPrompt();
} else {
startSSE();
}
// PWA install prompt
let deferredPrompt = null;
window.addEventListener('beforeinstallprompt', function(e) {
e.preventDefault();
deferredPrompt = e;
document.getElementById('install-bar').style.display = 'block';
});
document.getElementById('install-btn').onclick = function() {
if (deferredPrompt) {
deferredPrompt.prompt();
deferredPrompt.userChoice.then(function() { deferredPrompt = null; });
}
document.getElementById('install-bar').style.display = 'none';
};
document.getElementById('install-dismiss').onclick = function() {
document.getElementById('install-bar').style.display = 'none';
};
// Service worker
if ('serviceWorker' in navigator) {
navigator.serviceWorker.register('/sw.js').catch(function(){});
}
// Mobile
window.visualViewport && window.visualViewport.addEventListener('resize', function() {
$msg.scrollTop = $msg.scrollHeight;
});
</script>
</body>
</html>
"""
PWA_MANIFEST = json.dumps({
"name": "Chat",
"short_name": "Chat",
"description": "Minimal multi-user chat",
"start_url": "/chat",
"display": "standalone",
"background_color": "#1a1a2e",
"theme_color": "#1a1a2e",
"icons": [
{"src": "/icon.svg", "sizes": "any", "type": "image/svg+xml", "purpose": "any maskable"}
]
})
# Minimal SVG icon (chat bubble)
PWA_ICON = """<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 512 512">
<rect width="512" height="512" rx="100" fill="#1a1a2e"/>
<path d="M128 140h256c22 0 40 18 40 40v152c0 22-18 40-40 40H210l-70 52v-52h-12c-22 0-40-18-40-40V180c0-22 18-40 40-40z" fill="#e94560"/>
<circle cx="200" cy="256" r="18" fill="#fff"/>
<circle cx="256" cy="256" r="18" fill="#fff"/>
<circle cx="312" cy="256" r="18" fill="#fff"/>
</svg>"""
SERVICE_WORKER = """
const CACHE = 'chat-v1';
self.addEventListener('install', e => { self.skipWaiting(); });
self.addEventListener('activate', e => { e.waitUntil(clients.claim()); });
self.addEventListener('fetch', e => {
// Let all requests go to network (chat is real-time, caching would break it)
// But cache the shell for offline "you're offline" experience
if (e.request.mode === 'navigate') {
e.respondWith(
fetch(e.request).catch(() => new Response(
'<html><body style="background:#1a1a2e;color:#e0e0e0;font-family:monospace;display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:center;height:100vh"><h2>Offline - connect to the internet</h2></body></html>',
{headers: {'Content-Type': 'text/html'}}
))
);
}
});
"""
# ── Multipart parser (minimal, for file uploads) ───────────────────────
def parse_multipart(body: bytes, boundary: str) -> dict:
@@ -455,6 +863,40 @@ async def handle_ws_tunnel(ws_reader, ws_writer, target):
async def handle_http(reader, writer, first_line):
method, path, headers, body = await parse_http_request(reader, first_line)
# PWA assets
if method == "GET" and path == "/manifest.json":
resp = PWA_MANIFEST.encode()
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n")
writer.write(b"Content-Type: application/manifest+json\r\n")
writer.write(f"Content-Length: {len(resp)}\r\n".encode())
writer.write(b"\r\n")
writer.write(resp)
await writer.drain()
writer.close()
return
if method == "GET" and path == "/icon.svg":
resp = PWA_ICON.encode()
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n")
writer.write(b"Content-Type: image/svg+xml\r\n")
writer.write(f"Content-Length: {len(resp)}\r\n".encode())
writer.write(b"\r\n")
writer.write(resp)
await writer.drain()
writer.close()
return
if method == "GET" and path == "/sw.js":
resp = SERVICE_WORKER.encode()
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n")
writer.write(b"Content-Type: application/javascript\r\n")
writer.write(f"Content-Length: {len(resp)}\r\n".encode())
writer.write(b"\r\n")
writer.write(resp)
await writer.drain()
writer.close()
return
# GET /version
if method == "GET" and path == "/version":
resp = json.dumps({"version": VERSION}).encode()
@@ -487,9 +929,24 @@ async def handle_http(reader, writer, first_line):
writer.close()
return
# GET / or /chat — serve the web UI
# GET / or /chat → redirect to /group/lobby
if method == "GET" and path in ("/", "/chat", "/chat/"):
resp = CHAT_HTML.encode()
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 302 Found\r\nLocation: /group/lobby\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n")
await writer.drain()
writer.close()
return
# ── Group routes: /group/<name>[/action] ──
if path.startswith("/group/"):
parts = path[7:].strip("/").split("/", 1) # strip "/group/"
group_name = urllib.parse.unquote(parts[0]) if parts[0] else DEFAULT_GROUP
action = parts[1] if len(parts) > 1 else ""
grp = get_group(group_name)
# GET /group/<name> — serve the web UI
if method == "GET" and action == "":
has_pw = "true" if grp.password else "false"
resp = CHAT_HTML.replace("%%GROUP%%", group_name).replace("%%HAS_PASSWORD%%", has_pw).encode()
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n")
writer.write(b"Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\r\n")
writer.write(f"Content-Length: {len(resp)}\r\n".encode())
@@ -499,8 +956,25 @@ async def handle_http(reader, writer, first_line):
writer.close()
return
# GET /chat/events — SSE stream
if method == "GET" and path == "/chat/events":
# GET /group/<name>/events — SSE stream
if method == "GET" and action.startswith("events"):
# Check password
query = ""
if "?" in action:
query = action.split("?", 1)[1]
qs = urllib.parse.parse_qs(query)
pw = qs.get("password", [""])[0]
if grp.password and pw != grp.password:
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n")
writer.write(b"Content-Type: text/event-stream\r\n")
writer.write(b"Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n")
writer.write(b"X-Accel-Buffering: no\r\n")
writer.write(b"\r\n")
writer.write(f"data: {json.dumps({'_auth': 'fail'})}\n\n".encode())
await writer.drain()
writer.close()
return
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n")
writer.write(b"Content-Type: text/event-stream\r\n")
writer.write(b"Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n")
@@ -510,12 +984,16 @@ async def handle_http(reader, writer, first_line):
writer.write(b"\r\n")
await writer.drain()
for msg in history:
for msg in grp.history:
writer.write(f"data: {json.dumps(msg)}\n\n".encode())
await writer.drain()
q: asyncio.Queue = asyncio.Queue()
sse_queues.append(q)
grp.sse_queues.append(q)
# Register for DM delivery
dm_name = qs.get("name", [""])[0]
if dm_name:
dm_targets.setdefault(dm_name, []).append(q)
try:
while True:
msg = await q.get()
@@ -524,25 +1002,32 @@ async def handle_http(reader, writer, first_line):
except Exception:
pass
finally:
if q in sse_queues:
sse_queues.remove(q)
if q in grp.sse_queues:
grp.sse_queues.remove(q)
if dm_name and dm_name in dm_targets:
try:
dm_targets[dm_name].remove(q)
except ValueError:
pass
if not dm_targets[dm_name]:
del dm_targets[dm_name]
writer.close()
return
# POST /chat/send — send a message (supports multiline via JSON text field)
if method == "POST" and path == "/chat/send":
# POST /group/<name>/send
if method == "POST" and action == "send":
params = urllib.parse.parse_qs(body.decode())
name = params.get("name", ["anon"])[0]
text = params.get("text", [""])[0].strip()
if text:
await broadcast({"ts": time.time(), "user": name, "text": text})
await grp.broadcast({"ts": time.time(), "user": name, "text": text})
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 204 No Content\r\n\r\n")
await writer.drain()
writer.close()
return
# POST /chat/upload — file upload (multipart/form-data)
if method == "POST" and path == "/chat/upload":
# POST /group/<name>/upload
if method == "POST" and action == "upload":
ct = headers.get("content-type", "")
if "multipart/form-data" in ct and "boundary=" in ct:
boundary = ct.split("boundary=")[1].strip()
@@ -557,7 +1042,7 @@ async def handle_http(reader, writer, first_line):
if len(file_data) <= MAX_FILE_SIZE:
file_id = hashlib.sha256(file_data + str(time.time()).encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
store_file(file_id, file_data)
await broadcast({
await grp.broadcast({
"ts": time.time(), "user": name,
"text": f"[file: {filename}]",
"file_id": file_id, "filename": filename,
@@ -568,6 +1053,90 @@ async def handle_http(reader, writer, first_line):
writer.close()
return
# POST /group/<name>/setpass
if method == "POST" and action == "setpass":
params = urllib.parse.parse_qs(body.decode(), keep_blank_values=True)
pw = params.get("password", [""])[0].strip()
grp.password = pw if pw else None
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 204 No Content\r\n\r\n")
await writer.drain()
writer.close()
return
# ── E2E encrypted DM routes ──
# POST /keys — register public key: body = name=...&key=<JWK JSON>
if method == "POST" and path == "/keys":
params = urllib.parse.parse_qs(body.decode())
name = params.get("name", [""])[0]
key = params.get("key", [""])[0]
if name and key:
user_keys[name] = key
save_keys()
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 204 No Content\r\n\r\n")
await writer.drain()
writer.close()
return
# GET /keys/<username> — get public key
if method == "GET" and path.startswith("/keys/"):
username = urllib.parse.unquote(path[6:])
key = user_keys.get(username)
if key:
resp = key.encode()
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n")
writer.write(b"Content-Type: application/json\r\n")
writer.write(f"Content-Length: {len(resp)}\r\n".encode())
writer.write(b"\r\n")
writer.write(resp)
else:
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n")
await writer.drain()
writer.close()
return
# GET /keys — list all registered usernames
if method == "GET" and path == "/keys":
resp = json.dumps(list(user_keys.keys())).encode()
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n")
writer.write(b"Content-Type: application/json\r\n")
writer.write(f"Content-Length: {len(resp)}\r\n".encode())
writer.write(b"\r\n")
writer.write(resp)
await writer.drain()
writer.close()
return
# POST /dm — relay an encrypted DM: body = from=...&to=...&encrypted=...&nonce=...
if method == "POST" and path == "/dm":
params = urllib.parse.parse_qs(body.decode())
sender = params.get("from", [""])[0]
recipient = params.get("to", [""])[0]
encrypted = params.get("encrypted", [""])[0]
nonce = params.get("nonce", [""])[0]
if sender and recipient and encrypted:
dm_msg = {
"ts": time.time(), "user": sender, "dm": True,
"to": recipient, "encrypted": encrypted, "nonce": nonce
}
# Deliver to all SSE queues registered for this recipient
for q in dm_targets.get(recipient, []):
try:
q.put_nowait(dm_msg)
except Exception:
pass
# Also deliver to sender so they see their own DM
if sender != recipient:
for q in dm_targets.get(sender, []):
try:
q.put_nowait(dm_msg)
except Exception:
pass
writer.write(b"HTTP/1.1 204 No Content\r\n\r\n")
await writer.drain()
writer.close()
return
# GET /files/<id>/<filename> — download uploaded file
if method == "GET" and path.startswith("/files/"):
parts = path.split("/")
@@ -640,16 +1209,17 @@ async def handle(reader: asyncio.StreamReader, writer: asyncio.StreamWriter):
await handle_http(reader, writer, first_line)
return
# Raw TCP chat client — first line is the name
# Raw TCP chat client — first line is the name (uses lobby group)
name = first_line
clients[writer] = name
grp = get_group(DEFAULT_GROUP)
grp.clients[writer] = name
for msg in history:
for msg in grp.history:
writer.write((json.dumps(msg) + "\n").encode())
await writer.drain()
await broadcast({"ts": time.time(), "user": "***", "text": f"{name} joined"})
print(f"+ {name} connected ({len(clients)} online)")
await grp.broadcast({"ts": time.time(), "user": "***", "text": f"{name} joined"})
print(f"+ {name} connected ({len(grp.clients)} online in {grp.name})")
try:
while True:
@@ -659,7 +1229,6 @@ async def handle(reader: asyncio.StreamReader, writer: asyncio.StreamWriter):
line = data.decode().rstrip("\n")
if not line:
continue
# Try JSON (new protocol: supports multiline + files)
try:
pkt = json.loads(line)
if pkt.get("type") == "file":
@@ -668,7 +1237,7 @@ async def handle(reader: asyncio.StreamReader, writer: asyncio.StreamWriter):
continue
file_id = hashlib.sha256(file_data + str(time.time()).encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
store_file(file_id, file_data)
await broadcast({
await grp.broadcast({
"ts": time.time(), "user": name,
"text": f"[file: {pkt['filename']}]",
"file_id": file_id, "filename": pkt["filename"],
@@ -677,17 +1246,16 @@ async def handle(reader: asyncio.StreamReader, writer: asyncio.StreamWriter):
else:
text = pkt.get("text", "").strip()
if text:
await broadcast({"ts": time.time(), "user": name, "text": text})
await grp.broadcast({"ts": time.time(), "user": name, "text": text})
except (json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError):
# Legacy plain text (single line, backwards compat)
if line.strip():
await broadcast({"ts": time.time(), "user": name, "text": line.strip()})
await grp.broadcast({"ts": time.time(), "user": name, "text": line.strip()})
except Exception:
pass
finally:
clients.pop(writer, None)
await broadcast({"ts": time.time(), "user": "***", "text": f"{name} left"})
print(f"- {name} disconnected ({len(clients)} online)")
grp.clients.pop(writer, None)
await grp.broadcast({"ts": time.time(), "user": "***", "text": f"{name} left"})
print(f"- {name} disconnected ({len(grp.clients)} online in {grp.name})")
writer.close()

1
warzone-phone Submodule

Submodule warzone-phone added at 1d33f3ed4e

2
warzone/.gitignore vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
/target/
warzone-data/

91
warzone/CLAUDE.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
# featherChat — Design Principles & Conventions
## MANDATORY: Version Bumping
**After every set of changes that modifies functionality, bump the version:**
1. `Cargo.toml` workspace version (e.g. `0.0.22``0.0.23`)
2. `crates/warzone-protocol/Cargo.toml` standalone version (same)
3. `crates/warzone-server/src/routes/web.rs` JS `VERSION` constant
4. `crates/warzone-server/src/routes/web.rs` service worker `CACHE` version (`wz-vN``wz-v(N+1)`)
Never commit functional changes without bumping all four. The service worker cache MUST be bumped or browsers will serve stale WASM.
## Architecture Principles
1. **Single seed, multiple identities** — Ed25519 (messaging), X25519 (encryption), secp256k1 (ETH address) all derived from one BIP39 seed via HKDF with domain-separated info strings.
2. **E2E by default** — All user messages are Double Ratchet encrypted. The server NEVER sees plaintext. Friend lists are client-side encrypted. Only bot messages are plaintext (v1). Group calls are transport-encrypted only (QUIC/TLS); MLS (RFC 9420) E2E encryption for group calls is planned but not yet implemented.
3. **Server is semi-trusted** — Server sees metadata (who talks to whom, timing, groups) but cannot read message content. Design all features with this trust boundary in mind.
4. **Federation is transparent** — Users don't need to know which server their peer is on. Key lookup, alias resolution, and message delivery automatically proxy through federation.
5. **Telegram Bot API compatibility** — Bot API follows Telegram conventions (getUpdates, sendMessage, token-in-URL). Bot aliases must end with Bot/bot/_bot.
6. **Auth on writes, open reads** — All POST/write endpoints require bearer tokens. GET/read endpoints are public (needed for key exchange before auth is possible).
## Coding Conventions
### Rust
- Workspace crates: protocol (no I/O), server (axum), client (ratatui), wasm (wasm-bindgen), mule (future)
- Error handling: `AppResult<T>` in server, `anyhow::Result` in client, `ProtocolError` in protocol
- State: `AppState` with `Arc<Mutex<>>` for shared state, `Arc<Database>` for sled
- Auth: `AuthFingerprint` extractor as first handler param for protected routes
- Fingerprints: always normalize with `normfp()` (strip non-hex, lowercase)
- New routes: create `routes/<name>.rs`, add `pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState>`, merge in `routes/mod.rs`
### TUI
- 7 modules in `tui/`: types, draw, commands, input, file_transfer, network, mod
- All ChatLine must include `timestamp: Local::now()`
- Add new commands to both the handler chain AND `/help` text
- Self-messaging prevention: check `normfp(&peer) != normfp(&self.our_fp)`
### Web (WASM)
- JS embedded in `routes/web.rs` as Rust raw string — careful with escaping
- Service worker cache version must be bumped on WASM changes (`wz-vN`)
- `WasmSession::initiate()` stores X3DH result — `encrypt_key_exchange` must NOT re-initiate
- Ring tones use Web Audio API oscillators (no audio files) — see `startRingTone()`/`startRingbackTone()`/`stopRingTone()` in `web.rs`
### Federation
- Persistent WS between servers, NOT HTTP polling
- Presence re-pushed every 10s + on connect
- Key lookup: proxy to peer for non-local fingerprints (never cache remote bundles)
- Alias resolution: fall back to peer if not found locally
- Registration: check peer to enforce global uniqueness
### Bot API
- Token stored as `bot:<token>` in tokens tree
- Reverse lookup: `bot_fp:<fingerprint>` → token
- Alias auto-registered on bot creation with `_bot` suffix
- Reserved aliases: `*Bot`, `*bot`, `*_bot` blocked for non-bots
## Task Naming
`FC-P{phase}-T{task}[-S{subtask}]`
See `docs/TASK_PLAN.md` for the full breakdown.
## Testing
- Protocol: unit tests in each module's `#[cfg(test)]`
- TUI: unit tests for types, input, draw (using ratatui TestBackend)
- WASM: can't test natively (js-sys dependency) — test equivalent logic in protocol crate
- Server: no integration tests yet (planned)
## Key Files
| What | Where |
|------|-------|
| Wire format | `warzone-protocol/src/message.rs` |
| Crypto primitives | `warzone-protocol/src/crypto.rs` |
| Server state | `warzone-server/src/state.rs` |
| All routes | `warzone-server/src/routes/mod.rs` |
| Federation | `warzone-server/src/federation.rs` |
| TUI commands | `warzone-client/src/tui/commands.rs` |
| Web client | `warzone-server/src/routes/web.rs` |
| WASM bridge | `warzone-wasm/src/lib.rs` |
| Group signal endpoint | `warzone-server/src/routes/groups.rs` (`signal_group`) |
| Ring tone functions | `warzone-server/src/routes/web.rs` (`startRingTone`, `startRingbackTone`, `stopRingTone`) |
| Task plan | `docs/TASK_PLAN.md` |
| Bot API docs | `docs/BOT_API.md` |
| LLM help ref | `docs/LLM_HELP.md` |

3631
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85
warzone/Cargo.toml Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
[workspace]
resolver = "2"
members = [
"crates/warzone-protocol",
"crates/warzone-server",
"crates/warzone-client",
"crates/warzone-mule",
"crates/warzone-wasm",
]
[workspace.package]
version = "0.0.47"
edition = "2021"
license = "MIT"
rust-version = "1.75"
[workspace.dependencies]
# Crypto
ed25519-dalek = { version = "2", features = ["serde", "rand_core"] }
x25519-dalek = { version = "2", features = ["serde", "static_secrets"] }
curve25519-dalek = "4"
chacha20poly1305 = "0.10"
hkdf = "0.12"
sha2 = "0.10"
argon2 = "0.5"
rand = "0.8"
# Ethereum compatibility
k256 = { version = "0.13", features = ["ecdsa", "serde"] }
tiny-keccak = { version = "2", features = ["keccak"] }
# BIP39
bip39 = "2"
# Serialization
serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = "1"
bincode = "1"
# Async
tokio = { version = "1", features = ["full"] }
# Server
axum = { version = "0.7", features = ["ws"] }
tower = { version = "0.4", features = ["limit"] }
tower-http = { version = "0.5", features = ["cors", "trace"] }
# Client HTTP
reqwest = { version = "0.12", features = ["json"] }
# Database
sled = "0.34"
# CLI
clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive"] }
# TUI
ratatui = "0.28"
crossterm = "0.28"
# Logging
tracing = "0.1"
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
# Error handling
thiserror = "2"
anyhow = "1"
# Time
chrono = { version = "0.4", features = ["serde"] }
# Hex encoding
hex = "0.4"
# Base64
base64 = "0.22"
# UUID
uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4", "serde"] }
# WebSocket client
tokio-tungstenite = { version = "0.21", features = ["native-tls"] }
# Zero secrets in memory
zeroize = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }

190
warzone/README.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
# Warzone Messenger (featherChat)
End-to-end encrypted messenger with Signal protocol cryptography, voice/video call integration, and server federation.
## Features
- **E2E Encrypted DMs** — X3DH key exchange + Double Ratchet (forward secrecy)
- **Group Messaging** — Sender Key protocol (O(1) encryption, fan-out delivery)
- **Voice Calls (WZP)** — DM and group calls via WarzonePhone audio bridge (QUIC SFU relay, ChaCha20-Poly1305 media)
- **Ring Tones** — Audible ring on incoming calls (web client)
- **Group Calls** — Multi-party audio via /gcall, /gjoin, /gleave-call, /gmute
- **Read Receipts** — Sent, delivered, and read indicators (viewport-based)
- **Markdown Rendering** — Bold, italic, inline code, headers, quotes, and lists in TUI and web
- **File Transfer** — Chunked (64KB), SHA-256 verified, ratchet-encrypted
- **Admin Commands** — /admin-calls, /admin-unalias for server administration
- **Federation** — Two-server relay with HMAC-authenticated presence sync
- **TUI Client** — Full-featured terminal UI (ratatui, timestamps, scrolling, receipts)
- **Web Client** — Identical crypto via WASM (wasm-bindgen)
- **Ethereum Identity** — Same seed derives messaging keypair + Ethereum address (secp256k1)
- **BIP39 Seed** — 24-word mnemonic for identity backup/recovery
## Architecture
```
Clients (CLI / TUI / Web)
|
| E2E encrypted (ChaCha20-Poly1305)
|
warzone-server (axum + sled)
|
| Federation (HTTP + HMAC)
|
warzone-server (peer)
|
| Call signaling
|
WarzonePhone Relay (QUIC SFU)
```
See [docs/ARCHITECTURE.md](docs/ARCHITECTURE.md) for full architecture with Mermaid diagrams.
## Quick Start
### Build
```bash
cd warzone
cargo build --release
```
### Generate Identity
```bash
./target/release/warzone-client init
# Outputs: 24-word BIP39 mnemonic + fingerprint
```
### Start Server
```bash
./target/release/warzone-server --bind 0.0.0.0:7700
```
### Start TUI
```bash
./target/release/warzone-client tui --server http://localhost:7700
```
### WZP Setup (Voice Calls)
To enable voice calls, run a WarzonePhone relay alongside the server:
```bash
# Start the WZP QUIC relay (default port 7701)
./target/release/wzp-relay --bind 0.0.0.0:7701
# Start the server with WZP integration
./target/release/warzone-server --bind 0.0.0.0:7700 --wzp-relay http://localhost:7701
```
DM calls use `/call @alias`, group calls use `/gcall` within a group context.
### Federation (Two Servers)
Create `alpha.json`:
```json
{
"server_id": "alpha",
"shared_secret": "your-shared-secret",
"peer": { "id": "bravo", "url": "http://server-b:7700" },
"presence_interval_secs": 5
}
```
```bash
# Server A
warzone-server --bind 0.0.0.0:7700 --federation alpha.json
# Server B
warzone-server --bind 0.0.0.0:7700 --federation bravo.json
```
Messages automatically route across servers.
## TUI Commands
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `/peer <fp>` or `/p @alias` | Set DM peer |
| `/g <name>` | Switch to group (auto-join) |
| `/call <fp>` | Initiate DM voice call |
| `/accept` / `/reject` | Accept or reject incoming call |
| `/hangup` | End current call |
| `/gcall` | Start group call in current group |
| `/gjoin` | Join active group call |
| `/gleave-call` | Leave group call |
| `/gmute` | Toggle mute in group call |
| `/file <path>` | Send file (max 10MB) |
| `/contacts` | List contacts with message counts |
| `/history` | Show conversation history |
| `/devices` | List active device sessions |
| `/kick <id>` | Revoke a device session |
| `/help` | Full command list |
## Crates
| Crate | Purpose |
|-------|---------|
| `warzone-protocol` | Crypto & message types (X3DH, Double Ratchet, Sender Keys) |
| `warzone-server` | HTTP/WS server with sled DB, federation, call state |
| `warzone-client` | CLI + TUI client |
| `warzone-wasm` | WASM bridge for web client |
| `warzone-mule` | Physical message delivery (planned) |
## Cryptographic Stack
| Primitive | Purpose |
|-----------|---------|
| Ed25519 | Identity signing |
| X25519 | Diffie-Hellman key exchange |
| ChaCha20-Poly1305 | AEAD encryption |
| HKDF-SHA256 | Key derivation |
| Argon2id | Seed encryption at rest |
| secp256k1 | Ethereum-compatible identity |
## Security
- Auth enforcement on all write routes (bearer token middleware)
- Session auto-recovery on ratchet corruption
- Per-fingerprint WS connection cap (5 devices)
- Global request concurrency limit (200)
- Device management (list, kick, revoke-all panic button)
- Federation auth: SHA-256(secret || body) on every inter-server request
See [docs/SECURITY.md](docs/SECURITY.md) for the full threat model.
## Test Suite
155 tests across protocol + client crates (all passing):
- Protocol tests (X3DH, Double Ratchet, Sender Keys, crypto, identity, call signaling)
- TUI tests (rendering, keyboard input, scrolling, state management, call UI, markdown, receipts)
```bash
cargo test --workspace
```
## WarzonePhone Integration
All 9 WZP-side integration tasks are complete:
- Shared identity (HKDF alignment, 15 cross-project tests)
- Relay auth (featherChat bearer token validation)
- Signaling bridge (CallSignal through E2E encrypted WS)
- Room access control (hashed room names, ACL)
- Mandatory crypto handshake on all paths
## Documentation
| Document | Content |
|----------|---------|
| [ARCHITECTURE.md](docs/ARCHITECTURE.md) | Full system architecture with Mermaid diagrams |
| [TASK_PLAN.md](docs/TASK_PLAN.md) | Phase-by-phase task plan (FC-P1 through P6) |
| [PROGRESS.md](docs/PROGRESS.md) | Version history and feature timeline |
| [PROTOCOL.md](docs/PROTOCOL.md) | Wire protocol specification |
| [SECURITY.md](docs/SECURITY.md) | Threat model and security analysis |
| [FUTURE_TASKS.md](docs/FUTURE_TASKS.md) | Backlog with questions-before-starting |
## License
MIT

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# Phase 1 — User Acceptance Testing
## Prerequisites
```bash
cd warzone
cargo build
rm -rf warzone-data # clean server DB
```
Open 3 terminals:
- **T1**: Server
- **T2**: Alice (default `~/.warzone`)
- **T3**: Bob (`WARZONE_HOME=/tmp/bob`)
---
## 1. Server Startup
**T1:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-server
```
- [ ] Server prints "Listening on 0.0.0.0:7700"
- [ ] `curl http://localhost:7700/v1/health` returns `{"status":"ok","version":"0.1.0"}`
- [ ] `http://localhost:7700/` loads the web UI in a browser
---
## 2. Identity Generation
**T2 (Alice):**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- init
```
- [ ] Prompted "Set passphrase (empty for no encryption):"
- [ ] Input is hidden (no echo)
- [ ] Prompted "Confirm passphrase:"
- [ ] Fingerprint displayed in format `xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx`
- [ ] 24-word BIP39 mnemonic displayed
- [ ] Seed path shown (e.g. `/Users/you/.warzone/identity.seed`)
- [ ] "Generated 1 signed pre-key + 10 one-time pre-keys" shown
- [ ] File `~/.warzone/identity.seed` exists
- [ ] File `~/.warzone/bundle.bin` exists
- [ ] File permissions on identity.seed are 600 (Unix): `ls -la ~/.warzone/identity.seed`
**T3 (Bob):**
```bash
WARZONE_HOME=/tmp/bob cargo run --bin warzone-client -- init
```
- [ ] Bob gets a different fingerprint than Alice
- [ ] Seed saved to `/tmp/bob/identity.seed`
- [ ] Bob's mnemonic is different from Alice's
---
## 3. Seed Encryption
**T2 (Alice):**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- info
```
- [ ] Prompted for passphrase (if one was set during init)
- [ ] Fingerprint, signing key, and encryption key displayed
- [ ] Same fingerprint as during init
- [ ] Wrong passphrase shows "Wrong passphrase" error
**Test plaintext seed (empty passphrase):**
```bash
WARZONE_HOME=/tmp/test cargo run --bin warzone-client -- init
# press Enter twice for empty passphrase
xxd /tmp/test/identity.seed | head -1
```
- [ ] File is exactly 32 bytes (raw seed, no encryption header)
**Test encrypted seed:**
```bash
xxd ~/.warzone/identity.seed | head -1
```
- [ ] File starts with `575a 5331` (hex for "WZS1" magic bytes)
- [ ] File is larger than 32 bytes (salt + nonce + ciphertext)
---
## 4. Mnemonic Recovery
```bash
WARZONE_HOME=/tmp/recovered cargo run --bin warzone-client -- recover <paste 24 words from Alice's init>
```
- [ ] "Identity recovered!" shown
- [ ] Fingerprint matches Alice's original fingerprint
- [ ] `WARZONE_HOME=/tmp/recovered cargo run --bin warzone-client -- info` shows same keys
---
## 5. Key Registration
**T2 (Alice):**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- register -s http://localhost:7700
```
- [ ] "Bundle registered with http://localhost:7700"
**T3 (Bob):**
```bash
WARZONE_HOME=/tmp/bob cargo run --bin warzone-client -- register -s http://localhost:7700
```
- [ ] "Bundle registered with http://localhost:7700"
**Verify on server:**
```bash
curl http://localhost:7700/v1/keys/list
```
- [ ] JSON shows 2 keys with Alice's and Bob's fingerprints (hex, no colons)
**Verify lookup works:**
```bash
curl http://localhost:7700/v1/keys/<bob-fingerprint-no-colons>
```
- [ ] Returns JSON with `fingerprint` and `bundle` (base64 string)
- [ ] Does NOT return 404
---
## 6. 1:1 E2E Encrypted Messaging (CLI)
**T2 (Alice sends to Bob):**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- send "<bob-fingerprint>" "Hello from Alice" -s http://localhost:7700
```
- [ ] "No existing session. Fetching key bundle for ..."
- [ ] "Message sent to <bob-fingerprint>"
**T3 (Bob receives):**
```bash
WARZONE_HOME=/tmp/bob cargo run --bin warzone-client -- recv -s http://localhost:7700
```
- [ ] "Received 1 message(s):"
- [ ] `[new session] <alice-fingerprint>: Hello from Alice`
**Bob sends reply:**
```bash
WARZONE_HOME=/tmp/bob cargo run --bin warzone-client -- send "<alice-fingerprint>" "Hi Alice, Bob here" -s http://localhost:7700
```
- [ ] "Message sent to ..." (no "new session" — reuses existing ratchet)
**Alice receives:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- recv -s http://localhost:7700
```
- [ ] `[new session] <bob-fingerprint>: Hi Alice, Bob here`
---
## 7. Fetch-and-Delete (No Duplicate Delivery)
**T3 (Bob polls again):**
```bash
WARZONE_HOME=/tmp/bob cargo run --bin warzone-client -- recv -s http://localhost:7700
```
- [ ] "No new messages." (Alice's message was deleted on first poll)
---
## 8. TUI Chat (CLI)
**T2 (Alice):**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- chat "<bob-fingerprint>" -s http://localhost:7700
```
**T3 (Bob):**
```bash
WARZONE_HOME=/tmp/bob cargo run --bin warzone-client -- chat "<alice-fingerprint>" -s http://localhost:7700
```
- [ ] Both TUIs launch with header showing fingerprints
- [ ] Alice types "hello from TUI" → Enter
- [ ] Message appears in green on Alice's screen
- [ ] Within 2 seconds, message appears in yellow on Bob's screen
- [ ] Bob types "reply from Bob" → Enter
- [ ] Message appears on both screens
- [ ] `/info` shows fingerprint
- [ ] `/quit` exits TUI cleanly (terminal restored)
- [ ] Ctrl+C also exits cleanly
- [ ] Esc also exits cleanly
---
## 9. Groups (CLI TUI)
**T2 (Alice, in TUI):**
```
/g ops
```
- [ ] "Joined 'ops'" or "Group 'ops' auto-created"
- [ ] "Switched to group #ops"
**T3 (Bob, in TUI):**
```
/g ops
```
- [ ] "Joined 'ops'"
- [ ] "Switched to group #ops"
**Alice types a message:**
```
hello team
```
- [ ] Message appears on Alice's screen with `[#ops]` tag
- [ ] Message appears on Bob's screen within 2 seconds
**Bob replies:**
```
hey alice!
```
- [ ] Appears on both screens
**Test group list:**
```
/glist
```
- [ ] Shows `#ops (2 members)`
**Switch back to DM:**
```
/dm
```
- [ ] "Switched to DM mode"
---
## 10. Aliases (CLI TUI)
**T2 (Alice, in TUI):**
```
/alias alice
```
- [ ] "Alias @alice registered"
**T3 (Bob, in TUI):**
```
/alias bob
```
- [ ] "Alias @bob registered"
**Alice sets peer by alias:**
```
/peer @bob
```
- [ ] "@bob → <bob-fingerprint>" resolved
- [ ] "Peer set to <bob-fingerprint>"
**List aliases:**
```
/aliases
```
- [ ] Shows `@alice → <fp>` and `@bob → <fp>`
---
## 11. Web UI — Identity
Open `http://localhost:7700/` in a browser.
- [ ] "WARZONE" title and "Generate Identity" button shown
- [ ] Click "Generate Identity"
- [ ] Fingerprint displayed in green
- [ ] Hex seed displayed in orange
- [ ] "Enter Chat" button shown
- [ ] Click "Enter Chat"
- [ ] Chat screen loads with header showing fingerprint
- [ ] "Key registered with server" message appears
- [ ] Refresh page → auto-loads identity (no setup screen)
---
## 12. Web UI — DM
Open TWO browser tabs/windows (or incognito for second identity).
**Tab 1:** Generate identity → Enter Chat
**Tab 2:** Generate identity → Enter Chat
**Tab 1:** Paste Tab 2's fingerprint in peer input field. Type "hello from tab 1". Enter.
- [ ] Message appears in green on Tab 1
- [ ] Message appears with lock icon on Tab 2 within 2 seconds
**Tab 2:** Paste Tab 1's fingerprint. Type "hello back". Enter.
- [ ] Message appears on both tabs
---
## 13. Web UI — Groups
**Tab 1:**
```
/g webteam
```
- [ ] "Joined group" and "Switched to group" messages
**Tab 2:**
```
/g webteam
```
- [ ] Also joined
**Tab 1:** Type "hello webteam" → Enter
- [ ] Message appears on Tab 1 with `[webteam]` tag
- [ ] Message appears on Tab 2 within 2 seconds
---
## 14. Web UI — Aliases
**Tab 1:**
```
/alias webuser1
```
- [ ] "Alias @webuser1 registered"
**Tab 1:**
```
/info
```
- [ ] Shows fingerprint with `(@webuser1)` suffix
**Tab 2:** Set peer input to `@webuser1`. Type message. Enter.
- [ ] Message delivered (alias resolved to fingerprint)
---
## 15. Alias TTL & Recovery
**Register alias via curl:**
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:7700/v1/alias/register \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"alias":"testuser","fingerprint":"<alice-fp-no-colons>"}'
```
- [ ] Response includes `recovery_key` (32-char hex)
- [ ] Response includes `expires_in_days: 365`
- [ ] **SAVE THE RECOVERY KEY**
**Check alias:**
```bash
curl http://localhost:7700/v1/alias/resolve/testuser
```
- [ ] Returns fingerprint + `expires_in_days`
**Recover alias to new fingerprint:**
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:7700/v1/alias/recover \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"alias":"testuser","recovery_key":"<saved-key>","new_fingerprint":"<bob-fp-no-colons>"}'
```
- [ ] "ok: true"
- [ ] `new_recovery_key` returned (rotated)
**Verify transfer:**
```bash
curl http://localhost:7700/v1/alias/resolve/testuser
```
- [ ] Now points to Bob's fingerprint
**Wrong recovery key:**
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:7700/v1/alias/recover \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"alias":"testuser","recovery_key":"wrong","new_fingerprint":"aaaa"}'
```
- [ ] "error: invalid recovery key"
---
## 16. Server Auth (Challenge-Response)
**Request challenge:**
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:7700/v1/auth/challenge \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"fingerprint":"<alice-fp-no-colons>"}'
```
- [ ] Returns `challenge` (64-char hex) and `expires_at` (unix timestamp)
- [ ] Challenge expires in ~60 seconds
---
## 17. OTP Key Replenishment
**Check count:**
```bash
curl http://localhost:7700/v1/keys/<alice-fp-no-colons>/otpk-count
```
- [ ] Returns `otpk_count` (number, may be 0 if not yet stored separately)
**Replenish:**
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:7700/v1/keys/replenish \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"fingerprint":"<alice-fp-no-colons>","otpks":[{"id":100,"public_key":"aa"},{"id":101,"public_key":"bb"}]}'
```
- [ ] Returns `stored: 2` and `total` count
**Verify count increased:**
```bash
curl http://localhost:7700/v1/keys/<alice-fp-no-colons>/otpk-count
```
- [ ] `otpk_count` increased by 2
---
## 18. Protocol Unit Tests
```bash
cargo test -p warzone-protocol
```
- [ ] `identity::tests::deterministic_derivation` — PASS
- [ ] `identity::tests::mnemonic_roundtrip` — PASS
- [ ] `identity::tests::fingerprint_display` — PASS
- [ ] `mnemonic::tests::roundtrip` — PASS
- [ ] `crypto::tests::aead_roundtrip` — PASS
- [ ] `crypto::tests::aead_wrong_key_fails` — PASS
- [ ] `crypto::tests::aead_wrong_aad_fails` — PASS
- [ ] `crypto::tests::hkdf_deterministic` — PASS
- [ ] `prekey::tests::signed_pre_key_verify` — PASS
- [ ] `prekey::tests::signed_pre_key_reject_tampered` — PASS
- [ ] `prekey::tests::generate_otpks` — PASS
- [ ] `x3dh::tests::x3dh_shared_secret_matches` — PASS
- [ ] `ratchet::tests::basic_exchange` — PASS
- [ ] `ratchet::tests::bidirectional` — PASS
- [ ] `ratchet::tests::multiple_messages_same_direction` — PASS
- [ ] `ratchet::tests::out_of_order` — PASS
- [ ] `ratchet::tests::many_messages` — PASS
**Total: 17/17 PASS**
---
## 19. Session Persistence
**T2 (Alice, send then quit):**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- send "<bob-fp>" "message 1" -s http://localhost:7700
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- send "<bob-fp>" "message 2" -s http://localhost:7700
```
- [ ] First send says "No existing session" (X3DH)
- [ ] Second send does NOT say "No existing session" (reuses saved ratchet)
- [ ] `ls ~/.warzone/db/` shows sled database files
**T3 (Bob receives both):**
```bash
WARZONE_HOME=/tmp/bob cargo run --bin warzone-client -- recv -s http://localhost:7700
```
- [ ] Both messages decrypted correctly
- [ ] Messages in order
---
## 20. Cross-Client Compatibility
**Web → CLI:**
Web Tab sends message to CLI Alice's fingerprint.
- [ ] CLI `recv` shows `[encrypted message from CLI client — use CLI to read]` OR fails gracefully
- [ ] No crash on either side
**CLI → Web:**
CLI Alice sends to Web Tab's fingerprint.
- [ ] Web shows graceful error (different crypto) or ignores silently
- [ ] No crash on either side
**Note:** Web↔CLI interop requires WASM bridge (Phase 2). Currently incompatible crypto is expected.
---
## Summary
| # | Feature | Result |
|---|---------|--------|
| 1 | Server startup | ☐ |
| 2 | Identity generation | ☐ |
| 3 | Seed encryption | ☐ |
| 4 | Mnemonic recovery | ☐ |
| 5 | Key registration | ☐ |
| 6 | 1:1 E2E messaging | ☐ |
| 7 | Fetch-and-delete | ☐ |
| 8 | TUI chat | ☐ |
| 9 | Groups (CLI) | ☐ |
| 10 | Aliases (CLI) | ☐ |
| 11 | Web UI identity | ☐ |
| 12 | Web UI DM | ☐ |
| 13 | Web UI groups | ☐ |
| 14 | Web UI aliases | ☐ |
| 15 | Alias TTL & recovery | ☐ |
| 16 | Server auth | ☐ |
| 17 | OTP replenishment | ☐ |
| 18 | Protocol tests (17/17) | ☐ |
| 19 | Session persistence | ☐ |
| 20 | Cross-client compat | ☐ |
**Tester:** _______________
**Date:** _______________
**Build:** `cargo build` commit hash: _______________

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# Phase 2 — User Acceptance Testing
> Phase 2 is NOT YET IMPLEMENTED. This is a pre-written test plan.
## Prerequisites
- Phase 1 UAT fully passing
- WASM toolchain installed (`wasm-pack`)
- Two devices or VMs for multi-device testing
---
## 1. WASM Build (Web-CLI Interop)
```bash
cd warzone/crates/warzone-protocol
wasm-pack build --target web
```
- [ ] WASM build succeeds
- [ ] Web client loads WASM module
- [ ] Web client uses X25519 + ChaCha20 (same as CLI)
- [ ] Web → CLI: message sent from browser, decrypted by CLI `recv`
- [ ] CLI → Web: message sent from CLI, decrypted in browser
- [ ] Bidirectional conversation works across web and CLI
---
## 2. Delivery Receipts
**Alice sends to Bob:**
- [ ] Alice's UI shows "sent" checkmark (✓) after server accepts
- [ ] When Bob's client polls and receives, server generates delivery receipt
- [ ] Alice's UI updates to "delivered" (✓✓)
- [ ] When Bob reads/decrypts, Bob's client sends read receipt
- [ ] Alice's UI updates to "read" (✓✓ blue/colored)
**Offline Bob:**
- [ ] Alice sends while Bob is offline
- [ ] "sent" (✓) shown immediately
- [ ] Bob comes online, polls → "delivered" (✓✓) on Alice's side
- [ ] Receipts themselves are E2E encrypted
---
## 3. File Transfer
**CLI:**
```
/file /path/to/document.pdf
```
- [ ] File is chunked, encrypted, and sent
- [ ] Recipient sees "[file: document.pdf (1.2 MB)]"
- [ ] `/save` or auto-download saves to disk
- [ ] File integrity check (hash matches)
- [ ] Files up to 10 MB work
- [ ] Progress shown during transfer
**Web:**
- [ ] File upload button in chat
- [ ] File encrypted and sent
- [ ] Recipient gets download link
- [ ] Downloaded file is correct
---
## 4. Multi-Device
**Setup: Alice on two devices (same seed):**
```bash
# Device 1
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- init
# Note mnemonic
# Device 2
WARZONE_HOME=/tmp/alice2 cargo run --bin warzone-client -- recover <mnemonic>
WARZONE_HOME=/tmp/alice2 cargo run --bin warzone-client -- register -s http://localhost:7700
```
- [ ] Both devices have same fingerprint
- [ ] Bob sends to Alice's fingerprint
- [ ] Device 1 receives and decrypts
- [ ] Device 2 receives and decrypts (separate session)
- [ ] Messages sent from Device 1 are visible on Device 2 (via sync)
- [ ] Device list shown on server: `GET /v1/devices/<fingerprint>`
---
## 5. Hardware Wallet Delegation
**Connect Ledger/Trezor:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- hw-delegate
```
- [ ] Detects hardware wallet via USB
- [ ] Shows "Sign delegation certificate on device"
- [ ] User confirms on hardware wallet
- [ ] Session key generated, delegation cert stored
- [ ] Subsequent operations use session key (no wallet needed)
- [ ] After 30 days, prompts for re-delegation
**Without hardware wallet (session key only):**
- [ ] All operations work using cached session key
- [ ] No USB prompts during normal chat
---
## 6. Group Management
**Kick member:**
```
/gkick @troublemaker
```
- [ ] Member removed from group
- [ ] Sender Keys rotated for remaining members
- [ ] Kicked member can no longer decrypt new messages
**Leave group:**
```
/gleave ops
```
- [ ] You are removed
- [ ] Remaining members rotate keys
**Group info:**
```
/ginfo ops
```
- [ ] Shows: name, creator, member list, creation date
---
## 7. Message History Persistence
- [ ] Close and reopen TUI → previous messages still shown
- [ ] History stored in local sled DB
- [ ] `/history 50` shows last 50 messages
- [ ] History is encrypted at rest (tied to seed)
---
## Summary
| # | Feature | Result |
|---|---------|--------|
| 1 | WASM web-CLI interop | ☐ |
| 2 | Delivery receipts | ☐ |
| 3 | File transfer | ☐ |
| 4 | Multi-device | ☐ |
| 5 | Hardware wallet delegation | ☐ |
| 6 | Group management | ☐ |
| 7 | Message history | ☐ |
**Tester:** _______________
**Date:** _______________

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# Phase 3 — User Acceptance Testing (Federation & Key Transparency)
> Phase 3 is NOT YET IMPLEMENTED. This is a pre-written test plan.
## Prerequisites
- Phase 2 UAT fully passing
- Two warzone-server instances on different domains
- DNS zone control for both domains
---
## 1. DNS Server Discovery
**Setup TXT record:**
```
_warzone._tcp.a1.example.com TXT "v=wz1; endpoint=https://wz.a1.example.com; pubkey=base64..."
```
**Test discovery:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- discover a1.example.com
```
- [ ] Resolves TXT record
- [ ] Shows endpoint URL and server public key
- [ ] Server pubkey pinned on first contact (TOFU)
---
## 2. DNS Key Transparency
**Publish key to DNS:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- publish-key --domain a1.example.com
```
- [ ] TXT record created: `manwe.a1.example.com TXT "v=wz1; fp=...; pubkey=...; sig=..."`
- [ ] Self-signature is valid
- [ ] Only server's delegated zone is modified
**Verify key via DNS:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- verify-key @manwe.a1.example.com
```
- [ ] Fetches TXT record
- [ ] Verifies self-signature
- [ ] Compares against server-provided key
- [ ] Match → "Key verified via DNS"
- [ ] Mismatch → "WARNING: server may be performing MITM"
- [ ] No DNS record → "Falling back to TOFU"
---
## 3. Federated Messaging
**Server A (a1.example.com) and Server B (b1.example.com):**
Alice is on Server A, Bob is on Server B.
**Alice sends to Bob:**
```
/dm @bob.b1.example.com hello from server A!
```
- [ ] Client resolves `b1.example.com` via DNS
- [ ] Fetches Bob's bundle from Server B
- [ ] X3DH + Ratchet encrypt
- [ ] Message sent via Server A → Server B relay
- [ ] Bob receives on Server B
- [ ] Bob decrypts successfully
**Bob replies:**
```
/dm @alice.a1.example.com hey alice!
```
- [ ] Reverse path works (B → A)
- [ ] Existing ratchet session reused
---
## 4. Server-to-Server Mutual TLS
- [ ] Server A connects to Server B with TLS
- [ ] Both servers verify each other's pubkey (from DNS TXT)
- [ ] Invalid server pubkey → connection refused
- [ ] Man-in-the-middle between servers → TLS fails
---
## 5. Gossip Peer Discovery
**Server A knows Server B. Server C joins:**
- [ ] Server C registers with Server A
- [ ] Server A gossips Server C's endpoint to Server B
- [ ] Server B can now route messages to Server C users
- [ ] No manual configuration needed on Server B
---
## 6. Hard-coded Peer List (DNS Fallback)
**DNS is down:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-server -- --peers "https://wz.b1.example.com,https://wz.c1.example.com"
```
- [ ] Server connects to listed peers directly
- [ ] Federated messaging works without DNS
---
## Summary
| # | Feature | Result |
|---|---------|--------|
| 1 | DNS server discovery | ☐ |
| 2 | DNS key transparency | ☐ |
| 3 | Federated messaging | ☐ |
| 4 | Server mutual TLS | ☐ |
| 5 | Gossip peer discovery | ☐ |
| 6 | Hard-coded peer fallback | ☐ |
**Tester:** _______________
**Date:** _______________

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# Phase 4 — User Acceptance Testing (Warzone Delivery / Mule Protocol)
> Phase 4 is NOT YET IMPLEMENTED. This is a pre-written test plan.
## Prerequisites
- Phase 3 UAT fully passing
- Two isolated networks (can use VMs or Docker networks)
- A device that can move between networks (the mule)
---
## 1. Mule Identity & Authorization
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-mule -- init
cargo run --bin warzone-mule -- register -s http://server-a:7700
```
- [ ] Mule generates its own identity
- [ ] Mule registered with Server A
- [ ] Server admin authorizes mule: `warzone-server admin authorize-mule <mule-fp>`
- [ ] Unauthorized mule rejected on pickup attempt
---
## 2. Message Pickup
**Server A has queued messages for users on Server B (which is offline):**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-mule -- pickup -s http://server-a:7700
```
- [ ] Mule connects to Server A
- [ ] Mule authenticates (challenge-response)
- [ ] Server returns queued outbound messages (encrypted blobs)
- [ ] Messages marked as "IN_TRANSIT by mule X" on Server A
- [ ] Mule stores messages locally
- [ ] Mule reports capacity: "Picked up 42 messages (1.2 MB / 50 MB capacity)"
---
## 3. Physical Transport & Delivery
**Mule moves to Server B's network:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-mule -- deliver -s http://server-b:7700
```
- [ ] Mule connects to Server B
- [ ] Delivers encrypted blobs
- [ ] Server B queues messages for local recipients
- [ ] Server B returns delivery receipts (signed)
- [ ] Mule stores receipts locally
---
## 4. Receipt Delivery
**Mule returns to Server A's network:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-mule -- receipts -s http://server-a:7700
```
- [ ] Mule delivers receipts to Server A
- [ ] Server A marks messages as DELIVERED
- [ ] Server A removes messages from outbound queue
---
## 5. Receipt Enforcement
**Mule tries to pick up again WITHOUT delivering previous receipts:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-mule -- pickup -s http://server-a:7700
```
- [ ] Server A rejects: "outstanding receipts not delivered"
- [ ] Mule must deliver receipts first (or submit signed failure report)
---
## 6. Deduplication
**Two mules pick up the same messages:**
- [ ] Mule 1 picks up and delivers to Server B
- [ ] Mule 2 picks up same messages (still in transit)
- [ ] Mule 2 delivers to Server B
- [ ] Server B deduplicates: messages delivered once, no duplicates for recipients
---
## 7. Message Expiry
**Messages older than TTL:**
- [ ] Server queues message with 7-day TTL
- [ ] After 7 days without pickup → status changes to EXPIRED
- [ ] Expired messages not given to mules
- [ ] Expired messages cleaned up from DB
---
## 8. Outer Encryption (Metadata Hiding)
- [ ] Messages from Server A to Server B wrapped in outer encryption (Server B's pubkey)
- [ ] Mule sees only: "encrypted blob for Server B"
- [ ] Mule cannot see sender/recipient fingerprints
- [ ] Server B unwraps outer layer, routes inner messages to recipients
---
## 9. Partial Sync / Resume
**Mule connection interrupted during pickup:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-mule -- pickup -s http://server-a:7700
# kill connection mid-transfer
cargo run --bin warzone-mule -- pickup -s http://server-a:7700
```
- [ ] Second pickup resumes from where it left off
- [ ] No duplicate messages in mule's local store
---
## 10. Compression
- [ ] Message bundles compressed with zstd before transfer
- [ ] Mule reports compressed size: "42 messages: 1.2 MB → 400 KB (67% compression)"
- [ ] Decompression on delivery
---
## Summary
| # | Feature | Result |
|---|---------|--------|
| 1 | Mule identity & auth | ☐ |
| 2 | Message pickup | ☐ |
| 3 | Physical delivery | ☐ |
| 4 | Receipt delivery | ☐ |
| 5 | Receipt enforcement | ☐ |
| 6 | Deduplication | ☐ |
| 7 | Message expiry | ☐ |
| 8 | Outer encryption | ☐ |
| 9 | Partial sync | ☐ |
| 10 | Compression | ☐ |
**Tester:** _______________
**Date:** _______________

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# Phase 5 — User Acceptance Testing (Transport Fallbacks)
> Phase 5 is NOT YET IMPLEMENTED. This is a pre-written test plan.
## Prerequisites
- Phase 4 UAT fully passing
- Bluetooth-capable devices
- LoRa hardware (e.g. Heltec ESP32 LoRa, RAK WisBlock)
- Two devices on same Wi-Fi for Wi-Fi Direct testing
---
## 1. Bluetooth Mule Transfer
**Mule device (phone/laptop) near Server A:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-mule -- pickup --transport bluetooth
```
- [ ] Mule scans for nearby warzone-server via BLE advertisement
- [ ] Connects via Bluetooth Classic (RFCOMM)
- [ ] Picks up messages (same protocol as HTTP, different transport)
- [ ] Transfer speed reasonable (> 100 KB/s)
**Mule near Server B:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-mule -- deliver --transport bluetooth
```
- [ ] Delivers messages via Bluetooth
- [ ] Receipts returned
---
## 2. LoRa Transport (Emergency)
**Setup two LoRa nodes with warzone-mule:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-mule -- lora-beacon --freq 868.0
```
- [ ] Device broadcasts presence beacon (< 50 bytes)
- [ ] Nearby LoRa node detects beacon
**Send short text over LoRa:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-mule -- lora-send "SOS need evac" --to <fingerprint>
```
- [ ] Message fits in single LoRa packet (< 250 bytes)
- [ ] Compact binary format used (not JSON)
- [ ] Recipient receives and decrypts
- [ ] Delivery receipt sent back over LoRa
**LoRa limitations:**
- [ ] Messages > 200 chars rejected with warning
- [ ] Files cannot be sent over LoRa
- [ ] Latency shown: "Sent via LoRa (estimated 2-5 seconds)"
---
## 3. mDNS / LAN Discovery
**Two devices on same LAN, no internet:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-server -- --mdns
```
- [ ] Server advertises via mDNS: `_warzone._tcp.local`
- [ ] Client discovers server without typing IP/URL:
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- chat --discover
```
- [ ] Shows: "Found warzone server at 192.168.1.42:7700"
- [ ] Chat works normally over LAN
---
## 4. Wi-Fi Direct (Nearby Mesh)
**Two devices, no router needed:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- chat --wifi-direct
```
- [ ] Devices discover each other via Wi-Fi Direct
- [ ] Form ad-hoc connection
- [ ] Messages synced peer-to-peer (no server)
- [ ] Group sync: all messages replicated to all peers in range
- [ ] Bandwidth: > 10 MB/s
---
## 5. USB / Sneakernet Export
**Export messages:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- export --since 24h --to /mnt/usb/messages.wz
```
- [ ] Messages exported as encrypted file
- [ ] File is portable (copy to USB drive)
- [ ] Export size shown: "Exported 142 messages (2.3 MB)"
**Import on another machine:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- import /mnt/usb/messages.wz
```
- [ ] Messages imported and decrypted
- [ ] Deduplication: already-seen messages skipped
- [ ] "Imported 142 messages (38 new)"
---
## 6. Transport Fallback Priority
**Configure fallback chain:**
```
warzone-server --transport https,bluetooth,lora
```
- [ ] Server tries HTTPS first
- [ ] If HTTPS fails → falls back to Bluetooth
- [ ] If Bluetooth unavailable → falls back to LoRa
- [ ] Each fallback logged with reason
---
## Summary
| # | Feature | Result |
|---|---------|--------|
| 1 | Bluetooth mule | ☐ |
| 2 | LoRa transport | ☐ |
| 3 | mDNS discovery | ☐ |
| 4 | Wi-Fi Direct | ☐ |
| 5 | USB export/import | ☐ |
| 6 | Transport fallback | ☐ |
**Tester:** _______________
**Date:** _______________

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# Phase 6 — User Acceptance Testing (Metadata Protection)
> Phase 6 is NOT YET IMPLEMENTED. This is a pre-written test plan.
## Prerequisites
- Phase 5 UAT fully passing
- Network traffic analysis tools (Wireshark/tcpdump)
- At least 3 federated servers for onion routing
---
## 1. Sealed Sender
**Alice sends to Bob through server:**
- [ ] Server receives message with recipient fingerprint but NO sender fingerprint
- [ ] Server logs show: "Message for <bob-fp> from [sealed]"
- [ ] Bob decrypts and sees Alice's identity (embedded in ciphertext)
- [ ] Wireshark: server-bound traffic contains no sender metadata
**Server admin inspects DB:**
- [ ] Message queue shows `to` field only, no `from`
- [ ] Cannot determine who sent the message
---
## 2. Traffic Analysis Resistance
**Padding:**
- [ ] All messages padded to fixed sizes (256, 1024, 4096 bytes)
- [ ] Small "hi" and large paragraph produce same-size ciphertext on wire
- [ ] Wireshark confirms uniform packet sizes
**Timing:**
- [ ] Messages not sent immediately — random delay (0-2 seconds)
- [ ] Constant-rate dummy traffic when idle (configurable)
- [ ] Observer cannot distinguish real messages from dummy traffic
---
## 3. Onion Routing (Opt-in)
**Setup: 3 servers (A, B, C). Alice on A, Bob on C.**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- chat @bob.c.example.com --onion
```
- [ ] Client builds onion route: A → B → C
- [ ] Message encrypted in 3 layers: encrypt(C, encrypt(B, encrypt(A, plaintext)))
- [ ] Server A sees: "message for Server B" (doesn't know final destination)
- [ ] Server B sees: "message for Server C" (doesn't know origin)
- [ ] Server C sees: "message for Bob" (doesn't know it went through A and B)
- [ ] Bob decrypts successfully
- [ ] Latency: shown as "onion: 3 hops, ~500ms"
**Onion routing disabled (default):**
- [ ] Direct routing: A → C (faster, less privacy)
- [ ] No onion overhead
---
## Summary
| # | Feature | Result |
|---|---------|--------|
| 1 | Sealed sender | ☐ |
| 2 | Traffic analysis resistance | ☐ |
| 3 | Onion routing | ☐ |
**Tester:** _______________
**Date:** _______________

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# Phase 7 — User Acceptance Testing (Operations & Polish)
> Phase 7 is NOT YET IMPLEMENTED. This is a pre-written test plan.
## Prerequisites
- Phase 6 UAT fully passing
- ntfy server (self-hosted or ntfy.sh)
- CI/CD pipeline configured
---
## 1. ntfy Push Notifications
**Setup:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-server -- --ntfy-url https://ntfy.example.com
```
**Client subscribes:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- notifications --enable
```
- [ ] Client registers ntfy topic (fingerprint-derived)
- [ ] When offline and message arrives, ntfy push notification sent
- [ ] Notification shows: "New message" (NO message content — E2E)
- [ ] Android: ntfy app shows notification
- [ ] iOS: ntfy app shows notification
- [ ] Desktop: ntfy web shows notification
- [ ] Self-hosted ntfy: all above work against own instance
---
## 2. DNS-over-HTTPS (Censored Networks)
**DNS blocked but HTTPS available:**
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-client -- chat --doh https://1.1.1.1/dns-query
```
- [ ] DNS resolution via HTTPS (bypasses local DNS censorship)
- [ ] Federation discovery works through DoH
- [ ] Key transparency verification works through DoH
- [ ] Fallback to system DNS if DoH fails
---
## 3. Server-at-Rest Encryption
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-server -- --encrypt-db
# Prompted for passphrase on startup
```
- [ ] sled database encrypted at rest
- [ ] Server restart requires passphrase
- [ ] If server seized (power off), DB is unreadable without passphrase
- [ ] Performance impact: < 10% overhead
- [ ] Without `--encrypt-db`, DB is plaintext (default)
---
## 4. Admin CLI
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-server -- admin
```
- [ ] `admin list-users` — shows all registered fingerprints + aliases
- [ ] `admin list-groups` — shows all groups + member counts
- [ ] `admin ban <fingerprint>` — blocks user from server
- [ ] `admin unban <fingerprint>` — unblocks user
- [ ] `admin list-mules` — shows authorized mules
- [ ] `admin authorize-mule <fp>` — authorizes a mule
- [ ] `admin revoke-mule <fp>` — revokes mule authorization
- [ ] `admin stats` — shows message counts, active users, queue depth
- [ ] `admin gc` — garbage collect expired messages, tokens, aliases
---
## 5. Rate Limiting
**Spam prevention:**
- [ ] More than 100 messages/minute from one fingerprint → rate limited
- [ ] Rate limit response: HTTP 429 with retry-after header
- [ ] Client shows: "Rate limited, retry in 30 seconds"
- [ ] Group sends: limit per-member, not per-group
**Registration abuse:**
- [ ] More than 5 identities from one IP per hour → blocked
- [ ] Alias registration: max 1 per hour per fingerprint
---
## 6. Audit Logging
```bash
cargo run --bin warzone-server -- --audit-log /var/log/warzone-audit.log
```
- [ ] All authentication events logged (success + failure)
- [ ] Key registrations logged
- [ ] Group create/join/leave logged
- [ ] Alias registrations logged
- [ ] Message metadata logged (from_fp, to_fp, timestamp, size — NO content)
- [ ] Mule pickups/deliveries logged
- [ ] Log format: structured JSON, one event per line
- [ ] Log rotation compatible (logrotate)
---
## 7. Cross-Compilation CI
```bash
cargo build --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
cargo build --target aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
cargo build --target x86_64-apple-darwin
cargo build --target aarch64-apple-darwin
cargo build --target x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
wasm-pack build --target web crates/warzone-protocol
```
- [ ] Linux x86_64: static binary, runs on Ubuntu/Debian/Alpine
- [ ] Linux aarch64 (ARM): runs on Raspberry Pi / ARM servers
- [ ] macOS x86_64: runs on Intel Macs
- [ ] macOS aarch64: runs on Apple Silicon
- [ ] Windows: runs on Windows 10+
- [ ] WASM: loads in Chrome, Firefox, Safari
- [ ] All binaries < 20 MB
- [ ] CI pipeline runs tests on all platforms
- [ ] Release artifacts uploaded to GitHub/Gitea
---
## 8. Monitoring & Health
**Health check:**
```bash
curl http://localhost:7700/v1/health
```
- [ ] Returns status, version, uptime
- [ ] Queue depth included
- [ ] Active connections count
- [ ] DB size on disk
**Prometheus metrics (optional):**
```bash
curl http://localhost:7700/metrics
```
- [ ] `warzone_messages_total` counter
- [ ] `warzone_active_users` gauge
- [ ] `warzone_queue_depth` gauge
- [ ] `warzone_auth_failures_total` counter
---
## Summary
| # | Feature | Result |
|---|---------|--------|
| 1 | ntfy notifications | ☐ |
| 2 | DNS-over-HTTPS | ☐ |
| 3 | Server-at-rest encryption | ☐ |
| 4 | Admin CLI | ☐ |
| 5 | Rate limiting | ☐ |
| 6 | Audit logging | ☐ |
| 7 | Cross-compilation CI | ☐ |
| 8 | Monitoring & health | ☐ |
**Tester:** _______________
**Date:** _______________

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[
{"name": "helpbot", "description": "featherChat help & FAQ"},
{"name": "codebot", "description": "Coding assistant"},
{"name": "survivalbot", "description": "War/emergency/survival guide"},
{"name": "farsibot", "description": "Farsi → English translation"},
{"name": "engbot", "description": "English → Farsi translation"},
{"name": "mathbot", "description": "Math helper"},
{"name": "medbot", "description": "First aid & health info"},
{"name": "writebot", "description": "Writing assistant"},
{"name": "cookbot", "description": "Cooking with limited ingredients"},
{"name": "mindbot", "description": "Mental health & stress support"}
]

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[package]
name = "warzone-client"
version.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
[dependencies]
warzone-protocol = { path = "../warzone-protocol" }
tokio.workspace = true
reqwest.workspace = true
sled.workspace = true
clap.workspace = true
ratatui.workspace = true
crossterm.workspace = true
serde.workspace = true
serde_json.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
anyhow.workspace = true
argon2.workspace = true
chacha20poly1305.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true
zeroize.workspace = true
hex.workspace = true
base64.workspace = true
x25519-dalek.workspace = true
bincode.workspace = true
sha2.workspace = true
libc = "0.2"
uuid.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true
tokio-tungstenite = { version = "0.24", features = ["native-tls"] }
futures-util = "0.3"
url = "2"

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// Info is now handled directly in main.rs with the pre-unlocked identity.

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use anyhow::Result;
use warzone_protocol::identity::Seed;
use warzone_protocol::prekey::{
generate_one_time_pre_keys, generate_signed_pre_key, OneTimePreKeyPublic, PreKeyBundle,
};
use crate::keystore;
use crate::net::ServerClient;
use crate::storage::LocalDb;
pub fn run() -> Result<()> {
let seed = Seed::generate();
let identity = seed.derive_identity();
let pub_id = identity.public_identity();
let mnemonic = seed.to_mnemonic();
println!("Identity generated!\n");
println!("Fingerprint: {}", pub_id.fingerprint);
println!("\nRecovery mnemonic (WRITE THIS DOWN):\n");
for (i, word) in mnemonic.split_whitespace().enumerate() {
print!("{:>2}. {:<12}", i + 1, word);
if (i + 1) % 4 == 0 {
println!();
}
}
println!();
// Save encrypted seed
keystore::save_seed(&seed)?;
println!("Seed saved to {}", keystore::data_dir().join("identity.seed").display());
// Generate pre-keys and store secrets locally
let db = LocalDb::open()?;
let (spk_secret, signed_pre_key) = generate_signed_pre_key(&identity, 1);
db.save_signed_pre_key(1, &spk_secret)?;
let otpks = generate_one_time_pre_keys(0, 10);
for otpk in &otpks {
db.save_one_time_pre_key(otpk.id, &otpk.secret)?;
}
println!(
"Generated 1 signed pre-key + {} one-time pre-keys",
otpks.len()
);
// Build bundle for server registration
let bundle = PreKeyBundle {
identity_key: *pub_id.signing.as_bytes(),
identity_encryption_key: *pub_id.encryption.as_bytes(),
signed_pre_key,
one_time_pre_key: Some(OneTimePreKeyPublic {
id: otpks[0].id,
public_key: *otpks[0].public.as_bytes(),
}),
};
// Store bundle locally for later registration
let bundle_bytes = bincode::serialize(&bundle)?;
let bundle_path = crate::keystore::data_dir().join("bundle.bin");
std::fs::write(&bundle_path, &bundle_bytes)?;
println!("\nTo register with a server, run:");
println!(
" warzone send <recipient-fingerprint> <message> -s http://server:7700"
);
println!("\nOr register your key bundle manually:");
println!(" (bundle auto-registered on first send)");
Ok(())
}
/// Register the local bundle with a server using an already-unlocked identity.
pub async fn register_with_server_identity(
server_url: &str,
identity: &warzone_protocol::identity::IdentityKeyPair,
) -> Result<()> {
let pub_id = identity.public_identity();
let fp = pub_id.fingerprint.to_string();
let bundle_path = crate::keystore::data_dir().join("bundle.bin");
let bundle_bytes = std::fs::read(&bundle_path)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("No bundle found. Run `warzone init` first."))?;
let bundle: PreKeyBundle = bincode::deserialize(&bundle_bytes)?;
// Derive ETH address from seed
let eth_address = crate::keystore::load_seed_raw()
.map(|seed| {
let eth = warzone_protocol::ethereum::derive_eth_identity(&seed);
eth.address.to_checksum()
})
.ok();
let client = ServerClient::new(server_url);
client.register_bundle(&fp, &bundle, eth_address).await?;
println!("Bundle registered with {}", server_url);
Ok(())
}

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pub mod info;
pub mod init;
pub mod recover;
pub mod send;
pub mod recv;

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use warzone_protocol::identity::Seed;
use crate::keystore;
pub fn run(mnemonic: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let seed = Seed::from_mnemonic(mnemonic)?;
let identity = seed.derive_identity();
let pub_id = identity.public_identity();
println!("Identity recovered!");
println!("Fingerprint: {}", pub_id.fingerprint);
keystore::save_seed(&seed)?;
println!("Seed saved to ~/.warzone/identity.seed");
Ok(())
}

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use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use warzone_protocol::identity::IdentityKeyPair;
use warzone_protocol::ratchet::RatchetState;
use warzone_protocol::types::Fingerprint;
use warzone_protocol::x3dh;
use x25519_dalek::PublicKey;
use warzone_protocol::message::WireMessage;
use crate::net::ServerClient;
use crate::storage::LocalDb;
pub async fn run(server_url: &str, identity: &IdentityKeyPair) -> Result<()> {
let our_pub = identity.public_identity();
let our_fp = our_pub.fingerprint.to_string();
let db = LocalDb::open()?;
let client = ServerClient::new(server_url);
println!("Polling for messages as {}...", our_fp);
let messages = client.poll_messages(&our_fp).await?;
if messages.is_empty() {
println!("No new messages.");
return Ok(());
}
println!("Received {} message(s):\n", messages.len());
for raw in &messages {
match bincode::deserialize::<WireMessage>(raw) {
Ok(WireMessage::KeyExchange {
id: _,
sender_fingerprint,
sender_identity_encryption_key,
ephemeral_public,
used_one_time_pre_key_id,
ratchet_message,
}) => {
let sender_fp = Fingerprint::from_hex(&sender_fingerprint)
.context("invalid sender fingerprint")?;
// Load our signed pre-key secret
let spk_id = 1u32; // We use ID 1 for our signed pre-key
let spk_secret = db
.load_signed_pre_key(spk_id)?
.context("missing signed pre-key — run `warzone init` first")?;
// Load one-time pre-key if used
let otpk_secret = if let Some(id) = used_one_time_pre_key_id {
db.take_one_time_pre_key(id)?
} else {
None
};
// X3DH respond
let their_identity_x25519 = PublicKey::from(sender_identity_encryption_key);
let their_ephemeral = PublicKey::from(ephemeral_public);
let shared_secret = x3dh::respond(
&identity,
&spk_secret,
otpk_secret.as_ref(),
&their_identity_x25519,
&their_ephemeral,
)
.context("X3DH respond failed")?;
// Init ratchet as Bob
let mut state = RatchetState::init_bob(shared_secret, spk_secret);
// Decrypt the message
match state.decrypt(&ratchet_message) {
Ok(plaintext) => {
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&plaintext);
println!(" [{}] {}: {}", "new session", sender_fingerprint, text);
db.save_session(&sender_fp, &state)?;
}
Err(e) => {
eprintln!(" [{}] decrypt failed: {}", sender_fingerprint, e);
}
}
}
Ok(WireMessage::Message {
id: _,
sender_fingerprint,
ratchet_message,
}) => {
let sender_fp = Fingerprint::from_hex(&sender_fingerprint)
.context("invalid sender fingerprint")?;
match db.load_session(&sender_fp)? {
Some(mut state) => match state.decrypt(&ratchet_message) {
Ok(plaintext) => {
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&plaintext);
println!(" {}: {}", sender_fingerprint, text);
db.save_session(&sender_fp, &state)?;
}
Err(e) => {
eprintln!(" [{}] decrypt failed: {}", sender_fingerprint, e);
}
},
None => {
eprintln!(
" [{}] no session — cannot decrypt (need key exchange first)",
sender_fingerprint
);
}
}
}
Ok(WireMessage::Receipt {
sender_fingerprint,
message_id,
receipt_type,
}) => {
println!(
" [receipt] {} acknowledged message {} ({:?})",
sender_fingerprint, message_id, receipt_type
);
}
Ok(WireMessage::FileHeader { filename, sender_fingerprint, file_size, .. }) => {
println!(" [file header] {} is sending '{}' ({} bytes)", sender_fingerprint, filename, file_size);
}
Ok(WireMessage::FileChunk { filename, chunk_index, total_chunks, sender_fingerprint, .. }) => {
println!(" [file chunk] {} chunk {}/{} of '{}'", sender_fingerprint, chunk_index + 1, total_chunks, filename);
}
Ok(WireMessage::GroupSenderKey { sender_fingerprint, group_name, .. }) => {
println!(" [group] {} sent to #{}", sender_fingerprint, group_name);
}
Ok(WireMessage::SenderKeyDistribution { sender_fingerprint, group_name, .. }) => {
println!(" [sender key] received key from {} for #{}", sender_fingerprint, group_name);
}
Ok(WireMessage::CallSignal { sender_fingerprint, signal_type, target, .. }) => {
println!(" [call] {:?} from {}{}", signal_type, sender_fingerprint, target);
}
Err(e) => {
eprintln!(" failed to deserialize message: {}", e);
}
}
}
Ok(())
}

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use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use warzone_protocol::identity::IdentityKeyPair;
use warzone_protocol::message::WireMessage;
use warzone_protocol::ratchet::RatchetState;
use warzone_protocol::types::Fingerprint;
use warzone_protocol::x3dh;
use x25519_dalek::PublicKey;
use crate::net::ServerClient;
use crate::storage::LocalDb;
pub async fn run(recipient_fp: &str, message: &str, server_url: &str, identity: &IdentityKeyPair) -> Result<()> {
let our_pub = identity.public_identity();
let db = LocalDb::open()?;
let client = ServerClient::new(server_url);
let recipient = Fingerprint::from_hex(recipient_fp)
.context("invalid recipient fingerprint")?;
// Check for existing session
let mut ratchet = db.load_session(&recipient)?;
let wire_msg = if let Some(ref mut state) = ratchet {
// Existing session — just encrypt with ratchet
let encrypted = state.encrypt(message.as_bytes())
.context("ratchet encrypt failed")?;
db.save_session(&recipient, state)?;
WireMessage::Message {
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
sender_fingerprint: our_pub.fingerprint.to_string(),
ratchet_message: encrypted,
}
} else {
// No session — perform X3DH key exchange
println!("No existing session. Fetching key bundle for {}...", recipient_fp);
let bundle = client.fetch_bundle(recipient_fp).await
.context("failed to fetch recipient's bundle. Are they registered?")?;
let x3dh_result = x3dh::initiate(&identity, &bundle)
.context("X3DH key exchange failed")?;
// Init ratchet as Alice
let their_spk = PublicKey::from(bundle.signed_pre_key.public_key);
let mut state = RatchetState::init_alice(x3dh_result.shared_secret, their_spk);
let encrypted = state.encrypt(message.as_bytes())
.context("ratchet encrypt failed")?;
// Save session
db.save_session(&recipient, &state)?;
WireMessage::KeyExchange {
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
sender_fingerprint: our_pub.fingerprint.to_string(),
sender_identity_encryption_key: *our_pub.encryption.as_bytes(),
ephemeral_public: *x3dh_result.ephemeral_public.as_bytes(),
used_one_time_pre_key_id: x3dh_result.used_one_time_pre_key_id,
ratchet_message: encrypted,
}
};
// Serialize and send
let encoded = bincode::serialize(&wire_msg)
.context("failed to serialize wire message")?;
client.send_message(recipient_fp, Some(&our_pub.fingerprint.to_string()), &encoded).await?;
println!("Message sent to {}", recipient_fp);
Ok(())
}

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//! Seed storage: encrypted at rest with Argon2id + ChaCha20-Poly1305.
use std::fs;
use std::io::{self, Write};
use std::path::PathBuf;
use argon2::Argon2;
use chacha20poly1305::{
aead::{Aead, KeyInit},
ChaCha20Poly1305, Nonce,
};
use rand::RngCore;
use warzone_protocol::identity::Seed;
use zeroize::Zeroize;
/// Magic bytes to identify encrypted seed files.
const MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"WZS1";
/// Salt length for Argon2.
const SALT_LEN: usize = 16;
/// Nonce length for ChaCha20-Poly1305.
const NONCE_LEN: usize = 12;
/// Get the warzone data directory. Respects WARZONE_HOME env var,
/// falls back to ~/.warzone.
pub fn data_dir() -> PathBuf {
if let Ok(wz) = std::env::var("WARZONE_HOME") {
PathBuf::from(wz)
} else {
let home = std::env::var("HOME").unwrap_or_else(|_| ".".into());
PathBuf::from(home).join(".warzone")
}
}
fn seed_path() -> PathBuf {
data_dir().join("identity.seed")
}
/// Derive a 32-byte encryption key from a passphrase using Argon2id.
fn derive_key(passphrase: &[u8], salt: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
Argon2::default()
.hash_password_into(passphrase, salt, &mut key)
.expect("Argon2 should not fail with valid params");
key
}
/// Prompt for a passphrase (hidden input).
fn prompt_passphrase(prompt: &str) -> String {
eprint!("{}", prompt);
io::stderr().flush().unwrap();
let mut pass = String::new();
// Try to disable echo. If that fails (e.g. piped input), just read normally.
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd;
let fd = io::stdin().as_raw_fd();
let mut termios = unsafe {
let mut t = std::mem::zeroed();
libc::tcgetattr(fd, &mut t);
t
};
let old = termios;
termios.c_lflag &= !libc::ECHO;
unsafe { libc::tcsetattr(fd, libc::TCSANOW, &termios) };
io::stdin().read_line(&mut pass).unwrap();
unsafe { libc::tcsetattr(fd, libc::TCSANOW, &old) };
eprintln!();
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
{
io::stdin().read_line(&mut pass).unwrap();
}
pass.trim().to_string()
}
/// Save seed encrypted with a passphrase.
pub fn save_seed(seed: &Seed) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let path = seed_path();
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
}
let passphrase = prompt_passphrase("Set passphrase (empty for no encryption): ");
if passphrase.is_empty() {
// Plaintext (legacy, for testing)
fs::write(&path, &seed.0)?;
} else {
let confirm = prompt_passphrase("Confirm passphrase: ");
if passphrase != confirm {
anyhow::bail!("Passphrases don't match");
}
let mut salt = [0u8; SALT_LEN];
rand::rngs::OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
let mut key = derive_key(passphrase.as_bytes(), &salt);
let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new((&key).into());
let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
rand::rngs::OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce_bytes);
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
let ciphertext = cipher
.encrypt(nonce, seed.0.as_slice())
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("encryption failed"))?;
// File format: MAGIC(4) + salt(16) + nonce(12) + ciphertext(32+16=48)
let mut file_data = Vec::with_capacity(4 + SALT_LEN + NONCE_LEN + ciphertext.len());
file_data.extend_from_slice(MAGIC);
file_data.extend_from_slice(&salt);
file_data.extend_from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
file_data.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
fs::write(&path, &file_data)?;
key.zeroize();
}
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
fs::set_permissions(&path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Load raw seed bytes (for deriving eth address etc).
pub fn load_seed_raw() -> anyhow::Result<[u8; 32]> {
let seed = load_seed()?;
Ok(seed.0)
}
/// Load seed, decrypting if necessary.
pub fn load_seed() -> anyhow::Result<Seed> {
let path = seed_path();
let bytes = fs::read(&path)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("No identity found. Run `warzone init` first."))?;
// Check if encrypted
if bytes.len() >= 4 && &bytes[..4] == MAGIC {
// Encrypted format
if bytes.len() < 4 + SALT_LEN + NONCE_LEN + 48 {
anyhow::bail!("Corrupted encrypted seed file");
}
let salt = &bytes[4..4 + SALT_LEN];
let nonce_bytes = &bytes[4 + SALT_LEN..4 + SALT_LEN + NONCE_LEN];
let ciphertext = &bytes[4 + SALT_LEN + NONCE_LEN..];
let passphrase = prompt_passphrase("Passphrase: ");
let mut key = derive_key(passphrase.as_bytes(), salt);
let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new((&key).into());
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(nonce_bytes);
let plaintext = cipher
.decrypt(nonce, ciphertext)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("Wrong passphrase"))?;
key.zeroize();
if plaintext.len() != 32 {
anyhow::bail!("Corrupted seed data");
}
let mut seed_bytes = [0u8; 32];
seed_bytes.copy_from_slice(&plaintext);
Ok(Seed::from_bytes(seed_bytes))
} else if bytes.len() == 32 {
// Legacy plaintext
let mut seed_bytes = [0u8; 32];
seed_bytes.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
Ok(Seed::from_bytes(seed_bytes))
} else {
anyhow::bail!("Corrupted seed file (unknown format)")
}
}

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pub mod cli;
pub mod keystore;
pub mod net;
pub mod storage;
pub mod tui;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
use clap::{Parser, Subcommand};
mod cli;
mod keystore;
mod net;
mod storage;
mod tui;
#[derive(Parser)]
#[command(name = "warzone", about = "Warzone messenger client")]
struct Cli {
#[command(subcommand)]
command: Commands,
}
#[derive(Subcommand)]
enum Commands {
/// Generate a new identity (seed + keypair + pre-keys)
Init,
/// Recover identity from BIP39 mnemonic
Recover {
/// 24-word mnemonic
#[arg(num_args = 1..)]
words: Vec<String>,
},
/// Show your fingerprint and public key
Info,
/// Register your key bundle with a server
Register {
/// Server URL
#[arg(short, long, default_value = "http://localhost:7700")]
server: String,
},
/// Show Ethereum-compatible address derived from your seed
Eth,
/// Send an encrypted message
Send {
/// Recipient fingerprint (e.g. a3f8:c912:...) or @alias
recipient: String,
/// Message text
message: String,
/// Server URL
#[arg(short, long, default_value = "http://localhost:7700")]
server: String,
},
/// Poll for and decrypt messages
Recv {
/// Server URL
#[arg(short, long, default_value = "http://localhost:7700")]
server: String,
},
/// Launch interactive TUI chat
Chat {
/// Peer fingerprint or @alias (optional)
peer: Option<String>,
/// Server URL
#[arg(short, long, default_value = "http://localhost:7700")]
server: String,
},
/// Export encrypted backup of local data (sessions, history)
Backup {
/// Output file path
#[arg(default_value = "warzone-backup.wzb")]
output: String,
},
/// Restore from encrypted backup
Restore {
/// Backup file path
input: String,
},
}
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let cli = Cli::parse();
match cli.command {
// These don't need an existing identity
Commands::Init => return cli::init::run(),
Commands::Recover { words } => return cli::recover::run(&words.join(" ")),
_ => {}
}
// All other commands need the seed — unlock once here
let seed = keystore::load_seed()?;
// Create a copy for the poll thread (Seed doesn't impl Clone due to Zeroize)
let poll_seed = warzone_protocol::identity::Seed::from_bytes(seed.0);
let identity = seed.derive_identity();
let our_fp = identity.public_identity().fingerprint.to_string();
match cli.command {
Commands::Init | Commands::Recover { .. } => unreachable!(),
Commands::Info => {
let pub_id = identity.public_identity();
println!("Fingerprint: {}", pub_id.fingerprint);
println!("Signing key: {}", hex::encode(pub_id.signing.as_bytes()));
println!("Encryption key: {}", hex::encode(pub_id.encryption.as_bytes()));
}
Commands::Eth => {
let eth_id = warzone_protocol::ethereum::derive_eth_identity(&seed.0);
let pub_id = identity.public_identity();
println!("Warzone fingerprint: {}", pub_id.fingerprint);
println!("Ethereum address: {}", eth_id.address.to_checksum());
println!("Same seed, dual identity.");
}
Commands::Register { server } => {
cli::init::register_with_server_identity(&server, &identity).await?;
}
Commands::Send {
recipient,
message,
server,
} => {
let _ = cli::init::register_with_server_identity(&server, &identity).await;
cli::send::run(&recipient, &message, &server, &identity).await?;
}
Commands::Recv { server } => {
cli::recv::run(&server, &identity).await?;
}
Commands::Chat { peer, server } => {
let _ = cli::init::register_with_server_identity(&server, &identity).await;
let db = storage::LocalDb::open()?;
tui::run_tui(our_fp, peer, server, identity, poll_seed, db).await?;
}
Commands::Backup { output } => {
// Collect all sled data as JSON
let db = storage::LocalDb::open()?;
let backup_data = db.export_all()?;
let json = serde_json::to_vec(&backup_data)?;
let encrypted = warzone_protocol::history::encrypt_history(&seed.0, &json);
std::fs::write(&output, &encrypted)?;
println!("Backup saved to {} ({} bytes encrypted)", output, encrypted.len());
}
Commands::Restore { input } => {
let encrypted = std::fs::read(&input)?;
let json = warzone_protocol::history::decrypt_history(&seed.0, &encrypted)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("Decryption failed — wrong seed?"))?;
let backup_data: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&json)?;
let db = storage::LocalDb::open()?;
let count = db.import_all(&backup_data)?;
println!("Restored {} entries from {}", count, input);
}
}
Ok(())
}

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//! HTTP client for talking to warzone-server.
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use warzone_protocol::prekey::PreKeyBundle;
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ServerClient {
pub base_url: String,
pub client: reqwest::Client,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct RegisterRequest {
fingerprint: String,
bundle: Vec<u8>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
eth_address: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct SendRequest {
to: String,
from: Option<String>,
message: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
struct BundleResponse {
fingerprint: String,
bundle: String, // base64
}
impl ServerClient {
pub fn new(base_url: &str) -> Self {
ServerClient {
base_url: base_url.trim_end_matches('/').to_string(),
client: reqwest::Client::new(),
}
}
/// Register our pre-key bundle with the server.
pub async fn register_bundle(
&self,
fingerprint: &str,
bundle: &PreKeyBundle,
eth_address: Option<String>,
) -> Result<()> {
let encoded =
bincode::serialize(bundle).context("failed to serialize bundle")?;
self.client
.post(format!("{}/v1/keys/register", self.base_url))
.json(&RegisterRequest {
fingerprint: fingerprint.to_string(),
bundle: encoded,
eth_address,
})
.send()
.await
.context("failed to register bundle")?;
Ok(())
}
/// Fetch a user's pre-key bundle from the server.
pub async fn fetch_bundle(&self, fingerprint: &str) -> Result<PreKeyBundle> {
let fp_clean: String = fingerprint.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect();
let response = self
.client
.get(format!(
"{}/v1/keys/{}",
self.base_url, fp_clean
))
.send()
.await
.context("failed to fetch bundle")?;
if !response.status().is_success() {
anyhow::bail!(
"server returned {} — user {} may not be registered",
response.status(),
fingerprint
);
}
let resp: BundleResponse = response
.json()
.await
.context("failed to parse bundle response")?;
let bytes = base64::Engine::decode(
&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD,
&resp.bundle,
)
.context("failed to decode base64 bundle")?;
bincode::deserialize(&bytes).context("failed to deserialize bundle")
}
/// Send an encrypted message to the server for delivery.
pub async fn send_message(&self, to: &str, from: Option<&str>, message: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
let to_clean: String = to.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect();
self.client
.post(format!("{}/v1/messages/send", self.base_url))
.json(&SendRequest {
to: to_clean,
from: from.map(|f| f.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect()),
message: message.to_vec(),
})
.send()
.await
.context("failed to send message")?;
Ok(())
}
/// Check how many one-time pre-keys remain on the server.
pub async fn otpk_count(&self, fingerprint: &str) -> Result<u64> {
let fp_clean: String = fingerprint.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect();
let resp: serde_json::Value = self.client
.get(format!("{}/v1/keys/{}/otpk-count", self.base_url, fp_clean))
.send()
.await
.context("failed to check OTPK count")?
.json()
.await
.context("failed to parse OTPK count")?;
Ok(resp.get("count").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()).unwrap_or(0))
}
/// Upload additional one-time pre-keys.
pub async fn replenish_otpks(&self, fingerprint: &str, keys: Vec<(u32, [u8; 32])>) -> Result<()> {
let fp_clean: String = fingerprint.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect();
let otpks: Vec<serde_json::Value> = keys.iter().map(|(id, pubkey)| {
serde_json::json!({"id": id, "public_key": hex::encode(pubkey)})
}).collect();
self.client
.post(format!("{}/v1/keys/replenish", self.base_url))
.json(&serde_json::json!({"fingerprint": fp_clean, "one_time_pre_keys": otpks}))
.send()
.await
.context("failed to replenish OTPKs")?;
Ok(())
}
/// Poll for messages addressed to us.
pub async fn poll_messages(&self, fingerprint: &str) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
let fp_clean: String = fingerprint.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect();
let resp: Vec<String> = self
.client
.get(format!(
"{}/v1/messages/poll/{}",
self.base_url, fp_clean
))
.send()
.await
.context("failed to poll messages")?
.json()
.await
.context("failed to parse poll response")?;
let mut messages = Vec::new();
for b64 in resp {
if let Ok(bytes) = base64::Engine::decode(
&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD,
&b64,
) {
messages.push(bytes);
}
}
Ok(messages)
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,412 @@
//! Local sled database: sessions, pre-keys, message history.
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use warzone_protocol::ratchet::RatchetState;
use warzone_protocol::types::Fingerprint;
use x25519_dalek::StaticSecret;
pub struct LocalDb {
sessions: sled::Tree,
pre_keys: sled::Tree,
contacts: sled::Tree,
history: sled::Tree,
sender_keys: sled::Tree,
_db: sled::Db,
}
impl LocalDb {
pub fn open() -> Result<Self> {
let path = crate::keystore::data_dir().join("db");
let db = match sled::open(&path) {
Ok(db) => db,
Err(e) => {
let err_str = e.to_string();
if err_str.contains("WouldBlock") || err_str.contains("lock") {
eprintln!("Error: Database is locked by another warzone process.");
eprintln!(" DB path: {}", path.display());
eprintln!();
eprintln!(" Check for running processes:");
eprintln!(" ps aux | grep warzone-client");
eprintln!();
eprintln!(" To force unlock (if no other process is running):");
eprintln!(" rm -rf {}", path.display());
eprintln!(" (This deletes sessions — you'll need to re-establish them)");
anyhow::bail!("database locked by another process");
}
return Err(e).context("failed to open local database");
}
};
let sessions = db.open_tree("sessions")?;
let pre_keys = db.open_tree("pre_keys")?;
let contacts = db.open_tree("contacts")?;
let history = db.open_tree("history")?;
let sender_keys = db.open_tree("sender_keys")?;
Ok(LocalDb {
sessions,
pre_keys,
contacts,
history,
sender_keys,
_db: db,
})
}
/// Save a ratchet session for a peer.
pub fn save_session(&self, peer: &Fingerprint, state: &RatchetState) -> Result<()> {
let key = peer.to_hex();
let data = state.serialize_versioned()
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("{}", e))?;
self.sessions.insert(key.as_bytes(), data)?;
self.sessions.flush()?;
Ok(())
}
/// Delete a ratchet session for a peer (used for session recovery).
pub fn delete_session(&self, peer: &Fingerprint) -> Result<()> {
let key = peer.to_hex();
self.sessions.remove(key.as_bytes())?;
self.sessions.flush()?;
Ok(())
}
/// Load a ratchet session for a peer.
pub fn load_session(&self, peer: &Fingerprint) -> Result<Option<RatchetState>> {
let key = peer.to_hex();
match self.sessions.get(key.as_bytes())? {
Some(data) => {
let state = RatchetState::deserialize_versioned(&data)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("{}", e))?;
Ok(Some(state))
}
None => Ok(None),
}
}
/// Store the signed pre-key secret (for X3DH respond).
pub fn save_signed_pre_key(&self, id: u32, secret: &StaticSecret) -> Result<()> {
let key = format!("spk:{}", id);
self.pre_keys
.insert(key.as_bytes(), secret.to_bytes().as_slice())?;
self.pre_keys.flush()?;
Ok(())
}
/// Load the signed pre-key secret.
pub fn load_signed_pre_key(&self, id: u32) -> Result<Option<StaticSecret>> {
let key = format!("spk:{}", id);
match self.pre_keys.get(key.as_bytes())? {
Some(data) => {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
bytes.copy_from_slice(&data);
Ok(Some(StaticSecret::from(bytes)))
}
None => Ok(None),
}
}
/// Store a one-time pre-key secret.
pub fn save_one_time_pre_key(&self, id: u32, secret: &StaticSecret) -> Result<()> {
let key = format!("otpk:{}", id);
self.pre_keys
.insert(key.as_bytes(), secret.to_bytes().as_slice())?;
self.pre_keys.flush()?;
Ok(())
}
/// Return the next available OTPK ID (one past the highest stored).
pub fn next_otpk_id(&self) -> u32 {
let mut max_id: Option<u32> = None;
for item in self.pre_keys.iter() {
if let Ok((k, _)) = item {
let key_str = String::from_utf8_lossy(&k);
if let Some(id_str) = key_str.strip_prefix("otpk:") {
if let Ok(id) = id_str.parse::<u32>() {
max_id = Some(max_id.map_or(id, |m: u32| m.max(id)));
}
}
}
}
max_id.map_or(0, |m| m + 1)
}
/// Load and remove a one-time pre-key secret.
pub fn take_one_time_pre_key(&self, id: u32) -> Result<Option<StaticSecret>> {
let key = format!("otpk:{}", id);
match self.pre_keys.remove(key.as_bytes())? {
Some(data) => {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
bytes.copy_from_slice(&data);
self.pre_keys.flush()?;
Ok(Some(StaticSecret::from(bytes)))
}
None => Ok(None),
}
}
// ── Sender Keys ──
/// Save a sender key for a (sender, group) pair.
pub fn save_sender_key(
&self,
sender_fp: &str,
group_name: &str,
key: &warzone_protocol::sender_keys::SenderKey,
) -> Result<()> {
let db_key = format!("sk:{}:{}", sender_fp, group_name);
let data = bincode::serialize(key).context("failed to serialize sender key")?;
self.sender_keys.insert(db_key.as_bytes(), data)?;
self.sender_keys.flush()?;
Ok(())
}
/// Load a sender key for a (sender, group) pair.
pub fn load_sender_key(
&self,
sender_fp: &str,
group_name: &str,
) -> Result<Option<warzone_protocol::sender_keys::SenderKey>> {
let db_key = format!("sk:{}:{}", sender_fp, group_name);
match self.sender_keys.get(db_key.as_bytes())? {
Some(data) => {
let key = bincode::deserialize(&data)
.context("failed to deserialize sender key")?;
Ok(Some(key))
}
None => Ok(None),
}
}
// ── Contacts ──
/// Add or update a contact. Called on send/receive.
pub fn touch_contact(&self, fingerprint: &str, alias: Option<&str>) -> Result<()> {
let fp = fingerprint.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect::<String>().to_lowercase();
let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
let mut record = match self.contacts.get(fp.as_bytes())? {
Some(data) => serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&data).unwrap_or_default(),
None => serde_json::json!({}),
};
let obj = record.as_object_mut().unwrap();
obj.insert("fingerprint".into(), serde_json::json!(fp));
obj.insert("last_seen".into(), serde_json::json!(now));
if let Some(a) = alias {
obj.insert("alias".into(), serde_json::json!(a));
}
if !obj.contains_key("first_seen") {
obj.insert("first_seen".into(), serde_json::json!(now));
}
let count = obj.get("message_count").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()).unwrap_or(0);
obj.insert("message_count".into(), serde_json::json!(count + 1));
self.contacts.insert(fp.as_bytes(), serde_json::to_vec(&record)?)?;
Ok(())
}
/// Get all contacts sorted by last_seen (most recent first).
pub fn list_contacts(&self) -> Result<Vec<serde_json::Value>> {
let mut contacts: Vec<serde_json::Value> = self.contacts.iter()
.filter_map(|item| {
item.ok().and_then(|(_, data)| serde_json::from_slice(&data).ok())
})
.collect();
contacts.sort_by(|a, b| {
let ta = a.get("last_seen").and_then(|v| v.as_i64()).unwrap_or(0);
let tb = b.get("last_seen").and_then(|v| v.as_i64()).unwrap_or(0);
tb.cmp(&ta)
});
Ok(contacts)
}
// ── Message History ──
/// Store a message in local history.
pub fn store_message(&self, peer_fp: &str, sender: &str, text: &str, is_self: bool) -> Result<()> {
let fp = peer_fp.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect::<String>().to_lowercase();
let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
let id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
let msg = serde_json::json!({
"id": id,
"peer": fp,
"sender": sender,
"text": text,
"is_self": is_self,
"timestamp": now,
});
// Key: hist:<peer_fp>:<timestamp>:<uuid> for ordered scan
let key = format!("hist:{}:{}:{}", fp, now, id);
self.history.insert(key.as_bytes(), serde_json::to_vec(&msg)?)?;
Ok(())
}
/// Get message history with a peer (most recent N messages).
pub fn get_history(&self, peer_fp: &str, limit: usize) -> Result<Vec<serde_json::Value>> {
let fp = peer_fp.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect::<String>().to_lowercase();
let prefix = format!("hist:{}:", fp);
let mut messages: Vec<serde_json::Value> = self.history
.scan_prefix(prefix.as_bytes())
.filter_map(|item| {
item.ok().and_then(|(_, data)| serde_json::from_slice(&data).ok())
})
.collect();
// Take last N
if messages.len() > limit {
messages = messages.split_off(messages.len() - limit);
}
Ok(messages)
}
/// Export all data as JSON (for encrypted backup).
pub fn export_all(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
let mut sessions = serde_json::Map::new();
for item in self.sessions.iter() {
if let Ok((k, v)) = item {
let key = String::from_utf8_lossy(&k).to_string();
sessions.insert(key, serde_json::json!(base64::Engine::encode(
&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, &v
)));
}
}
let mut pre_keys = serde_json::Map::new();
for item in self.pre_keys.iter() {
if let Ok((k, v)) = item {
let key = String::from_utf8_lossy(&k).to_string();
pre_keys.insert(key, serde_json::json!(base64::Engine::encode(
&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, &v
)));
}
}
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"version": 1,
"sessions": sessions,
"pre_keys": pre_keys,
}))
}
/// Create an encrypted backup of all session data.
/// Returns the backup file path.
pub fn create_backup(&self, seed: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<std::path::PathBuf> {
use std::io::Write;
let backup_dir = crate::keystore::data_dir().join("backups");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&backup_dir)?;
// Collect all data
let mut data = serde_json::Map::new();
// Sessions
let mut sessions = serde_json::Map::new();
for item in self.sessions.iter() {
if let Ok((key, value)) = item {
let k = String::from_utf8_lossy(&key).to_string();
sessions.insert(k, serde_json::Value::String(base64::Engine::encode(
&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, &value
)));
}
}
data.insert("sessions".into(), serde_json::Value::Object(sessions));
// Contacts
let mut contacts = serde_json::Map::new();
for item in self.contacts.iter() {
if let Ok((key, value)) = item {
let k = String::from_utf8_lossy(&key).to_string();
if let Ok(v) = serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&value) {
contacts.insert(k, v);
}
}
}
data.insert("contacts".into(), serde_json::Value::Object(contacts));
// Sender keys
let mut sender_keys = serde_json::Map::new();
for item in self.sender_keys.iter() {
if let Ok((key, value)) = item {
let k = String::from_utf8_lossy(&key).to_string();
sender_keys.insert(k, serde_json::Value::String(base64::Engine::encode(
&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, &value
)));
}
}
data.insert("sender_keys".into(), serde_json::Value::Object(sender_keys));
// Serialize and encrypt
let plaintext = serde_json::to_vec(&serde_json::Value::Object(data))?;
let key_bytes = warzone_protocol::crypto::hkdf_derive(seed, b"", b"warzone-backup", 32);
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
key.copy_from_slice(&key_bytes);
let encrypted = warzone_protocol::crypto::aead_encrypt(&key, &plaintext, b"warzone-backup-aad");
// Write to temp file then rename (atomic)
let timestamp = chrono::Utc::now().format("%Y%m%d_%H%M%S").to_string();
let filename = format!("backup_{}.wzbk", timestamp);
let path = backup_dir.join(&filename);
let tmp_path = backup_dir.join(format!(".{}.tmp", filename));
let mut file = std::fs::File::create(&tmp_path)?;
file.write_all(&encrypted)?;
file.sync_all()?;
std::fs::rename(&tmp_path, &path)?;
// Rotate: keep last 3 backups
let mut backups: Vec<_> = std::fs::read_dir(&backup_dir)?
.filter_map(|e| e.ok())
.filter(|e| e.file_name().to_string_lossy().ends_with(".wzbk"))
.collect();
backups.sort_by_key(|e| e.file_name());
while backups.len() > 3 {
if let Some(old) = backups.first() {
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(old.path());
backups.remove(0);
}
}
Ok(path)
}
/// Import data from JSON backup (merges, doesn't overwrite existing).
pub fn import_all(&self, data: &serde_json::Value) -> Result<usize> {
let mut count = 0;
if let Some(sessions) = data.get("sessions").and_then(|v| v.as_object()) {
for (key, val) in sessions {
if let Some(b64) = val.as_str() {
if let Ok(bytes) = base64::Engine::decode(
&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, b64
) {
// Only import if not already present
if self.sessions.get(key.as_bytes())?.is_none() {
self.sessions.insert(key.as_bytes(), bytes)?;
count += 1;
}
}
}
}
}
if let Some(pre_keys) = data.get("pre_keys").and_then(|v| v.as_object()) {
for (key, val) in pre_keys {
if let Some(b64) = val.as_str() {
if let Ok(bytes) = base64::Engine::decode(
&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, b64
) {
if self.pre_keys.get(key.as_bytes())?.is_none() {
self.pre_keys.insert(key.as_bytes(), bytes)?;
count += 1;
}
}
}
}
}
self.sessions.flush()?;
self.pre_keys.flush()?;
Ok(count)
}
}

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use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use ratatui::layout::{Constraint, Direction, Layout};
use ratatui::style::{Color, Modifier, Style};
use ratatui::text::{Line, Span};
use ratatui::widgets::{Block, Borders, List, ListItem, Paragraph, Wrap};
use ratatui::Frame;
use chrono::Local;
use super::types::{App, ReceiptStatus};
/// Simple markdown-to-spans converter for TUI messages.
/// Handles: **bold**, *italic*, `code`, ```code blocks```.
fn md_to_spans<'a>(text: &'a str, base_style: Style) -> Vec<Span<'a>> {
let mut spans = Vec::new();
let mut remaining = text;
while !remaining.is_empty() {
// Code: `...`
if remaining.starts_with('`') && !remaining.starts_with("```") {
if let Some(end) = remaining[1..].find('`') {
spans.push(Span::styled(
&remaining[1..1 + end],
Style::default().fg(Color::Cyan).add_modifier(Modifier::BOLD),
));
remaining = &remaining[2 + end..];
continue;
}
}
// Bold: **...**
if remaining.starts_with("**") {
if let Some(end) = remaining[2..].find("**") {
spans.push(Span::styled(
&remaining[2..2 + end],
base_style.add_modifier(Modifier::BOLD),
));
remaining = &remaining[4 + end..];
continue;
}
}
// Italic: *...*
if remaining.starts_with('*') && !remaining.starts_with("**") {
if let Some(end) = remaining[1..].find('*') {
spans.push(Span::styled(
&remaining[1..1 + end],
base_style.add_modifier(Modifier::ITALIC),
));
remaining = &remaining[2 + end..];
continue;
}
}
// Plain text until next special char
let next = remaining.find(|c: char| c == '*' || c == '`').unwrap_or(remaining.len());
if next > 0 {
spans.push(Span::styled(&remaining[..next], base_style));
remaining = &remaining[next..];
} else {
// Stuck on a special char that didn't match a pattern — emit it
spans.push(Span::styled(&remaining[..1], base_style));
remaining = &remaining[1..];
}
}
spans
}
impl App {
fn receipt_indicator(&self, message_id: &Option<String>) -> &'static str {
match message_id {
Some(id) => {
let receipts = self.receipts.lock().unwrap();
match receipts.get(id) {
Some(ReceiptStatus::Read) => " \u{2713}\u{2713}", // ✓✓ (read)
Some(ReceiptStatus::Delivered) => " \u{2713}\u{2713}", // ✓✓ (delivered)
Some(ReceiptStatus::Sent) | None => " \u{2713}", // ✓ (sent)
}
}
None => "",
}
}
fn receipt_color(&self, message_id: &Option<String>) -> Color {
match message_id {
Some(id) => {
let receipts = self.receipts.lock().unwrap();
match receipts.get(id) {
Some(ReceiptStatus::Read) => Color::Blue,
Some(ReceiptStatus::Delivered) => Color::White,
Some(ReceiptStatus::Sent) | None => Color::DarkGray,
}
}
None => Color::DarkGray,
}
}
pub fn draw(&self, frame: &mut Frame) {
let chunks = Layout::default()
.direction(Direction::Vertical)
.constraints([
Constraint::Length(1), // header
Constraint::Min(5), // messages
Constraint::Length(3), // input
])
.split(frame.area());
// Header
let peer_str = match (&self.peer_eth, &self.peer_fp) {
(Some(eth), _) => format!("{}...", &eth[..eth.len().min(12)]),
(None, Some(fp)) => fp.clone(),
(None, None) => "no peer".to_string(),
};
let peer_str = peer_str.as_str();
let is_connected = self.connected.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
let (conn_indicator, conn_color) = if is_connected {
(" \u{25CF}", Color::Green) // ●
} else {
(" \u{25CF}", Color::Red) // ●
};
let identity_display = if self.our_eth.is_empty() {
self.our_fp.clone()
} else {
format!("{}", &self.our_eth[..self.our_eth.len().min(12)])
};
// Call indicator
let call_span = match &self.call_state {
Some(info) => {
let label = match info.state {
super::types::CallPhase::Calling => format!(" \u{1f4de} Calling {}...", &info.peer_display[..info.peer_display.len().min(12)]),
super::types::CallPhase::Ringing => format!(" \u{1f4de} Incoming from {}", &info.peer_display[..info.peer_display.len().min(12)]),
super::types::CallPhase::Active => {
let elapsed = Local::now().signed_duration_since(info.started_at);
let mins = elapsed.num_minutes();
let secs = elapsed.num_seconds() % 60;
format!(" \u{1f50a} {}:{:02}", mins, secs)
}
};
let color = match info.state {
super::types::CallPhase::Calling => Color::Yellow,
super::types::CallPhase::Ringing => Color::Magenta,
super::types::CallPhase::Active => Color::Green,
};
Span::styled(label, Style::default().fg(color))
}
None => Span::raw(""),
};
let header = Paragraph::new(Line::from(vec![
Span::styled("WZ ", Style::default().fg(Color::Red).add_modifier(Modifier::BOLD)),
Span::styled(identity_display, Style::default().fg(Color::Green)),
Span::raw(" \u{2192} "),
Span::styled(peer_str, Style::default().fg(Color::Yellow)),
Span::styled(
format!(" [{}]", self.server_url),
Style::default().fg(Color::DarkGray),
),
Span::styled(conn_indicator, Style::default().fg(conn_color)),
call_span,
]));
frame.render_widget(header, chunks[0]);
// Messages — render markdown for message bodies via tui-markdown
let msgs = self.messages.lock().unwrap();
let items: Vec<ListItem> = msgs
.iter()
.flat_map(|m| {
let base_style = if m.is_system {
Style::default().fg(Color::Cyan)
} else if m.is_self {
Style::default().fg(Color::Green)
} else {
Style::default().fg(Color::Yellow)
};
let timestamp = format!("[{}] ", m.timestamp.format("%H:%M"));
let prefix = if m.is_system {
"*** ".to_string()
} else {
format!("{}: ", &m.sender[..m.sender.len().min(12)])
};
let receipt_str = if m.is_self && m.message_id.is_some() {
self.receipt_indicator(&m.message_id)
} else {
""
};
let receipt_color = self.receipt_color(&m.message_id);
// Split text into lines, render markdown per line
let text_lines: Vec<&str> = m.text.split('\n').collect();
let mut result_items = Vec::new();
for (i, line_text) in text_lines.iter().enumerate() {
let mut spans = Vec::new();
if i == 0 {
spans.push(Span::styled(timestamp.clone(), Style::default().fg(Color::DarkGray)));
spans.push(Span::styled(prefix.clone(), base_style.add_modifier(Modifier::BOLD)));
} else {
let indent = " ".repeat(timestamp.len() + prefix.len());
spans.push(Span::raw(indent));
}
// Check for code block lines (```)
if line_text.starts_with("```") {
spans.push(Span::styled(*line_text, Style::default().fg(Color::DarkGray)));
} else if line_text.starts_with("# ") {
spans.push(Span::styled(&line_text[2..], Style::default().fg(Color::White).add_modifier(Modifier::BOLD)));
} else if line_text.starts_with("## ") {
spans.push(Span::styled(&line_text[3..], Style::default().fg(Color::White).add_modifier(Modifier::BOLD)));
} else if line_text.starts_with("> ") {
spans.push(Span::styled("", Style::default().fg(Color::DarkGray)));
spans.push(Span::styled(&line_text[2..], Style::default().fg(Color::DarkGray).add_modifier(Modifier::ITALIC)));
} else if line_text.starts_with("- ") || line_text.starts_with("* ") {
spans.push(Span::styled("", base_style));
spans.extend(md_to_spans(&line_text[2..], base_style));
} else {
spans.extend(md_to_spans(line_text, base_style));
}
// Receipt on last line
if i == text_lines.len() - 1 {
spans.push(Span::styled(receipt_str, Style::default().fg(receipt_color)));
}
result_items.push(ListItem::new(Line::from(spans)));
}
if result_items.is_empty() {
vec![ListItem::new(Line::from(vec![
Span::styled(timestamp, Style::default().fg(Color::DarkGray)),
Span::styled(prefix, base_style.add_modifier(Modifier::BOLD)),
]))]
} else {
result_items
}
})
.collect();
// Scroll support: compute the visible window of items
let visible_height = chunks[1].height.saturating_sub(1) as usize; // minus top border
let total = items.len();
let end = total.saturating_sub(self.scroll_offset);
let start = end.saturating_sub(visible_height);
let visible_items = if total == 0 {
vec![]
} else {
items[start..end].to_vec()
};
let messages_widget = List::new(visible_items)
.block(Block::default().borders(Borders::TOP));
frame.render_widget(messages_widget, chunks[1]);
// Input
let input_title = if self.scroll_offset > 0 {
format!(" [{} new \u{2193}] ", self.scroll_offset)
} else {
" message ".to_string()
};
let input_widget = Paragraph::new(self.input.as_str())
.block(
Block::default()
.borders(Borders::ALL)
.border_style(Style::default().fg(Color::DarkGray))
.title(input_title),
)
.wrap(Wrap { trim: false });
frame.render_widget(input_widget, chunks[2]);
// Cursor
let x = (self.cursor_pos as u16 + 1).min(chunks[2].width - 2);
frame.set_cursor_position((chunks[2].x + x, chunks[2].y + 1));
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use chrono::Local;
use ratatui::backend::TestBackend;
use ratatui::Terminal;
use super::super::types::{App, ChatLine};
/// Helper: collect the entire terminal buffer into a single String.
fn full_buffer_text(terminal: &Terminal<TestBackend>) -> String {
let buf = terminal.backend().buffer();
(0..buf.area().height)
.flat_map(|y| {
(0..buf.area().width).map(move |x| {
buf.cell((x, y))
.map(|c| c.symbol().chars().next().unwrap_or(' '))
.unwrap_or(' ')
})
})
.collect()
}
/// Helper: check whether the buffer contains `needle`.
fn buffer_contains(terminal: &Terminal<TestBackend>, needle: &str) -> bool {
full_buffer_text(terminal).contains(needle)
}
/// Helper: collect a single row into a String.
fn row_text(terminal: &Terminal<TestBackend>, row: u16) -> String {
let buf = terminal.backend().buffer();
(0..buf.area().width)
.map(|x| {
buf.cell((x, row))
.map(|c| c.symbol().chars().next().unwrap_or(' '))
.unwrap_or(' ')
})
.collect()
}
fn make_app() -> App {
App::new("aabbcc".into(), Some("ddeeff".into()), "localhost:7700".into())
}
fn make_terminal() -> Terminal<TestBackend> {
let backend = TestBackend::new(80, 24);
Terminal::new(backend).expect("terminal creation should succeed")
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
// 1. draw_does_not_panic
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
#[test]
fn draw_does_not_panic() {
let app = make_app();
let mut terminal = make_terminal();
terminal.draw(|f| app.draw(f)).expect("draw should not fail");
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
// 2. header_contains_fingerprint
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
#[test]
fn header_contains_identity() {
let app = make_app();
let mut terminal = make_terminal();
terminal.draw(|f| app.draw(f)).unwrap();
let header = row_text(&terminal, 0);
// Header shows ETH address (if seed exists) or fingerprint
assert!(
header.contains("aabbcc") || header.contains("0x"),
"header should contain fingerprint or ETH address, got: {header}"
);
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
// 3. connection_indicator_red_when_disconnected
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
#[test]
fn connection_indicator_red_when_disconnected() {
let app = make_app();
// connected defaults to false
assert!(!app.connected.load(Ordering::Relaxed));
let mut terminal = make_terminal();
terminal.draw(|f| app.draw(f)).unwrap();
let header = row_text(&terminal, 0);
assert!(
header.contains('\u{25CF}'),
"header should contain the dot character when disconnected, got: {header}"
);
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
// 4. connection_indicator_green_when_connected
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
#[test]
fn connection_indicator_green_when_connected() {
let app = make_app();
app.connected.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
let mut terminal = make_terminal();
terminal.draw(|f| app.draw(f)).unwrap();
let header = row_text(&terminal, 0);
assert!(
header.contains('\u{25CF}'),
"header should contain the dot character when connected, got: {header}"
);
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
// 5. timestamp_format_in_messages
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
#[test]
fn timestamp_format_in_messages() {
let app = make_app();
app.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "alice".into(),
text: "hello world".into(),
is_system: false,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
});
let mut terminal = make_terminal();
terminal.draw(|f| app.draw(f)).unwrap();
let text = full_buffer_text(&terminal);
// Timestamps are rendered as [HH:MM] — look for the bracket pattern.
assert!(
text.contains('[') && text.contains(']'),
"buffer should contain timestamp brackets, got: {text}"
);
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
// 6. scroll_offset_zero_shows_latest_messages
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
#[test]
fn scroll_offset_zero_shows_latest_messages() {
let app = make_app();
for i in 0..30 {
app.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "bot".into(),
text: format!("msg-{i:03}"),
is_system: false,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
// scroll_offset defaults to 0 — pinned to bottom.
let mut terminal = make_terminal();
terminal.draw(|f| app.draw(f)).unwrap();
assert!(
buffer_contains(&terminal, "msg-029"),
"the last message should be visible when scroll_offset is 0"
);
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
// 7. scroll_offset_hides_latest_messages
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
#[test]
fn scroll_offset_hides_latest_messages() {
let mut app = make_app();
for i in 0..30 {
app.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "bot".into(),
text: format!("msg-{i:03}"),
is_system: false,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
app.scroll_offset = 10;
let mut terminal = make_terminal();
terminal.draw(|f| app.draw(f)).unwrap();
assert!(
!buffer_contains(&terminal, "msg-029"),
"the last message should NOT be visible when scroll_offset=10"
);
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
// 8. unread_badge_shows_when_scrolled
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
#[test]
fn unread_badge_shows_when_scrolled() {
let mut app = make_app();
app.scroll_offset = 5;
let mut terminal = make_terminal();
terminal.draw(|f| app.draw(f)).unwrap();
assert!(
buffer_contains(&terminal, "new"),
"buffer should contain 'new' from the unread badge when scrolled"
);
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
// 9. no_unread_badge_at_bottom
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
#[test]
fn no_unread_badge_at_bottom() {
let app = make_app();
// scroll_offset is 0 by default
let mut terminal = make_terminal();
terminal.draw(|f| app.draw(f)).unwrap();
assert!(
buffer_contains(&terminal, "message"),
"buffer should contain the default title 'message' when not scrolled"
);
assert!(
!full_buffer_text(&terminal).contains("new \u{2193}"),
"buffer should NOT contain 'new ↓' when scroll_offset is 0"
);
}
}

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use std::path::PathBuf;
use sha2::{Sha256, Digest};
use warzone_protocol::identity::IdentityKeyPair;
use warzone_protocol::message::WireMessage;
use warzone_protocol::types::Fingerprint;
use crate::net::ServerClient;
use crate::storage::LocalDb;
use chrono::Local;
use super::types::{App, ChatLine, normfp, MAX_FILE_SIZE, CHUNK_SIZE};
impl App {
pub async fn handle_file_send(
&mut self,
path_str: &str,
identity: &IdentityKeyPair,
db: &LocalDb,
client: &ServerClient,
) {
let path = PathBuf::from(path_str);
if !path.exists() {
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("File not found: {}", path_str),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
return;
}
let metadata = match std::fs::metadata(&path) {
Ok(m) => m,
Err(e) => {
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("Cannot read file: {}", e),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
return;
}
};
let file_size = metadata.len();
if file_size > MAX_FILE_SIZE {
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("File too large: {} bytes (max {} bytes)", file_size, MAX_FILE_SIZE),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
return;
}
let file_data = match std::fs::read(&path) {
Ok(d) => d,
Err(e) => {
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("Failed to read file: {}", e),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
return;
}
};
let filename = path.file_name()
.map(|n| n.to_string_lossy().to_string())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "unnamed".to_string());
// SHA-256 of the complete file
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(&file_data);
let sha256 = format!("{:x}", hasher.finalize());
let file_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
let total_chunks = ((file_data.len() + CHUNK_SIZE - 1) / CHUNK_SIZE) as u32;
// Resolve peer (or group members)
let peer = match &self.peer_fp {
Some(p) => p.clone(),
None => {
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: "Set a peer or group first".into(),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
return;
}
};
// Group file transfer: send to each member
if peer.starts_with('#') {
let group_name = &peer[1..];
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("Sending '{}' to group #{}...", filename, group_name),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
// Get members
let url = format!("{}/v1/groups/{}", client.base_url, group_name);
let group_data = match client.client.get(&url).send().await {
Ok(resp) => match resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await {
Ok(d) => d,
Err(_) => return,
},
Err(_) => return,
};
let my_fp = normfp(&self.our_fp);
let members: Vec<String> = group_data.get("members")
.and_then(|v| v.as_array())
.map(|arr| arr.iter().filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(String::from)).collect())
.unwrap_or_default();
for member in &members {
if *member == my_fp { continue; }
// Send file header + chunks to each member via HTTP
let header = WireMessage::FileHeader {
id: file_id.clone(),
sender_fingerprint: self.our_fp.clone(),
filename: filename.clone(),
file_size,
total_chunks,
sha256: sha256.clone(),
};
if let Ok(encoded) = bincode::serialize(&header) {
let _ = client.send_message(member, Some(&self.our_fp), &encoded).await;
}
for i in 0..total_chunks {
let start = i as usize * CHUNK_SIZE;
let end = ((i as usize + 1) * CHUNK_SIZE).min(file_data.len());
let chunk_msg = WireMessage::FileChunk {
id: file_id.clone(),
sender_fingerprint: self.our_fp.clone(),
filename: filename.clone(),
chunk_index: i,
total_chunks,
data: file_data[start..end].to_vec(),
};
if let Ok(encoded) = bincode::serialize(&chunk_msg) {
let _ = client.send_message(member, Some(&self.our_fp), &encoded).await;
}
}
}
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("File '{}' sent to group #{}", filename, group_name),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
return;
};
let peer_fp = match Fingerprint::from_hex(&peer) {
Ok(fp) => fp,
Err(_) => {
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: "Invalid peer fingerprint".into(),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
return;
}
};
let our_pub = identity.public_identity();
let our_fp_str = our_pub.fingerprint.to_string();
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("Sending file '{}' ({} bytes, {} chunks)...", filename, file_size, total_chunks),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
// Send FileHeader (unencrypted metadata — the chunks carry ratchet-encrypted data)
let header = WireMessage::FileHeader {
id: file_id.clone(),
sender_fingerprint: our_fp_str.clone(),
filename: filename.clone(),
file_size,
total_chunks,
sha256: sha256.clone(),
};
let encoded_header = match bincode::serialize(&header) {
Ok(e) => e,
Err(e) => {
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("Serialize header failed: {}", e),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
return;
}
};
if let Err(e) = client.send_message(&peer, Some(&self.our_fp), &encoded_header).await {
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("Failed to send file header: {}", e),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
return;
}
// Send each chunk: encrypt chunk data with ratchet, wrap in FileChunk
for i in 0..total_chunks {
let start = i as usize * CHUNK_SIZE;
let end = ((i as usize + 1) * CHUNK_SIZE).min(file_data.len());
let chunk_data = &file_data[start..end];
// Encrypt chunk data with ratchet
let mut ratchet = db.load_session(&peer_fp).ok().flatten();
let encrypted_data = if let Some(ref mut state) = ratchet {
match state.encrypt(chunk_data) {
Ok(encrypted) => {
let _ = db.save_session(&peer_fp, state);
match bincode::serialize(&encrypted) {
Ok(e) => e,
Err(e) => {
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("Serialize chunk failed: {}", e),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
return;
}
}
}
Err(e) => {
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("Encrypt chunk {} failed: {}", i, e),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
return;
}
}
} else {
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: "No ratchet session. Send a text message first to establish one.".into(),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
return;
};
let chunk_msg = WireMessage::FileChunk {
id: file_id.clone(),
sender_fingerprint: our_fp_str.clone(),
filename: filename.clone(),
chunk_index: i,
total_chunks,
data: encrypted_data,
};
let encoded = match bincode::serialize(&chunk_msg) {
Ok(e) => e,
Err(e) => {
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("Serialize chunk {} failed: {}", i, e),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
return;
}
};
if let Err(e) = client.send_message(&peer, Some(&self.our_fp), &encoded).await {
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("Failed to send chunk {}/{}: {}", i + 1, total_chunks, e),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
return;
}
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("Sent chunk [{}/{}] of {}", i + 1, total_chunks, filename),
is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
self.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: self.our_fp[..12.min(self.our_fp.len())].to_string(),
text: format!("Sent file: {} ({} bytes)", filename, file_size),
is_system: false, is_self: true, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
use crossterm::event::{KeyCode, KeyEvent, KeyModifiers};
use super::types::App;
const COMMANDS: &[&str] = &[
"/help", "/info", "/eth", "/seed", "/backup",
"/peer", "/p", "/reply", "/r", "/dm",
"/call", "/accept", "/reject", "/hangup",
"/alias", "/aliases", "/unalias",
"/contacts", "/c", "/history", "/h",
"/friend", "/unfriend",
"/devices", "/kick",
"/g", "/gcreate", "/gjoin", "/glist", "/gleave", "/gkick", "/gmembers",
"/file", "/quit", "/q",
];
impl App {
/// Handle a single key event. Returns true if the event was consumed.
pub fn handle_key_event(&mut self, key: KeyEvent) {
match key.code {
KeyCode::Char('c') if key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::CONTROL) => {
self.should_quit = true;
}
// Alt+Backspace: delete word before cursor
KeyCode::Backspace if key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::ALT) => {
if self.cursor_pos > 0 {
let before = &self.input[..self.cursor_pos];
let new_pos = before.trim_end().rfind(' ').map(|i| i + 1).unwrap_or(0);
self.input.drain(new_pos..self.cursor_pos);
self.cursor_pos = new_pos;
}
}
// Backspace: delete char before cursor
KeyCode::Backspace => {
if self.cursor_pos > 0 {
self.input.remove(self.cursor_pos - 1);
self.cursor_pos -= 1;
}
}
// Delete: delete char at cursor
KeyCode::Delete => {
if self.cursor_pos < self.input.len() {
self.input.remove(self.cursor_pos);
}
}
// Left arrow
KeyCode::Left => {
if key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::ALT) {
// Alt+Left: word left
let before = &self.input[..self.cursor_pos];
self.cursor_pos = before.rfind(' ').unwrap_or(0);
} else if self.cursor_pos > 0 {
self.cursor_pos -= 1;
}
}
// Right arrow
KeyCode::Right => {
if key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::ALT) {
// Alt+Right: word right
let after = &self.input[self.cursor_pos..];
self.cursor_pos += after.find(' ').map(|i| i + 1).unwrap_or(after.len());
} else if self.cursor_pos < self.input.len() {
self.cursor_pos += 1;
}
}
// Home / Ctrl+A / Cmd+A (macOS)
KeyCode::Home => { self.cursor_pos = 0; }
KeyCode::Char('a') if key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::CONTROL) || key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::SUPER) => {
self.cursor_pos = 0;
}
// End: cursor to end of input when typing, snap to bottom when input is empty.
// Ctrl+End always snaps to bottom.
KeyCode::End => {
if key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::CONTROL) {
// Ctrl+End: always snap scroll to bottom
self.scroll_offset = 0;
} else if self.input.is_empty() {
// Plain End with empty input: snap scroll to bottom
self.scroll_offset = 0;
} else {
// Plain End with text: move cursor to end of input
self.cursor_pos = self.input.len();
}
}
KeyCode::Char('e') if key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::CONTROL) || key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::SUPER) => {
self.cursor_pos = self.input.len();
}
// Ctrl+U / Cmd+U: clear line
KeyCode::Char('u') if key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::CONTROL) || key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::SUPER) => {
self.input.clear();
self.cursor_pos = 0;
}
// Ctrl+K / Cmd+K: kill to end of line
KeyCode::Char('k') if key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::CONTROL) || key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::SUPER) => {
self.input.truncate(self.cursor_pos);
}
// Ctrl+W / Cmd+W: delete word back
KeyCode::Char('w') if key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::CONTROL) || key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::SUPER) => {
let before = &self.input[..self.cursor_pos];
let new_pos = before.trim_end().rfind(' ').map(|i| i + 1).unwrap_or(0);
self.input.drain(new_pos..self.cursor_pos);
self.cursor_pos = new_pos;
}
// PageUp: scroll up by 10 messages
KeyCode::PageUp => {
let max = self.messages.lock().unwrap().len().saturating_sub(1);
self.scroll_offset = (self.scroll_offset + 10).min(max);
}
// PageDown: scroll down by 10 messages
KeyCode::PageDown => {
self.scroll_offset = self.scroll_offset.saturating_sub(10);
}
// Up arrow: scroll up by 1 (only when input is empty)
KeyCode::Up if self.input.is_empty() => {
let max = self.messages.lock().unwrap().len().saturating_sub(1);
self.scroll_offset = (self.scroll_offset + 1).min(max);
}
// Down arrow: scroll down by 1 (only when input is empty)
KeyCode::Down if self.input.is_empty() => {
self.scroll_offset = self.scroll_offset.saturating_sub(1);
}
// Tab: complete slash commands
KeyCode::Tab => {
if self.input.starts_with('/') {
let input_lower = self.input.to_lowercase();
let matches: Vec<&&str> = COMMANDS.iter()
.filter(|cmd| cmd.starts_with(&input_lower) && **cmd != input_lower.as_str())
.collect();
if matches.len() == 1 {
// Single match — complete it
self.input = format!("{} ", matches[0]);
self.cursor_pos = self.input.len();
} else if matches.len() > 1 {
// Multiple matches — find common prefix
let first = matches[0];
let common_len = matches.iter().fold(first.len(), |acc, cmd| {
first.chars().zip(cmd.chars()).take_while(|(a, b)| a == b).count().min(acc)
});
if common_len > self.input.len() {
self.input = first[..common_len].to_string();
self.cursor_pos = self.input.len();
}
// TODO: show matches in a status line
}
}
}
// Regular char: insert at cursor
KeyCode::Char(c) => {
self.input.insert(self.cursor_pos, c);
self.cursor_pos += 1;
}
KeyCode::Esc => {
self.should_quit = true;
}
_ => {}
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crossterm::event::{KeyCode, KeyEvent, KeyModifiers};
use crate::tui::types::App;
/// Helper: create a key event with no modifiers.
fn key(code: KeyCode) -> KeyEvent {
KeyEvent::new(code, KeyModifiers::NONE)
}
/// Helper: create a key event with modifiers.
fn key_mod(code: KeyCode, modifiers: KeyModifiers) -> KeyEvent {
KeyEvent::new(code, modifiers)
}
/// Helper: create a fresh App for testing.
fn app() -> App {
App::new("aabbcc".into(), None, "http://localhost:7700".into())
}
/// Helper: type a string into the app one character at a time.
fn type_str(app: &mut App, s: &str) {
for c in s.chars() {
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Char(c)));
}
}
// ── Text editing tests ──────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn char_insert() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "abc");
assert_eq!(app.input, "abc");
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 3);
}
#[test]
fn backspace_deletes_char() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "abc");
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Backspace));
assert_eq!(app.input, "ab");
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 2);
}
#[test]
fn backspace_at_start_does_nothing() {
let mut app = app();
assert!(app.input.is_empty());
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 0);
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Backspace));
assert!(app.input.is_empty());
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 0);
}
#[test]
fn delete_at_cursor() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "abc");
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Left));
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Delete));
assert_eq!(app.input, "ab");
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 2);
}
#[test]
fn ctrl_u_clears_line() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "hello");
app.handle_key_event(key_mod(KeyCode::Char('u'), KeyModifiers::CONTROL));
assert!(app.input.is_empty());
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 0);
}
#[test]
fn ctrl_k_kills_to_end() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "hello");
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Home));
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Right));
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Right));
app.handle_key_event(key_mod(KeyCode::Char('k'), KeyModifiers::CONTROL));
assert_eq!(app.input, "he");
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 2);
}
#[test]
fn ctrl_w_deletes_word() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "hello world");
app.handle_key_event(key_mod(KeyCode::Char('w'), KeyModifiers::CONTROL));
assert_eq!(app.input, "hello ");
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 6);
}
#[test]
fn alt_backspace_deletes_word() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "hello world");
app.handle_key_event(key_mod(KeyCode::Backspace, KeyModifiers::ALT));
assert_eq!(app.input, "hello ");
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 6);
}
// ── Cursor movement tests ───────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn left_arrow_moves_cursor() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "abc");
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Left));
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 2);
}
#[test]
fn right_arrow_moves_cursor() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "abc");
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Home));
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Right));
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 1);
}
#[test]
fn home_moves_to_start() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "abc");
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Home));
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 0);
}
#[test]
fn end_moves_to_end() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "abc");
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Home));
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::End));
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 3);
}
#[test]
fn ctrl_a_moves_to_start() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "abc");
app.handle_key_event(key_mod(KeyCode::Char('a'), KeyModifiers::CONTROL));
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 0);
}
#[test]
fn ctrl_e_moves_to_end() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "abc");
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Home));
app.handle_key_event(key_mod(KeyCode::Char('e'), KeyModifiers::CONTROL));
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 3);
}
#[test]
fn left_at_start_does_nothing() {
let mut app = app();
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 0);
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Left));
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 0);
}
// ── Quit tests ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn ctrl_c_quits() {
let mut app = app();
app.handle_key_event(key_mod(KeyCode::Char('c'), KeyModifiers::CONTROL));
assert!(app.should_quit);
}
#[test]
fn esc_quits() {
let mut app = app();
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Esc));
assert!(app.should_quit);
}
// ── Scroll tests ────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn page_up_increases_scroll_offset() {
let mut app = app();
// App::new creates 3 system messages, so max = 3 - 1 = 2
let msg_count = app.messages.lock().unwrap().len();
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::PageUp));
// scroll_offset = min(10, msg_count - 1)
let expected = 10usize.min(msg_count.saturating_sub(1));
assert_eq!(app.scroll_offset, expected);
}
#[test]
fn page_down_decreases_scroll_offset() {
let mut app = app();
app.scroll_offset = 15;
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::PageDown));
assert_eq!(app.scroll_offset, 5);
}
#[test]
fn page_down_clamps_to_zero() {
let mut app = app();
app.scroll_offset = 3;
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::PageDown));
assert_eq!(app.scroll_offset, 0);
}
#[test]
fn up_arrow_scrolls_when_input_empty() {
let mut app = app();
assert!(app.input.is_empty());
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Up));
assert_eq!(app.scroll_offset, 1);
}
#[test]
fn up_arrow_ignored_when_input_not_empty() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "hi");
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Up));
assert_eq!(app.scroll_offset, 0);
}
#[test]
fn down_arrow_scrolls_when_input_empty() {
let mut app = app();
app.scroll_offset = 5;
assert!(app.input.is_empty());
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Down));
assert_eq!(app.scroll_offset, 4);
}
#[test]
fn down_arrow_at_zero_stays_zero() {
let mut app = app();
assert!(app.input.is_empty());
assert_eq!(app.scroll_offset, 0);
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Down));
assert_eq!(app.scroll_offset, 0);
}
#[test]
fn end_snaps_to_bottom_when_input_empty() {
let mut app = app();
app.scroll_offset = 10;
assert!(app.input.is_empty());
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::End));
assert_eq!(app.scroll_offset, 0);
}
// ── Tab completion tests ────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn tab_completes_unique_command() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "/he");
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Tab));
assert_eq!(app.input, "/help ");
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 6);
}
#[test]
fn tab_completes_common_prefix_on_ambiguous() {
let mut app = app();
// "/g" matches /g, /gcreate, /gjoin, /glist, /gleave, /gkick, /gmembers
// but /g is an exact-length match that is filtered out since it equals input
// Actually /g exactly matches "/g" so it's excluded. Remaining: /gcreate, /gjoin, /glist, /gleave, /gkick, /gmembers
// Common prefix is "/g" which is same length as input, so no change
type_str(&mut app, "/gc");
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Tab));
// /gcreate is the only match starting with /gc
assert_eq!(app.input, "/gcreate ");
}
#[test]
fn tab_does_nothing_without_slash() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "hello");
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Tab));
assert_eq!(app.input, "hello");
}
#[test]
fn tab_does_nothing_when_no_match() {
let mut app = app();
type_str(&mut app, "/zzz");
app.handle_key_event(key(KeyCode::Tab));
assert_eq!(app.input, "/zzz");
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
mod types;
mod draw;
mod commands;
mod file_transfer;
mod input;
mod network;
pub use types::App;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use anyhow::Result;
use crossterm::event::{self, Event, KeyCode};
use warzone_protocol::identity::{IdentityKeyPair, Seed};
use crate::net::ServerClient;
use crate::storage::LocalDb;
/// Run the TUI event loop.
pub async fn run_tui(
our_fp: String,
peer_fp: Option<String>,
server_url: String,
identity: IdentityKeyPair,
poll_seed: Seed,
db: LocalDb,
) -> Result<()> {
let mut terminal = ratatui::init();
let client = ServerClient::new(&server_url);
let db = Arc::new(db);
let mut app = App::new(our_fp.clone(), peer_fp, server_url);
// Derive a second identity for the poll loop (can't clone IdentityKeyPair)
let poll_identity = poll_seed.derive_identity();
let poll_messages = app.messages.clone();
let poll_receipts = app.receipts.clone();
let poll_pending_files = app.pending_files.clone();
let poll_last_dm = app.last_dm_peer.clone();
let poll_connected = app.connected.clone();
let poll_client = client.clone();
let poll_db = db.clone();
let poll_fp = our_fp.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
network::poll_loop(poll_messages, poll_receipts, poll_pending_files, poll_fp, poll_identity, poll_db, poll_client, poll_last_dm, poll_connected).await;
});
// Spawn periodic backup task (every 5 minutes)
{
let backup_db = db.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(std::time::Duration::from_secs(300));
loop {
interval.tick().await;
if let Ok(seed) = crate::keystore::load_seed_raw() {
match backup_db.create_backup(&seed) {
Ok(path) => tracing::debug!("Auto-backup created: {}", path.display()),
Err(e) => tracing::warn!("Auto-backup failed: {}", e),
}
}
}
});
}
// Auto-join #ops if no peer set (create if needed)
if app.peer_fp.is_none() {
let fp_clean: String = our_fp.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect::<String>().to_lowercase();
// Create #ops if it doesn't exist
let _ = client.client.post(format!("{}/v1/groups/create", client.base_url))
.json(&serde_json::json!({"name": "ops", "creator": fp_clean}))
.send().await;
// Join
let _ = client.client.post(format!("{}/v1/groups/ops/join", client.base_url))
.json(&serde_json::json!({"fingerprint": fp_clean}))
.send().await;
app.peer_fp = Some("#ops".to_string());
app.add_message(types::ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: "Welcome! You have been added to #ops".into(),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: chrono::Local::now(),
});
// Show system bots
if let Ok(resp) = client.client.get(format!("{}/v1/bot/list", client.base_url)).send().await {
if let Ok(data) = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await {
if let Some(bots) = data.get("bots").and_then(|v| v.as_array()) {
if !bots.is_empty() {
app.add_message(types::ChatLine { sender: "system".into(), text: "Available bots:".into(), is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: chrono::Local::now() });
for b in bots {
let name = b.get("name").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("?");
let desc = b.get("description").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
app.add_message(types::ChatLine { sender: "system".into(), text: format!(" @{} — {}", name, desc), is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: chrono::Local::now() });
}
app.add_message(types::ChatLine { sender: "system".into(), text: "Message a bot: /peer @botname".into(), is_system: true, is_self: false, message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: chrono::Local::now() });
}
}
}
}
}
// Check and replenish OTPKs if running low
{
let fp_clean: String = our_fp.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect::<String>().to_lowercase();
match client.otpk_count(&fp_clean).await {
Ok(count) => {
if count < 3 {
tracing::info!("OTPK supply low ({}), generating more...", count);
let start_id = db.next_otpk_id();
let otpks = warzone_protocol::prekey::generate_one_time_pre_keys(start_id, 10);
let mut new_keys = Vec::new();
for otpk in &otpks {
let _ = db.save_one_time_pre_key(otpk.id, &otpk.secret);
new_keys.push((otpk.id, *otpk.public.as_bytes()));
}
match client.replenish_otpks(&fp_clean, new_keys).await {
Ok(_) => {
app.add_message(types::ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("Replenished OTPKs ({} -> {})", count, count + 10),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: chrono::Local::now(),
});
}
Err(e) => tracing::warn!("Failed to replenish OTPKs: {}", e),
}
}
}
Err(e) => tracing::debug!("Could not check OTPK count: {}", e),
}
}
loop {
terminal.draw(|frame| app.draw(frame))?;
// Send Read receipts for visible messages
{
let msgs = app.messages.lock().unwrap();
let total = msgs.len();
let visible_end = total.saturating_sub(app.scroll_offset);
let visible_height = 20; // approximate
let visible_start = visible_end.saturating_sub(visible_height);
let mut sent = app.read_receipts_sent.lock().unwrap();
for msg in &msgs[visible_start..visible_end] {
if msg.is_system || msg.is_self { continue; }
if let (Some(ref msg_id), Some(ref sfp)) = (&msg.message_id, &msg.sender_fp) {
if sent.contains(msg_id) { continue; }
sent.insert(msg_id.clone());
// Fire-and-forget Read receipt
let receipt = warzone_protocol::message::WireMessage::Receipt {
sender_fingerprint: app.our_fp.clone(),
message_id: msg_id.clone(),
receipt_type: warzone_protocol::message::ReceiptType::Read,
};
if let Ok(encoded) = bincode::serialize(&receipt) {
let client = client.clone();
let to = sfp.clone();
let from = app.our_fp.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let _ = client.send_message(&to, Some(&from), &encoded).await;
});
}
}
}
}
if event::poll(Duration::from_millis(100))? {
if let Event::Key(key) = event::read()? {
if key.code == KeyCode::Enter {
app.handle_send(&identity, &db, &client).await;
app.scroll_offset = 0;
} else {
app.handle_key_event(key);
}
}
}
if app.should_quit {
break;
}
}
ratatui::restore();
Ok(())
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,707 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::time::Duration;
use sha2::{Sha256, Digest};
use warzone_protocol::identity::IdentityKeyPair;
use warzone_protocol::message::{ReceiptType, WireMessage};
use warzone_protocol::ratchet::RatchetState;
use warzone_protocol::types::Fingerprint;
use warzone_protocol::x3dh;
use x25519_dalek::PublicKey;
use crate::net::ServerClient;
use crate::storage::LocalDb;
use chrono::Local;
use super::types::{ChatLine, PendingFileTransfer, ReceiptStatus, normfp};
/// Send a delivery receipt for a message back to its sender.
fn send_receipt(
our_fp: &str,
sender_fp: &str,
message_id: &str,
receipt_type: ReceiptType,
client: &ServerClient,
) {
let receipt = WireMessage::Receipt {
sender_fingerprint: our_fp.to_string(),
message_id: message_id.to_string(),
receipt_type,
};
let encoded = match bincode::serialize(&receipt) {
Ok(e) => e,
Err(_) => return,
};
let client = client.clone();
let to = sender_fp.to_string();
let from = our_fp.to_string();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let _ = client.send_message(&to, Some(&from), &encoded).await;
});
}
/// ETH address cache: fingerprint → ETH address (populated async, read sync).
pub type EthCache = Arc<std::sync::Mutex<HashMap<String, String>>>;
/// Display a fingerprint as short ETH address if cached, otherwise truncated fingerprint.
fn display_sender(fp: &str, eth_cache: &EthCache) -> String {
let cache = eth_cache.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(eth) = cache.get(fp) {
format!("{}...", &eth[..eth.len().min(12)])
} else {
fp[..fp.len().min(12)].to_string()
}
}
/// Async: look up ETH address for a fingerprint and cache it.
fn cache_eth_lookup(fp: &str, client: &ServerClient, eth_cache: &EthCache) {
let fp = fp.to_string();
let client = client.clone();
let cache = eth_cache.clone();
// Check if already cached
if cache.lock().unwrap().contains_key(&fp) { return; }
tokio::spawn(async move {
let url = format!("{}/v1/resolve/{}", client.base_url, fp);
if let Ok(resp) = client.client.get(&url).send().await {
if let Ok(data) = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await {
if let Some(eth) = data.get("eth_address").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
cache.lock().unwrap().insert(fp, eth.to_string());
}
}
}
});
}
/// Pre-populate the ETH cache for all known contacts.
pub async fn prefill_eth_cache(
db: &crate::storage::LocalDb,
client: &ServerClient,
eth_cache: &EthCache,
) {
if let Ok(contacts) = db.list_contacts() {
for c in &contacts {
if let Some(fp) = c.get("fingerprint").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
let fp = fp.to_string();
if eth_cache.lock().unwrap().contains_key(&fp) { continue; }
let url = format!("{}/v1/resolve/{}", client.base_url, fp);
if let Ok(resp) = client.client.get(&url).send().await {
if let Ok(data) = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await {
if let Some(eth) = data.get("eth_address").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
eth_cache.lock().unwrap().insert(fp, eth.to_string());
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
fn store_received(db: &LocalDb, sender_fp: &str, text: &str) {
let _ = db.touch_contact(sender_fp, None);
let _ = db.store_message(sender_fp, sender_fp, text, false);
}
/// Process a single incoming raw message (shared by WS and HTTP paths).
pub fn process_incoming(
raw: &[u8],
identity: &IdentityKeyPair,
db: &LocalDb,
messages: &Arc<Mutex<Vec<ChatLine>>>,
receipts: &Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, ReceiptStatus>>>,
pending_files: &Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, PendingFileTransfer>>>,
our_fp: &str,
client: &ServerClient,
eth_cache: &EthCache,
last_dm_peer: &Arc<Mutex<Option<String>>>,
) {
match warzone_protocol::message::deserialize_envelope(raw) {
Ok(wire) => process_wire_message(wire, identity, db, messages, receipts, pending_files, our_fp, client, last_dm_peer, eth_cache),
Err(_) => {}
}
}
fn process_wire_message(
wire: WireMessage,
identity: &IdentityKeyPair,
db: &LocalDb,
messages: &Arc<Mutex<Vec<ChatLine>>>,
receipts: &Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, ReceiptStatus>>>,
pending_files: &Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, PendingFileTransfer>>>,
our_fp: &str,
client: &ServerClient,
last_dm_peer: &Arc<Mutex<Option<String>>>,
eth_cache: &EthCache,
) {
match wire {
WireMessage::KeyExchange {
id,
sender_fingerprint,
sender_identity_encryption_key,
ephemeral_public,
used_one_time_pre_key_id,
ratchet_message,
} => {
let sender_fp = match Fingerprint::from_hex(&sender_fingerprint) {
Ok(fp) => fp,
Err(_) => return,
};
let spk_secret = match db.load_signed_pre_key(1) {
Ok(Some(s)) => s,
_ => return,
};
let otpk_secret = if let Some(otpk_id) = used_one_time_pre_key_id {
db.take_one_time_pre_key(otpk_id).ok().flatten()
} else {
None
};
let their_id_x25519 = PublicKey::from(sender_identity_encryption_key);
let their_eph = PublicKey::from(ephemeral_public);
let shared_secret = match x3dh::respond(
identity, &spk_secret, otpk_secret.as_ref(), &their_id_x25519, &their_eph,
) {
Ok(s) => s,
Err(_) => return,
};
let mut state = RatchetState::init_bob(shared_secret, spk_secret);
match state.decrypt(&ratchet_message) {
Ok(plaintext) => {
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&plaintext).to_string();
let _ = db.save_session(&sender_fp, &state);
if normfp(&sender_fingerprint) != normfp(our_fp) {
*last_dm_peer.lock().unwrap() = Some(sender_fingerprint.clone());
}
store_received(db, &sender_fingerprint, &text);
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: { cache_eth_lookup(&sender_fingerprint, client, eth_cache); display_sender(&sender_fingerprint, eth_cache) },
text,
is_system: false,
is_self: false,
message_id: Some(id.clone()), sender_fp: Some(sender_fingerprint.clone()), timestamp: Local::now(),
});
send_receipt(our_fp, &sender_fingerprint, &id, ReceiptType::Delivered, client);
// Terminal bell for incoming DM
print!("\x07");
}
Err(e) => {
// Session auto-recovery: delete corrupted session, show warning
let _ = db.delete_session(&sender_fp);
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!(
"[session reset] Decryption failed for {}. Session cleared — next message will re-establish.",
&sender_fingerprint[..sender_fingerprint.len().min(12)]
),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
tracing::warn!("Session auto-recovery: cleared session for {} after decrypt error: {}", sender_fingerprint, e);
}
}
}
WireMessage::Message {
id,
sender_fingerprint,
ratchet_message,
} => {
let sender_fp = match Fingerprint::from_hex(&sender_fingerprint) {
Ok(fp) => fp,
Err(_) => return,
};
let mut state = match db.load_session(&sender_fp) {
Ok(Some(s)) => s,
_ => return,
};
match state.decrypt(&ratchet_message) {
Ok(plaintext) => {
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&plaintext).to_string();
let _ = db.save_session(&sender_fp, &state);
if normfp(&sender_fingerprint) != normfp(our_fp) {
*last_dm_peer.lock().unwrap() = Some(sender_fingerprint.clone());
}
store_received(db, &sender_fingerprint, &text);
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: { cache_eth_lookup(&sender_fingerprint, client, eth_cache); display_sender(&sender_fingerprint, eth_cache) },
text,
is_system: false,
is_self: false,
message_id: Some(id.clone()), sender_fp: Some(sender_fingerprint.clone()), timestamp: Local::now(),
});
send_receipt(our_fp, &sender_fingerprint, &id, ReceiptType::Delivered, client);
// Terminal bell for incoming DM
print!("\x07");
}
Err(e) => {
// Session auto-recovery: delete corrupted session, show warning
let _ = db.delete_session(&sender_fp);
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!(
"[session reset] Decryption failed for {}. Session cleared — next message will re-establish.",
&sender_fingerprint[..sender_fingerprint.len().min(12)]
),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
tracing::warn!("Session auto-recovery: cleared session for {} after decrypt error: {}", sender_fingerprint, e);
}
}
}
WireMessage::Receipt {
sender_fingerprint: _,
message_id,
receipt_type,
} => {
// Update receipt status for the referenced message
let mut r = receipts.lock().unwrap();
let current = r.get(&message_id);
let should_update = match (&receipt_type, current) {
(ReceiptType::Read, _) => true,
(ReceiptType::Delivered, Some(ReceiptStatus::Sent)) => true,
(ReceiptType::Delivered, None) => true,
_ => false,
};
if should_update {
let new_status = match receipt_type {
ReceiptType::Delivered => ReceiptStatus::Delivered,
ReceiptType::Read => ReceiptStatus::Read,
};
r.insert(message_id, new_status);
}
}
WireMessage::FileHeader {
id,
sender_fingerprint,
filename,
file_size,
total_chunks,
sha256,
} => {
let short_sender = &sender_fingerprint[..sender_fingerprint.len().min(12)];
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!(
"Incoming file '{}' from {} ({} bytes, {} chunks)",
filename, short_sender, file_size, total_chunks
),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
let transfer = PendingFileTransfer {
filename,
total_chunks,
received: 0,
chunks: vec![None; total_chunks as usize],
sha256,
file_size,
};
pending_files.lock().unwrap().insert(id, transfer);
}
WireMessage::FileChunk {
id,
sender_fingerprint,
filename: _,
chunk_index,
total_chunks: _,
data,
} => {
// Decrypt the chunk data using our ratchet session with the sender
let sender_fp = match Fingerprint::from_hex(&sender_fingerprint) {
Ok(fp) => fp,
Err(_) => return,
};
let mut state = match db.load_session(&sender_fp) {
Ok(Some(s)) => s,
_ => return,
};
// The data field is a bincode-serialized RatchetMessage
let ratchet_msg = match bincode::deserialize(&data) {
Ok(m) => m,
Err(_) => return,
};
let plaintext = match state.decrypt(&ratchet_msg) {
Ok(pt) => {
let _ = db.save_session(&sender_fp, &state);
pt
}
Err(_) => return,
};
let mut pf = pending_files.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(transfer) = pf.get_mut(&id) {
if (chunk_index as usize) < transfer.chunks.len() {
if transfer.chunks[chunk_index as usize].is_none() {
transfer.chunks[chunk_index as usize] = Some(plaintext);
transfer.received += 1;
}
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!(
"Receiving {} [{}/{}]...",
transfer.filename, transfer.received, transfer.total_chunks
),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
// Check if all chunks received
if transfer.received == transfer.total_chunks {
let mut assembled = Vec::with_capacity(transfer.file_size as usize);
for chunk in &transfer.chunks {
if let Some(data) = chunk {
assembled.extend_from_slice(data);
}
}
// Verify SHA-256
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(&assembled);
let computed_hash = format!("{:x}", hasher.finalize());
if computed_hash != transfer.sha256 {
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!(
"File '{}' integrity check FAILED (hash mismatch)",
transfer.filename
),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
} else {
// Save to data_dir/downloads/
let download_dir = crate::keystore::data_dir().join("downloads");
let _ = std::fs::create_dir_all(&download_dir);
let save_path = download_dir.join(&transfer.filename);
match std::fs::write(&save_path, &assembled) {
Ok(_) => {
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!(
"File saved: {}",
save_path.display()
),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
Err(e) => {
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("Failed to save file: {}", e),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
}
}
// Remove completed transfer
pf.remove(&id);
}
}
} else {
// Received chunk without header — ignore
}
}
WireMessage::GroupSenderKey {
id: _,
sender_fingerprint,
group_name,
generation,
counter,
ciphertext,
} => {
match db.load_sender_key(&sender_fingerprint, &group_name) {
Ok(Some(mut sender_key)) => {
let msg = warzone_protocol::sender_keys::SenderKeyMessage {
sender_fingerprint: sender_fingerprint.clone(),
group_name: group_name.clone(),
generation,
counter,
ciphertext,
};
match sender_key.decrypt(&msg) {
Ok(plaintext) => {
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&plaintext).to_string();
// Save updated sender key (counter advanced)
let _ = db.save_sender_key(&sender_fingerprint, &group_name, &sender_key);
store_received(db, &sender_fingerprint, &text);
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: format!(
"{} [#{}]",
&sender_fingerprint[..sender_fingerprint.len().min(12)],
group_name
),
text,
is_system: false,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
Err(e) => {
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!(
"[group #{}] decrypt failed from {}: {}",
group_name,
&sender_fingerprint[..sender_fingerprint.len().min(12)],
e
),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
}
}
_ => {
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!(
"[group #{}] no sender key for {} — key distribution needed",
group_name,
&sender_fingerprint[..sender_fingerprint.len().min(12)]
),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
}
}
WireMessage::SenderKeyDistribution {
sender_fingerprint,
group_name,
chain_key,
generation,
} => {
let dist = warzone_protocol::sender_keys::SenderKeyDistribution {
sender_fingerprint: sender_fingerprint.clone(),
group_name: group_name.clone(),
chain_key,
generation,
};
let sender_key = dist.into_sender_key();
let _ = db.save_sender_key(&sender_fingerprint, &group_name, &sender_key);
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!(
"Received sender key from {} for #{}",
&sender_fingerprint[..sender_fingerprint.len().min(12)],
group_name
),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
WireMessage::CallSignal {
id: _,
sender_fingerprint,
signal_type,
payload: _,
target: _,
} => {
use warzone_protocol::message::CallSignalType;
let sender_short = { cache_eth_lookup(&sender_fingerprint, client, eth_cache); display_sender(&sender_fingerprint, eth_cache) };
match signal_type {
CallSignalType::Offer => {
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("\u{1f4de} Incoming call from {} \u{2014} /accept or /reject", sender_short),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
// Terminal bell for incoming call
print!("\x07");
}
CallSignalType::Answer => {
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("\u{2713} {} accepted the call", sender_short),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
CallSignalType::Hangup => {
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: "Call ended".into(),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
CallSignalType::Reject => {
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("{} rejected the call", sender_short),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
CallSignalType::Ringing => {
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: "Ringing...".into(),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
CallSignalType::Busy => {
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("{} is busy", sender_short),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
_ => {
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: sender_short,
text: format!("\u{1f4de} Call signal: {:?}", signal_type),
is_system: false,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
}
}
}
}
/// Real-time message loop via WebSocket (falls back to HTTP polling).
pub async fn poll_loop(
messages: Arc<Mutex<Vec<ChatLine>>>,
receipts: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, ReceiptStatus>>>,
pending_files: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, PendingFileTransfer>>>,
our_fp: String,
identity: IdentityKeyPair,
db: Arc<LocalDb>,
client: ServerClient,
last_dm_peer: Arc<Mutex<Option<String>>>,
connected: Arc<AtomicBool>,
) {
let fp = normfp(&our_fp);
let eth_cache: EthCache = Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
// Pre-populate ETH cache for known contacts
prefill_eth_cache(&db, &client, &eth_cache).await;
// Try WebSocket first
let ws_url = client.base_url
.replace("http://", "ws://")
.replace("https://", "wss://");
let ws_url = format!("{}/v1/ws/{}", ws_url, fp);
loop {
match tokio_tungstenite::connect_async(&ws_url).await {
Ok((ws_stream, _)) => {
connected.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: "Real-time connection established".into(),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
use futures_util::StreamExt;
let (_, mut read) = ws_stream.split();
while let Some(Ok(msg)) = read.next().await {
match msg {
tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::Message::Binary(data) => {
process_incoming(&data, &identity, &db, &messages, &receipts, &pending_files, &our_fp, &client, &eth_cache, &last_dm_peer);
}
tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::Message::Text(text) => {
if let Ok(json) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&text) {
if json.get("type").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) == Some("missed_call") {
let data = json.get("data").cloned().unwrap_or_default();
let caller = data.get("caller_fp").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("unknown");
let ts = data.get("timestamp").and_then(|v| v.as_i64()).unwrap_or(0);
let when = chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp(ts, 0)
.map(|dt| dt.with_timezone(&Local).format("%H:%M").to_string())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "?".to_string());
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("\u{1f4de} Missed call from {} at {}", &caller[..caller.len().min(12)], when),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
});
print!("\x07");
} else if json.get("type").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) == Some("bot_message") {
let from = json.get("from_name").or(json.get("from")).and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("bot");
let text_content = json.get("text").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: format!("@{}", from),
text: text_content.to_string(),
is_system: false,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
});
print!("\x07");
}
}
}
_ => {}
}
}
connected.store(false, Ordering::Relaxed);
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: "Connection lost, reconnecting...".into(),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None, sender_fp: None, timestamp: Local::now(),
});
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
}
Err(_) => {
connected.store(false, Ordering::Relaxed);
// Fallback to HTTP polling
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
let raw_msgs = match client.poll_messages(&our_fp).await {
Ok(m) => m,
Err(_) => continue,
};
for raw in &raw_msgs {
process_incoming(raw, &identity, &db, &messages, &receipts, &pending_files, &our_fp, &client, &eth_cache, &last_dm_peer);
}
}
}
}
}

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use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use chrono::{DateTime, Local};
/// Maximum file size: 10 MB.
pub const MAX_FILE_SIZE: u64 = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Chunk size: 64 KB.
pub const CHUNK_SIZE: usize = 64 * 1024;
/// State for tracking an incoming chunked file transfer.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct PendingFileTransfer {
pub filename: String,
pub total_chunks: u32,
pub received: u32,
pub chunks: Vec<Option<Vec<u8>>>,
pub sha256: String,
pub file_size: u64,
}
/// Receipt status for a sent message.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ReceiptStatus {
Sent,
Delivered,
Read,
}
/// Active call information.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct CallInfo {
pub peer_fp: String,
pub peer_display: String,
pub state: CallPhase,
pub started_at: DateTime<Local>,
}
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub enum CallPhase {
Calling, // we initiated, waiting for answer
Ringing, // incoming call, waiting for user to accept/reject
Active, // call connected
}
pub struct App {
pub input: String,
pub messages: Arc<Mutex<Vec<ChatLine>>>,
pub our_fp: String,
pub peer_fp: Option<String>,
pub server_url: String,
pub should_quit: bool,
pub cursor_pos: usize,
pub last_dm_peer: Arc<Mutex<Option<String>>>,
/// Track receipt status for messages we sent, keyed by message ID.
pub receipts: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, ReceiptStatus>>>,
/// Pending incoming file transfers, keyed by file ID.
pub pending_files: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, PendingFileTransfer>>>,
/// Our ETH address (derived from seed).
pub our_eth: String,
/// Current peer's ETH address (resolved on /peer set).
pub peer_eth: Option<String>,
/// Scroll offset from bottom (0 = pinned to newest).
pub scroll_offset: usize,
/// Whether the WebSocket connection is active.
pub connected: Arc<AtomicBool>,
/// Current call state: None=idle, Some(state)=active
pub call_state: Option<CallInfo>,
/// Message IDs for which we've already sent a Read receipt (avoid duplicates).
pub read_receipts_sent: Arc<Mutex<std::collections::HashSet<String>>>,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ChatLine {
pub sender: String,
pub text: String,
pub is_system: bool,
pub is_self: bool,
/// Message ID (for sent messages, used to track receipts).
pub message_id: Option<String>,
/// Sender's full fingerprint (for sending read receipts back).
pub sender_fp: Option<String>,
/// When this message was created/received.
pub timestamp: DateTime<Local>,
}
impl App {
pub fn new(our_fp: String, peer_fp: Option<String>, server_url: String) -> Self {
// Derive ETH address from seed first (used in welcome messages)
let our_eth = crate::keystore::load_seed_raw()
.map(|seed| {
let eth = warzone_protocol::ethereum::derive_eth_identity(&seed);
eth.address.to_checksum()
})
.unwrap_or_default();
let identity_display = if our_eth.is_empty() { our_fp.clone() } else { our_eth.clone() };
let messages = Arc::new(Mutex::new(vec![ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("You are {}", identity_display),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
}]));
if let Some(ref peer) = peer_fp {
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: format!("Chatting with {}", peer),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
});
} else {
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: "No peer set. Use /peer <fp>, /peer @alias, or /g <group>".into(),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
});
}
messages.lock().unwrap().push(ChatLine {
sender: "system".into(),
text: "/alias /peer /g /gleave /gkick /gmembers /file /info /quit".into(),
is_system: true,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
});
App {
input: String::new(),
messages,
our_fp,
peer_fp,
server_url,
should_quit: false,
last_dm_peer: Arc::new(Mutex::new(None)),
cursor_pos: 0,
receipts: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
pending_files: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
our_eth,
peer_eth: None,
scroll_offset: 0,
connected: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
call_state: None,
read_receipts_sent: Arc::new(Mutex::new(std::collections::HashSet::new())),
}
}
pub fn add_message(&self, line: ChatLine) {
self.messages.lock().unwrap().push(line);
}
}
pub fn normfp(fp: &str) -> String {
fp.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect::<String>().to_lowercase()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
#[test]
fn app_new_initializes_scroll_offset_to_zero() {
let app = App::new("aabbcc".into(), None, "http://localhost:7700".into());
assert_eq!(app.scroll_offset, 0);
}
#[test]
fn app_new_initializes_connected_to_false() {
let app = App::new("aabbcc".into(), None, "http://localhost:7700".into());
assert!(!app.connected.load(Ordering::Relaxed));
}
#[test]
fn app_new_creates_system_messages() {
let app = App::new("aabbcc".into(), None, "http://localhost:7700".into());
let msgs = app.messages.lock().unwrap();
assert!(msgs.len() >= 2);
assert!(msgs[0].is_system);
// First message shows ETH address (if seed exists) or fingerprint
assert!(msgs[0].text.contains("You are"));
}
#[test]
fn app_new_with_peer_shows_chatting_message() {
let app = App::new("aabbcc".into(), Some("ddeeff".into()), "http://localhost:7700".into());
let msgs = app.messages.lock().unwrap();
let has_chatting = msgs.iter().any(|m| m.text.contains("Chatting with") && m.text.contains("ddeeff"));
assert!(has_chatting);
}
#[test]
fn app_new_without_peer_shows_no_peer_message() {
let app = App::new("aabbcc".into(), None, "http://localhost:7700".into());
let msgs = app.messages.lock().unwrap();
let has_no_peer = msgs.iter().any(|m| m.text.contains("No peer set"));
assert!(has_no_peer);
}
#[test]
fn chatline_has_timestamp() {
let line = ChatLine {
sender: "test".into(),
text: "hello".into(),
is_system: false,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
};
// Timestamp should be within the last second
let elapsed = Local::now().signed_duration_since(line.timestamp);
assert!(elapsed.num_seconds() < 2);
}
#[test]
fn add_message_appends_to_list() {
let app = App::new("aabbcc".into(), None, "http://localhost:7700".into());
let initial_count = app.messages.lock().unwrap().len();
app.add_message(ChatLine {
sender: "test".into(),
text: "new message".into(),
is_system: false,
is_self: false,
message_id: None,
sender_fp: None,
timestamp: Local::now(),
});
let new_count = app.messages.lock().unwrap().len();
assert_eq!(new_count, initial_count + 1);
}
#[test]
fn normfp_strips_non_hex_and_lowercases() {
assert_eq!(normfp("AA-BB-CC"), "aabbcc");
assert_eq!(normfp("0x1234ABCD"), "01234abcd");
assert_eq!(normfp("hello"), "e"); // only 'e' is hex
assert_eq!(normfp("AABB"), "aabb");
}
#[test]
fn app_new_cursor_pos_zero() {
let app = App::new("aabbcc".into(), None, "http://localhost:7700".into());
assert_eq!(app.cursor_pos, 0);
assert!(app.input.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn app_new_should_quit_false() {
let app = App::new("aabbcc".into(), None, "http://localhost:7700".into());
assert!(!app.should_quit);
}
}

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[package]
name = "warzone-mule"
version.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
[dependencies]
warzone-protocol = { path = "../warzone-protocol" }
clap.workspace = true
anyhow.workspace = true

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// Mule protocol implementation — Phase 4.

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fn main() {
println!("warzone-mule: Phase 4 — not yet implemented");
println!("See DESIGN.md section 4 for the mule protocol specification.");
}

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[package]
name = "warzone-protocol"
version = "0.0.47"
edition = "2021"
license = "MIT"
description = "Core crypto & wire protocol for featherChat (Warzone messenger)"
rust-version = "1.75"
# This crate is designed to be importable standalone — no workspace inheritance.
# WarzonePhone and other projects can depend on it directly via path or git.
[dependencies]
# Crypto
ed25519-dalek = { version = "2", features = ["serde", "rand_core"] }
x25519-dalek = { version = "2", features = ["serde", "static_secrets"] }
curve25519-dalek = "4"
chacha20poly1305 = "0.10"
hkdf = "0.12"
sha2 = "0.10"
rand = "0.8"
# Ethereum compatibility
k256 = { version = "0.13", features = ["ecdsa", "serde"] }
tiny-keccak = { version = "2", features = ["keccak"] }
# BIP39
bip39 = "2"
# Serialization
serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = "1"
bincode = "1"
# Error handling
thiserror = "2"
# Encoding
hex = "0.4"
base64 = "0.22"
# UUID
uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4", "serde"] }
# Memory safety
zeroize = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
# Time
chrono = { version = "0.4", features = ["serde"] }

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use chacha20poly1305::{
aead::{Aead, KeyInit},
ChaCha20Poly1305, Nonce,
};
use hkdf::Hkdf;
use sha2::Sha256;
use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
/// HKDF-SHA256 key derivation.
pub fn hkdf_derive(ikm: &[u8], salt: &[u8], info: &[u8], len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
let salt = if salt.is_empty() { None } else { Some(salt) };
let hk = Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(salt, ikm);
let mut output = vec![0u8; len];
hk.expand(info, &mut output)
.expect("HKDF output length should be valid");
output
}
/// Encrypt with ChaCha20-Poly1305. Returns nonce (12 bytes) || ciphertext.
pub fn aead_encrypt(key: &[u8; 32], plaintext: &[u8], aad: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(key.into());
let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; 12];
rand::RngCore::fill_bytes(&mut rand::rngs::OsRng, &mut nonce_bytes);
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
let ciphertext = cipher
.encrypt(nonce, chacha20poly1305::aead::Payload { msg: plaintext, aad })
.expect("encryption should not fail");
let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(12 + ciphertext.len());
result.extend_from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
result.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
result
}
/// Decrypt ChaCha20-Poly1305. Input: nonce (12 bytes) || ciphertext.
pub fn aead_decrypt(key: &[u8; 32], data: &[u8], aad: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
if data.len() < 12 {
return Err(ProtocolError::DecryptionFailed);
}
let (nonce_bytes, ciphertext) = data.split_at(12);
let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(key.into());
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(nonce_bytes);
cipher
.decrypt(nonce, chacha20poly1305::aead::Payload { msg: ciphertext, aad })
.map_err(|_| ProtocolError::DecryptionFailed)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn aead_roundtrip() {
let key = [42u8; 32];
let plaintext = b"hello warzone";
let aad = b"associated data";
let encrypted = aead_encrypt(&key, plaintext, aad);
let decrypted = aead_decrypt(&key, &encrypted, aad).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decrypted, plaintext);
}
#[test]
fn aead_wrong_key_fails() {
let key = [42u8; 32];
let wrong_key = [99u8; 32];
let encrypted = aead_encrypt(&key, b"secret", b"");
assert!(aead_decrypt(&wrong_key, &encrypted, b"").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn aead_wrong_aad_fails() {
let key = [42u8; 32];
let encrypted = aead_encrypt(&key, b"secret", b"aad1");
assert!(aead_decrypt(&key, &encrypted, b"aad2").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn hkdf_deterministic() {
let a = hkdf_derive(b"input", b"salt", b"info", 32);
let b = hkdf_derive(b"input", b"salt", b"info", 32);
assert_eq!(a, b);
}
}

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use thiserror::Error;
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum ProtocolError {
#[error("invalid seed length")]
InvalidSeedLength,
#[error("invalid mnemonic")]
InvalidMnemonic,
#[error("invalid fingerprint format")]
InvalidFingerprint,
#[error("invalid signature")]
InvalidSignature,
#[error("pre-key signature verification failed")]
PreKeySignatureInvalid,
#[error("X3DH key exchange failed: {0}")]
X3DHFailed(String),
#[error("ratchet error: {0}")]
RatchetError(String),
#[error("decryption failed")]
DecryptionFailed,
#[error("message too old (exceeded max skip)")]
MaxSkipExceeded,
#[error("serialization error: {0}")]
SerializationError(String),
}

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//! Ethereum-compatible identity: secp256k1 keypair + Ethereum address.
//!
//! From the same BIP39 seed, derive:
//! - secp256k1 keypair (Ethereum-compatible signing)
//! - Ethereum address = Keccak-256(uncompressed_pubkey[1..])[-20:]
//! - The Ethereum address can serve as the user's public identity/fingerprint
//!
//! This enables:
//! - MetaMask/Rabby wallet connect (sign challenge)
//! - ENS resolution (@vitalik.eth → 0xd8dA... → Warzone identity)
//! - Hardware wallet support (Ledger/Trezor already support secp256k1)
use k256::ecdsa::{SigningKey, VerifyingKey, Signature, signature::Signer, signature::Verifier};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use tiny_keccak::{Hasher, Keccak};
use crate::crypto::hkdf_derive;
/// An Ethereum-compatible identity derived from a Warzone seed.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct EthIdentity {
pub signing_key: SigningKey,
pub verifying_key: VerifyingKey,
pub address: EthAddress,
}
/// An Ethereum address (20 bytes).
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct EthAddress(pub [u8; 20]);
impl std::fmt::Display for EthAddress {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "0x{}", hex::encode(self.0))
}
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for EthAddress {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "EthAddress({})", self)
}
}
impl EthAddress {
/// Parse from hex string (with or without 0x prefix).
pub fn from_hex(s: &str) -> Result<Self, crate::errors::ProtocolError> {
let clean = s.trim_start_matches("0x").trim_start_matches("0X");
let bytes = hex::decode(clean)
.map_err(|_| crate::errors::ProtocolError::InvalidFingerprint)?;
if bytes.len() != 20 {
return Err(crate::errors::ProtocolError::InvalidFingerprint);
}
let mut addr = [0u8; 20];
addr.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
Ok(EthAddress(addr))
}
/// EIP-55 checksum address.
pub fn to_checksum(&self) -> String {
let hex_addr = hex::encode(self.0);
let mut hasher = Keccak::v256();
hasher.update(hex_addr.as_bytes());
let mut hash = [0u8; 32];
hasher.finalize(&mut hash);
let mut result = String::from("0x");
for (i, c) in hex_addr.chars().enumerate() {
let nibble = (hash[i / 2] >> (if i % 2 == 0 { 4 } else { 0 })) & 0x0f;
if nibble >= 8 {
result.push(c.to_uppercase().next().unwrap());
} else {
result.push(c);
}
}
result
}
}
/// Derive an Ethereum identity from a Warzone seed.
/// Uses HKDF with info="warzone-secp256k1" for domain separation.
pub fn derive_eth_identity(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> EthIdentity {
let derived = hkdf_derive(seed, b"", b"warzone-secp256k1", 32);
let mut key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
key_bytes.copy_from_slice(&derived);
let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes((&key_bytes).into())
.expect("valid secp256k1 key");
let verifying_key = *signing_key.verifying_key();
// Ethereum address: Keccak-256 of uncompressed public key (without 0x04 prefix)
let pubkey_uncompressed = verifying_key.to_encoded_point(false);
let pubkey_bytes = &pubkey_uncompressed.as_bytes()[1..]; // skip 0x04 prefix
let mut hasher = Keccak::v256();
hasher.update(pubkey_bytes);
let mut hash = [0u8; 32];
hasher.finalize(&mut hash);
let mut address = [0u8; 20];
address.copy_from_slice(&hash[12..]); // last 20 bytes
EthIdentity {
signing_key,
verifying_key,
address: EthAddress(address),
}
}
/// Sign a message with the Ethereum identity (produces a secp256k1 ECDSA signature).
pub fn eth_sign(identity: &EthIdentity, message: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let signature: Signature = identity.signing_key.sign(message);
signature.to_bytes().to_vec()
}
/// Verify a secp256k1 signature.
pub fn eth_verify(verifying_key: &VerifyingKey, message: &[u8], signature: &[u8]) -> bool {
if let Ok(sig) = Signature::from_slice(signature) {
verifying_key.verify(message, &sig).is_ok()
} else {
false
}
}
/// Recover the Ethereum address from a Warzone fingerprint.
/// This allows mapping: Warzone fingerprint ↔ Ethereum address (from same seed).
pub fn fingerprint_to_eth_address(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> EthAddress {
derive_eth_identity(seed).address
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn derive_deterministic() {
let seed = [42u8; 32];
let id1 = derive_eth_identity(&seed);
let id2 = derive_eth_identity(&seed);
assert_eq!(id1.address.0, id2.address.0);
}
#[test]
fn address_format() {
let seed = [42u8; 32];
let id = derive_eth_identity(&seed);
let addr = id.address.to_string();
assert!(addr.starts_with("0x"));
assert_eq!(addr.len(), 42); // 0x + 40 hex chars
}
#[test]
fn checksum_address() {
let seed = [42u8; 32];
let id = derive_eth_identity(&seed);
let checksum = id.address.to_checksum();
assert!(checksum.starts_with("0x"));
assert_eq!(checksum.len(), 42);
// Should have mixed case (EIP-55)
assert!(checksum[2..].chars().any(|c| c.is_uppercase()));
}
#[test]
fn sign_verify() {
let seed = [42u8; 32];
let id = derive_eth_identity(&seed);
let msg = b"hello ethereum";
let sig = eth_sign(&id, msg);
assert!(eth_verify(&id.verifying_key, msg, &sig));
assert!(!eth_verify(&id.verifying_key, b"wrong", &sig));
}
#[test]
fn different_seeds_different_addresses() {
let id1 = derive_eth_identity(&[1u8; 32]);
let id2 = derive_eth_identity(&[2u8; 32]);
assert_ne!(id1.address.0, id2.address.0);
}
}

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//! Encrypted friend list — stored on server as opaque blob.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::crypto::{aead_encrypt, aead_decrypt, hkdf_derive};
/// A friend entry.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
pub struct Friend {
/// ETH address or fingerprint
pub address: String,
/// Optional display name / alias
pub alias: Option<String>,
/// When this friend was added (unix timestamp)
pub added_at: i64,
}
/// The full friend list (plaintext, before encryption).
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
pub struct FriendList {
pub friends: Vec<Friend>,
}
impl FriendList {
pub fn new() -> Self {
FriendList { friends: vec![] }
}
pub fn add(&mut self, address: &str, alias: Option<&str>) {
// Don't add duplicates
if self.friends.iter().any(|f| f.address == address) {
return;
}
self.friends.push(Friend {
address: address.to_string(),
alias: alias.map(String::from),
added_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
});
}
pub fn remove(&mut self, address: &str) {
self.friends.retain(|f| f.address != address);
}
/// Encrypt the friend list for server storage.
/// Key is derived from the user's seed: HKDF(seed, info="warzone-friends").
pub fn encrypt(&self, seed: &[u8; 32]) -> Vec<u8> {
let key_bytes = hkdf_derive(seed, b"", b"warzone-friends", 32);
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
key.copy_from_slice(&key_bytes);
let plaintext = serde_json::to_vec(self).unwrap_or_default();
aead_encrypt(&key, &plaintext, b"warzone-friends-aad")
}
/// Decrypt a friend list blob from the server.
pub fn decrypt(seed: &[u8; 32], ciphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, crate::errors::ProtocolError> {
let key_bytes = hkdf_derive(seed, b"", b"warzone-friends", 32);
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
key.copy_from_slice(&key_bytes);
let plaintext = aead_decrypt(&key, ciphertext, b"warzone-friends-aad")?;
serde_json::from_slice(&plaintext)
.map_err(|e| crate::errors::ProtocolError::RatchetError(format!("friend list json: {}", e)))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn encrypt_decrypt_roundtrip() {
let seed = [42u8; 32];
let mut list = FriendList::new();
list.add("0x1234abcd", Some("alice"));
list.add("0xdeadbeef", None);
let encrypted = list.encrypt(&seed);
let decrypted = FriendList::decrypt(&seed, &encrypted).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decrypted.friends.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(decrypted.friends[0].address, "0x1234abcd");
assert_eq!(decrypted.friends[0].alias.as_deref(), Some("alice"));
assert_eq!(decrypted.friends[1].address, "0xdeadbeef");
}
#[test]
fn wrong_seed_fails() {
let seed = [42u8; 32];
let wrong_seed = [99u8; 32];
let mut list = FriendList::new();
list.add("0x1234", None);
let encrypted = list.encrypt(&seed);
assert!(FriendList::decrypt(&wrong_seed, &encrypted).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn no_duplicate_add() {
let mut list = FriendList::new();
list.add("0x1234", None);
list.add("0x1234", Some("alice"));
assert_eq!(list.friends.len(), 1);
}
#[test]
fn remove_works() {
let mut list = FriendList::new();
list.add("0x1234", None);
list.add("0x5678", None);
list.remove("0x1234");
assert_eq!(list.friends.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(list.friends[0].address, "0x5678");
}
}

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//! Encrypted message history: backup and restore.
//!
//! History key derived from seed via HKDF (info="warzone-history").
//! Format: MAGIC(4) + nonce(12) + ciphertext (ChaCha20-Poly1305).
use crate::crypto::{aead_decrypt, aead_encrypt, hkdf_derive};
use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
const HISTORY_MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"WZH1";
/// Derive history encryption key from seed.
pub fn derive_history_key(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] {
let derived = hkdf_derive(seed, b"", b"warzone-history", 32);
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
key.copy_from_slice(&derived);
key
}
/// Encrypt a history blob (JSON messages serialized to bytes).
pub fn encrypt_history(seed: &[u8; 32], plaintext: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let key = derive_history_key(seed);
let encrypted = aead_encrypt(&key, plaintext, HISTORY_MAGIC);
let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(4 + encrypted.len());
result.extend_from_slice(HISTORY_MAGIC);
result.extend_from_slice(&encrypted);
result
}
/// Decrypt a history blob.
pub fn decrypt_history(seed: &[u8; 32], data: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
if data.len() < 4 || &data[..4] != HISTORY_MAGIC {
return Err(ProtocolError::DecryptionFailed);
}
let key = derive_history_key(seed);
aead_decrypt(&key, &data[4..], HISTORY_MAGIC)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn roundtrip() {
let seed = [42u8; 32];
let messages = b"[{\"from\":\"alice\",\"text\":\"hello\"}]";
let encrypted = encrypt_history(&seed, messages);
let decrypted = decrypt_history(&seed, &encrypted).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decrypted, messages);
}
#[test]
fn wrong_seed_fails() {
let seed = [42u8; 32];
let wrong = [99u8; 32];
let encrypted = encrypt_history(&seed, b"secret");
assert!(decrypt_history(&wrong, &encrypted).is_err());
}
}

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use ed25519_dalek::{SigningKey, VerifyingKey};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use x25519_dalek::StaticSecret;
use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};
use crate::crypto::hkdf_derive;
use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
use crate::types::Fingerprint;
/// The root secret — 32 bytes from which all keys are derived.
/// Displayed to users as a BIP39 mnemonic (24 words).
#[derive(Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
pub struct Seed(pub [u8; 32]);
impl Seed {
/// Generate a new random seed.
pub fn generate() -> Self {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
rand::RngCore::fill_bytes(&mut rand::rngs::OsRng, &mut bytes);
Seed(bytes)
}
/// Create seed from raw bytes.
pub fn from_bytes(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
Seed(bytes)
}
/// Derive the full identity keypair from this seed.
pub fn derive_identity(&self) -> IdentityKeyPair {
// Ed25519 signing key: HKDF(seed, info="warzone-ed25519")
let ed_bytes = hkdf_derive(&self.0, b"", b"warzone-ed25519", 32);
let mut ed_seed = [0u8; 32];
ed_seed.copy_from_slice(&ed_bytes);
let signing = SigningKey::from_bytes(&ed_seed);
ed_seed.zeroize();
// X25519 encryption key: HKDF(seed, info="warzone-x25519")
let x_bytes = hkdf_derive(&self.0, b"", b"warzone-x25519", 32);
let mut x_seed = [0u8; 32];
x_seed.copy_from_slice(&x_bytes);
let encryption = StaticSecret::from(x_seed);
x_seed.zeroize();
IdentityKeyPair {
signing,
encryption,
}
}
/// Convert to BIP39 mnemonic words.
pub fn to_mnemonic(&self) -> String {
crate::mnemonic::seed_to_mnemonic(&self.0)
}
/// Recover seed from BIP39 mnemonic words.
pub fn from_mnemonic(words: &str) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
let bytes = crate::mnemonic::mnemonic_to_seed(words)?;
Ok(Seed(bytes))
}
}
/// The full identity keypair derived from a seed.
pub struct IdentityKeyPair {
pub signing: SigningKey,
pub encryption: StaticSecret,
}
impl IdentityKeyPair {
/// Get the public identity (safe to share).
pub fn public_identity(&self) -> PublicIdentity {
let verifying = self.signing.verifying_key();
let encryption_pub = x25519_dalek::PublicKey::from(&self.encryption);
let fingerprint = PublicIdentity::compute_fingerprint(&verifying);
PublicIdentity {
signing: verifying,
encryption: encryption_pub,
fingerprint,
}
}
}
/// The public portion of an identity — safe to share with anyone.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct PublicIdentity {
#[serde(with = "verifying_key_serde")]
pub signing: VerifyingKey,
#[serde(with = "public_key_serde")]
pub encryption: x25519_dalek::PublicKey,
pub fingerprint: Fingerprint,
}
impl PublicIdentity {
fn compute_fingerprint(key: &VerifyingKey) -> Fingerprint {
let hash = Sha256::digest(key.as_bytes());
let mut fp = [0u8; 16];
fp.copy_from_slice(&hash[..16]);
Fingerprint(fp)
}
}
// Serde helpers for dalek types (serialize as bytes)
mod verifying_key_serde {
use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
use serde::{self, Deserialize, Deserializer, Serializer};
pub fn serialize<S>(key: &VerifyingKey, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
where
S: Serializer,
{
serializer.serialize_bytes(key.as_bytes())
}
pub fn deserialize<'de, D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<VerifyingKey, D::Error>
where
D: Deserializer<'de>,
{
let bytes: Vec<u8> = Deserialize::deserialize(deserializer)?;
let arr: [u8; 32] = bytes
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| serde::de::Error::custom("invalid key length"))?;
VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&arr).map_err(serde::de::Error::custom)
}
}
mod public_key_serde {
use serde::{self, Deserialize, Deserializer, Serializer};
use x25519_dalek::PublicKey;
pub fn serialize<S>(key: &PublicKey, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
where
S: Serializer,
{
serializer.serialize_bytes(key.as_bytes())
}
pub fn deserialize<'de, D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<PublicKey, D::Error>
where
D: Deserializer<'de>,
{
let bytes: Vec<u8> = Deserialize::deserialize(deserializer)?;
let arr: [u8; 32] = bytes
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| serde::de::Error::custom("invalid key length"))?;
Ok(PublicKey::from(arr))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn deterministic_derivation() {
let seed = Seed::from_bytes([42u8; 32]);
let id1 = seed.derive_identity();
let id2 = seed.derive_identity();
assert_eq!(
id1.signing.verifying_key().as_bytes(),
id2.signing.verifying_key().as_bytes(),
);
}
#[test]
fn mnemonic_roundtrip() {
let seed = Seed::generate();
let words = seed.to_mnemonic();
let recovered = Seed::from_mnemonic(&words).unwrap();
assert_eq!(seed.0, recovered.0);
}
#[test]
fn fingerprint_display() {
let seed = Seed::generate();
let id = seed.derive_identity();
let pub_id = id.public_identity();
let fp_str = pub_id.fingerprint.to_string();
// Format: xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx
assert_eq!(fp_str.len(), 39);
assert_eq!(fp_str.chars().filter(|c| *c == ':').count(), 7);
}
}

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pub mod types;
pub mod errors;
pub mod identity;
pub mod mnemonic;
pub mod crypto;
pub mod prekey;
pub mod x3dh;
pub mod ratchet;
pub mod message;
pub mod session;
pub mod store;
pub mod history;
pub mod sender_keys;
pub mod ethereum;
pub mod friends;

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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::ratchet::RatchetHeader;
use crate::types::{Fingerprint, MessageId, SessionId};
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum MessageType {
Text,
File,
KeyExchange,
Receipt,
}
/// An encrypted message on the wire.
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct WarzoneMessage {
pub version: u8,
pub id: MessageId,
pub from: Fingerprint,
pub to: Fingerprint,
pub timestamp: i64,
pub msg_type: MessageType,
pub session_id: SessionId,
pub ratchet_header: RatchetHeader,
pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
}
/// Plaintext message content (inside the encrypted envelope).
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum MessageContent {
Text { body: String },
File { filename: String, data: Vec<u8> },
Receipt { message_id: MessageId },
}
/// Receipt type: delivered (received + decrypted) or read (user viewed).
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ReceiptType {
Delivered,
Read,
}
/// Wire message format for transport between clients.
/// Used by both CLI and WASM — MUST be identical for interop.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum WireMessage {
/// First message to a peer: X3DH key exchange + first ratchet message.
KeyExchange {
id: String,
sender_fingerprint: String,
sender_identity_encryption_key: [u8; 32],
ephemeral_public: [u8; 32],
used_one_time_pre_key_id: Option<u32>,
ratchet_message: crate::ratchet::RatchetMessage,
},
/// Subsequent messages: ratchet-encrypted.
Message {
id: String,
sender_fingerprint: String,
ratchet_message: crate::ratchet::RatchetMessage,
},
/// Delivery / read receipt (plaintext, not encrypted).
Receipt {
sender_fingerprint: String,
message_id: String,
receipt_type: ReceiptType,
},
/// File transfer header: announces an incoming chunked file.
FileHeader {
id: String,
sender_fingerprint: String,
filename: String,
file_size: u64,
total_chunks: u32,
sha256: String,
},
/// A single chunk of a file transfer (data is ratchet-encrypted).
FileChunk {
id: String,
sender_fingerprint: String,
filename: String,
chunk_index: u32,
total_chunks: u32,
data: Vec<u8>,
},
/// Group message encrypted with sender key (O(1) instead of O(N)).
GroupSenderKey {
id: String,
sender_fingerprint: String,
group_name: String,
generation: u32,
counter: u32,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
},
/// Sender key distribution: share your sender key with a group member.
/// This is sent via 1:1 encrypted channel (wrapped in KeyExchange/Message).
SenderKeyDistribution {
sender_fingerprint: String,
group_name: String,
chain_key: [u8; 32],
generation: u32,
},
/// Call signaling: SDP offers/answers, ICE candidates, call control.
/// Routed through featherChat's E2E encrypted channel for WarzonePhone integration.
CallSignal {
id: String,
sender_fingerprint: String,
signal_type: CallSignalType,
/// SDP offer/answer body, ICE candidate, or empty for hangup/reject.
payload: String,
/// Target peer (for 1:1) or group/room name (for group calls).
target: String,
},
}
/// Call signaling types for WarzonePhone integration.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum CallSignalType {
/// Initiate a call (contains SDP offer or WZP connection params).
Offer,
/// Accept a call (contains SDP answer or WZP connection params).
Answer,
/// ICE candidate for NAT traversal.
IceCandidate,
/// Hang up / end call.
Hangup,
/// Reject incoming call.
Reject,
/// Call is ringing on the other side.
Ringing,
/// Peer is busy.
Busy,
}
/// Current wire protocol version.
pub const WIRE_VERSION: u8 = 1;
/// Magic bytes to identify versioned envelope: "WZ"
pub const WIRE_MAGIC: [u8; 2] = [0x57, 0x5A];
/// Serialize a WireMessage with version envelope.
/// Format: [0x57][0x5A][version: u8][length: u32 BE][bincode payload]
pub fn serialize_envelope(msg: &WireMessage) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
let payload =
bincode::serialize(msg).map_err(|e| format!("serialize: {}", e))?;
let len = payload.len() as u32;
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(7 + payload.len());
out.extend_from_slice(&WIRE_MAGIC);
out.push(WIRE_VERSION);
out.extend_from_slice(&len.to_be_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(&payload);
Ok(out)
}
/// Deserialize a WireMessage, handling both envelope and legacy formats.
/// - Envelope: [0x57][0x5A][version][length][payload]
/// - Legacy: raw bincode (no envelope)
pub fn deserialize_envelope(data: &[u8]) -> Result<WireMessage, String> {
if data.len() >= 7 && data[0] == WIRE_MAGIC[0] && data[1] == WIRE_MAGIC[1] {
let version = data[2];
let len =
u32::from_be_bytes([data[3], data[4], data[5], data[6]]) as usize;
if version > WIRE_VERSION {
return Err(format!(
"unsupported wire version {} (max {}). Please update your client.",
version, WIRE_VERSION
));
}
if data.len() < 7 + len {
return Err("truncated envelope".to_string());
}
bincode::deserialize(&data[7..7 + len])
.map_err(|e| format!("v{} deserialize: {}", version, e))
} else {
// Legacy: raw bincode
bincode::deserialize(data)
.map_err(|e| format!("legacy deserialize: {}", e))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod envelope_tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn envelope_roundtrip() {
let msg = WireMessage::Receipt {
sender_fingerprint: "abc123".to_string(),
message_id: "msg-001".to_string(),
receipt_type: ReceiptType::Delivered,
};
let envelope = serialize_envelope(&msg).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&envelope[..2], &WIRE_MAGIC);
assert_eq!(envelope[2], WIRE_VERSION);
let decoded = deserialize_envelope(&envelope).unwrap();
match decoded {
WireMessage::Receipt { message_id, .. } => {
assert_eq!(message_id, "msg-001")
}
_ => panic!("wrong variant"),
}
}
#[test]
fn legacy_still_works() {
let msg = WireMessage::Receipt {
sender_fingerprint: "abc123".to_string(),
message_id: "msg-002".to_string(),
receipt_type: ReceiptType::Read,
};
let raw = bincode::serialize(&msg).unwrap();
let decoded = deserialize_envelope(&raw).unwrap();
match decoded {
WireMessage::Receipt { message_id, .. } => {
assert_eq!(message_id, "msg-002")
}
_ => panic!("wrong variant"),
}
}
#[test]
fn future_version_rejected() {
let mut envelope = serialize_envelope(&WireMessage::Receipt {
sender_fingerprint: "x".into(),
message_id: "y".into(),
receipt_type: ReceiptType::Delivered,
})
.unwrap();
envelope[2] = 99; // fake future version
let result = deserialize_envelope(&envelope);
assert!(result.is_err());
assert!(result.unwrap_err().contains("unsupported wire version"));
}
}

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use bip39::Mnemonic;
use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
/// Encode 32 bytes as a BIP39 mnemonic (24 words).
pub fn seed_to_mnemonic(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> String {
// BIP39 with 256 bits of entropy = 24 words
let mnemonic = Mnemonic::from_entropy(seed).expect("32 bytes is valid BIP39 entropy");
mnemonic.to_string()
}
/// Decode a BIP39 mnemonic back to 32 bytes.
pub fn mnemonic_to_seed(words: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], ProtocolError> {
let mnemonic: Mnemonic = words.parse().map_err(|_| ProtocolError::InvalidMnemonic)?;
let entropy = mnemonic.to_entropy();
if entropy.len() != 32 {
return Err(ProtocolError::InvalidSeedLength);
}
let mut seed = [0u8; 32];
seed.copy_from_slice(&entropy);
Ok(seed)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn roundtrip() {
let seed = [0xab; 32];
let words = seed_to_mnemonic(&seed);
let word_count = words.split_whitespace().count();
assert_eq!(word_count, 24);
let recovered = mnemonic_to_seed(&words).unwrap();
assert_eq!(seed, recovered);
}
}

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use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, Verifier};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, StaticSecret};
use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
use crate::identity::IdentityKeyPair;
/// A signed pre-key (medium-term, rotated periodically).
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SignedPreKey {
pub id: u32,
pub public_key: [u8; 32],
pub signature: Vec<u8>,
pub timestamp: i64,
}
impl SignedPreKey {
/// Verify the signature against the identity signing key.
pub fn verify(&self, identity_key: &ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey) -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
let sig =
Signature::from_slice(&self.signature).map_err(|_| ProtocolError::InvalidSignature)?;
identity_key
.verify(&self.public_key, &sig)
.map_err(|_| ProtocolError::PreKeySignatureInvalid)
}
}
/// A one-time pre-key (used once, then discarded).
pub struct OneTimePreKey {
pub id: u32,
pub secret: StaticSecret,
pub public: PublicKey,
}
/// The public portion of a one-time pre-key (sent to server).
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct OneTimePreKeyPublic {
pub id: u32,
pub public_key: [u8; 32],
}
/// A full pre-key bundle that the server stores for a user.
/// Fetched by others to initiate X3DH key exchange.
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct PreKeyBundle {
pub identity_key: [u8; 32], // Ed25519 verifying key bytes
pub identity_encryption_key: [u8; 32], // X25519 public key bytes
pub signed_pre_key: SignedPreKey,
pub one_time_pre_key: Option<OneTimePreKeyPublic>,
}
/// Generate a signed pre-key.
pub fn generate_signed_pre_key(identity: &IdentityKeyPair, id: u32) -> (StaticSecret, SignedPreKey) {
let secret = StaticSecret::random_from_rng(rand::rngs::OsRng);
let public = PublicKey::from(&secret);
let signature = identity.signing.sign(public.as_bytes());
let spk = SignedPreKey {
id,
public_key: *public.as_bytes(),
signature: signature.to_bytes().to_vec(),
timestamp: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
};
(secret, spk)
}
/// Generate a batch of one-time pre-keys.
pub fn generate_one_time_pre_keys(start_id: u32, count: u32) -> Vec<OneTimePreKey> {
(start_id..start_id + count)
.map(|id| {
let secret = StaticSecret::random_from_rng(rand::rngs::OsRng);
let public = PublicKey::from(&secret);
OneTimePreKey {
id,
secret,
public,
}
})
.collect()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::identity::Seed;
#[test]
fn signed_pre_key_verify() {
let seed = Seed::generate();
let identity = seed.derive_identity();
let (_secret, spk) = generate_signed_pre_key(&identity, 1);
let pub_id = identity.public_identity();
assert!(spk.verify(&pub_id.signing).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn signed_pre_key_reject_tampered() {
let seed = Seed::generate();
let identity = seed.derive_identity();
let (_secret, mut spk) = generate_signed_pre_key(&identity, 1);
spk.public_key[0] ^= 0xff; // tamper
let pub_id = identity.public_identity();
assert!(spk.verify(&pub_id.signing).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn generate_otpks() {
let keys = generate_one_time_pre_keys(0, 10);
assert_eq!(keys.len(), 10);
// All public keys should be unique
let pubs: Vec<_> = keys.iter().map(|k| *k.public.as_bytes()).collect();
let unique: std::collections::HashSet<_> = pubs.iter().collect();
assert_eq!(unique.len(), 10);
}
}

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//! Double Ratchet algorithm implementation.
//! Follows Signal's Double Ratchet specification.
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, StaticSecret};
use crate::crypto::{aead_decrypt, aead_encrypt, hkdf_derive};
use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
const MAX_SKIP: u32 = 1000;
/// Current serialization version for [`RatchetState`].
const RATCHET_VERSION: u8 = 1;
/// Magic byte to distinguish versioned from unversioned (legacy) data.
const RATCHET_MAGIC: u8 = 0xFC;
/// A message produced by the ratchet.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct RatchetMessage {
pub header: RatchetHeader,
pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
}
/// Header included with each ratchet message.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct RatchetHeader {
/// Current DH ratchet public key.
pub dh_public: [u8; 32],
/// Number of messages in the previous sending chain.
pub prev_chain_length: u32,
/// Message number in the current sending chain.
pub message_number: u32,
}
/// The Double Ratchet state machine.
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct RatchetState {
dh_self: Vec<u8>, // StaticSecret bytes (32)
dh_remote: Option<[u8; 32]>,
root_key: [u8; 32],
chain_key_send: Option<[u8; 32]>,
chain_key_recv: Option<[u8; 32]>,
send_count: u32,
recv_count: u32,
prev_send_count: u32,
skipped: BTreeMap<([u8; 32], u32), [u8; 32]>, // (dh_pub, n) -> message_key
}
impl RatchetState {
/// Initialize as Alice (initiator). Alice knows Bob's ratchet public key.
pub fn init_alice(shared_secret: [u8; 32], bob_ratchet_pub: PublicKey) -> Self {
let dh_self = StaticSecret::random_from_rng(rand::rngs::OsRng);
let dh_out = dh_self.diffie_hellman(&bob_ratchet_pub);
let (root_key, chain_key_send) = kdf_rk(&shared_secret, dh_out.as_bytes());
RatchetState {
dh_self: dh_self.to_bytes().to_vec(),
dh_remote: Some(*bob_ratchet_pub.as_bytes()),
root_key,
chain_key_send: Some(chain_key_send),
chain_key_recv: None,
send_count: 0,
recv_count: 0,
prev_send_count: 0,
skipped: BTreeMap::new(),
}
}
/// Initialize as Bob (responder). Bob uses his signed pre-key as initial ratchet key.
pub fn init_bob(shared_secret: [u8; 32], our_ratchet_secret: StaticSecret) -> Self {
RatchetState {
dh_self: our_ratchet_secret.to_bytes().to_vec(),
dh_remote: None,
root_key: shared_secret,
chain_key_send: None,
chain_key_recv: None,
send_count: 0,
recv_count: 0,
prev_send_count: 0,
skipped: BTreeMap::new(),
}
}
/// Get our current DH ratchet public key.
fn dh_public(&self) -> PublicKey {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.dh_self);
let secret = StaticSecret::from(bytes);
PublicKey::from(&secret)
}
fn dh_secret(&self) -> StaticSecret {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.dh_self);
StaticSecret::from(bytes)
}
/// Encrypt a plaintext message.
pub fn encrypt(&mut self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<RatchetMessage, ProtocolError> {
// If we don't have a sending chain yet (Bob's first message), do a DH ratchet step
if self.chain_key_send.is_none() {
if self.dh_remote.is_none() {
return Err(ProtocolError::RatchetError(
"no remote DH key and no sending chain".into(),
));
}
self.dh_ratchet_step()?;
}
let ck = self
.chain_key_send
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| ProtocolError::RatchetError("no sending chain".into()))?;
let (new_ck, message_key) = kdf_ck(ck);
self.chain_key_send = Some(new_ck);
let header = RatchetHeader {
dh_public: *self.dh_public().as_bytes(),
prev_chain_length: self.prev_send_count,
message_number: self.send_count,
};
// AAD: serialized header
let aad = bincode::serialize(&header)
.map_err(|e| ProtocolError::SerializationError(e.to_string()))?;
let ciphertext = aead_encrypt(&message_key, plaintext, &aad);
self.send_count += 1;
Ok(RatchetMessage { header, ciphertext })
}
/// Decrypt a received ratchet message.
pub fn decrypt(&mut self, message: &RatchetMessage) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
// Check skipped messages first
let key = (message.header.dh_public, message.header.message_number);
if let Some(mk) = self.skipped.remove(&key) {
let aad = bincode::serialize(&message.header)
.map_err(|e| ProtocolError::SerializationError(e.to_string()))?;
return aead_decrypt(&mk, &message.ciphertext, &aad);
}
// If the message's DH key differs from what we have, perform DH ratchet
let need_ratchet = match self.dh_remote {
Some(ref remote) => *remote != message.header.dh_public,
None => true,
};
if need_ratchet {
// Skip any missed messages in the current receiving chain
if self.chain_key_recv.is_some() {
self.skip_messages(message.header.prev_chain_length)?;
}
// DH ratchet step
let their_pub = PublicKey::from(message.header.dh_public);
// New receiving chain
let dh_recv = self.dh_secret().diffie_hellman(&their_pub);
let (rk, ck_recv) = kdf_rk(&self.root_key, dh_recv.as_bytes());
self.root_key = rk;
self.chain_key_recv = Some(ck_recv);
self.recv_count = 0;
// New sending chain
self.prev_send_count = self.send_count;
self.send_count = 0;
let new_dh = StaticSecret::random_from_rng(rand::rngs::OsRng);
let dh_send = new_dh.diffie_hellman(&their_pub);
let (rk2, ck_send) = kdf_rk(&self.root_key, dh_send.as_bytes());
self.root_key = rk2;
self.chain_key_send = Some(ck_send);
self.dh_self = new_dh.to_bytes().to_vec();
self.dh_remote = Some(message.header.dh_public);
}
// Skip to the message number
self.skip_messages(message.header.message_number)?;
// Derive message key
let ck = self
.chain_key_recv
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| ProtocolError::RatchetError("no receiving chain".into()))?;
let (new_ck, message_key) = kdf_ck(ck);
self.chain_key_recv = Some(new_ck);
self.recv_count += 1;
let aad = bincode::serialize(&message.header)
.map_err(|e| ProtocolError::SerializationError(e.to_string()))?;
aead_decrypt(&message_key, &message.ciphertext, &aad)
}
fn skip_messages(&mut self, until: u32) -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
if self.recv_count + MAX_SKIP < until {
return Err(ProtocolError::MaxSkipExceeded);
}
if let Some(ref ck) = self.chain_key_recv.clone() {
let dh_pub = self.dh_remote.unwrap_or([0u8; 32]);
let mut current_ck = *ck;
while self.recv_count < until {
let (new_ck, mk) = kdf_ck(&current_ck);
self.skipped.insert((dh_pub, self.recv_count), mk);
current_ck = new_ck;
self.recv_count += 1;
}
self.chain_key_recv = Some(current_ck);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Serialize with version prefix: `[MAGIC][VERSION][bincode data]`.
///
/// Use [`deserialize_versioned`](Self::deserialize_versioned) to restore.
pub fn serialize_versioned(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
let data = bincode::serialize(self)
.map_err(|e| format!("serialize: {}", e))?;
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(2 + data.len());
out.push(RATCHET_MAGIC);
out.push(RATCHET_VERSION);
out.extend_from_slice(&data);
Ok(out)
}
/// Deserialize with version awareness. Handles:
/// - Versioned format: `[0xFC][version][bincode]`
/// - Legacy format: raw bincode (no prefix)
pub fn deserialize_versioned(data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, String> {
if data.len() >= 2 && data[0] == RATCHET_MAGIC {
let version = data[1];
match version {
1 => bincode::deserialize(&data[2..])
.map_err(|e| format!("v1 deserialize: {}", e)),
_ => Err(format!("unknown ratchet version: {}", version)),
}
} else {
// Legacy: try raw bincode (pre-versioning data)
bincode::deserialize(data)
.map_err(|e| format!("legacy deserialize: {}", e))
}
}
fn dh_ratchet_step(&mut self) -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
let their_pub = self
.dh_remote
.map(PublicKey::from)
.ok_or_else(|| ProtocolError::RatchetError("no remote key for ratchet".into()))?;
self.prev_send_count = self.send_count;
self.send_count = 0;
let new_dh = StaticSecret::random_from_rng(rand::rngs::OsRng);
let dh_out = new_dh.diffie_hellman(&their_pub);
let (rk, ck_send) = kdf_rk(&self.root_key, dh_out.as_bytes());
self.root_key = rk;
self.chain_key_send = Some(ck_send);
self.dh_self = new_dh.to_bytes().to_vec();
Ok(())
}
}
/// Root key KDF: derive new root key + chain key from DH output.
fn kdf_rk(root_key: &[u8; 32], dh_output: &[u8]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
let derived = hkdf_derive(dh_output, root_key, b"warzone-ratchet-rk", 64);
let mut new_rk = [0u8; 32];
let mut chain_key = [0u8; 32];
new_rk.copy_from_slice(&derived[..32]);
chain_key.copy_from_slice(&derived[32..]);
(new_rk, chain_key)
}
/// Chain key KDF: derive new chain key + message key.
fn kdf_ck(chain_key: &[u8; 32]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
let mk_bytes = hkdf_derive(chain_key, b"", b"warzone-ratchet-mk", 32);
let ck_bytes = hkdf_derive(chain_key, b"", b"warzone-ratchet-ck", 32);
let mut new_ck = [0u8; 32];
let mut mk = [0u8; 32];
new_ck.copy_from_slice(&ck_bytes);
mk.copy_from_slice(&mk_bytes);
(new_ck, mk)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn make_pair() -> (RatchetState, RatchetState) {
let shared_secret = [42u8; 32];
let bob_ratchet = StaticSecret::random_from_rng(rand::rngs::OsRng);
let bob_ratchet_pub = PublicKey::from(&bob_ratchet);
let alice = RatchetState::init_alice(shared_secret, bob_ratchet_pub);
let bob = RatchetState::init_bob(shared_secret, bob_ratchet);
(alice, bob)
}
#[test]
fn basic_exchange() {
let (mut alice, mut bob) = make_pair();
let msg = alice.encrypt(b"hello bob").unwrap();
let plain = bob.decrypt(&msg).unwrap();
assert_eq!(plain, b"hello bob");
}
#[test]
fn bidirectional() {
let (mut alice, mut bob) = make_pair();
let m1 = alice.encrypt(b"hello bob").unwrap();
assert_eq!(bob.decrypt(&m1).unwrap(), b"hello bob");
let m2 = bob.encrypt(b"hello alice").unwrap();
assert_eq!(alice.decrypt(&m2).unwrap(), b"hello alice");
let m3 = alice.encrypt(b"how are you?").unwrap();
assert_eq!(bob.decrypt(&m3).unwrap(), b"how are you?");
}
#[test]
fn multiple_messages_same_direction() {
let (mut alice, mut bob) = make_pair();
let m1 = alice.encrypt(b"one").unwrap();
let m2 = alice.encrypt(b"two").unwrap();
let m3 = alice.encrypt(b"three").unwrap();
assert_eq!(bob.decrypt(&m1).unwrap(), b"one");
assert_eq!(bob.decrypt(&m2).unwrap(), b"two");
assert_eq!(bob.decrypt(&m3).unwrap(), b"three");
}
#[test]
fn out_of_order() {
let (mut alice, mut bob) = make_pair();
let m1 = alice.encrypt(b"one").unwrap();
let m2 = alice.encrypt(b"two").unwrap();
let m3 = alice.encrypt(b"three").unwrap();
// Deliver out of order
assert_eq!(bob.decrypt(&m3).unwrap(), b"three");
assert_eq!(bob.decrypt(&m1).unwrap(), b"one");
assert_eq!(bob.decrypt(&m2).unwrap(), b"two");
}
#[test]
fn versioned_serialize_roundtrip() {
let (mut alice, mut bob) = make_pair();
let msg = alice.encrypt(b"test versioning").unwrap();
// Save alice with versioned format
let serialized = alice.serialize_versioned().unwrap();
assert_eq!(serialized[0], 0xFC); // magic byte
assert_eq!(serialized[1], 1); // version 1
// Restore and use
let mut restored = RatchetState::deserialize_versioned(&serialized).unwrap();
let msg2 = restored.encrypt(b"after restore").unwrap();
let plain = bob.decrypt(&msg).unwrap();
assert_eq!(plain, b"test versioning");
let plain2 = bob.decrypt(&msg2).unwrap();
assert_eq!(plain2, b"after restore");
}
#[test]
fn legacy_deserialize_works() {
let (alice, _) = make_pair();
// Serialize with raw bincode (legacy format)
let legacy = bincode::serialize(&alice).unwrap();
// Should still deserialize with versioned reader
let restored = RatchetState::deserialize_versioned(&legacy).unwrap();
assert_eq!(bincode::serialize(&restored).unwrap(), legacy);
}
#[test]
fn many_messages() {
let (mut alice, mut bob) = make_pair();
for i in 0..100 {
let msg = format!("message {}", i);
let encrypted = alice.encrypt(msg.as_bytes()).unwrap();
let decrypted = bob.decrypt(&encrypted).unwrap();
assert_eq!(decrypted, msg.as_bytes());
}
}
}

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//! Sender Keys for efficient group encryption.
//!
//! Instead of encrypting per-member (O(N)), each member generates a
//! symmetric "sender key" and distributes it to all group members via
//! 1:1 encrypted channels. Group messages are encrypted ONCE with the
//! sender's key, and the same ciphertext is delivered to all members.
//!
//! Key rotation: on member join/leave, all members rotate their sender keys.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::crypto::{aead_decrypt, aead_encrypt, hkdf_derive};
use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
/// A sender key: symmetric key + chain for forward ratcheting.
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SenderKey {
/// Who owns this key.
pub owner_fingerprint: String,
/// Group this key belongs to.
pub group_name: String,
/// Current chain key (ratchets forward on each message).
pub chain_key: [u8; 32],
/// Message counter.
pub counter: u32,
/// Generation (incremented on rotation).
pub generation: u32,
}
impl SenderKey {
/// Generate a new sender key for a group.
pub fn generate(owner_fingerprint: &str, group_name: &str) -> Self {
let mut chain_key = [0u8; 32];
rand::RngCore::fill_bytes(&mut rand::rngs::OsRng, &mut chain_key);
SenderKey {
owner_fingerprint: owner_fingerprint.to_string(),
group_name: group_name.to_string(),
chain_key,
counter: 0,
generation: 0,
}
}
/// Rotate: new random chain key, increment generation.
pub fn rotate(&mut self) {
rand::RngCore::fill_bytes(&mut rand::rngs::OsRng, &mut self.chain_key);
self.counter = 0;
self.generation += 1;
}
/// Derive a message key from the current chain key, then ratchet forward.
fn derive_message_key(&mut self) -> [u8; 32] {
let info = format!("wz-sk-msg-{}-{}", self.generation, self.counter);
let mk_bytes = hkdf_derive(&self.chain_key, b"", info.as_bytes(), 32);
let mut message_key = [0u8; 32];
message_key.copy_from_slice(&mk_bytes);
// Ratchet chain key forward
let ck_bytes = hkdf_derive(&self.chain_key, b"", b"wz-sk-chain", 32);
self.chain_key.copy_from_slice(&ck_bytes);
self.counter += 1;
message_key
}
/// Encrypt a message with this sender key.
pub fn encrypt(&mut self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> SenderKeyMessage {
let message_key = self.derive_message_key();
let aad = format!("{}:{}:{}", self.group_name, self.generation, self.counter - 1);
let ciphertext = aead_encrypt(&message_key, plaintext, aad.as_bytes());
SenderKeyMessage {
sender_fingerprint: self.owner_fingerprint.clone(),
group_name: self.group_name.clone(),
generation: self.generation,
counter: self.counter - 1,
ciphertext,
}
}
/// Decrypt a message from another member using their sender key.
/// `self` is the RECEIVER's copy of the SENDER's key.
pub fn decrypt(&mut self, msg: &SenderKeyMessage) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
// Fast-forward chain if needed (handle skipped messages)
if msg.generation != self.generation {
return Err(ProtocolError::RatchetError(format!(
"generation mismatch: expected {}, got {}",
self.generation, msg.generation
)));
}
// We need to advance to the right counter
while self.counter < msg.counter {
// Skip this message key (lost message)
let _ = self.derive_message_key();
}
if self.counter != msg.counter {
return Err(ProtocolError::RatchetError("counter mismatch".into()));
}
let message_key = self.derive_message_key();
let aad = format!("{}:{}:{}", msg.group_name, msg.generation, msg.counter);
aead_decrypt(&message_key, &msg.ciphertext, aad.as_bytes())
}
}
/// An encrypted group message using sender keys.
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SenderKeyMessage {
pub sender_fingerprint: String,
pub group_name: String,
pub generation: u32,
pub counter: u32,
pub ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
}
/// Distribution message: sent via 1:1 encrypted channel to share a sender key.
#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SenderKeyDistribution {
pub sender_fingerprint: String,
pub group_name: String,
pub chain_key: [u8; 32],
pub generation: u32,
}
impl From<&SenderKey> for SenderKeyDistribution {
fn from(sk: &SenderKey) -> Self {
SenderKeyDistribution {
sender_fingerprint: sk.owner_fingerprint.clone(),
group_name: sk.group_name.clone(),
chain_key: sk.chain_key,
generation: sk.generation,
}
}
}
impl SenderKeyDistribution {
/// Convert distribution into a receiver's copy of the sender key.
pub fn into_sender_key(self) -> SenderKey {
SenderKey {
owner_fingerprint: self.sender_fingerprint,
group_name: self.group_name,
chain_key: self.chain_key,
counter: 0,
generation: self.generation,
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn basic_encrypt_decrypt() {
let mut alice_key = SenderKey::generate("alice", "ops");
// Bob gets a copy of Alice's key (via distribution)
let dist = SenderKeyDistribution::from(&alice_key);
let mut bob_copy = dist.into_sender_key();
let msg = alice_key.encrypt(b"hello group");
let plain = bob_copy.decrypt(&msg).unwrap();
assert_eq!(plain, b"hello group");
}
#[test]
fn multiple_messages() {
let mut alice_key = SenderKey::generate("alice", "ops");
let dist = SenderKeyDistribution::from(&alice_key);
let mut bob_copy = dist.into_sender_key();
for i in 0..10 {
let msg = alice_key.encrypt(format!("msg {}", i).as_bytes());
let plain = bob_copy.decrypt(&msg).unwrap();
assert_eq!(plain, format!("msg {}", i).as_bytes());
}
}
#[test]
fn rotation() {
let mut alice_key = SenderKey::generate("alice", "ops");
let dist1 = SenderKeyDistribution::from(&alice_key);
let mut bob_copy = dist1.into_sender_key();
let msg1 = alice_key.encrypt(b"before rotation");
let _ = bob_copy.decrypt(&msg1).unwrap();
// Rotate
alice_key.rotate();
let dist2 = SenderKeyDistribution::from(&alice_key);
let mut bob_copy2 = dist2.into_sender_key();
let msg2 = alice_key.encrypt(b"after rotation");
let plain = bob_copy2.decrypt(&msg2).unwrap();
assert_eq!(plain, b"after rotation");
}
#[test]
fn old_key_cant_decrypt_new() {
let mut alice_key = SenderKey::generate("alice", "ops");
let dist = SenderKeyDistribution::from(&alice_key);
let mut bob_old = dist.into_sender_key();
alice_key.rotate();
let msg = alice_key.encrypt(b"new generation");
assert!(bob_old.decrypt(&msg).is_err());
}
}

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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::ratchet::RatchetState;
use crate::types::{Fingerprint, SessionId};
/// A session represents an ongoing encrypted conversation with a peer.
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Session {
pub id: SessionId,
pub peer: Fingerprint,
pub ratchet: RatchetState,
pub created_at: i64,
pub last_active: i64,
}

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//! Storage trait definitions. Implementations live in server/client crates.
use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
use crate::message::WarzoneMessage;
use crate::prekey::{OneTimePreKey, SignedPreKey};
use crate::session::Session;
use crate::types::{Fingerprint, MessageId};
pub trait PreKeyStore {
fn store_signed_pre_key(&mut self, key: SignedPreKey) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>;
fn load_signed_pre_key(&self, id: u32) -> Result<Option<SignedPreKey>, ProtocolError>;
fn store_one_time_pre_keys(&mut self, keys: Vec<OneTimePreKey>) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>;
fn take_one_time_pre_key(&mut self, id: u32) -> Result<Option<OneTimePreKey>, ProtocolError>;
fn count_one_time_pre_keys(&self) -> Result<usize, ProtocolError>;
}
pub trait SessionStore {
fn load_session(&self, peer: &Fingerprint) -> Result<Option<Session>, ProtocolError>;
fn store_session(&mut self, session: &Session) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>;
}
pub trait MessageQueue {
fn queue_message(&mut self, msg: &WarzoneMessage) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>;
fn fetch_messages(&self, recipient: &Fingerprint) -> Result<Vec<WarzoneMessage>, ProtocolError>;
fn delete_message(&mut self, id: &MessageId) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>;
}

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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::fmt;
/// Truncated SHA-256 hash of the public signing key (16 bytes).
/// The primary identity of a user — displayed as hex groups.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Fingerprint(pub [u8; 16]);
impl fmt::Display for Fingerprint {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
write!(
f,
"{:04x}:{:04x}:{:04x}:{:04x}:{:04x}:{:04x}:{:04x}:{:04x}",
u16::from_be_bytes([self.0[0], self.0[1]]),
u16::from_be_bytes([self.0[2], self.0[3]]),
u16::from_be_bytes([self.0[4], self.0[5]]),
u16::from_be_bytes([self.0[6], self.0[7]]),
u16::from_be_bytes([self.0[8], self.0[9]]),
u16::from_be_bytes([self.0[10], self.0[11]]),
u16::from_be_bytes([self.0[12], self.0[13]]),
u16::from_be_bytes([self.0[14], self.0[15]]),
)
}
}
impl fmt::Debug for Fingerprint {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
write!(f, "Fingerprint({})", self)
}
}
impl Fingerprint {
pub fn from_hex(s: &str) -> Result<Self, crate::errors::ProtocolError> {
let clean: String = s.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect();
let bytes = hex::decode(&clean)
.map_err(|_| crate::errors::ProtocolError::InvalidFingerprint)?;
if bytes.len() < 16 {
return Err(crate::errors::ProtocolError::InvalidFingerprint);
}
let mut fp = [0u8; 16];
fp.copy_from_slice(&bytes[..16]);
Ok(Fingerprint(fp))
}
pub fn to_hex(&self) -> String {
hex::encode(self.0)
}
}
/// Unique device identifier (derived from seed + device index).
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct DeviceId(pub u32);
/// Unique session identifier.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SessionId(pub uuid::Uuid);
impl SessionId {
pub fn new() -> Self {
SessionId(uuid::Uuid::new_v4())
}
}
/// Unique message identifier.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct MessageId(pub uuid::Uuid);
impl MessageId {
pub fn new() -> Self {
MessageId(uuid::Uuid::new_v4())
}
}

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//! X3DH (Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman) key agreement.
//! Follows Signal's X3DH specification.
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, StaticSecret};
use zeroize::Zeroize;
use crate::crypto::hkdf_derive;
use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
use crate::identity::IdentityKeyPair;
use crate::prekey::PreKeyBundle;
/// Result of initiating X3DH (Alice's side).
pub struct X3DHInitResult {
/// The shared secret (32 bytes), used to initialize the Double Ratchet.
pub shared_secret: [u8; 32],
/// Alice's ephemeral public key (sent to Bob).
pub ephemeral_public: PublicKey,
/// Which one-time pre-key was used (if any).
pub used_one_time_pre_key_id: Option<u32>,
}
/// Initiate X3DH key exchange (Alice's side).
///
/// Alice fetches Bob's pre-key bundle from the server, performs four DH
/// operations, and derives a shared secret.
pub fn initiate(
our_identity: &IdentityKeyPair,
their_bundle: &PreKeyBundle,
) -> Result<X3DHInitResult, ProtocolError> {
// Verify the signed pre-key signature
let their_identity = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
&their_bundle.identity_key,
)
.map_err(|_| ProtocolError::X3DHFailed("invalid identity key".into()))?;
their_bundle
.signed_pre_key
.verify(&their_identity)
.map_err(|_| ProtocolError::X3DHFailed("signed pre-key verification failed".into()))?;
let ephemeral_secret = StaticSecret::random_from_rng(rand::rngs::OsRng);
let ephemeral_public = PublicKey::from(&ephemeral_secret);
let their_spk = PublicKey::from(their_bundle.signed_pre_key.public_key);
let their_identity_x25519 = PublicKey::from(their_bundle.identity_encryption_key);
// DH1: our_identity_x25519 * their_signed_pre_key
let dh1 = our_identity.encryption.diffie_hellman(&their_spk);
// DH2: our_ephemeral * their_identity_x25519
let dh2 = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&their_identity_x25519);
// DH3: our_ephemeral * their_signed_pre_key
let dh3 = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&their_spk);
// DH4: our_ephemeral * their_one_time_pre_key (if available)
let mut dh_concat = Vec::with_capacity(128);
dh_concat.extend_from_slice(dh1.as_bytes());
dh_concat.extend_from_slice(dh2.as_bytes());
dh_concat.extend_from_slice(dh3.as_bytes());
let used_otpk_id = if let Some(ref otpk) = their_bundle.one_time_pre_key {
let their_otpk = PublicKey::from(otpk.public_key);
let dh4 = ephemeral_secret.diffie_hellman(&their_otpk);
dh_concat.extend_from_slice(dh4.as_bytes());
Some(otpk.id)
} else {
None
};
// KDF: derive 32-byte shared secret
let mut shared_secret = [0u8; 32];
let derived = hkdf_derive(&dh_concat, b"", b"warzone-x3dh", 32);
shared_secret.copy_from_slice(&derived);
dh_concat.zeroize();
Ok(X3DHInitResult {
shared_secret,
ephemeral_public,
used_one_time_pre_key_id: used_otpk_id,
})
}
/// Respond to X3DH key exchange (Bob's side).
///
/// Bob receives Alice's ephemeral public key and performs the same DH
/// operations to derive the same shared secret.
pub fn respond(
our_identity: &IdentityKeyPair,
our_signed_pre_key_secret: &StaticSecret,
our_one_time_pre_key_secret: Option<&StaticSecret>,
their_identity_x25519: &PublicKey,
their_ephemeral_public: &PublicKey,
) -> Result<[u8; 32], ProtocolError> {
let their_eph = *their_ephemeral_public;
// DH1: our_signed_pre_key * their_identity_x25519
let dh1 = our_signed_pre_key_secret.diffie_hellman(their_identity_x25519);
// DH2: our_identity_x25519 * their_ephemeral
let dh2 = our_identity.encryption.diffie_hellman(&their_eph);
// DH3: their_ephemeral * our_signed_pre_key
let dh3 = our_signed_pre_key_secret.diffie_hellman(&their_eph);
let mut dh_concat = Vec::with_capacity(128);
dh_concat.extend_from_slice(dh1.as_bytes());
dh_concat.extend_from_slice(dh2.as_bytes());
dh_concat.extend_from_slice(dh3.as_bytes());
if let Some(otpk) = our_one_time_pre_key_secret {
let dh4 = otpk.diffie_hellman(&their_eph);
dh_concat.extend_from_slice(dh4.as_bytes());
}
let mut shared_secret = [0u8; 32];
let derived = hkdf_derive(&dh_concat, b"", b"warzone-x3dh", 32);
shared_secret.copy_from_slice(&derived);
dh_concat.zeroize();
Ok(shared_secret)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::identity::Seed;
use crate::prekey::{generate_one_time_pre_keys, generate_signed_pre_key};
#[test]
fn x3dh_shared_secret_matches() {
let alice_seed = Seed::generate();
let alice_id = alice_seed.derive_identity();
let bob_seed = Seed::generate();
let bob_id = bob_seed.derive_identity();
let (bob_spk_secret, bob_spk) = generate_signed_pre_key(&bob_id, 1);
let bob_otpks = generate_one_time_pre_keys(0, 1);
let bob_pub = bob_id.public_identity();
let alice_pub = alice_id.public_identity();
let bundle = PreKeyBundle {
identity_key: *bob_pub.signing.as_bytes(),
identity_encryption_key: *bob_pub.encryption.as_bytes(),
signed_pre_key: bob_spk,
one_time_pre_key: Some(crate::prekey::OneTimePreKeyPublic {
id: bob_otpks[0].id,
public_key: *bob_otpks[0].public.as_bytes(),
}),
};
let alice_result = initiate(&alice_id, &bundle).unwrap();
let bob_secret = respond(
&bob_id,
&bob_spk_secret,
Some(&bob_otpks[0].secret),
&alice_pub.encryption,
&alice_result.ephemeral_public,
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(alice_result.shared_secret, bob_secret);
}
/// Simulate the EXACT web client (WASM) flow:
/// 1. Alice: generate identity + SPK, create bundle, register
/// 2. Bob: same
/// 3. Alice: fetch Bob's bundle, WasmSession::initiate (X3DH), encrypt_key_exchange
/// 4. Bob: receive wire bytes, decrypt_wire_message (X3DH respond + ratchet decrypt)
#[test]
fn web_client_x3dh_roundtrip() {
use crate::identity::Seed;
use crate::message::WireMessage;
use crate::ratchet::RatchetState;
// === Alice ===
let alice_seed = Seed::generate();
let alice_id = alice_seed.derive_identity();
let alice_pub = alice_id.public_identity();
let (alice_spk_secret, alice_spk) = generate_signed_pre_key(&alice_id, 1);
let alice_bundle = PreKeyBundle {
identity_key: *alice_pub.signing.as_bytes(),
identity_encryption_key: *alice_pub.encryption.as_bytes(),
signed_pre_key: alice_spk,
one_time_pre_key: None, // web client: no OTPKs
};
// === Bob ===
let bob_seed = Seed::generate();
let bob_id = bob_seed.derive_identity();
let bob_pub = bob_id.public_identity();
let (bob_spk_secret, bob_spk) = generate_signed_pre_key(&bob_id, 1);
let bob_spk_secret_bytes = bob_spk_secret.to_bytes();
let bob_bundle = PreKeyBundle {
identity_key: *bob_pub.signing.as_bytes(),
identity_encryption_key: *bob_pub.encryption.as_bytes(),
signed_pre_key: bob_spk,
one_time_pre_key: None,
};
let bob_bundle_bytes = bincode::serialize(&bob_bundle).unwrap();
// === Alice sends to Bob (simulating WasmSession::initiate + encrypt_key_exchange_with_id) ===
// Step 1: WasmSession::initiate — X3DH + init ratchet
let x3dh_result = initiate(&alice_id, &bob_bundle).unwrap();
let their_spk = PublicKey::from(bob_bundle.signed_pre_key.public_key);
let mut alice_ratchet = RatchetState::init_alice(x3dh_result.shared_secret, their_spk);
// Step 2: encrypt_key_exchange_with_id — use SAME x3dh_result (NOT re-initiate!)
let encrypted = alice_ratchet.encrypt(b"hello bob").unwrap();
let wire = WireMessage::KeyExchange {
id: "test-msg-001".to_string(),
sender_fingerprint: alice_pub.fingerprint.to_string(),
sender_identity_encryption_key: *alice_pub.encryption.as_bytes(),
ephemeral_public: *x3dh_result.ephemeral_public.as_bytes(),
used_one_time_pre_key_id: x3dh_result.used_one_time_pre_key_id,
ratchet_message: encrypted,
};
let wire_bytes = bincode::serialize(&wire).unwrap();
// === Bob decrypts (simulating decrypt_wire_message) ===
let wire_in: WireMessage = bincode::deserialize(&wire_bytes).unwrap();
match wire_in {
WireMessage::KeyExchange {
sender_identity_encryption_key,
ephemeral_public,
ratchet_message,
..
} => {
let bob_spk_secret_restored = StaticSecret::from(bob_spk_secret_bytes);
let their_id = PublicKey::from(sender_identity_encryption_key);
let their_eph = PublicKey::from(ephemeral_public);
let shared = respond(
&bob_id, &bob_spk_secret_restored, None, &their_id, &their_eph,
).unwrap();
let bob_spk_for_ratchet = StaticSecret::from(bob_spk_secret_bytes);
let mut bob_ratchet = RatchetState::init_bob(shared, bob_spk_for_ratchet);
let plaintext = bob_ratchet.decrypt(&ratchet_message).unwrap();
assert_eq!(plaintext, b"hello bob");
}
_ => panic!("expected KeyExchange"),
}
}
/// Test that the OLD buggy flow (double X3DH initiate) fails,
/// confirming the bug we found.
#[test]
fn double_x3dh_initiate_fails() {
use crate::identity::Seed;
use crate::ratchet::RatchetState;
let alice_seed = Seed::generate();
let alice_id = alice_seed.derive_identity();
let alice_pub = alice_id.public_identity();
let bob_seed = Seed::generate();
let bob_id = bob_seed.derive_identity();
let bob_pub = bob_id.public_identity();
let (bob_spk_secret, bob_spk) = generate_signed_pre_key(&bob_id, 1);
let bob_spk_secret_bytes = bob_spk_secret.to_bytes();
let bob_bundle = PreKeyBundle {
identity_key: *bob_pub.signing.as_bytes(),
identity_encryption_key: *bob_pub.encryption.as_bytes(),
signed_pre_key: bob_spk,
one_time_pre_key: None,
};
// FIRST X3DH — used for ratchet
let result1 = initiate(&alice_id, &bob_bundle).unwrap();
let their_spk = PublicKey::from(bob_bundle.signed_pre_key.public_key);
let mut alice_ratchet = RatchetState::init_alice(result1.shared_secret, their_spk);
let encrypted = alice_ratchet.encrypt(b"test").unwrap();
// SECOND X3DH — different ephemeral key (THE BUG)
let result2 = initiate(&alice_id, &bob_bundle).unwrap();
// result2.ephemeral_public != result1.ephemeral_public
assert_ne!(
result1.ephemeral_public.as_bytes(),
result2.ephemeral_public.as_bytes(),
"two X3DH initiates should produce different ephemeral keys"
);
// Bob tries to decrypt using result2's ephemeral (wrong one)
let bob_spk_restored = StaticSecret::from(bob_spk_secret_bytes);
let shared = respond(
&bob_id, &bob_spk_restored, None,
&alice_pub.encryption, &result2.ephemeral_public,
).unwrap();
// The shared secrets DIFFER because different ephemeral keys
assert_ne!(result1.shared_secret, shared, "mismatched ephemeral should produce different shared secret");
// Decryption should FAIL
let bob_spk_for_ratchet = StaticSecret::from(bob_spk_secret_bytes);
let mut bob_ratchet = RatchetState::init_bob(shared, bob_spk_for_ratchet);
assert!(bob_ratchet.decrypt(&encrypted).is_err(), "decrypt should fail with wrong shared secret");
}
}

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[package]
name = "warzone-server"
version.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
[dependencies]
warzone-protocol = { path = "../warzone-protocol" }
tokio.workspace = true
axum.workspace = true
tower.workspace = true
tower-http.workspace = true
sled.workspace = true
serde.workspace = true
serde_json.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
clap.workspace = true
thiserror.workspace = true
anyhow.workspace = true
uuid.workspace = true
chrono.workspace = true
hex.workspace = true
base64.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true
futures-util = "0.3"
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
bincode.workspace = true
sha2.workspace = true
reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["rustls-tls", "json"] }
tokio-tungstenite.workspace = true
[dev-dependencies]
tempfile = "3"
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["test-util"] }

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//! Auth enforcement middleware: axum extractor that validates bearer tokens.
//!
//! Reads `Authorization: Bearer <token>` from request headers, validates via
//! [`crate::routes::auth::validate_token`], and returns the authenticated
//! fingerprint or a 401 rejection.
use axum::{
extract::FromRequestParts,
http::{request::Parts, StatusCode},
response::{IntoResponse, Response},
};
use crate::state::AppState;
/// Extractor that validates a bearer token and provides the authenticated fingerprint.
///
/// Place this as the **first** parameter in any handler that requires authentication.
/// The extractor will reject the request with 401 if the token is missing or invalid.
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```ignore
/// async fn my_handler(
/// auth: AuthFingerprint,
/// State(state): State<AppState>,
/// ) -> impl IntoResponse {
/// let fp = auth.fingerprint; // guaranteed valid
/// // ...
/// }
/// ```
pub struct AuthFingerprint {
pub fingerprint: String,
}
#[axum::async_trait]
impl FromRequestParts<AppState> for AuthFingerprint {
type Rejection = AuthError;
async fn from_request_parts(
parts: &mut Parts,
state: &AppState,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
let header = parts
.headers
.get("authorization")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|s| s.strip_prefix("Bearer "))
.map(|s| s.trim().to_string());
let token = match header {
Some(t) if !t.is_empty() => t,
_ => return Err(AuthError::MissingToken),
};
match crate::routes::auth::validate_token(&state.db.tokens, &token) {
Some(fingerprint) => Ok(AuthFingerprint { fingerprint }),
None => Err(AuthError::InvalidToken),
}
}
}
/// Rejection type for [`AuthFingerprint`] extractor failures.
pub enum AuthError {
/// No `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header was present (or it was empty).
MissingToken,
/// The token was present but did not pass validation (expired or unknown).
InvalidToken,
}
impl IntoResponse for AuthError {
fn into_response(self) -> Response {
let (status, msg) = match self {
AuthError::MissingToken => (
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
"missing or empty Authorization: Bearer <token> header",
),
AuthError::InvalidToken => (
StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
"invalid or expired token",
),
};
(status, axum::Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": msg }))).into_response()
}
}

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//! Built-in BotFather: processes messages to @botfather and manages bot lifecycle.
//!
//! Supports: /start, /newbot, /mybots, /deletebot, /help
//! Runs as a server-side handler — no external process needed.
use crate::state::AppState;
const BOTFATHER_FP: &str = "00000000000000000b0ffa00e000000f";
/// Check if a message is destined for BotFather and handle it.
/// Called from deliver_or_queue when the recipient is the BotFather fingerprint.
/// Returns true if handled (message consumed).
pub async fn handle_botfather_message(state: &AppState, from_fp: &str, message: &[u8]) -> bool {
if !state.bots_enabled {
return false;
}
// Try to parse as plaintext bot_message JSON
let bot_msg: serde_json::Value = match serde_json::from_slice(message) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(_) => return false, // Encrypted messages can't be processed by built-in handler
};
if bot_msg.get("type").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) != Some("bot_message") {
return false;
}
let text = bot_msg
.get("text")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.unwrap_or("")
.trim();
let from_name = bot_msg
.get("from_name")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.unwrap_or(from_fp);
tracing::info!(
"BotFather: message from {} ({}): {}",
from_fp,
from_name,
text
);
let response = match text {
"/start" | "/help" => {
"Welcome to BotFather! I can help you create and manage bots.\n\n\
Commands:\n\
/newbot - Create a new bot\n\
/mybots - List your bots\n\
/deletebot <name> - Delete a bot\n\
/token <name> - Get bot token\n\
/help - Show this message"
.to_string()
}
t if t.starts_with("/newbot") => handle_newbot(state, from_fp, t).await,
t if t.starts_with("/deletebot") => handle_deletebot(state, from_fp, t).await,
"/mybots" => handle_mybots(state, from_fp).await,
t if t.starts_with("/token") => handle_token(state, from_fp, t).await,
_ => "I don't understand that command. Try /help".to_string(),
};
// Send response back to the user
send_botfather_reply(state, from_fp, &response).await;
true
}
async fn handle_newbot(state: &AppState, owner_fp: &str, text: &str) -> String {
// Parse: /newbot <name>
let name = text.strip_prefix("/newbot").unwrap_or("").trim();
if name.is_empty() {
return "Usage: /newbot <botname>\n\nExample: /newbot WeatherBot\n\n\
The name must end with 'bot' or 'Bot'."
.to_string();
}
// Validate name
if name.len() > 32 || name.len() < 3 {
return "Bot name must be 3-32 characters.".to_string();
}
let name_lower = name.to_lowercase();
if !name_lower.ends_with("bot") {
return "Bot name must end with 'bot' or 'Bot'. Example: WeatherBot, my_bot".to_string();
}
// Check if alias is taken
let alias_key = format!("a:{}", name_lower);
if state
.db
.aliases
.get(alias_key.as_bytes())
.ok()
.flatten()
.is_some()
{
return format!(
"Sorry, @{} is already taken. Try a different name.",
name_lower
);
}
// Generate fingerprint and token
let fp_bytes: [u8; 16] = rand::random();
let fp = hex::encode(fp_bytes);
let token_rand: [u8; 16] = rand::random();
let token = format!("{}:{}", &fp[..16], hex::encode(token_rand));
// Store bot info
let bot_info = serde_json::json!({
"name": name,
"fingerprint": fp,
"token": token,
"owner": owner_fp,
"e2e": false,
"created_at": chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
});
let bot_key = format!("bot:{}", token);
let _ = state.db.tokens.insert(
bot_key.as_bytes(),
serde_json::to_vec(&bot_info).unwrap_or_default(),
);
let fp_key = format!("bot_fp:{}", fp);
let _ = state.db.tokens.insert(fp_key.as_bytes(), token.as_bytes());
// Register alias (all 3 keys needed for resolve_alias to work)
let _ = state.db.aliases.insert(alias_key.as_bytes(), fp.as_bytes());
let _ = state.db.aliases.insert(format!("fp:{}", fp).as_bytes(), name_lower.as_bytes());
let alias_record = serde_json::json!({
"alias": name_lower,
"fingerprint": fp,
"recovery_key": "",
"registered_at": chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
"last_active": chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
});
let _ = state.db.aliases.insert(format!("rec:{}", name_lower).as_bytes(), serde_json::to_vec(&alias_record).unwrap_or_default());
tracing::info!(
"BotFather: created bot @{} for owner {}",
name_lower,
owner_fp
);
format!(
"Done! Your new bot @{} is ready.\n\n\
Token: {}\n\n\
Keep this token secret! Use it to access the Bot API.\n\n\
API endpoint: /v1/bot/{}/getUpdates",
name_lower, token, token
)
}
async fn handle_deletebot(state: &AppState, owner_fp: &str, text: &str) -> String {
let name = text
.strip_prefix("/deletebot")
.unwrap_or("")
.trim()
.to_lowercase();
if name.is_empty() {
return "Usage: /deletebot <botname>".to_string();
}
// Find the bot
let alias_key = format!("a:{}", name);
let bot_fp = match state.db.aliases.get(alias_key.as_bytes()).ok().flatten() {
Some(v) => String::from_utf8_lossy(&v).to_string(),
None => return format!("Bot @{} not found.", name),
};
// Get bot info to verify ownership
let token_key = format!("bot_fp:{}", bot_fp);
let token = match state.db.tokens.get(token_key.as_bytes()).ok().flatten() {
Some(v) => String::from_utf8_lossy(&v).to_string(),
None => return format!("Bot @{} not found in registry.", name),
};
let bot_key = format!("bot:{}", token);
if let Some(info_bytes) = state.db.tokens.get(bot_key.as_bytes()).ok().flatten() {
if let Ok(info) = serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&info_bytes) {
let owner = info.get("owner").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if owner != owner_fp && owner != "system" {
return format!("You don't own @{}. Only the owner can delete it.", name);
}
}
}
// Delete everything
let _ = state.db.tokens.remove(bot_key.as_bytes());
let _ = state.db.tokens.remove(token_key.as_bytes());
let _ = state.db.aliases.remove(alias_key.as_bytes());
let _ = state
.db
.aliases
.remove(format!("fp:{}", bot_fp).as_bytes());
let _ = state.db.keys.remove(bot_fp.as_bytes());
tracing::info!("BotFather: deleted bot @{} by owner {}", name, owner_fp);
format!("Bot @{} has been deleted.", name)
}
async fn handle_mybots(state: &AppState, owner_fp: &str) -> String {
let mut bots = Vec::new();
for item in state.db.tokens.iter().flatten() {
let key = String::from_utf8_lossy(&item.0).to_string();
if !key.starts_with("bot:") {
continue;
}
if let Ok(info) = serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&item.1) {
let owner = info.get("owner").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if owner == owner_fp {
let name = info.get("name").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("?");
let e2e = info.get("e2e").and_then(|v| v.as_bool()).unwrap_or(false);
let mode = if e2e { "E2E" } else { "plaintext" };
bots.push(format!(" @{} ({})", name.to_lowercase(), mode));
}
}
}
if bots.is_empty() {
"You have no bots. Use /newbot <name> to create one.".to_string()
} else {
format!("Your bots ({}):\n{}", bots.len(), bots.join("\n"))
}
}
async fn handle_token(state: &AppState, owner_fp: &str, text: &str) -> String {
let name = text
.strip_prefix("/token")
.unwrap_or("")
.trim()
.to_lowercase();
if name.is_empty() {
return "Usage: /token <botname>".to_string();
}
let alias_key = format!("a:{}", name);
let bot_fp = match state.db.aliases.get(alias_key.as_bytes()).ok().flatten() {
Some(v) => String::from_utf8_lossy(&v).to_string(),
None => return format!("Bot @{} not found.", name),
};
let token_key = format!("bot_fp:{}", bot_fp);
let token = match state.db.tokens.get(token_key.as_bytes()).ok().flatten() {
Some(v) => String::from_utf8_lossy(&v).to_string(),
None => return format!("Token not found for @{}.", name),
};
// Verify ownership
let bot_key = format!("bot:{}", token);
if let Some(info_bytes) = state.db.tokens.get(bot_key.as_bytes()).ok().flatten() {
if let Ok(info) = serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&info_bytes) {
let owner = info.get("owner").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if owner != owner_fp {
return format!("You don't own @{}.", name);
}
}
}
format!("Token for @{}:\n{}", name, token)
}
/// Send a reply from BotFather to a user.
async fn send_botfather_reply(state: &AppState, to_fp: &str, text: &str) {
let msg = serde_json::json!({
"type": "bot_message",
"id": uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
"from": BOTFATHER_FP,
"from_name": "BotFather",
"text": text,
"timestamp": chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
});
let msg_bytes = serde_json::to_vec(&msg).unwrap_or_default();
// Deliver directly (don't go through deliver_or_queue to avoid recursion)
if !state.push_to_client(to_fp, &msg_bytes).await {
// Queue for offline pickup
let key = format!("queue:{}:{}", to_fp, uuid::Uuid::new_v4());
let _ = state.db.messages.insert(key.as_bytes(), msg_bytes);
}
}

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// Server configuration — currently handled via CLI args in main.rs.
// This module will be used when file-based configuration is added.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
use anyhow::Result;
pub struct Database {
pub keys: sled::Tree,
pub messages: sled::Tree,
pub groups: sled::Tree,
pub aliases: sled::Tree,
pub tokens: sled::Tree,
pub calls: sled::Tree,
pub missed_calls: sled::Tree,
pub friends: sled::Tree,
pub eth_addresses: sled::Tree,
_db: sled::Db,
}
impl Database {
pub fn open(data_dir: &str) -> Result<Self> {
let db = sled::open(data_dir)?;
let keys = db.open_tree("keys")?;
let messages = db.open_tree("messages")?;
let groups = db.open_tree("groups")?;
let aliases = db.open_tree("aliases")?;
let tokens = db.open_tree("tokens")?;
let calls = db.open_tree("calls")?;
let missed_calls = db.open_tree("missed_calls")?;
let friends = db.open_tree("friends")?;
let eth_addresses = db.open_tree("eth_addresses")?;
Ok(Database {
keys,
messages,
groups,
aliases,
tokens,
calls,
missed_calls,
friends,
eth_addresses,
_db: db,
})
}
}

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use axum::http::StatusCode;
use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
/// Wraps anyhow::Error into an axum-compatible error response.
pub struct AppError(pub anyhow::Error);
impl IntoResponse for AppError {
fn into_response(self) -> Response {
tracing::error!("{:#}", self.0);
(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, self.0.to_string()).into_response()
}
}
impl<E: Into<anyhow::Error>> From<E> for AppError {
fn from(err: E) -> Self {
AppError(err.into())
}
}
/// Convenience type for route handlers.
pub type AppResult<T> = Result<T, AppError>;

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@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
//! Federation: two-server message relay via persistent WebSocket.
//!
//! Each server maintains a WS connection to its peer. Presence updates
//! and message forwards flow over this single connection. Reconnects
//! automatically on failure.
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
/// Federation configuration loaded from JSON.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct FederationConfig {
pub server_id: String,
pub shared_secret: String,
pub peer: PeerConfig,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct PeerConfig {
pub id: String,
pub url: String,
}
/// Load federation config from a JSON file.
pub fn load_config(path: &str) -> anyhow::Result<FederationConfig> {
let data = std::fs::read_to_string(path)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to read federation config '{}': {}", path, e))?;
let config: FederationConfig = serde_json::from_str(&data)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid federation config: {}", e))?;
Ok(config)
}
/// Remote presence: which fingerprints are on the peer server.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct RemotePresence {
pub peer_id: String,
pub fingerprints: HashSet<String>,
pub last_updated: i64,
pub connected: bool,
}
impl RemotePresence {
pub fn new(peer_id: String) -> Self {
RemotePresence {
peer_id,
fingerprints: HashSet::new(),
last_updated: 0,
connected: false,
}
}
pub fn contains(&self, fp: &str) -> bool {
self.connected && self.fingerprints.contains(fp)
}
}
/// Sender for outgoing federation messages over the WS.
pub type FederationSender = Arc<Mutex<Option<tokio::sync::mpsc::UnboundedSender<String>>>>;
/// Handle for communicating with the federation peer.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct FederationHandle {
pub config: FederationConfig,
pub remote_presence: Arc<Mutex<RemotePresence>>,
/// Channel to send messages over the outgoing WS to the peer.
pub outgoing: FederationSender,
/// HTTP client for one-shot requests (key fetch, etc.)
pub client: reqwest::Client,
}
impl FederationHandle {
pub fn new(config: FederationConfig) -> Self {
let remote_presence = Arc::new(Mutex::new(RemotePresence::new(
config.peer.id.clone(),
)));
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
.timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))
.build()
.expect("failed to build HTTP client");
FederationHandle {
config,
remote_presence,
outgoing: Arc::new(Mutex::new(None)),
client,
}
}
/// Check if a fingerprint is known to be on the peer server.
pub async fn is_remote(&self, fp: &str) -> bool {
let rp = self.remote_presence.lock().await;
rp.contains(fp)
}
/// Forward a message to the peer server via the persistent WS.
pub async fn forward_message(&self, to_fp: &str, message: &[u8]) -> bool {
let msg = serde_json::json!({
"type": "forward",
"to": to_fp,
"message": base64::Engine::encode(&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, message),
"from_server": self.config.server_id,
});
self.send_json(msg).await
}
/// Fetch a pre-key bundle from the peer server (HTTP GET fallback).
/// Used when a local key lookup fails and the fingerprint is on the remote.
pub async fn fetch_remote_bundle(&self, fingerprint: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
let url = format!("{}/v1/keys/{}", self.config.peer.url, fingerprint);
let resp = self.client.get(&url).send().await.ok()?;
if !resp.status().is_success() {
return None;
}
let data: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await.ok()?;
let bundle_b64 = data.get("bundle")?.as_str()?;
base64::Engine::decode(&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, bundle_b64).ok()
}
/// Resolve an alias on the peer server.
/// Returns Some(fingerprint) if the peer knows this alias.
pub async fn resolve_remote_alias(&self, alias: &str) -> Option<String> {
let url = format!("{}/v1/alias/resolve/{}", self.config.peer.url, alias);
let resp = self.client.get(&url).send().await.ok()?;
if !resp.status().is_success() {
return None;
}
let data: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await.ok()?;
// Check for error (alias not found on peer)
if data.get("error").is_some() {
return None;
}
data.get("fingerprint").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).map(String::from)
}
/// Check if an alias is already taken on the peer server.
/// Returns true if the alias exists on the peer (taken).
pub async fn is_alias_taken_remote(&self, alias: &str) -> bool {
self.resolve_remote_alias(alias).await.is_some()
}
/// Push local presence to peer via the persistent WS.
pub async fn push_presence(&self, fingerprints: Vec<String>) -> bool {
let msg = serde_json::json!({
"type": "presence",
"server_id": self.config.server_id,
"fingerprints": fingerprints,
});
self.send_json(msg).await
}
/// Send a JSON message over the outgoing WS channel.
async fn send_json(&self, msg: serde_json::Value) -> bool {
let guard = self.outgoing.lock().await;
if let Some(ref tx) = *guard {
let json_str = serde_json::to_string(&msg).unwrap_or_default();
tx.send(json_str).is_ok()
} else {
false
}
}
}
/// Background task: connect to peer's WS endpoint, send auth, then loop.
/// Handles reconnection on failure.
pub async fn outgoing_ws_loop(
handle: FederationHandle,
state: crate::state::AppState,
) {
let ws_url = handle.config.peer.url
.replace("http://", "ws://")
.replace("https://", "wss://");
let ws_url = format!("{}/v1/federation/ws", ws_url);
loop {
tracing::info!("Federation: connecting to peer {} at {}", handle.config.peer.id, ws_url);
match tokio_tungstenite::connect_async(&ws_url).await {
Ok((ws_stream, _)) => {
tracing::info!("Federation: connected to peer {}", handle.config.peer.id);
use futures_util::{SinkExt, StreamExt};
let (mut ws_tx, mut ws_rx) = ws_stream.split();
// Send auth as first message
let auth_msg = serde_json::json!({
"type": "auth",
"secret": handle.config.shared_secret,
"server_id": handle.config.server_id,
});
if ws_tx.send(tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::Message::Text(
serde_json::to_string(&auth_msg).unwrap_or_default()
)).await.is_err() {
tracing::warn!("Federation: failed to send auth to peer");
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
continue;
}
// Set up outgoing channel
let (out_tx, mut out_rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::unbounded_channel::<String>();
{
let mut guard = handle.outgoing.lock().await;
*guard = Some(out_tx);
}
{
let mut rp = handle.remote_presence.lock().await;
rp.connected = true;
}
// Send initial presence
let fps: Vec<String> = {
let conns = state.connections.lock().await;
conns.keys().cloned().collect()
};
let _ = handle.push_presence(fps).await;
// Spawn task to forward outgoing channel + periodic ping to WS
let send_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut ping_interval = tokio::time::interval(std::time::Duration::from_secs(15));
loop {
tokio::select! {
msg = out_rx.recv() => {
match msg {
Some(text) => {
if ws_tx.send(tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::Message::Text(text)).await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
None => break,
}
}
_ = ping_interval.tick() => {
if ws_tx.send(tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::Message::Ping(vec![])).await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
}
}
});
// Spawn task to periodically re-push presence
let presence_handle = handle.clone();
let presence_conns = state.connections.clone();
let presence_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10));
loop {
interval.tick().await;
let fps: Vec<String> = {
let conns = presence_conns.lock().await;
conns.keys().cloned().collect()
};
if !presence_handle.push_presence(fps).await {
break;
}
}
});
// Read incoming messages from peer
while let Some(Ok(msg)) = ws_rx.next().await {
match msg {
tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::Message::Text(text) => {
handle_incoming_federation_msg(&text, &handle, &state).await;
}
tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::Message::Pong(_) => {} // keepalive response
tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::Message::Close(_) => break,
_ => {}
}
}
// Connection lost
send_task.abort();
presence_task.abort();
{
let mut guard = handle.outgoing.lock().await;
*guard = None;
}
{
let mut rp = handle.remote_presence.lock().await;
rp.connected = false;
rp.fingerprints.clear();
}
tracing::warn!("Federation: lost connection to peer {}, reconnecting...", handle.config.peer.id);
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!("Federation: failed to connect to peer {}: {}", handle.config.peer.id, e);
}
}
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
}
}
/// Process a single incoming JSON message from the federated peer WS.
async fn handle_incoming_federation_msg(
text: &str,
handle: &FederationHandle,
state: &crate::state::AppState,
) {
let parsed: serde_json::Value = match serde_json::from_str(text) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(_) => return,
};
let msg_type = parsed.get("type").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
match msg_type {
"presence" => {
let fingerprints: Vec<String> = parsed.get("fingerprints")
.and_then(|v| v.as_array())
.map(|arr| arr.iter().filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(String::from)).collect())
.unwrap_or_default();
let server_id = parsed.get("server_id").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("?");
let count = fingerprints.len();
let mut rp = handle.remote_presence.lock().await;
rp.fingerprints = fingerprints.into_iter().collect();
rp.last_updated = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
tracing::debug!("Federation: received {} fingerprints from {}", count, server_id);
}
"forward" => {
let to = parsed.get("to").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
let message_b64 = parsed.get("message").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
let from_server = parsed.get("from_server").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("?");
if let Ok(message) = base64::Engine::decode(&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, message_b64) {
let delivered = state.push_to_client(to, &message).await;
if !delivered {
let key = format!("queue:{}:{}", to, uuid::Uuid::new_v4());
let _ = state.db.messages.insert(key.as_bytes(), message.as_slice());
tracing::info!("Federation: queued message from {} for offline {}", from_server, to);
} else {
tracing::debug!("Federation: delivered message from {} to {}", from_server, to);
}
}
}
_ => {
tracing::debug!("Federation: unknown message type '{}'", msg_type);
}
}
}

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pub mod auth_middleware;
pub mod botfather;
pub mod config;
pub mod db;
pub mod errors;
pub mod federation;
pub mod routes;
pub mod state;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
use clap::Parser;
mod botfather;
pub mod auth_middleware;
mod config;
mod db;
mod errors;
mod federation;
mod routes;
mod state;
#[derive(Parser)]
#[command(name = "warzone-server", about = "Warzone messenger server")]
struct Cli {
/// Address to bind to
#[arg(short, long, default_value = "0.0.0.0:7700")]
bind: String,
/// Database directory
#[arg(short, long, default_value = "./warzone-data")]
data_dir: String,
/// Federation config file (JSON). Enables server-to-server message relay.
#[arg(short, long)]
federation: Option<String>,
/// Enable bot API (disabled by default)
#[arg(long, default_value = "false")]
enable_bots: bool,
/// System bots config file (JSON array). Bots are auto-created on startup.
#[arg(long)]
bots_config: Option<String>,
}
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
tracing_subscriber::fmt()
.with_env_filter(
tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env()
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "info,tower_http=debug".parse().unwrap()),
)
.init();
let cli = Cli::parse();
tracing::info!("Warzone server starting on {}", cli.bind);
let mut state = state::AppState::new(&cli.data_dir)?;
// Reload active calls from DB
{
let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
let mut loaded = 0u32;
let mut expired = 0u32;
for item in state.db.calls.iter().flatten() {
if let Ok(call) = serde_json::from_slice::<state::CallState>(&item.1) {
match call.status {
state::CallStatus::Ringing | state::CallStatus::Active => {
if now - call.created_at > 86400 {
let mut ended = call.clone();
ended.status = state::CallStatus::Ended;
ended.ended_at = Some(now);
let _ = state.db.calls.insert(
&item.0,
serde_json::to_vec(&ended).unwrap_or_default(),
);
expired += 1;
} else {
state.active_calls.lock().await.insert(call.call_id.clone(), call);
loaded += 1;
}
}
_ => {} // Ended calls stay in DB but not in memory
}
}
}
if loaded > 0 || expired > 0 {
tracing::info!("Calls: loaded {} active, expired {} stale", loaded, expired);
}
}
// Load federation config if provided
if let Some(ref fed_path) = cli.federation {
let fed_config = federation::load_config(fed_path)?;
tracing::info!(
"Federation enabled: server_id={}, peer={}@{}",
fed_config.server_id, fed_config.peer.id, fed_config.peer.url
);
let handle = federation::FederationHandle::new(fed_config);
state.federation = Some(handle);
}
// Enable bot API if requested
state.bots_enabled = cli.enable_bots;
if cli.enable_bots {
tracing::info!("Bot API enabled");
// Auto-create BotFather if it doesn't exist
let botfather_fp = "00000000000000000b0ffa00e000000f";
let botfather_key = format!("bot_fp:{}", botfather_fp);
if state.db.tokens.get(botfather_key.as_bytes()).ok().flatten().is_none() {
let token = format!("botfather:{}", hex::encode(rand::random::<[u8; 16]>()));
let bot_info = serde_json::json!({
"name": "BotFather",
"fingerprint": botfather_fp,
"token": token,
"owner": "system",
"e2e": false,
"created_at": chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
});
let key = format!("bot:{}", token);
let _ = state.db.tokens.insert(key.as_bytes(), serde_json::to_vec(&bot_info).unwrap_or_default());
let _ = state.db.tokens.insert(botfather_key.as_bytes(), token.as_bytes());
// Register alias
let _ = state.db.aliases.insert(b"a:botfather", botfather_fp.as_bytes());
let _ = state.db.aliases.insert(format!("fp:{}", botfather_fp).as_bytes(), b"botfather");
tracing::info!("BotFather created: @botfather (token: {})", token);
} else {
tracing::info!("BotFather already exists");
}
// Always ensure alias exists (may have been lost on data wipe)
let _ = state.db.aliases.insert(b"a:botfather", botfather_fp.as_bytes());
let _ = state.db.aliases.insert(format!("fp:{}", botfather_fp).as_bytes(), b"botfather");
// Store proper AliasRecord so resolve_alias works
let bf_record = serde_json::json!({
"alias": "botfather",
"fingerprint": botfather_fp,
"recovery_key": "",
"registered_at": chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
"last_active": chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
});
let _ = state.db.aliases.insert(b"rec:botfather", serde_json::to_vec(&bf_record).unwrap_or_default());
// Load system bots from config file
if let Some(ref bots_path) = cli.bots_config {
match std::fs::read_to_string(bots_path) {
Ok(data) => {
if let Ok(bots) = serde_json::from_str::<Vec<serde_json::Value>>(&data) {
for bot in &bots {
let name = bot.get("name").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
let desc = bot.get("description").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if name.is_empty() { continue; }
let alias = name.to_lowercase();
let alias_key = format!("a:{}", alias);
// Check if already exists
let existing_fp = state.db.aliases.get(alias_key.as_bytes())
.ok().flatten()
.map(|v| String::from_utf8_lossy(&v).to_string());
let fp = if let Some(ref efp) = existing_fp {
// Bot exists — just ensure alias record is intact
efp.clone()
} else {
// Create new bot
let fp_bytes: [u8; 16] = rand::random();
let fp = hex::encode(fp_bytes);
let token_rand: [u8; 16] = rand::random();
let token = format!("{}:{}", &fp[..16], hex::encode(token_rand));
let bot_info = serde_json::json!({
"name": name,
"fingerprint": fp,
"token": token,
"owner": "system",
"description": desc,
"system_bot": true,
"e2e": false,
"created_at": chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
});
let _ = state.db.tokens.insert(format!("bot:{}", token).as_bytes(), serde_json::to_vec(&bot_info).unwrap_or_default());
let _ = state.db.tokens.insert(format!("bot_fp:{}", fp).as_bytes(), token.as_bytes());
let _ = state.db.aliases.insert(alias_key.as_bytes(), fp.as_bytes());
let _ = state.db.aliases.insert(format!("fp:{}", fp).as_bytes(), alias.as_bytes());
tracing::info!("System bot @{} created (token: {})", alias, token);
fp
};
// Always ensure alias record exists
let rec = serde_json::json!({
"alias": alias,
"fingerprint": fp,
"recovery_key": "",
"registered_at": chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
"last_active": chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
});
let _ = state.db.aliases.insert(format!("rec:{}", alias).as_bytes(), serde_json::to_vec(&rec).unwrap_or_default());
}
tracing::info!("Loaded {} system bots from {}", bots.len(), bots_path);
// Write tokens to file for easy access
let tokens_path = format!("{}/bot-tokens.txt", cli.data_dir);
let mut token_lines = Vec::new();
for bot in &bots {
let name = bot.get("name").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if name.is_empty() { continue; }
let alias = name.to_lowercase();
if let Some(fp_bytes) = state.db.aliases.get(format!("a:{}", alias).as_bytes()).ok().flatten() {
let fp = String::from_utf8_lossy(&fp_bytes).to_string();
if let Some(tok_bytes) = state.db.tokens.get(format!("bot_fp:{}", fp).as_bytes()).ok().flatten() {
let tok = String::from_utf8_lossy(&tok_bytes).to_string();
token_lines.push(format!("{}={}", alias.to_uppercase(), tok));
}
}
}
if !token_lines.is_empty() {
let _ = std::fs::write(&tokens_path, token_lines.join("\n") + "\n");
tracing::info!("Bot tokens written to {}", tokens_path);
}
// Store bot list in DB for welcome screen
let bot_list: Vec<serde_json::Value> = bots.iter().map(|b| {
serde_json::json!({
"name": b.get("name").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or(""),
"description": b.get("description").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or(""),
})
}).collect();
let _ = state.db.tokens.insert(b"system:bot_list", serde_json::to_vec(&bot_list).unwrap_or_default());
}
}
Err(e) => tracing::warn!("Failed to load bots config '{}': {}", bots_path, e),
}
}
}
// Spawn federation outgoing WS connection if enabled
if let Some(ref fed) = state.federation {
let handle = fed.clone();
let fed_state = state.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
federation::outgoing_ws_loop(handle, fed_state).await;
});
}
let cors = tower_http::cors::CorsLayer::new()
.allow_origin(tower_http::cors::Any)
.allow_methods(tower_http::cors::Any)
.allow_headers(tower_http::cors::Any);
let app = axum::Router::new()
.merge(routes::web_router())
.nest("/v1", routes::router())
.layer(cors)
.layer(tower::limit::ConcurrencyLimitLayer::new(200))
.layer(tower_http::trace::TraceLayer::new_for_http())
.with_state(state);
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(&cli.bind).await?;
tracing::info!("Listening on {}", cli.bind);
axum::serve(listener, app.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>()).await?;
Ok(())
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,436 @@
use axum::{
extract::{Path, State},
routing::{get, post},
Json, Router,
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::errors::AppResult;
use crate::state::AppState;
/// Alias expires after 365 days of inactivity.
const ALIAS_TTL_SECS: i64 = 365 * 24 * 3600;
/// Grace period after expiry: 30 days before someone else can claim.
const GRACE_PERIOD_SECS: i64 = 30 * 24 * 3600;
pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new()
.route("/alias/register", post(register_alias))
.route("/alias/recover", post(recover_alias))
.route("/alias/renew", post(renew_alias))
.route("/alias/resolve/:name", get(resolve_alias))
.route("/alias/list", get(list_aliases))
.route("/alias/whois/:fingerprint", get(reverse_lookup))
.route("/alias/unregister", post(unregister_alias))
.route("/alias/admin-remove", post(admin_remove_alias))
}
fn normalize_fp(fp: &str) -> String {
fp.chars()
.filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
.collect::<String>()
.to_lowercase()
}
fn normalize_alias(name: &str) -> String {
name.trim()
.to_lowercase()
.chars()
.filter(|c| c.is_alphanumeric() || *c == '_' || *c == '-')
.collect()
}
fn now_ts() -> i64 {
chrono::Utc::now().timestamp()
}
fn gen_recovery_key() -> String {
use rand::RngCore;
let mut bytes = [0u8; 16];
rand::rngs::OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
hex::encode(bytes)
}
/// Stored record for an alias.
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Clone)]
struct AliasRecord {
alias: String,
fingerprint: String,
recovery_key: String,
registered_at: i64,
last_active: i64,
}
impl AliasRecord {
fn is_expired(&self) -> bool {
now_ts() - self.last_active > ALIAS_TTL_SECS
}
fn is_past_grace(&self) -> bool {
now_ts() - self.last_active > ALIAS_TTL_SECS + GRACE_PERIOD_SECS
}
fn expires_in_days(&self) -> i64 {
let remaining = (self.last_active + ALIAS_TTL_SECS) - now_ts();
remaining / 86400
}
}
fn load_alias_record(db: &sled::Tree, alias: &str) -> Option<AliasRecord> {
db.get(format!("rec:{}", alias).as_bytes())
.ok()
.flatten()
.and_then(|data| serde_json::from_slice(&data).ok())
}
fn save_alias_record(db: &sled::Tree, record: &AliasRecord) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let data = serde_json::to_vec(record)?;
db.insert(format!("rec:{}", record.alias).as_bytes(), data)?;
// Forward + reverse index
db.insert(format!("a:{}", record.alias).as_bytes(), record.fingerprint.as_bytes())?;
db.insert(format!("fp:{}", record.fingerprint).as_bytes(), record.alias.as_bytes())?;
db.flush()?;
Ok(())
}
fn delete_alias_record(db: &sled::Tree, record: &AliasRecord) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
db.remove(format!("rec:{}", record.alias).as_bytes())?;
db.remove(format!("a:{}", record.alias).as_bytes())?;
db.remove(format!("fp:{}", record.fingerprint).as_bytes())?;
db.flush()?;
Ok(())
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct RegisterRequest {
alias: String,
fingerprint: String,
}
/// Register an alias. Returns a recovery key on first registration.
/// - One alias per fingerprint
/// - Expired aliases (past grace period) can be reclaimed by anyone
/// - Expired aliases (within grace period) can only be reclaimed by recovery key
async fn register_alias(
_auth: crate::auth_middleware::AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<RegisterRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let alias = normalize_alias(&req.alias);
let fp = normalize_fp(&req.fingerprint);
if alias.is_empty() || alias.len() > 32 {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "alias must be 1-32 alphanumeric chars" })));
}
// Reserve *Bot and *_bot suffixes for bots only
let is_bot_name = alias.ends_with("bot") || alias.ends_with("_bot");
if is_bot_name {
// Check if this fingerprint is registered as a bot
let bot_key = format!("bot_fp:{}", fp);
let is_registered_bot = state.db.tokens.get(bot_key.as_bytes())
.ok().flatten().is_some();
if !is_registered_bot {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "aliases ending with 'Bot' or '_bot' are reserved for bots — register via /v1/bot/register first" })));
}
}
// Check existing record for this alias
if let Some(existing) = load_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &alias) {
if existing.fingerprint == fp {
// Same person — renew
let mut updated = existing;
updated.last_active = now_ts();
save_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &updated)?;
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"ok": true, "alias": alias, "fingerprint": fp,
"renewed": true, "expires_in_days": updated.expires_in_days()
})));
}
if !existing.is_past_grace() {
// Still active or in grace period — can't take it
if existing.is_expired() {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"error": "alias expired but in grace period — use recovery key or wait",
"grace_ends_in_days": (existing.last_active + ALIAS_TTL_SECS + GRACE_PERIOD_SECS - now_ts()) / 86400
})));
}
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "alias already taken" })));
}
// Past grace period — clean up old record
tracing::info!("Alias '{}' expired past grace, releasing from {}", alias, existing.fingerprint);
delete_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &existing)?;
}
// Check if alias is taken on federation peer (globally unique)
if let Some(ref federation) = state.federation {
if federation.is_alias_taken_remote(&alias).await {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "alias already taken on federated server" })));
}
}
// Remove old alias for this fingerprint (one alias per person)
if let Some(old_alias_bytes) = state.db.aliases.get(format!("fp:{}", fp).as_bytes())? {
let old_alias = String::from_utf8_lossy(&old_alias_bytes).to_string();
if let Some(old_record) = load_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &old_alias) {
delete_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &old_record)?;
tracing::info!("Removed old alias '{}' for {}", old_alias, fp);
}
}
let recovery_key = gen_recovery_key();
let record = AliasRecord {
alias: alias.clone(),
fingerprint: fp.clone(),
recovery_key: recovery_key.clone(),
registered_at: now_ts(),
last_active: now_ts(),
};
save_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &record)?;
tracing::info!("Alias '{}' registered for {}", alias, fp);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"ok": true,
"alias": alias,
"fingerprint": fp,
"recovery_key": recovery_key,
"expires_in_days": record.expires_in_days(),
"IMPORTANT": "Save your recovery key! It's the only way to reclaim this alias if you lose access."
})))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct RecoverRequest {
alias: String,
recovery_key: String,
new_fingerprint: String,
}
/// Recover an alias using the recovery key. Works even if expired (within or past grace).
async fn recover_alias(
_auth: crate::auth_middleware::AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<RecoverRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let alias = normalize_alias(&req.alias);
let new_fp = normalize_fp(&req.new_fingerprint);
let record = match load_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &alias) {
Some(r) => r,
None => return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "alias not found" }))),
};
if record.recovery_key != req.recovery_key {
tracing::warn!("Failed recovery attempt for alias '{}'", alias);
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "invalid recovery key" })));
}
// Delete old mappings
delete_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &record)?;
// Remove any existing alias for the new fingerprint
if let Some(old_alias_bytes) = state.db.aliases.get(format!("fp:{}", new_fp).as_bytes())? {
let old_alias = String::from_utf8_lossy(&old_alias_bytes).to_string();
if let Some(old_record) = load_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &old_alias) {
delete_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &old_record)?;
}
}
let new_recovery_key = gen_recovery_key();
let new_record = AliasRecord {
alias: alias.clone(),
fingerprint: new_fp.clone(),
recovery_key: new_recovery_key.clone(),
registered_at: now_ts(),
last_active: now_ts(),
};
save_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &new_record)?;
tracing::info!("Alias '{}' recovered and transferred to {}", alias, new_fp);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"ok": true,
"alias": alias,
"fingerprint": new_fp,
"new_recovery_key": new_recovery_key,
"IMPORTANT": "Your recovery key has been rotated. Save the new one!"
})))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct RenewRequest {
fingerprint: String,
}
/// Renew/heartbeat — resets the TTL. Called automatically on activity.
async fn renew_alias(
_auth: crate::auth_middleware::AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<RenewRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let fp = normalize_fp(&req.fingerprint);
let alias = match state.db.aliases.get(format!("fp:{}", fp).as_bytes())? {
Some(data) => String::from_utf8_lossy(&data).to_string(),
None => return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "alias": null }))),
};
if let Some(mut record) = load_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &alias) {
record.last_active = now_ts();
save_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &record)?;
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"ok": true, "alias": alias, "expires_in_days": record.expires_in_days()
})));
}
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "alias": null })))
}
/// Resolve an alias to a fingerprint.
async fn resolve_alias(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let alias = normalize_alias(&name);
match load_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &alias) {
Some(record) => {
if record.is_expired() {
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"alias": alias,
"fingerprint": record.fingerprint,
"expired": true,
"warning": "this alias is expired and may be reclaimed"
})))
} else {
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"alias": alias,
"fingerprint": record.fingerprint,
"expires_in_days": record.expires_in_days()
})))
}
}
None => {
// Try federation peer
if let Some(ref federation) = state.federation {
if let Some(fp) = federation.resolve_remote_alias(&alias).await {
tracing::info!("Alias @{} resolved via federation: {}", alias, fp);
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"alias": alias,
"fingerprint": fp,
"federated": true,
})));
}
}
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "alias not found" })))
}
}
}
/// Reverse lookup: fingerprint → alias.
async fn reverse_lookup(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(fingerprint): Path<String>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let fp = normalize_fp(&fingerprint);
match state.db.aliases.get(format!("fp:{}", fp).as_bytes())? {
Some(data) => {
let alias = String::from_utf8_lossy(&data).to_string();
if let Some(record) = load_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &alias) {
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"fingerprint": fp,
"alias": alias,
"expired": record.is_expired(),
"expires_in_days": record.expires_in_days()
})))
} else {
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "fingerprint": fp, "alias": alias })))
}
}
None => Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "fingerprint": fp, "alias": null }))),
}
}
/// List all aliases.
async fn list_aliases(
State(state): State<AppState>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let mut aliases: Vec<serde_json::Value> = Vec::new();
for item in state.db.aliases.scan_prefix(b"rec:") {
if let Ok((_, data)) = item {
if let Ok(record) = serde_json::from_slice::<AliasRecord>(&data) {
aliases.push(serde_json::json!({
"alias": record.alias,
"fingerprint": record.fingerprint,
"expired": record.is_expired(),
"expires_in_days": record.expires_in_days(),
}));
}
}
}
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "aliases": aliases, "count": aliases.len() })))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct UnregisterRequest {
fingerprint: String,
}
/// Remove your own alias.
async fn unregister_alias(
_auth: crate::auth_middleware::AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<UnregisterRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let fp = normalize_fp(&req.fingerprint);
let alias = match state.db.aliases.get(format!("fp:{}", fp).as_bytes())? {
Some(data) => String::from_utf8_lossy(&data).to_string(),
None => return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "no alias registered" }))),
};
if let Some(record) = load_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &alias) {
if record.fingerprint != fp {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "not your alias" })));
}
delete_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &record)?;
tracing::info!("Alias '{}' unregistered by {}", alias, fp);
}
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true, "removed": alias })))
}
/// Admin password (set via WARZONE_ADMIN_PASSWORD env var, defaults to "admin").
fn admin_password() -> String {
std::env::var("WARZONE_ADMIN_PASSWORD").unwrap_or_else(|_| "admin".to_string())
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct AdminRemoveRequest {
alias: String,
admin_password: String,
}
/// Admin: remove any alias.
async fn admin_remove_alias(
_auth: crate::auth_middleware::AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<AdminRemoveRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
if req.admin_password != admin_password() {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "invalid admin password" })));
}
let alias = normalize_alias(&req.alias);
if let Some(record) = load_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &alias) {
delete_alias_record(&state.db.aliases, &record)?;
tracing::info!("Alias '{}' removed by admin", alias);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true, "removed": alias })))
} else {
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "alias not found" })))
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
//! Challenge-response authentication.
//!
//! Flow:
//! 1. Client: POST /v1/auth/challenge { fingerprint }
//! 2. Server: returns { challenge: random_hex, expires_at }
//! 3. Client: POST /v1/auth/verify { fingerprint, challenge, signature }
//! (signature = Ed25519 sign the challenge bytes with identity key)
//! 4. Server: verifies signature against stored public key, returns { token }
//! 5. Client: includes `Authorization: Bearer <token>` on subsequent requests
//!
//! Token is valid for 7 days. Server renews on activity.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Mutex;
use axum::{
extract::State,
routing::post,
Json, Router,
};
use serde::Deserialize;
use crate::errors::AppResult;
use crate::state::AppState;
/// Token validity: 7 days.
const TOKEN_TTL_SECS: i64 = 7 * 24 * 3600;
/// Challenge validity: 60 seconds.
const CHALLENGE_TTL_SECS: i64 = 60;
pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new()
.route("/auth/challenge", post(create_challenge))
.route("/auth/verify", post(verify_challenge))
.route("/auth/validate", post(validate_token_endpoint))
}
fn now_ts() -> i64 {
chrono::Utc::now().timestamp()
}
fn normalize_fp(fp: &str) -> String {
fp.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect::<String>().to_lowercase()
}
fn random_hex(len: usize) -> String {
use rand::RngCore;
let mut bytes = vec![0u8; len];
rand::rngs::OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
hex::encode(bytes)
}
/// Pending challenges (fingerprint → (challenge_hex, expires_at)).
/// In production this would be in the DB, but for Phase 1 in-memory is fine.
static CHALLENGES: std::sync::LazyLock<Mutex<HashMap<String, (String, i64)>>> =
std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct ChallengeRequest {
fingerprint: String,
}
async fn create_challenge(
Json(req): Json<ChallengeRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let fp = normalize_fp(&req.fingerprint);
let challenge = random_hex(32);
let expires_at = now_ts() + CHALLENGE_TTL_SECS;
CHALLENGES.lock().unwrap().insert(fp.clone(), (challenge.clone(), expires_at));
tracing::info!("Challenge issued for {}", fp);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"challenge": challenge,
"expires_at": expires_at,
})))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct VerifyRequest {
fingerprint: String,
challenge: String,
signature: String, // hex-encoded Ed25519 signature
}
async fn verify_challenge(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<VerifyRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let fp = normalize_fp(&req.fingerprint);
// Check challenge exists and hasn't expired
let stored = {
let mut challenges = CHALLENGES.lock().unwrap();
challenges.remove(&fp)
};
let (expected_challenge, expires_at) = match stored {
Some(c) => c,
None => return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "no pending challenge" }))),
};
if now_ts() > expires_at {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "challenge expired" })));
}
if req.challenge != expected_challenge {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "challenge mismatch" })));
}
// Get stored public key bundle to extract Ed25519 verifying key
let bundle_bytes = match state.db.keys.get(fp.as_bytes())? {
Some(b) => b.to_vec(),
None => return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "fingerprint not registered" }))),
};
// Try to deserialize as bincode PreKeyBundle (CLI client)
let identity_key = if let Ok(bundle) = bincode::deserialize::<warzone_protocol::prekey::PreKeyBundle>(&bundle_bytes) {
bundle.identity_key
} else {
// Web client stores JSON — can't do Ed25519 verify. Accept for now.
// Phase 2: web client uses WASM for proper Ed25519.
let token = random_hex(32);
let token_expires = now_ts() + TOKEN_TTL_SECS;
state.db.tokens.insert(
token.as_bytes(),
serde_json::to_vec(&serde_json::json!({
"fingerprint": fp,
"expires_at": token_expires,
}))?.as_slice(),
)?;
tracing::info!("Token issued for {} (web client, no sig verify)", fp);
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"token": token,
"expires_at": token_expires,
})));
};
// Verify Ed25519 signature
let sig_bytes = hex::decode(&req.signature)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid signature hex"))?;
let verifying_key = ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&identity_key)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid identity key"))?;
let signature = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_slice(&sig_bytes)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid signature format"))?;
let challenge_bytes = hex::decode(&req.challenge)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid challenge hex"))?;
use ed25519_dalek::Verifier;
verifying_key
.verify(&challenge_bytes, &signature)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("signature verification failed"))?;
// Issue token
let token = random_hex(32);
let token_expires = now_ts() + TOKEN_TTL_SECS;
state.db.tokens.insert(
token.as_bytes(),
serde_json::to_vec(&serde_json::json!({
"fingerprint": fp,
"expires_at": token_expires,
}))?.as_slice(),
)?;
tracing::info!("Token issued for {} (Ed25519 verified)", fp);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"token": token,
"expires_at": token_expires,
})))
}
/// Validate a bearer token. Returns the fingerprint if valid.
pub fn validate_token(db: &sled::Tree, token: &str) -> Option<String> {
let data = db.get(token.as_bytes()).ok()??;
let val: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&data).ok()?;
let expires = val.get("expires_at")?.as_i64()?;
if now_ts() > expires {
let _ = db.remove(token.as_bytes());
return None;
}
val.get("fingerprint")?.as_str().map(String::from)
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct ValidateRequest {
token: String,
}
/// External token validation endpoint — used by WarzonePhone and other services
/// to verify that a bearer token is valid and get the associated fingerprint.
///
/// POST /v1/auth/validate { "token": "..." }
/// Returns: { "valid": true, "fingerprint": "...", "expires_at": ... }
/// or: { "valid": false }
async fn validate_token_endpoint(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<ValidateRequest>,
) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
match validate_token(&state.db.tokens, &req.token) {
Some(fingerprint) => {
// Also resolve alias if available
let alias = state.db.aliases.get(format!("fp:{}", fingerprint).as_bytes())
.ok().flatten()
.map(|v| String::from_utf8_lossy(&v).to_string());
// Get Ethereum address if we have the bundle
let eth_address: Option<String> = None; // Would need seed, which server doesn't have
tracing::info!("Token validated for {}", fingerprint);
Json(serde_json::json!({
"valid": true,
"fingerprint": fingerprint,
"alias": alias,
"eth_address": eth_address,
}))
}
None => {
Json(serde_json::json!({ "valid": false }))
}
}
}

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use axum::{
extract::{Path, Query, State},
routing::{get, post},
Json, Router,
};
use serde::Deserialize;
use sha2::{Sha256, Digest};
use crate::errors::AppResult;
use crate::state::{AppState, CallState, CallStatus};
pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new()
.route("/calls/initiate", post(initiate_call))
.route("/calls/:id", get(get_call))
.route("/calls/:id/end", post(end_call))
.route("/calls/active", get(active_calls))
.route("/calls/missed", post(get_missed_calls))
.route("/groups/:name/call", post(initiate_group_call))
}
fn normalize_fp(fp: &str) -> String {
fp.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect::<String>().to_lowercase()
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct InitiateRequest {
caller: String,
callee: String,
}
async fn initiate_call(
_auth: crate::auth_middleware::AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<InitiateRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let call_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
let call = CallState {
call_id: call_id.clone(),
caller_fp: normalize_fp(&req.caller),
callee_fp: normalize_fp(&req.callee),
group_name: None,
room_id: None,
status: CallStatus::Ringing,
created_at: now,
answered_at: None,
ended_at: None,
};
state.active_calls.lock().await.insert(call_id.clone(), call.clone());
state.db.calls.insert(call_id.as_bytes(), serde_json::to_vec(&call)?.as_slice())?;
tracing::info!("Call initiated: {} -> {}", call.caller_fp, call.callee_fp);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"call_id": call_id,
"status": "ringing",
})))
}
async fn get_call(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(id): Path<String>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
// Try in-memory first, then DB
if let Some(call) = state.active_calls.lock().await.get(&id) {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::to_value(call)?));
}
if let Some(data) = state.db.calls.get(id.as_bytes())? {
let call: CallState = serde_json::from_slice(&data)?;
return Ok(Json(serde_json::to_value(&call)?));
}
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "call not found" })))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct EndCallRequest {
fingerprint: String,
}
async fn end_call(
_auth: crate::auth_middleware::AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(id): Path<String>,
Json(req): Json<EndCallRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
let _fp = normalize_fp(&req.fingerprint);
let mut calls = state.active_calls.lock().await;
if let Some(mut call) = calls.remove(&id) {
call.status = CallStatus::Ended;
call.ended_at = Some(now);
state.db.calls.insert(id.as_bytes(), serde_json::to_vec(&call)?.as_slice())?;
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true, "call_id": id })));
}
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "call not found or already ended" })))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct ActiveQuery {
fingerprint: Option<String>,
}
async fn active_calls(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Query(q): Query<ActiveQuery>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let calls = state.active_calls.lock().await;
let filtered: Vec<&CallState> = match q.fingerprint {
Some(ref fp) => {
let fp = normalize_fp(fp);
calls.values().filter(|c| c.caller_fp == fp || c.callee_fp == fp).collect()
}
None => calls.values().collect(),
};
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "calls": filtered })))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct MissedRequest {
fingerprint: String,
}
async fn get_missed_calls(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<MissedRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let fp = normalize_fp(&req.fingerprint);
let prefix = format!("missed:{}", fp);
let mut missed = Vec::new();
let mut keys = Vec::new();
for (key, value) in state.db.missed_calls.scan_prefix(prefix.as_bytes()).flatten() {
if let Ok(record) = serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&value) {
missed.push(record);
keys.push(key);
}
}
// Delete after reading
for key in &keys {
let _ = state.db.missed_calls.remove(key);
}
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "missed_calls": missed })))
}
// --- FC-5: Group call ---
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct GroupCallRequest {
fingerprint: String,
}
/// Deterministic room ID from group name: hex(SHA-256("featherchat-group:" + name)[:16])
fn hash_room_name(group_name: &str) -> String {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(format!("featherchat-group:{}", group_name).as_bytes());
let hash = hasher.finalize();
hex::encode(&hash[..16])
}
async fn initiate_group_call(
_auth: crate::auth_middleware::AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
Json(req): Json<GroupCallRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let caller_fp = normalize_fp(&req.fingerprint);
// Load group
let group_data = match state.db.groups.get(name.as_bytes())? {
Some(d) => d,
None => return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "group not found" }))),
};
let group: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&group_data)?;
let members: Vec<String> = group.get("members")
.and_then(|v| v.as_array())
.map(|arr| arr.iter().filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(String::from)).collect())
.unwrap_or_default();
// Verify caller is a member
if !members.contains(&caller_fp) {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "not a member of this group" })));
}
let room_id = hash_room_name(&name);
let call_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
// Create call state
let call = CallState {
call_id: call_id.clone(),
caller_fp: caller_fp.clone(),
callee_fp: "group".to_string(),
group_name: Some(name.clone()),
room_id: Some(room_id.clone()),
status: CallStatus::Ringing,
created_at: now,
answered_at: None,
ended_at: None,
};
state.active_calls.lock().await.insert(call_id.clone(), call.clone());
state.db.calls.insert(call_id.as_bytes(), serde_json::to_vec(&call)?.as_slice())?;
// Fan out CallSignal::Offer to all online members (except caller)
let offer = warzone_protocol::message::WireMessage::CallSignal {
id: call_id.clone(),
sender_fingerprint: caller_fp.clone(),
signal_type: warzone_protocol::message::CallSignalType::Offer,
payload: serde_json::json!({ "room_id": room_id, "group": name }).to_string(),
target: format!("#{}", name),
};
let encoded = bincode::serialize(&offer)?;
let mut delivered = 0;
for member in &members {
if *member == caller_fp { continue; }
if state.push_to_client(member, &encoded).await {
delivered += 1;
} else {
// Queue for offline members
let key = format!("queue:{}:{}", member, uuid::Uuid::new_v4());
state.db.messages.insert(key.as_bytes(), encoded.as_slice())?;
}
}
tracing::info!("Group call #{}: room={}, caller={}, notified={}/{}",
name, room_id, caller_fp, delivered, members.len() - 1);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"call_id": call_id,
"room_id": room_id,
"group": name,
"members_notified": delivered,
"members_total": members.len() - 1,
})))
}

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use axum::{
extract::State,
routing::{get, post},
Json, Router,
};
use crate::auth_middleware::AuthFingerprint;
use crate::errors::AppResult;
use crate::state::AppState;
pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new()
.route("/devices", get(list_devices))
.route("/devices/:id/kick", post(kick_device))
.route("/devices/revoke-all", post(revoke_all))
}
/// List active WS connections for the authenticated user.
async fn list_devices(
auth: AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let devices = state.list_devices(&auth.fingerprint).await;
let list: Vec<serde_json::Value> = devices
.iter()
.map(|(id, connected_at)| {
serde_json::json!({
"device_id": id,
"connected_at": connected_at,
})
})
.collect();
let count = list.len();
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"fingerprint": auth.fingerprint,
"devices": list,
"count": count,
})))
}
/// Kick a specific device by ID. Requires auth -- only the device owner can kick.
async fn kick_device(
auth: AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
axum::extract::Path(device_id): axum::extract::Path<String>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let kicked = state.kick_device(&auth.fingerprint, &device_id).await;
if kicked {
tracing::info!("Device {} kicked by {}", device_id, auth.fingerprint);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true, "kicked": device_id })))
} else {
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "device not found" })))
}
}
/// Revoke all sessions except the current one. Panic button.
async fn revoke_all(
auth: AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<serde_json::Value>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let keep_device = req
.get("keep_device_id")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.unwrap_or("");
let removed = state
.revoke_all_except(&auth.fingerprint, keep_device)
.await;
// Also clear all tokens for this fingerprint except the current one
// Scan tokens tree for this fingerprint
let mut tokens_to_remove = Vec::new();
for item in state.db.tokens.iter().flatten() {
if let Ok(val) = serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&item.1) {
if val.get("fingerprint").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) == Some(&auth.fingerprint) {
tokens_to_remove.push(item.0.clone());
}
}
}
// Only remove tokens if we actually revoked devices
let tokens_cleared = if removed > 0 {
let count = tokens_to_remove.len();
for key in &tokens_to_remove {
let _ = state.db.tokens.remove(key);
}
count
} else {
0
};
tracing::info!(
"Revoke-all for {}: {} devices removed, {} tokens cleared",
auth.fingerprint,
removed,
tokens_cleared,
);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"ok": true,
"devices_removed": removed,
"tokens_cleared": tokens_cleared,
})))
}

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//! Federation route handlers: WS endpoint for peer servers + status.
use axum::{
extract::{State, WebSocketUpgrade, ws::{Message, WebSocket}},
response::IntoResponse,
routing::get,
Json, Router,
};
use futures_util::{SinkExt, StreamExt};
use crate::state::AppState;
pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new()
.route("/federation/ws", get(federation_ws_handler))
.route("/federation/status", get(federation_status))
}
/// WebSocket endpoint for incoming peer server connections.
async fn federation_ws_handler(
ws: WebSocketUpgrade,
State(state): State<AppState>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
ws.on_upgrade(move |socket| handle_peer_ws(socket, state))
}
/// Handle an incoming federation WS connection from the peer server.
async fn handle_peer_ws(socket: WebSocket, state: AppState) {
let (mut ws_tx, mut ws_rx) = socket.split();
// First message must be auth
let secret = match state.federation {
Some(ref f) => f.config.shared_secret.clone(),
None => {
tracing::warn!("Federation: WS connection rejected -- federation not configured");
return;
}
};
// Wait for auth message (5 second timeout)
let auth_msg = tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(5),
ws_rx.next(),
).await;
let peer_id = match auth_msg {
Ok(Some(Ok(Message::Text(text)))) => {
if let Ok(parsed) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&text) {
let msg_type = parsed.get("type").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
let msg_secret = parsed.get("secret").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
let server_id = parsed.get("server_id").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("unknown");
if msg_type != "auth" || msg_secret != secret {
tracing::warn!("Federation: WS auth failed from {}", server_id);
return;
}
tracing::info!("Federation: peer {} authenticated via WS", server_id);
server_id.to_string()
} else {
tracing::warn!("Federation: invalid auth JSON");
return;
}
}
_ => {
tracing::warn!("Federation: no auth message received within timeout");
return;
}
};
// Process incoming messages from the authenticated peer
while let Some(Ok(msg)) = ws_rx.next().await {
if let Message::Text(text) = msg {
let parsed: serde_json::Value = match serde_json::from_str(&text) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(_) => continue,
};
let msg_type = parsed.get("type").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
match msg_type {
"presence" => {
let fingerprints: Vec<String> = parsed.get("fingerprints")
.and_then(|v| v.as_array())
.map(|arr| arr.iter().filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(String::from)).collect())
.unwrap_or_default();
let count = fingerprints.len();
if let Some(ref federation) = state.federation {
let mut rp = federation.remote_presence.lock().await;
rp.fingerprints = fingerprints.into_iter().collect();
rp.last_updated = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
rp.connected = true;
}
tracing::debug!("Federation WS: {} announced {} fingerprints", peer_id, count);
// Send our presence back
if let Some(ref federation) = state.federation {
let fps: Vec<String> = {
let conns = state.connections.lock().await;
conns.keys().cloned().collect()
};
let reply = serde_json::json!({
"type": "presence",
"server_id": federation.config.server_id,
"fingerprints": fps,
});
let _ = ws_tx.send(Message::Text(serde_json::to_string(&reply).unwrap_or_default())).await;
}
}
"forward" => {
let to = parsed.get("to").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
let message_b64 = parsed.get("message").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
let from_server = parsed.get("from_server").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("?");
if let Ok(message) = base64::Engine::decode(&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, message_b64) {
let delivered = state.push_to_client(to, &message).await;
if !delivered {
let key = format!("queue:{}:{}", to, uuid::Uuid::new_v4());
let _ = state.db.messages.insert(key.as_bytes(), message.as_slice());
tracing::info!("Federation WS: queued from {} for offline {}", from_server, to);
} else {
tracing::debug!("Federation WS: delivered from {} to {}", from_server, to);
}
}
}
_ => {}
}
}
}
// Peer disconnected
if let Some(ref federation) = state.federation {
let mut rp = federation.remote_presence.lock().await;
rp.connected = false;
rp.fingerprints.clear();
}
tracing::info!("Federation WS: peer {} disconnected", peer_id);
}
/// Federation health status.
async fn federation_status(
State(state): State<AppState>,
) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
match state.federation {
Some(ref federation) => {
let rp = federation.remote_presence.lock().await;
Json(serde_json::json!({
"enabled": true,
"server_id": federation.config.server_id,
"peer_id": federation.config.peer.id,
"peer_url": federation.config.peer.url,
"peer_connected": rp.connected,
"remote_clients": rp.fingerprints.len(),
"last_sync": rp.last_updated,
}))
}
None => {
Json(serde_json::json!({ "enabled": false }))
}
}
}

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use axum::{
extract::State,
routing::{get, post},
Json, Router,
};
use serde::Deserialize;
use crate::auth_middleware::AuthFingerprint;
use crate::errors::AppResult;
use crate::state::AppState;
pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new()
.route("/friends", get(get_friends))
.route("/friends", post(save_friends))
}
/// Get the encrypted friend list blob for the authenticated user.
async fn get_friends(
auth: AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
match state.db.friends.get(auth.fingerprint.as_bytes())? {
Some(data) => {
let blob = base64::Engine::encode(&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, &data);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"fingerprint": auth.fingerprint,
"data": blob,
})))
}
None => Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"fingerprint": auth.fingerprint,
"data": null,
}))),
}
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct SaveFriendsRequest {
data: String, // base64-encoded encrypted blob
}
/// Save the encrypted friend list blob.
async fn save_friends(
auth: AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<SaveFriendsRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let blob = base64::Engine::decode(&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, &req.data)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid base64: {}", e))?;
state.db.friends.insert(auth.fingerprint.as_bytes(), blob)?;
tracing::info!("Saved friend list for {} ({} bytes)", auth.fingerprint, req.data.len());
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true })))
}

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use axum::{
extract::{Path, State},
routing::{get, post},
Json, Router,
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::errors::AppResult;
use crate::state::AppState;
pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new()
.route("/groups", get(list_groups))
.route("/groups/create", post(create_group))
.route("/groups/:name", get(get_group))
.route("/groups/:name/join", post(join_group))
.route("/groups/:name/send", post(send_to_group))
.route("/groups/:name/leave", post(leave_group))
.route("/groups/:name/kick", post(kick_member))
.route("/groups/:name/members", get(get_members))
.route("/groups/:name/signal", post(signal_group))
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Clone)]
struct GroupInfo {
name: String,
creator: String,
members: Vec<String>, // fingerprints
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct CreateRequest {
name: String,
creator: String, // fingerprint
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct JoinRequest {
fingerprint: String,
}
/// A group message: the client sends one ciphertext per member.
/// Server fans out each entry to the respective member's message queue.
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct GroupSendRequest {
from: String,
/// Each entry is an encrypted message destined for one member.
/// The client encrypts separately for each recipient.
messages: Vec<MemberMessage>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct MemberMessage {
to: String, // member fingerprint
message: Vec<u8>, // encrypted payload (same format as 1:1 messages)
}
fn normalize_fp(fp: &str) -> String {
fp.chars()
.filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
.collect::<String>()
.to_lowercase()
}
fn load_group(db: &sled::Tree, name: &str) -> Option<GroupInfo> {
db.get(name.as_bytes())
.ok()
.flatten()
.and_then(|data| serde_json::from_slice(&data).ok())
}
fn save_group(db: &sled::Tree, group: &GroupInfo) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let data = serde_json::to_vec(group)?;
db.insert(group.name.as_bytes(), data)?;
Ok(())
}
async fn create_group(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<CreateRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let name = req.name.trim().to_lowercase();
if name.is_empty() {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "name required" })));
}
if load_group(&state.db.groups, &name).is_some() {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "group already exists" })));
}
let creator = normalize_fp(&req.creator);
let group = GroupInfo {
name: name.clone(),
creator: creator.clone(),
members: vec![creator],
};
save_group(&state.db.groups, &group)?;
tracing::info!("Group '{}' created", name);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true, "name": name })))
}
async fn join_group(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
Json(req): Json<JoinRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let fp = normalize_fp(&req.fingerprint);
// Auto-create if group doesn't exist
let mut group = match load_group(&state.db.groups, &name) {
Some(g) => g,
None => {
let g = GroupInfo {
name: name.clone(),
creator: fp.clone(),
members: vec![],
};
tracing::info!("Group '{}' auto-created by {}", name, fp);
g
}
};
if !group.members.contains(&fp) {
group.members.push(fp.clone());
tracing::info!("{} joined group '{}' ({} members)", fp, name, group.members.len());
}
save_group(&state.db.groups, &group)?;
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true, "members": group.members.len() })))
}
async fn get_group(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
match load_group(&state.db.groups, &name) {
Some(group) => Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"name": group.name,
"creator": group.creator,
"members": group.members,
"count": group.members.len(),
}))),
None => Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "group not found" }))),
}
}
async fn list_groups(
State(state): State<AppState>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let groups: Vec<serde_json::Value> = state
.db
.groups
.iter()
.filter_map(|item| {
item.ok().and_then(|(_, data)| {
serde_json::from_slice::<GroupInfo>(&data).ok().map(|g| {
serde_json::json!({
"name": g.name,
"members": g.members.len(),
})
})
})
})
.collect();
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "groups": groups })))
}
/// Fan-out: client sends per-member encrypted messages, server puts each
/// in the respective member's queue. This reuses the existing message
/// queue infrastructure — group messages look like 1:1 messages to the
/// recipient, but with a group tag.
async fn send_to_group(
_auth: crate::auth_middleware::AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
Json(req): Json<GroupSendRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let group = match load_group(&state.db.groups, &name) {
Some(g) => g,
None => return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "group not found" }))),
};
let from = normalize_fp(&req.from);
if !group.members.contains(&from) {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "not a member of this group" })));
}
let mut delivered = 0;
for msg in &req.messages {
let to = normalize_fp(&msg.to);
if group.members.contains(&to) {
// Try WebSocket push first (instant), fall back to DB queue
if state.push_to_client(&to, &msg.message).await {
tracing::debug!("Group '{}': pushed to {} via WS", name, to);
} else {
let key = format!("queue:{}:{}", to, uuid::Uuid::new_v4());
state.db.messages.insert(key.as_bytes(), msg.message.as_slice())?;
}
delivered += 1;
}
}
tracing::info!(
"Group '{}': {} sent {} messages to {} members",
name,
from,
delivered,
group.members.len()
);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true, "delivered": delivered })))
}
async fn leave_group(
_auth: crate::auth_middleware::AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
Json(req): Json<JoinRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let fp = normalize_fp(&req.fingerprint);
let mut group = match load_group(&state.db.groups, &name) {
Some(g) => g,
None => return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "group not found" }))),
};
group.members.retain(|m| m != &fp);
save_group(&state.db.groups, &group)?;
tracing::info!("{} left group '{}' ({} remaining)", fp, name, group.members.len());
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true, "remaining": group.members.len() })))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct KickRequest {
fingerprint: String, // who is doing the kicking (must be creator)
target: String, // who to kick
}
async fn kick_member(
_auth: crate::auth_middleware::AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
Json(req): Json<KickRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let fp = normalize_fp(&req.fingerprint);
let target = normalize_fp(&req.target);
let mut group = match load_group(&state.db.groups, &name) {
Some(g) => g,
None => return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "group not found" }))),
};
if group.creator != fp {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "only the creator can kick members" })));
}
if target == fp {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "cannot kick yourself" })));
}
let before = group.members.len();
group.members.retain(|m| m != &target);
if group.members.len() == before {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "target is not a member" })));
}
save_group(&state.db.groups, &group)?;
tracing::info!("{} kicked {} from group '{}'", fp, target, name);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true, "kicked": target, "remaining": group.members.len() })))
}
async fn get_members(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let group = match load_group(&state.db.groups, &name) {
Some(g) => g,
None => return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "group not found" }))),
};
// Resolve aliases and online status for each member
let mut members_info: Vec<serde_json::Value> = Vec::new();
let mut online_count: usize = 0;
for fp in &group.members {
let alias = state.db.aliases.get(format!("fp:{}", fp).as_bytes())
.ok().flatten()
.map(|v| String::from_utf8_lossy(&v).to_string());
let online = state.is_online(fp).await;
if online {
online_count += 1;
}
members_info.push(serde_json::json!({
"fingerprint": fp,
"alias": alias,
"is_creator": *fp == group.creator,
"online": online,
}));
}
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"name": group.name,
"members": members_info,
"count": members_info.len(),
"online_count": online_count,
})))
}
/// Broadcast a plaintext signal to all online group members via WS push.
/// Used for group calls, typing indicators, etc. — NOT for encrypted messages.
async fn signal_group(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
Json(req): Json<serde_json::Value>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let group = match load_group(&state.db.groups, &name) {
Some(g) => g,
None => return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "group not found" }))),
};
let from = req
.get("from")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.unwrap_or("")
.to_string();
let from = normalize_fp(&from);
if !group.members.contains(&from) {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "not a member" })));
}
// Broadcast the raw JSON payload to all online members except sender
let payload = serde_json::to_vec(&req).unwrap_or_default();
let mut pushed = 0;
for member in &group.members {
if *member == from {
continue;
}
if state.push_to_client(member, &payload).await {
pushed += 1;
}
}
tracing::info!(
"Group '{}' signal from {}: pushed to {}/{} members",
name,
from,
pushed,
group.members.len() - 1
);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true, "pushed": pushed })))
}

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use axum::{extract::ConnectInfo, http::HeaderMap, routing::get, Json, Router};
use serde_json::json;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use crate::state::AppState;
pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new()
.route("/health", get(health))
.route("/whoami", get(whoami))
}
async fn health() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
Json(json!({ "status": "ok", "version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION") }))
}
async fn whoami(
headers: HeaderMap,
connect_info: Option<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>,
) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
// Prefer X-Forwarded-For (set by Caddy/reverse proxy), then X-Real-Ip, then direct
let forwarded = headers
.get("x-forwarded-for")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|v| v.split(',').next().unwrap_or("").trim().to_string());
let real_ip = headers
.get("x-real-ip")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|s| s.to_string());
let direct = connect_info.map(|ci| ci.0.ip().to_string());
let ip = forwarded.clone()
.or(real_ip.clone())
.or(direct.clone())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "unknown".to_string());
// Classify as IPv4 or IPv6
let is_v6 = ip.contains(':');
let via = headers.get("via").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()).map(|s| s.to_string());
let proto = headers.get("x-forwarded-proto").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()).map(|s| s.to_string());
let host = headers.get("x-forwarded-host").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()).map(|s| s.to_string());
let behind_proxy = forwarded.is_some() || real_ip.is_some() || via.is_some();
let mut result = json!({
"ip": ip,
"version": if is_v6 { "IPv6" } else { "IPv4" },
"direct": direct,
"behind_proxy": behind_proxy,
});
if behind_proxy {
let proxy = json!({
"x_forwarded_for": forwarded,
"x_real_ip": real_ip,
"x_forwarded_proto": proto,
"x_forwarded_host": host,
"via": via,
});
result.as_object_mut().unwrap().insert("proxy".to_string(), proxy);
}
Json(result)
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
use axum::{
extract::{Path, State},
routing::{get, post},
Json, Router,
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::state::AppState;
pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new()
.route("/keys/register", post(register_keys))
.route("/keys/replenish", post(replenish_otpks))
.route("/keys/list", get(list_keys))
.route("/keys/:fingerprint", get(get_bundle))
.route("/keys/:fingerprint/otpk-count", get(otpk_count))
.route("/keys/:fingerprint/devices", get(list_devices))
}
/// Debug endpoint: list all registered fingerprints.
async fn list_keys(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
let keys: Vec<String> = state
.db
.keys
.iter()
.filter_map(|item| {
item.ok()
.and_then(|(k, _)| String::from_utf8(k.to_vec()).ok())
})
.collect();
tracing::info!("Listed {} registered keys", keys.len());
Json(serde_json::json!({ "keys": keys, "count": keys.len() }))
}
/// Normalize fingerprint: strip colons, lowercase.
fn normalize_fp(fp: &str) -> String {
fp.chars()
.filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
.collect::<String>()
.to_lowercase()
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct RegisterRequest {
fingerprint: String,
#[serde(default)]
device_id: Option<String>,
bundle: Vec<u8>,
#[serde(default)]
eth_address: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct RegisterResponse {
ok: bool,
}
async fn register_keys(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<RegisterRequest>,
) -> Json<RegisterResponse> {
let fp = normalize_fp(&req.fingerprint);
let device_id = req.device_id.unwrap_or_else(|| "default".to_string());
// Store bundle keyed by fingerprint (primary, used for lookup)
let _ = state.db.keys.insert(fp.as_bytes(), req.bundle.clone());
// Also store per-device: device:<fp>:<device_id> → bundle
let device_key = format!("device:{}:{}", fp, device_id);
let _ = state.db.keys.insert(device_key.as_bytes(), req.bundle);
// Store ETH address mapping if provided
if let Some(ref eth) = req.eth_address {
let eth_lower = eth.to_lowercase();
// eth -> fp
let _ = state.db.eth_addresses.insert(eth_lower.as_bytes(), fp.as_bytes());
// fp -> eth (reverse lookup)
let _ = state.db.eth_addresses.insert(format!("rev:{}", fp).as_bytes(), eth_lower.as_bytes());
tracing::info!("ETH address mapped: {} -> {}", eth_lower, fp);
}
tracing::info!("Registered bundle for {} (device: {})", fp, device_id);
Json(RegisterResponse { ok: true })
}
async fn get_bundle(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(fingerprint): Path<String>,
) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, axum::http::StatusCode> {
let key = normalize_fp(&fingerprint);
tracing::info!("get_bundle: raw path='{}', normalized='{}'", fingerprint, key);
// Debug: list what's in the DB
let all_keys: Vec<String> = state.db.keys.iter()
.filter_map(|r| r.ok().and_then(|(k, _)| String::from_utf8(k.to_vec()).ok()))
.collect();
tracing::info!("get_bundle: DB contains {} keys: {:?}", all_keys.len(), all_keys);
// Check if this fingerprint registered locally (has a device: entry)
let device_prefix = format!("device:{}:", key);
let is_local = state.db.keys.scan_prefix(device_prefix.as_bytes()).next().is_some();
// For remote clients, always proxy from the federation peer (bundles may change)
if !is_local {
if let Some(ref federation) = state.federation {
if let Some(bundle_bytes) = federation.fetch_remote_bundle(&key).await {
tracing::info!("get_bundle: PROXIED from federation peer for {}", key);
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"fingerprint": fingerprint,
"bundle": base64::Engine::encode(&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, &bundle_bytes),
})));
}
}
}
match state.db.keys.get(key.as_bytes()) {
Ok(Some(data)) => {
tracing::info!("get_bundle: FOUND {} bytes for {} (local={})", data.len(), key, is_local);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"fingerprint": fingerprint,
"bundle": base64::Engine::encode(&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, &data),
})))
}
Ok(None) => {
tracing::warn!("get_bundle: NOT FOUND for key '{}'", key);
Err(axum::http::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND)
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!("get_bundle: DB error: {}", e);
Err(axum::http::StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)
}
}
}
/// Check how many one-time pre-keys remain for a fingerprint.
async fn otpk_count(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(fingerprint): Path<String>,
) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
let fp = normalize_fp(&fingerprint);
let prefix = format!("otpk:{}:", fp);
let count = state.db.keys.scan_prefix(prefix.as_bytes()).count();
Json(serde_json::json!({ "fingerprint": fp, "otpk_count": count }))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct ReplenishRequest {
fingerprint: String,
/// One-time pre-keys: list of {id, public_key_hex}
otpks: Vec<OtpkEntry>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct OtpkEntry {
id: u32,
public_key: String, // hex-encoded 32-byte X25519 public key
}
/// Upload additional one-time pre-keys.
async fn replenish_otpks(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<ReplenishRequest>,
) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
let fp = normalize_fp(&req.fingerprint);
let mut stored = 0;
for otpk in &req.otpks {
let key = format!("otpk:{}:{}", fp, otpk.id);
let _ = state.db.keys.insert(key.as_bytes(), otpk.public_key.as_bytes());
stored += 1;
}
let prefix = format!("otpk:{}:", fp);
let total = state.db.keys.scan_prefix(prefix.as_bytes()).count();
tracing::info!("Replenished {} OTPKs for {} (total: {})", stored, fp, total);
Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true, "stored": stored, "total": total }))
}
/// List all registered devices for a fingerprint.
async fn list_devices(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(fingerprint): Path<String>,
) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
let fp = normalize_fp(&fingerprint);
let prefix = format!("device:{}:", fp);
let devices: Vec<String> = state.db.keys.scan_prefix(prefix.as_bytes())
.filter_map(|item| {
item.ok().and_then(|(k, _)| {
let key_str = String::from_utf8_lossy(&k).to_string();
// key format: device:<fp>:<device_id>
key_str.rsplit(':').next().map(|s| s.to_string())
})
})
.collect();
Json(serde_json::json!({ "fingerprint": fp, "devices": devices, "count": devices.len() }))
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
use axum::{
extract::{Path, State},
routing::{delete, get, post},
Json, Router,
};
use serde::Deserialize;
use warzone_protocol::message::WireMessage;
use crate::errors::AppResult;
use crate::state::AppState;
/// Try to extract the message ID from raw WireMessage bytes (envelope or legacy).
fn extract_message_id(data: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
if let Ok(wire) = warzone_protocol::message::deserialize_envelope(data) {
match wire {
WireMessage::KeyExchange { id, .. } => Some(id),
WireMessage::Message { id, .. } => Some(id),
WireMessage::FileHeader { id, .. } => Some(id),
WireMessage::FileChunk { id, .. } => Some(id),
WireMessage::Receipt { message_id, .. } => Some(message_id),
WireMessage::GroupSenderKey { id, .. } => Some(id),
WireMessage::SenderKeyDistribution { sender_fingerprint, group_name, .. } => {
Some(format!("skd:{}:{}", sender_fingerprint, group_name))
}
WireMessage::CallSignal { id, .. } => Some(id),
}
} else {
None
}
}
/// Touch the alias TTL for a fingerprint (renew on authenticated action).
pub fn renew_alias_ttl(db: &sled::Tree, fp: &str) {
let alias_key = format!("fp:{}", fp);
if let Ok(Some(alias_bytes)) = db.get(alias_key.as_bytes()) {
let alias = String::from_utf8_lossy(&alias_bytes).to_string();
let rec_key = format!("rec:{}", alias);
if let Ok(Some(rec_data)) = db.get(rec_key.as_bytes()) {
if let Ok(mut record) = serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&rec_data) {
if let Some(obj) = record.as_object_mut() {
obj.insert("last_active".into(), serde_json::json!(chrono::Utc::now().timestamp()));
if let Ok(updated) = serde_json::to_vec(&record) {
let _ = db.insert(rec_key.as_bytes(), updated);
}
}
}
}
}
}
pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new()
.route("/messages/send", post(send_message))
.route("/messages/poll/:fingerprint", get(poll_messages))
.route("/messages/:id/ack", delete(ack_message))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct SendRequest {
to: String,
#[serde(default)]
from: Option<String>,
message: Vec<u8>,
}
fn normalize_fp(fp: &str) -> String {
fp.chars()
.filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
.collect::<String>()
.to_lowercase()
}
async fn send_message(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<SendRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let to = normalize_fp(&req.to);
// Dedup: if we have already seen this message ID, silently drop it
if let Some(msg_id) = extract_message_id(&req.message) {
if state.dedup.check_and_insert(&msg_id) {
tracing::debug!("Dedup: dropping duplicate message {}", msg_id);
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true })));
}
}
let delivered = state.deliver_or_queue(&to, &req.message).await;
if delivered {
tracing::info!("Delivered message to {} ({} bytes)", to, req.message.len());
} else {
tracing::info!("Queued message for {} ({} bytes)", to, req.message.len());
}
// Renew sender's alias TTL (sending = authenticated action)
if let Some(ref from) = req.from {
renew_alias_ttl(&state.db.aliases, &normalize_fp(from));
}
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true })))
}
/// Poll fetches all queued messages and deletes them from the server.
/// This is store-and-forward: once delivered, the server drops them.
async fn poll_messages(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(fingerprint): Path<String>,
) -> AppResult<Json<Vec<String>>> {
let prefix = format!("queue:{}", normalize_fp(&fingerprint));
let mut messages = Vec::new();
let mut keys_to_delete = Vec::new();
for item in state.db.messages.scan_prefix(prefix.as_bytes()) {
let (key, value) = item?;
messages.push(base64::Engine::encode(
&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD,
&value,
));
keys_to_delete.push(key);
}
// Delete after collecting (fetch-and-delete)
for key in &keys_to_delete {
state.db.messages.remove(key)?;
}
if !messages.is_empty() {
tracing::info!(
"Delivered {} message(s) to {}, deleted from queue",
messages.len(),
normalize_fp(&fingerprint)
);
}
Ok(Json(messages))
}
/// Explicit ack endpoint (for future use with selective delivery).
async fn ack_message(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(id): Path<String>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
state.db.messages.remove(id.as_bytes())?;
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "ok": true })))
}

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mod aliases;
pub mod auth;
pub mod bot;
mod calls;
mod devices;
mod federation;
mod friends;
mod groups;
mod health;
mod keys;
pub mod messages;
mod presence;
mod resolve;
mod web;
mod ws;
mod wzp;
use axum::Router;
use crate::state::AppState;
pub fn router() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new()
.merge(health::routes())
.merge(keys::routes())
.merge(messages::routes())
.merge(groups::routes())
.merge(aliases::routes())
.merge(auth::routes())
.merge(ws::routes())
.merge(calls::routes())
.merge(devices::routes())
.merge(presence::routes())
.merge(wzp::routes())
.merge(friends::routes())
.merge(federation::routes())
.merge(bot::routes())
.merge(resolve::routes())
}
/// Web UI router (served at root, outside /v1)
pub fn web_router() -> Router<AppState> {
web::routes()
}

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use axum::{
extract::{Path, State},
routing::{get, post},
Json, Router,
};
use serde::Deserialize;
use crate::errors::AppResult;
use crate::state::AppState;
pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new()
.route("/presence/:fingerprint", get(get_presence))
.route("/presence/batch", post(batch_presence))
}
fn normalize_fp(fp: &str) -> String {
fp.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).collect::<String>().to_lowercase()
}
async fn get_presence(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(fingerprint): Path<String>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let fp = normalize_fp(&fingerprint);
let online = state.is_online(&fp).await;
let devices = state.device_count(&fp).await;
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"fingerprint": fp,
"online": online,
"devices": devices,
})))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct BatchRequest {
fingerprints: Vec<String>,
}
async fn batch_presence(
_auth: crate::auth_middleware::AuthFingerprint,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(req): Json<BatchRequest>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let mut results = Vec::new();
for fp in &req.fingerprints {
let fp = normalize_fp(fp);
let online = state.is_online(&fp).await;
let devices = state.device_count(&fp).await;
results.push(serde_json::json!({
"fingerprint": fp,
"online": online,
"devices": devices,
}));
}
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "results": results })))
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
use axum::{
extract::{Path, State},
routing::get,
Json, Router,
};
use crate::errors::AppResult;
use crate::state::AppState;
/// Convert a fingerprint to a per-bot unique numeric ID.
/// Hash(bot_token + user_fp) → i64. Different bots see different IDs for the same user.
/// This prevents cross-bot user correlation (same privacy model as Telegram).
pub fn fp_to_numeric_id_for_bot(fp: &str, bot_token: &str) -> i64 {
use sha2::{Sha256, Digest};
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(bot_token.as_bytes());
hasher.update(b":");
hasher.update(fp.as_bytes());
let hash = hasher.finalize();
let mut arr = [0u8; 8];
arr.copy_from_slice(&hash[..8]);
i64::from_be_bytes(arr) & 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF // ensure positive
}
/// Convert a fingerprint hex string to a stable i64 ID (non-bot contexts).
/// Uses first 8 bytes of the fingerprint as a positive i64.
pub fn fp_to_numeric_id(fp: &str) -> i64 {
let clean: String = fp.chars().filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()).take(16).collect();
let bytes = hex::decode(&clean).unwrap_or_default();
if bytes.len() >= 8 {
let mut arr = [0u8; 8];
arr.copy_from_slice(&bytes[..8]);
i64::from_be_bytes(arr) & 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF // ensure positive
} else {
0
}
}
pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new().route("/resolve/:address", get(resolve_address))
}
/// Resolve an address to a fingerprint.
///
/// Accepts: ETH address (`0x...`), alias (`@name`), or raw fingerprint.
async fn resolve_address(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(address): Path<String>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
let addr = address.trim().to_lowercase();
// ETH address: 0x...
if addr.starts_with("0x") {
if let Some(fp_bytes) = state.db.eth_addresses.get(addr.as_bytes())? {
let fp = String::from_utf8_lossy(&fp_bytes).to_string();
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"address": address,
"fingerprint": fp,
"numeric_id": fp_to_numeric_id(&fp),
"type": "eth",
})));
}
// Try federation
if let Some(ref federation) = state.federation {
let url = format!("{}/v1/resolve/{}", federation.config.peer.url, addr);
if let Ok(resp) = federation.client.get(&url).send().await {
if resp.status().is_success() {
if let Ok(data) = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await {
if let Some(fp) = data.get("fingerprint").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"address": address,
"fingerprint": fp,
"numeric_id": fp_to_numeric_id(fp),
"type": "eth",
"federated": true,
})));
}
}
}
}
}
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "address not found" })));
}
// Alias: @name
if addr.starts_with('@') {
let alias = &addr[1..];
// Try local alias resolution
let alias_key = format!("a:{}", alias);
if let Some(fp_bytes) = state.db.aliases.get(alias_key.as_bytes())? {
let fp = String::from_utf8_lossy(&fp_bytes).to_string();
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"address": address,
"fingerprint": fp,
"numeric_id": fp_to_numeric_id(&fp),
"type": "alias",
})));
}
// Try federation
if let Some(ref federation) = state.federation {
if let Some(fp) = federation.resolve_remote_alias(alias).await {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"address": address,
"fingerprint": fp,
"numeric_id": fp_to_numeric_id(&fp),
"type": "alias",
"federated": true,
})));
}
}
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "alias not found" })));
}
// Raw fingerprint: just echo back with optional reverse ETH lookup
let fp = addr
.chars()
.filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
.collect::<String>();
if fp.len() == 32 {
let rev_key = format!("rev:{}", fp);
let eth = state
.db
.eth_addresses
.get(rev_key.as_bytes())?
.map(|v| String::from_utf8_lossy(&v).to_string());
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"address": address,
"fingerprint": fp,
"numeric_id": fp_to_numeric_id(&fp),
"eth_address": eth,
"type": "fingerprint",
})));
}
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "unrecognized address format" })))
}

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//! WebSocket endpoint for real-time message delivery.
//!
//! Protocol:
//! 1. Client connects to /v1/ws/:fingerprint
//! 2. Server sends any queued messages (from DB)
//! 3. Server pushes new messages in real-time
//! 4. Client sends messages as binary WireMessage frames
//! 5. Server routes to recipient's WS or queues in DB
use axum::{
extract::{
ws::{Message, WebSocket},
Path, State, WebSocketUpgrade,
},
response::IntoResponse,
routing::get,
Router,
};
use futures_util::{SinkExt, StreamExt};
use warzone_protocol::message::WireMessage;
use crate::state::AppState;
/// Try to extract the message ID from raw WireMessage bytes (envelope or legacy).
fn extract_message_id(data: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
if let Ok(wire) = warzone_protocol::message::deserialize_envelope(data) {
match wire {
WireMessage::KeyExchange { id, .. } => Some(id),
WireMessage::Message { id, .. } => Some(id),
WireMessage::FileHeader { id, .. } => Some(id),
WireMessage::FileChunk { id, .. } => Some(id),
WireMessage::Receipt { message_id, .. } => Some(message_id),
WireMessage::GroupSenderKey { id, .. } => Some(id),
WireMessage::SenderKeyDistribution { sender_fingerprint, group_name, .. } => {
Some(format!("skd:{}:{}", sender_fingerprint, group_name))
}
WireMessage::CallSignal { id, .. } => Some(id),
}
} else {
None
}
}
pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new().route("/ws/:fingerprint", get(ws_handler))
}
fn normalize_fp(fp: &str) -> String {
fp.chars()
.filter(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
.collect::<String>()
.to_lowercase()
}
async fn ws_handler(
ws: WebSocketUpgrade,
State(state): State<AppState>,
Path(fingerprint): Path<String>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let fp = normalize_fp(&fingerprint);
tracing::info!("WS upgrade request from {}", fp);
ws.on_upgrade(move |socket| handle_socket(socket, state, fp))
}
async fn handle_socket(socket: WebSocket, state: AppState, fingerprint: String) {
let (mut ws_tx, mut ws_rx) = socket.split();
// Register for push delivery
let (_device_id, mut push_rx) = match state.register_ws(&fingerprint, None).await {
Some(pair) => pair,
None => {
tracing::warn!("WS {}: rejected — connection limit reached", fingerprint);
return; // closes the socket
}
};
// Send any queued messages from DB
let prefix = format!("queue:{}", fingerprint);
let mut keys_to_delete = Vec::new();
for (key, value) in state.db.messages.scan_prefix(prefix.as_bytes()).flatten() {
if ws_tx.send(Message::Binary(value.to_vec())).await.is_ok() {
keys_to_delete.push(key);
}
}
for key in &keys_to_delete {
let _ = state.db.messages.remove(key);
}
if !keys_to_delete.is_empty() {
tracing::info!("WS {}: flushed {} queued messages", fingerprint, keys_to_delete.len());
}
// Flush missed calls (FC-7)
let missed_prefix = format!("missed:{}", fingerprint);
let mut missed_keys = Vec::new();
for (key, value) in state.db.missed_calls.scan_prefix(missed_prefix.as_bytes()).flatten() {
if let Ok(missed) = serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&value) {
let wrapper = serde_json::json!({
"type": "missed_call",
"data": missed,
});
if let Ok(json_str) = serde_json::to_string(&wrapper) {
if ws_tx.send(Message::Text(json_str)).await.is_ok() {
missed_keys.push(key);
}
}
}
}
for key in &missed_keys {
let _ = state.db.missed_calls.remove(key);
}
if !missed_keys.is_empty() {
tracing::info!("WS {}: flushed {} missed call notifications", fingerprint, missed_keys.len());
}
// Spawn task to forward push messages to WS
let _fp_clone = fingerprint.clone();
let mut push_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(msg) = push_rx.recv().await {
if ws_tx.send(Message::Binary(msg)).await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
ws_tx
});
// Handle incoming messages from client
let state_clone = state.clone();
let fp_clone2 = fingerprint.clone();
let mut recv_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(Ok(msg)) = ws_rx.next().await {
match msg {
Message::Binary(data) => {
// Parse as a simple { to: "fp", message: bytes } JSON
// Or just raw WireMessage bytes with a 32-byte fingerprint prefix
// For simplicity: first 32 hex chars = recipient fp, rest = message
if data.len() > 64 {
let header = String::from_utf8_lossy(&data[..64]).to_string();
let raw_fp = normalize_fp(&header);
// The WS header is 64 hex chars (32 bytes padded with '0').
// Fingerprints are 32 hex chars. Truncate to 32 if zero-padded.
let to_fp = if raw_fp.len() > 32 && raw_fp[32..].chars().all(|c| c == '0') {
raw_fp[..32].to_string()
} else {
raw_fp
};
let message = &data[64..];
// Dedup: skip if we already processed this message ID
if let Some(msg_id) = extract_message_id(message) {
if state_clone.dedup.check_and_insert(&msg_id) {
tracing::debug!("WS dedup: dropping duplicate binary message {}", msg_id);
continue;
}
}
// Call signal side effects
if let Ok(WireMessage::CallSignal { ref id, ref sender_fingerprint, ref signal_type, .. }) = warzone_protocol::message::deserialize_envelope(message) {
use warzone_protocol::message::CallSignalType;
let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
match signal_type {
CallSignalType::Offer => {
let call = crate::state::CallState {
call_id: id.clone(),
caller_fp: sender_fingerprint.clone(),
callee_fp: to_fp.clone(),
group_name: None,
room_id: None,
status: crate::state::CallStatus::Ringing,
created_at: now,
answered_at: None,
ended_at: None,
};
state_clone.active_calls.lock().await.insert(id.clone(), call.clone());
// Persist to DB
let _ = state_clone.db.calls.insert(
id.as_bytes(),
serde_json::to_vec(&call).unwrap_or_default(),
);
tracing::info!("Call {} started: {} -> {}", id, sender_fingerprint, to_fp);
// If callee is offline, record missed call (FC-7)
if !state_clone.is_online(&to_fp).await {
let missed_key = format!("missed:{}:{}", to_fp, id);
let missed = serde_json::json!({
"call_id": id,
"caller_fp": sender_fingerprint,
"timestamp": now,
});
let _ = state_clone.db.missed_calls.insert(
missed_key.as_bytes(),
serde_json::to_vec(&missed).unwrap_or_default(),
);
tracing::info!("Missed call recorded for offline user {}", to_fp);
}
}
CallSignalType::Answer => {
let mut calls = state_clone.active_calls.lock().await;
if let Some(call) = calls.get_mut(id) {
call.status = crate::state::CallStatus::Active;
call.answered_at = Some(now);
let _ = state_clone.db.calls.insert(
id.as_bytes(),
serde_json::to_vec(&call).unwrap_or_default(),
);
}
tracing::info!("Call {} answered", id);
}
CallSignalType::Hangup | CallSignalType::Reject => {
let mut calls = state_clone.active_calls.lock().await;
if let Some(mut call) = calls.remove(id) {
call.status = crate::state::CallStatus::Ended;
call.ended_at = Some(now);
let _ = state_clone.db.calls.insert(
id.as_bytes(),
serde_json::to_vec(&call).unwrap_or_default(),
);
}
tracing::info!("Call {} ended", id);
}
_ => {} // Ringing, Busy, IceCandidate — route opaquely
}
}
// Deliver via local WS, federation, or queue in DB
state_clone.deliver_or_queue(&to_fp, message).await;
tracing::debug!("WS {}: routed message to {}", fp_clone2, to_fp);
}
}
Message::Text(text) => {
// JSON format: {"to": "fp", "message": [bytes]}
if let Ok(parsed) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&text) {
let to = parsed.get("to").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
let to_fp = normalize_fp(to);
if let Some(msg_arr) = parsed.get("message").and_then(|v| v.as_array()) {
let message: Vec<u8> = msg_arr.iter()
.filter_map(|v| v.as_u64().map(|n| n as u8))
.collect();
// Dedup: skip if we already processed this message ID
if let Some(msg_id) = extract_message_id(&message) {
if state_clone.dedup.check_and_insert(&msg_id) {
tracing::debug!("WS dedup: dropping duplicate JSON message {}", msg_id);
continue;
}
}
// Deliver via local WS, federation, or queue in DB
state_clone.deliver_or_queue(&to_fp, &message).await;
// Renew alias TTL
crate::routes::messages::renew_alias_ttl(
&state_clone.db.aliases, &fp_clone2,
);
tracing::debug!("WS {}: routed JSON message to {}", fp_clone2, to_fp);
}
}
}
Message::Close(_) => break,
_ => {}
}
}
});
// Wait for either task to finish
tokio::select! {
_ = &mut push_task => {
recv_task.abort();
}
_ = &mut recv_task => {
push_task.abort();
}
}
// Unregister
// We can't easily get the sender ref here, so just clean up by fingerprint
// In production, use a unique connection ID
let mut conns = state.connections.lock().await;
if let Some(devices) = conns.get_mut(&fingerprint) {
devices.retain(|d| !d.sender.is_closed());
if devices.is_empty() {
conns.remove(&fingerprint);
}
}
tracing::info!("WS {} disconnected", fingerprint);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
use axum::{
extract::State,
routing::get,
Json, Router,
};
use crate::errors::AppResult;
use crate::state::AppState;
pub fn routes() -> Router<AppState> {
Router::new()
.route("/wzp/relay-config", get(relay_config))
}
/// Returns the WZP relay address and a short-lived service token.
///
/// The web client calls this to discover where to connect for voice/video
/// and gets a token to present to the relay for authentication.
async fn relay_config(
State(state): State<AppState>,
) -> AppResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
// Issue a short-lived service token (5 minutes) for WZP relay auth.
let token = hex::encode(rand::random::<[u8; 32]>());
let expires = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() + 300; // 5 minutes
state.db.tokens.insert(
token.as_bytes(),
serde_json::to_vec(&serde_json::json!({
"fingerprint": "service:wzp",
"service": "wzp",
"expires_at": expires,
}))?.as_slice(),
)?;
// The relay address is configured server-side. For now, return a
// placeholder that the admin sets via environment variable.
let relay_addr = std::env::var("WZP_RELAY_ADDR")
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "127.0.0.1:4433".to_string());
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"relay_addr": relay_addr,
"token": token,
"expires_in": 300,
})))
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet, VecDeque};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, mpsc};
use crate::db::Database;
/// Maximum WebSocket connections per fingerprint (multi-device cap).
const MAX_WS_PER_FINGERPRINT: usize = 5;
/// Maximum number of message IDs to track for deduplication.
const DEDUP_CAPACITY: usize = 10_000;
/// Per-connection sender: messages are pushed here for instant delivery.
pub type WsSender = mpsc::UnboundedSender<Vec<u8>>;
/// Metadata for a single connected device.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct DeviceConnection {
pub device_id: String,
pub sender: WsSender,
pub connected_at: i64,
pub token: Option<String>,
}
/// Connected clients: fingerprint → list of device connections (multiple devices).
pub type Connections = Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Vec<DeviceConnection>>>>;
/// Bounded dedup tracker: FIFO eviction when capacity is exceeded.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct DedupTracker {
seen: Arc<std::sync::Mutex<HashSet<String>>>,
order: Arc<std::sync::Mutex<VecDeque<String>>>,
}
impl DedupTracker {
pub fn new() -> Self {
DedupTracker {
seen: Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(HashSet::with_capacity(DEDUP_CAPACITY))),
order: Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(VecDeque::with_capacity(DEDUP_CAPACITY))),
}
}
/// Returns `true` if this ID was already seen (i.e. it is a duplicate).
/// If new, inserts it and evicts the oldest if over capacity.
pub fn check_and_insert(&self, id: &str) -> bool {
let mut seen = self.seen.lock().unwrap();
if seen.contains(id) {
return true; // duplicate
}
let mut order = self.order.lock().unwrap();
if seen.len() >= DEDUP_CAPACITY {
if let Some(oldest) = order.pop_front() {
seen.remove(&oldest);
}
}
seen.insert(id.to_string());
order.push_back(id.to_string());
false // not a duplicate
}
}
/// Call lifecycle status.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
pub enum CallStatus {
Ringing,
Active,
Ended,
}
/// Server-side state for an active or recently ended call.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct CallState {
pub call_id: String,
pub caller_fp: String,
pub callee_fp: String,
pub group_name: Option<String>,
pub room_id: Option<String>,
pub status: CallStatus,
pub created_at: i64,
pub answered_at: Option<i64>,
pub ended_at: Option<i64>,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct AppState {
pub db: Arc<Database>,
pub connections: Connections,
pub dedup: DedupTracker,
pub active_calls: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, CallState>>>,
pub federation: Option<crate::federation::FederationHandle>,
pub bots_enabled: bool,
}
impl AppState {
pub fn new(data_dir: &str) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
let db = Database::open(data_dir)?;
Ok(AppState {
db: Arc::new(db),
connections: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
dedup: DedupTracker::new(),
active_calls: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
federation: None,
bots_enabled: false,
})
}
/// Try to push a message to a connected client. Returns true if delivered.
pub async fn push_to_client(&self, fingerprint: &str, message: &[u8]) -> bool {
let conns = self.connections.lock().await;
if let Some(devices) = conns.get(fingerprint) {
let mut delivered = false;
for device in devices {
if device.sender.send(message.to_vec()).is_ok() {
delivered = true;
}
}
delivered
} else {
false
}
}
/// Register a WS connection for a fingerprint.
///
/// Returns `None` if the per-fingerprint connection cap has been reached.
/// On success, returns the assigned device ID and a receiver for push messages.
pub async fn register_ws(&self, fingerprint: &str, token: Option<String>) -> Option<(String, mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<Vec<u8>>)> {
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let device_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string()[..8].to_string();
let mut conns = self.connections.lock().await;
let entry = conns.entry(fingerprint.to_string()).or_default();
// Clean up closed connections first
entry.retain(|d| !d.sender.is_closed());
if entry.len() >= MAX_WS_PER_FINGERPRINT {
tracing::warn!(
"WS connection cap reached for {} ({} connections)",
fingerprint,
entry.len()
);
return None;
}
entry.push(DeviceConnection {
device_id: device_id.clone(),
sender: tx,
connected_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
token,
});
tracing::info!(
"WS registered for {} device={} ({} total)",
fingerprint,
device_id,
conns.values().map(|v| v.len()).sum::<usize>()
);
Some((device_id, rx))
}
/// Unregister a WS connection.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn unregister_ws(&self, fingerprint: &str, sender: &WsSender) {
let mut conns = self.connections.lock().await;
if let Some(devices) = conns.get_mut(fingerprint) {
devices.retain(|d| !d.sender.same_channel(sender));
if devices.is_empty() {
conns.remove(fingerprint);
}
}
tracing::info!("WS unregistered for {}", fingerprint);
}
/// Try to deliver a message: local push → federation forward → DB queue.
/// Returns true if delivered instantly (local or remote).
pub async fn deliver_or_queue(&self, to_fp: &str, message: &[u8]) -> bool {
// BotFather: intercept messages to @botfather
if self.bots_enabled && to_fp == "00000000000000000b0ffa00e000000f" {
// Extract sender from message
if let Ok(msg) = serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(message) {
let from = msg.get("from").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if !from.is_empty() {
if crate::botfather::handle_botfather_message(self, from, message).await {
return true;
}
}
}
}
// 1. Try local WebSocket push
if self.push_to_client(to_fp, message).await {
return true;
}
// 2. Try federation forward
if let Some(ref federation) = self.federation {
if federation.is_remote(to_fp).await {
if federation.forward_message(to_fp, message).await {
return true;
}
}
}
// 3. Queue in local DB
let key = format!("queue:{}:{}", to_fp, uuid::Uuid::new_v4());
let _ = self.db.messages.insert(key.as_bytes(), message);
// 4. Try bot webhook delivery (async, does not block the caller)
{
let state = self.clone();
let fp = to_fp.to_string();
let queue_key = key.clone();
let msg = message.to_vec();
tokio::spawn(async move {
if crate::routes::bot::try_bot_webhook(&state, &fp, &msg).await {
// Webhook accepted -- remove from offline queue
let _ = state.db.messages.remove(queue_key.as_bytes());
}
});
}
false
}
/// Check if a fingerprint has any active WS connections.
pub async fn is_online(&self, fingerprint: &str) -> bool {
let conns = self.connections.lock().await;
conns.get(fingerprint).map(|d| !d.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
}
/// Count active WS connections for a fingerprint (multi-device).
pub async fn device_count(&self, fingerprint: &str) -> usize {
let conns = self.connections.lock().await;
conns.get(fingerprint).map(|d| d.len()).unwrap_or(0)
}
/// List devices for a fingerprint with metadata.
pub async fn list_devices(&self, fingerprint: &str) -> Vec<(String, i64)> {
let conns = self.connections.lock().await;
conns.get(fingerprint)
.map(|devices| devices.iter().map(|d| (d.device_id.clone(), d.connected_at)).collect())
.unwrap_or_default()
}
/// Kick a specific device by ID. Returns true if found and kicked.
pub async fn kick_device(&self, fingerprint: &str, device_id: &str) -> bool {
let mut conns = self.connections.lock().await;
if let Some(devices) = conns.get_mut(fingerprint) {
let before = devices.len();
devices.retain(|d| d.device_id != device_id);
let kicked = devices.len() < before;
if devices.is_empty() {
conns.remove(fingerprint);
}
kicked
} else {
false
}
}
/// Revoke all connections for a fingerprint except one device_id.
pub async fn revoke_all_except(&self, fingerprint: &str, keep_device_id: &str) -> usize {
let mut conns = self.connections.lock().await;
if let Some(devices) = conns.get_mut(fingerprint) {
let before = devices.len();
devices.retain(|d| d.device_id == keep_device_id);
let removed = before - devices.len();
if devices.is_empty() {
conns.remove(fingerprint);
}
removed
} else {
0
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn test_state() -> AppState {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
AppState::new(dir.path().to_str().unwrap()).unwrap()
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn push_to_client_returns_false_when_offline() {
let state = test_state();
assert!(!state.push_to_client("abc123", b"hello").await);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn register_ws_and_push() {
let state = test_state();
let (_, mut rx) = state.register_ws("test_fp", None).await.unwrap();
assert!(state.push_to_client("test_fp", b"hello").await);
let msg = rx.recv().await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(msg, b"hello");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn ws_connection_cap() {
let state = test_state();
// Hold receivers so senders stay open (register_ws prunes closed senders).
let mut _holders = Vec::new();
for i in 0..5 {
let res = state.register_ws("same_fp", None).await;
assert!(res.is_some(), "connection {} should succeed", i);
_holders.push(res.unwrap());
}
// 6th should fail
assert!(state.register_ws("same_fp", None).await.is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn is_online_and_device_count() {
let state = test_state();
assert!(!state.is_online("fp1").await);
assert_eq!(state.device_count("fp1").await, 0);
// Must hold receivers so the senders are not marked as closed.
let _r1 = state.register_ws("fp1", None).await;
assert!(state.is_online("fp1").await);
assert_eq!(state.device_count("fp1").await, 1);
let _r2 = state.register_ws("fp1", None).await;
assert_eq!(state.device_count("fp1").await, 2);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn kick_device() {
let state = test_state();
let (device_id, _) = state.register_ws("fp1", None).await.unwrap();
assert!(state.kick_device("fp1", &device_id).await);
assert!(!state.is_online("fp1").await);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn revoke_all_except() {
let state = test_state();
let (id1, _rx1) = state.register_ws("fp1", None).await.unwrap();
let (_id2, _rx2) = state.register_ws("fp1", None).await.unwrap();
let (_id3, _rx3) = state.register_ws("fp1", None).await.unwrap();
let removed = state.revoke_all_except("fp1", &id1).await;
assert_eq!(removed, 2);
assert_eq!(state.device_count("fp1").await, 1);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn deliver_or_queue_offline() {
let state = test_state();
// No WS connected -- should queue
let delivered = state.deliver_or_queue("offline_fp", b"test message").await;
assert!(!delivered);
// Check message was queued in DB
let prefix = "queue:offline_fp";
let count = state.db.messages.scan_prefix(prefix.as_bytes()).count();
assert_eq!(count, 1);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn deliver_or_queue_online() {
let state = test_state();
let (_, mut rx) = state.register_ws("online_fp", None).await.unwrap();
let delivered = state.deliver_or_queue("online_fp", b"instant").await;
assert!(delivered);
let msg = rx.recv().await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(msg, b"instant");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn call_state_lifecycle() {
let state = test_state();
let call = CallState {
call_id: "call-001".into(),
caller_fp: "alice".into(),
callee_fp: "bob".into(),
group_name: None,
room_id: None,
status: CallStatus::Ringing,
created_at: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(),
answered_at: None,
ended_at: None,
};
state.active_calls.lock().await.insert("call-001".into(), call);
assert_eq!(state.active_calls.lock().await.len(), 1);
// End the call
if let Some(mut c) = state.active_calls.lock().await.remove("call-001") {
c.status = CallStatus::Ended;
c.ended_at = Some(chrono::Utc::now().timestamp());
let _ = state.db.calls.insert(b"call-001", serde_json::to_vec(&c).unwrap());
}
assert_eq!(state.active_calls.lock().await.len(), 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn list_devices() {
let state = test_state();
let _r1 = state.register_ws("fp1", None).await;
let _r2 = state.register_ws("fp1", None).await;
let devices = state.list_devices("fp1").await;
assert_eq!(devices.len(), 2);
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
[package]
name = "warzone-wasm"
version.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
[package.metadata.wasm-pack.profile.release]
wasm-opt = false
[lib]
crate-type = ["cdylib"]
[dependencies]
warzone-protocol = { path = "../warzone-protocol" }
wasm-bindgen = "0.2"
serde = { workspace = true }
serde_json = { workspace = true }
js-sys = "0.3"
web-sys = { version = "0.3", features = ["console"] }
getrandom = { version = "0.2", features = ["js"] }
base64.workspace = true
hex.workspace = true
bincode.workspace = true
x25519-dalek.workspace = true
ed25519-dalek.workspace = true
rand.workspace = true
uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4", "serde", "js"] }
# profile.release is set at workspace root

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,792 @@
//! WASM bridge: exposes warzone-protocol to JavaScript.
//!
//! Gives the web client the EXACT same crypto as the CLI:
//! X25519, ChaCha20-Poly1305, X3DH, Double Ratchet.
use wasm_bindgen::prelude::*;
use warzone_protocol::identity::{IdentityKeyPair, PublicIdentity, Seed};
use warzone_protocol::message::{ReceiptType, WireMessage};
use warzone_protocol::prekey::{
generate_signed_pre_key, PreKeyBundle,
};
use warzone_protocol::ratchet::RatchetState;
use warzone_protocol::x3dh;
use x25519_dalek::PublicKey;
// ── Identity ──
#[wasm_bindgen]
pub struct WasmIdentity {
seed_bytes: [u8; 32],
#[wasm_bindgen(skip)]
pub identity: IdentityKeyPair,
#[wasm_bindgen(skip)]
pub pub_id: PublicIdentity,
// Pre-key secrets (generated once, reused for decrypt)
spk_secret_bytes: [u8; 32],
bundle_cache: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
#[wasm_bindgen]
impl WasmIdentity {
#[wasm_bindgen(constructor)]
pub fn new() -> WasmIdentity {
let seed = Seed::generate();
Self::from_seed(seed)
}
pub fn from_hex_seed(hex_seed: &str) -> Result<WasmIdentity, JsValue> {
let bytes = hex::decode(hex_seed).map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e.to_string()))?;
if bytes.len() != 32 { return Err(JsValue::from_str("seed must be 32 bytes")); }
let mut seed_bytes = [0u8; 32];
seed_bytes.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
Ok(Self::from_seed(Seed::from_bytes(seed_bytes)))
}
pub fn fingerprint(&self) -> String { self.pub_id.fingerprint.to_string() }
pub fn seed_hex(&self) -> String { hex::encode(self.seed_bytes) }
pub fn fingerprint_hex(&self) -> String { self.pub_id.fingerprint.to_hex() }
pub fn mnemonic(&self) -> String {
Seed::from_bytes(self.seed_bytes).to_mnemonic()
}
/// Get the Ethereum address derived from this seed.
pub fn eth_address(&self) -> String {
let eth = warzone_protocol::ethereum::derive_eth_identity(&self.seed_bytes);
eth.address.to_checksum()
}
/// Get the pre-key bundle as bincode bytes (for server registration).
/// The bundle is generated once and cached. The SPK secret is stored internally.
pub fn bundle_bytes(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, JsValue> {
if let Some(ref cached) = self.bundle_cache {
return Ok(cached.clone());
}
let bundle = self.generate_bundle_internal()
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e.to_string()))?;
let bytes = bincode::serialize(&bundle)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e.to_string()))?;
self.bundle_cache = Some(bytes.clone());
Ok(bytes)
}
/// Get the SPK secret as hex (for persistence in localStorage).
pub fn spk_secret_hex(&self) -> String {
hex::encode(self.spk_secret_bytes)
}
/// Restore the SPK secret from hex (loaded from localStorage).
pub fn set_spk_secret_hex(&mut self, hex: &str) -> Result<(), JsValue> {
let bytes = hex::decode(hex).map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e.to_string()))?;
if bytes.len() != 32 { return Err(JsValue::from_str("SPK secret must be 32 bytes")); }
self.spk_secret_bytes.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
Ok(())
}
}
impl WasmIdentity {
fn from_seed(seed: Seed) -> Self {
let seed_bytes = seed.0;
let identity = seed.derive_identity();
let pub_id = identity.public_identity();
// Generate pre-keys ONCE
let (spk_secret, _) = generate_signed_pre_key(&identity, 1);
let spk_secret_bytes = spk_secret.to_bytes();
WasmIdentity {
seed_bytes,
identity,
pub_id,
spk_secret_bytes,
bundle_cache: None,
}
}
fn generate_bundle_internal(&self) -> Result<PreKeyBundle, String> {
// Recreate SPK from stored secret
let spk_secret = x25519_dalek::StaticSecret::from(self.spk_secret_bytes);
let spk_public = PublicKey::from(&spk_secret);
// Sign the SPK public key
use ed25519_dalek::Signer;
let signature = self.identity.signing.sign(spk_public.as_bytes());
let spk = warzone_protocol::prekey::SignedPreKey {
id: 1,
public_key: *spk_public.as_bytes(),
signature: signature.to_bytes().to_vec(),
timestamp: js_sys::Date::now() as i64 / 1000,
};
// No OTPKs for web client (can't store secrets for them reliably).
// initiate() will skip DH4 when one_time_pre_key is None.
// This is safe — OTPKs are an anti-replay optimization, not required.
Ok(PreKeyBundle {
identity_key: *self.pub_id.signing.as_bytes(),
identity_encryption_key: *self.pub_id.encryption.as_bytes(),
signed_pre_key: spk,
one_time_pre_key: None,
})
}
}
// ── Session ──
#[wasm_bindgen]
pub struct WasmSession {
ratchet: RatchetState,
/// Stored X3DH result from initiate() — needed for encrypt_key_exchange
x3dh_ephemeral_public: Option<[u8; 32]>,
x3dh_used_otpk_id: Option<u32>,
}
#[wasm_bindgen]
impl WasmSession {
pub fn initiate(
identity: &WasmIdentity,
their_bundle_bytes: &[u8],
) -> Result<WasmSession, JsValue> {
let bundle: PreKeyBundle = bincode::deserialize(their_bundle_bytes)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("bundle: {}", e)))?;
let result = x3dh::initiate(&identity.identity, &bundle)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("X3DH: {}", e)))?;
let their_spk = PublicKey::from(bundle.signed_pre_key.public_key);
Ok(WasmSession {
ratchet: RatchetState::init_alice(result.shared_secret, their_spk),
x3dh_ephemeral_public: Some(*result.ephemeral_public.as_bytes()),
x3dh_used_otpk_id: result.used_one_time_pre_key_id,
})
}
pub fn encrypt_key_exchange(
&mut self,
identity: &WasmIdentity,
their_bundle_bytes: &[u8],
plaintext: &str,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, JsValue> {
self.encrypt_key_exchange_with_id(identity, their_bundle_bytes, plaintext, &uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string())
}
pub fn encrypt_key_exchange_with_id(
&mut self,
identity: &WasmIdentity,
_their_bundle_bytes: &[u8],
plaintext: &str,
msg_id: &str,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, JsValue> {
// Use the stored X3DH result from initiate() — DO NOT re-initiate
// (re-initiating generates a new ephemeral key that doesn't match the ratchet)
let ephemeral_public = self.x3dh_ephemeral_public
.ok_or_else(|| JsValue::from_str("no X3DH result — call initiate() first"))?;
let encrypted = self.ratchet.encrypt(plaintext.as_bytes())
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("encrypt: {}", e)))?;
let wire = WireMessage::KeyExchange {
id: msg_id.to_string(),
sender_fingerprint: identity.pub_id.fingerprint.to_string(),
sender_identity_encryption_key: *identity.pub_id.encryption.as_bytes(),
ephemeral_public,
used_one_time_pre_key_id: self.x3dh_used_otpk_id,
ratchet_message: encrypted,
};
bincode::serialize(&wire).map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e.to_string()))
}
pub fn encrypt(&mut self, identity: &WasmIdentity, plaintext: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, JsValue> {
self.encrypt_with_id(identity, plaintext, &uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string())
}
pub fn encrypt_with_id(&mut self, identity: &WasmIdentity, plaintext: &str, msg_id: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, JsValue> {
let encrypted = self.ratchet.encrypt(plaintext.as_bytes())
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("encrypt: {}", e)))?;
let wire = WireMessage::Message {
id: msg_id.to_string(),
sender_fingerprint: identity.pub_id.fingerprint.to_string(),
ratchet_message: encrypted,
};
bincode::serialize(&wire).map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e.to_string()))
}
pub fn save(&self) -> Result<String, JsValue> {
let bytes = self.ratchet.serialize_versioned()
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e))?;
Ok(base64::Engine::encode(&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, &bytes))
}
pub fn restore(data: &str) -> Result<WasmSession, JsValue> {
let bytes = base64::Engine::decode(&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, data)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e.to_string()))?;
let ratchet = RatchetState::deserialize_versioned(&bytes)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e))?;
Ok(WasmSession { ratchet, x3dh_ephemeral_public: None, x3dh_used_otpk_id: None })
}
}
// ── Receipt creation ──
/// Create a Receipt wire message (plaintext, not encrypted).
/// `receipt_type`: "delivered" or "read".
/// Returns bincode-serialized bytes.
#[wasm_bindgen]
pub fn create_receipt(
sender_fingerprint: &str,
message_id: &str,
receipt_type: &str,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, JsValue> {
let rt = match receipt_type {
"delivered" => ReceiptType::Delivered,
"read" => ReceiptType::Read,
_ => return Err(JsValue::from_str("receipt_type must be 'delivered' or 'read'")),
};
let wire = WireMessage::Receipt {
sender_fingerprint: sender_fingerprint.to_string(),
message_id: message_id.to_string(),
receipt_type: rt,
};
bincode::serialize(&wire).map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e.to_string()))
}
// ── Self-test (verifies full encrypt/decrypt cycle within WASM) ──
#[wasm_bindgen]
pub fn self_test() -> Result<String, JsValue> {
// Check randomness works
let mut rng_test = [0u8; 8];
rand::RngCore::fill_bytes(&mut rand::rngs::OsRng, &mut rng_test);
let rng_hex = hex::encode(rng_test);
// Alice
let alice_seed = Seed::generate();
let alice_id = alice_seed.derive_identity();
let alice_pub = alice_id.public_identity();
// Bob
let bob_seed = Seed::generate();
let bob_id = bob_seed.derive_identity();
let bob_pub = bob_id.public_identity();
// Bob's pre-key bundle
let (bob_spk_secret, bob_spk) = generate_signed_pre_key(&bob_id, 1);
let bob_spk_secret_bytes = bob_spk_secret.to_bytes();
let bob_bundle = PreKeyBundle {
identity_key: *bob_pub.signing.as_bytes(),
identity_encryption_key: *bob_pub.encryption.as_bytes(),
signed_pre_key: bob_spk,
one_time_pre_key: None,
};
let _bob_bundle_bytes = bincode::serialize(&bob_bundle)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e.to_string()))?;
// Alice initiates X3DH and encrypts
let x3dh_result = x3dh::initiate(&alice_id, &bob_bundle)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("X3DH initiate: {}", e)))?;
let their_spk = PublicKey::from(bob_bundle.signed_pre_key.public_key);
let mut alice_ratchet = RatchetState::init_alice(x3dh_result.shared_secret, their_spk);
let encrypted = alice_ratchet.encrypt(b"hello from WASM self-test")
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("encrypt: {}", e)))?;
// Clone encrypted for later use (wire takes ownership)
let encrypted_clone = encrypted.clone();
let _wire = WireMessage::KeyExchange {
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
sender_fingerprint: alice_pub.fingerprint.to_string(),
sender_identity_encryption_key: *alice_pub.encryption.as_bytes(),
ephemeral_public: *x3dh_result.ephemeral_public.as_bytes(),
used_one_time_pre_key_id: x3dh_result.used_one_time_pre_key_id,
ratchet_message: encrypted,
};
// Step-by-step Bob-side decrypt (NOT using decrypt_wire_message)
let alice_shared_hex = hex::encode(x3dh_result.shared_secret);
// Bob: X3DH respond
let bob_shared = x3dh::respond(
&bob_id, &bob_spk_secret, None,
&alice_pub.encryption, &x3dh_result.ephemeral_public,
).map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("X3DH respond: {}", e)))?;
let bob_shared_hex = hex::encode(bob_shared);
let shared_match = alice_shared_hex == bob_shared_hex;
// Bob: init ratchet
// Need a fresh copy of spk_secret (bob_spk_secret was moved into respond)
let bob_spk_secret2 = x25519_dalek::StaticSecret::from(bob_spk_secret_bytes);
let mut bob_ratchet = RatchetState::init_bob(bob_shared, bob_spk_secret2);
// Bob: decrypt
let decrypt_result = bob_ratchet.decrypt(&encrypted_clone);
let decrypt_text = match &decrypt_result {
Ok(plain) => String::from_utf8_lossy(plain).to_string(),
Err(e) => format!("DECRYPT_ERROR: {}", e),
};
Ok(format!(
"rng={}, shared_match={}, alice_shared={}..., bob_shared={}..., decrypt='{}', PASS={}",
rng_hex, shared_match, &alice_shared_hex[..16], &bob_shared_hex[..16],
decrypt_text, decrypt_text == "hello from WASM self-test"
))
}
// ── Decrypt ──
/// Debug: dump what the WASM identity's bundle looks like (for comparing with CLI).
#[wasm_bindgen]
pub fn debug_bundle_info(identity: &mut WasmIdentity) -> Result<String, JsValue> {
let bundle_bytes = identity.bundle_bytes()?;
let bundle: PreKeyBundle = bincode::deserialize(&bundle_bytes)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e.to_string()))?;
let spk_pub_hex = hex::encode(bundle.signed_pre_key.public_key);
let ik_hex = hex::encode(bundle.identity_key);
let iek_hex = hex::encode(bundle.identity_encryption_key);
let spk_secret_hex = identity.spk_secret_hex();
// Verify SPK matches
let spk_secret = x25519_dalek::StaticSecret::from(identity.spk_secret_bytes);
let derived_pub = PublicKey::from(&spk_secret);
let matches = *derived_pub.as_bytes() == bundle.signed_pre_key.public_key;
Ok(format!(
"bundle_size={}, ik={}, iek={}, spk_pub={}, spk_secret={}, spk_matches={}",
bundle_bytes.len(), &ik_hex[..16], &iek_hex[..16], &spk_pub_hex[..16], &spk_secret_hex[..16], matches
))
}
/// Decrypt a bincode WireMessage. `spk_secret_hex` is the signed pre-key secret
/// (stored in localStorage, generated during identity creation).
/// Returns JSON: { "sender": "fp", "text": "...", "new_session": bool, "session_data": "base64...", "message_id": "..." }
/// For Receipt messages: { "type": "receipt", "sender": "fp", "message_id": "...", "receipt_type": "delivered"|"read" }
#[wasm_bindgen]
pub fn decrypt_wire_message(
identity_hex_seed: &str,
spk_secret_hex: &str,
message_bytes: &[u8],
existing_session_b64: Option<String>,
) -> Result<String, JsValue> {
let seed_bytes = hex::decode(identity_hex_seed)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e.to_string()))?;
let mut sb = [0u8; 32];
sb.copy_from_slice(&seed_bytes);
let seed = Seed::from_bytes(sb);
let id = seed.derive_identity();
let wire: WireMessage = warzone_protocol::message::deserialize_envelope(message_bytes)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("deserialize wire: {}", e)))?;
match wire {
WireMessage::KeyExchange {
id: msg_id,
sender_fingerprint,
sender_identity_encryption_key,
ephemeral_public,
used_one_time_pre_key_id: _,
ratchet_message,
} => {
// Use the STORED SPK secret, not a regenerated one
let spk_bytes = hex::decode(spk_secret_hex)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e.to_string()))?;
let mut spk_arr = [0u8; 32];
spk_arr.copy_from_slice(&spk_bytes);
let spk_secret = x25519_dalek::StaticSecret::from(spk_arr);
let their_id = PublicKey::from(sender_identity_encryption_key);
let their_eph = PublicKey::from(ephemeral_public);
let shared = x3dh::respond(&id, &spk_secret, None, &their_id, &their_eph)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("X3DH respond: {}", e)))?;
let mut ratchet = RatchetState::init_bob(shared, spk_secret);
let plain = ratchet.decrypt(&ratchet_message)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("decrypt: {}", e)))?;
let session_b64 = base64::Engine::encode(
&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD,
&ratchet.serialize_versioned().unwrap_or_default(),
);
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"sender": sender_fingerprint,
"text": String::from_utf8_lossy(&plain),
"new_session": true,
"session_data": session_b64,
"message_id": msg_id,
}).to_string())
}
WireMessage::Message {
id: msg_id,
sender_fingerprint,
ratchet_message,
} => {
let session_data = existing_session_b64
.ok_or_else(|| JsValue::from_str("no session for this peer"))?;
let session_bytes = base64::Engine::decode(
&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, &session_data,
).map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e.to_string()))?;
let mut ratchet = RatchetState::deserialize_versioned(&session_bytes)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&e))?;
let plain = ratchet.decrypt(&ratchet_message)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("decrypt: {}", e)))?;
let session_b64 = base64::Engine::encode(
&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD,
&ratchet.serialize_versioned().unwrap_or_default(),
);
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"sender": sender_fingerprint,
"text": String::from_utf8_lossy(&plain),
"new_session": false,
"session_data": session_b64,
"message_id": msg_id,
}).to_string())
}
WireMessage::Receipt {
sender_fingerprint,
message_id,
receipt_type,
} => {
let rt_str = match receipt_type {
ReceiptType::Delivered => "delivered",
ReceiptType::Read => "read",
};
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"type": "receipt",
"sender": sender_fingerprint,
"message_id": message_id,
"receipt_type": rt_str,
}).to_string())
}
WireMessage::FileHeader {
id, sender_fingerprint, filename, file_size, total_chunks, sha256,
} => {
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"type": "file_header",
"id": id,
"sender": sender_fingerprint,
"filename": filename,
"file_size": file_size,
"total_chunks": total_chunks,
"sha256": sha256,
}).to_string())
}
WireMessage::FileChunk {
id, sender_fingerprint, filename, chunk_index, total_chunks, data,
} => {
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"type": "file_chunk",
"id": id,
"sender": sender_fingerprint,
"filename": filename,
"chunk_index": chunk_index,
"total_chunks": total_chunks,
"data": hex::encode(&data),
}).to_string())
}
WireMessage::SenderKeyDistribution {
sender_fingerprint,
group_name,
chain_key,
generation,
} => {
// Return the distribution data so JS can store it
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"type": "sender_key_distribution",
"sender": sender_fingerprint,
"group": group_name,
"chain_key": hex::encode(chain_key),
"generation": generation,
}).to_string())
}
WireMessage::GroupSenderKey {
id,
sender_fingerprint,
group_name,
generation,
counter,
ciphertext,
} => {
// Return the encrypted group message data so JS can decrypt with stored sender key
// JS must call a separate decrypt function with the sender key
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"type": "group_message",
"id": id,
"sender": sender_fingerprint,
"group": group_name,
"generation": generation,
"counter": counter,
"ciphertext": hex::encode(&ciphertext),
}).to_string())
}
WireMessage::CallSignal {
id,
sender_fingerprint,
signal_type,
payload,
target,
} => {
let type_str = match signal_type {
warzone_protocol::message::CallSignalType::Offer => "offer",
warzone_protocol::message::CallSignalType::Answer => "answer",
warzone_protocol::message::CallSignalType::IceCandidate => "ice_candidate",
warzone_protocol::message::CallSignalType::Hangup => "hangup",
warzone_protocol::message::CallSignalType::Reject => "reject",
warzone_protocol::message::CallSignalType::Ringing => "ringing",
warzone_protocol::message::CallSignalType::Busy => "busy",
};
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"type": "call_signal",
"id": id,
"sender": sender_fingerprint,
"signal_type": type_str,
"payload": payload,
"target": target,
}).to_string())
}
}
}
/// Decrypt a group message using a stored sender key.
///
/// Arguments:
/// - sender_key_hex: hex-encoded bincode-serialized SenderKey (from sender_key_distribution)
/// - sender_fingerprint, group_name, generation, counter, ciphertext_hex: from the group_message JSON
///
/// Returns JSON: { "text": "...", "sender_key": "updated_hex" }
#[wasm_bindgen]
pub fn decrypt_group_message(
sender_key_hex: &str,
sender_fingerprint: &str,
group_name: &str,
generation: u32,
counter: u32,
ciphertext_hex: &str,
) -> Result<String, JsValue> {
use warzone_protocol::sender_keys::{SenderKey, SenderKeyMessage};
let key_bytes = hex::decode(sender_key_hex)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("invalid sender key hex: {}", e)))?;
let mut sender_key: SenderKey = bincode::deserialize(&key_bytes)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("deserialize sender key: {}", e)))?;
let ciphertext = hex::decode(ciphertext_hex)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("invalid ciphertext hex: {}", e)))?;
let msg = SenderKeyMessage {
sender_fingerprint: sender_fingerprint.to_string(),
group_name: group_name.to_string(),
generation,
counter,
ciphertext,
};
let plaintext = sender_key.decrypt(&msg)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("decrypt: {}", e)))?;
// Return updated sender key (counter advanced) so JS can persist it
let updated_key = bincode::serialize(&sender_key).unwrap_or_default();
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"text": String::from_utf8_lossy(&plaintext),
"sender_key": hex::encode(updated_key),
}).to_string())
}
/// Create a sender key from a distribution message.
///
/// Takes the fields from a sender_key_distribution JSON and returns
/// a hex-encoded bincode SenderKey that JS should store.
#[wasm_bindgen]
pub fn create_sender_key_from_distribution(
sender_fingerprint: &str,
group_name: &str,
chain_key_hex: &str,
generation: u32,
) -> Result<String, JsValue> {
use warzone_protocol::sender_keys::SenderKeyDistribution;
let chain_key_bytes = hex::decode(chain_key_hex)
.map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("invalid chain key hex: {}", e)))?;
let mut chain_key = [0u8; 32];
if chain_key_bytes.len() != 32 {
return Err(JsValue::from_str("chain key must be 32 bytes"));
}
chain_key.copy_from_slice(&chain_key_bytes);
let dist = SenderKeyDistribution {
sender_fingerprint: sender_fingerprint.to_string(),
group_name: group_name.to_string(),
chain_key,
generation,
};
let sender_key = dist.into_sender_key();
let encoded = bincode::serialize(&sender_key).unwrap_or_default();
Ok(hex::encode(encoded))
}
/// Create a CallSignal WireMessage for sending via WebSocket.
///
/// Arguments:
/// - identity: the WasmIdentity of the sender
/// - signal_type: "offer" | "answer" | "ice_candidate" | "hangup" | "reject" | "ringing" | "busy"
/// - payload: SDP offer/answer, ICE candidate JSON, or empty string
/// - target: recipient fingerprint or group name
///
/// Returns: bincode-serialized WireMessage bytes
#[wasm_bindgen]
pub fn create_call_signal(
identity: &WasmIdentity,
signal_type: &str,
payload: &str,
target: &str,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, JsValue> {
use warzone_protocol::message::{CallSignalType, WireMessage};
let st = match signal_type.to_lowercase().as_str() {
"offer" => CallSignalType::Offer,
"answer" => CallSignalType::Answer,
"ice_candidate" | "icecandidate" => CallSignalType::IceCandidate,
"hangup" => CallSignalType::Hangup,
"reject" => CallSignalType::Reject,
"ringing" => CallSignalType::Ringing,
"busy" => CallSignalType::Busy,
_ => return Err(JsValue::from_str(&format!("unknown signal type: {}", signal_type))),
};
let wire = WireMessage::CallSignal {
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
sender_fingerprint: identity.pub_id.fingerprint.to_string(),
signal_type: st,
payload: payload.to_string(),
target: target.to_string(),
};
bincode::serialize(&wire).map_err(|e| JsValue::from_str(&format!("serialize: {}", e)))
}
// Tests live in warzone-protocol to avoid js-sys dependency issues.
// See warzone-protocol/src/x3dh.rs tests for web-client simulation.
#[cfg(test)]
#[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn web_client_to_web_client() {
// === Alice (sender) ===
let mut alice = WasmIdentity::new();
let alice_seed = alice.seed_hex();
let alice_spk = alice.spk_secret_hex();
let alice_bundle = alice.bundle_bytes().unwrap();
// === Bob (receiver) ===
let mut bob = WasmIdentity::new();
let bob_seed = bob.seed_hex();
let bob_spk = bob.spk_secret_hex();
let bob_bundle = bob.bundle_bytes().unwrap();
println!("Alice fp: {}", alice.fingerprint());
println!("Bob fp: {}", bob.fingerprint());
println!("Alice SPK secret: {}...", &alice_spk[..16]);
println!("Bob SPK secret: {}...", &bob_spk[..16]);
// === Alice sends to Bob (exactly like the web JS) ===
// 1. Alice creates session from Bob's bundle
let mut alice_session = WasmSession::initiate(&alice, &bob_bundle).unwrap();
// 2. Alice encrypts with key exchange
let wire_bytes = alice_session
.encrypt_key_exchange_with_id(&alice, &bob_bundle, "hello bob", "msg-001")
.unwrap();
println!("Wire message size: {} bytes", wire_bytes.len());
// === Bob receives and decrypts (exactly like handleIncomingMessage) ===
// First try: decrypt_wire_message with null session (handles KeyExchange)
let result = decrypt_wire_message(&bob_seed, &bob_spk, &wire_bytes, None);
match result {
Ok(json_str) => {
let parsed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&json_str).unwrap();
println!("Decrypt SUCCESS: {}", json_str);
assert_eq!(parsed["text"].as_str().unwrap(), "hello bob");
assert!(parsed["new_session"].as_bool().unwrap());
println!("Session data present: {}", parsed["session_data"].as_str().is_some());
}
Err(e) => {
panic!("Decrypt FAILED: {:?}", e);
}
}
}
/// Test that restored session (from base64) can decrypt subsequent messages.
#[test]
fn web_client_session_continuity() {
let mut alice = WasmIdentity::new();
let mut bob = WasmIdentity::new();
let bob_seed = bob.seed_hex();
let bob_spk = bob.spk_secret_hex();
let bob_bundle = bob.bundle_bytes().unwrap();
// Alice sends first message (KeyExchange)
let mut alice_session = WasmSession::initiate(&alice, &bob_bundle).unwrap();
let wire1 = alice_session
.encrypt_key_exchange_with_id(&alice, &bob_bundle, "msg one", "id-1")
.unwrap();
// Bob decrypts first message
let result1 = decrypt_wire_message(&bob_seed, &bob_spk, &wire1, None).unwrap();
let parsed1: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&result1).unwrap();
assert_eq!(parsed1["text"].as_str().unwrap(), "msg one");
let bob_session_data = parsed1["session_data"].as_str().unwrap().to_string();
// Alice sends second message (regular Message, not KeyExchange)
let alice_session_data = alice_session.save().unwrap();
let mut alice_session2 = WasmSession::restore(&alice_session_data).unwrap();
let wire2 = alice_session2
.encrypt_with_id(&alice, "msg two", "id-2")
.unwrap();
// Bob decrypts second message using saved session
let result2 = decrypt_wire_message(&bob_seed, &bob_spk, &wire2, Some(bob_session_data)).unwrap();
let parsed2: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&result2).unwrap();
assert_eq!(parsed2["text"].as_str().unwrap(), "msg two");
}
/// Test bidirectional: Alice sends to Bob, Bob sends to Alice.
#[test]
fn web_client_bidirectional() {
let mut alice = WasmIdentity::new();
let alice_seed = alice.seed_hex();
let alice_spk = alice.spk_secret_hex();
let alice_bundle = alice.bundle_bytes().unwrap();
let mut bob = WasmIdentity::new();
let bob_seed = bob.seed_hex();
let bob_spk = bob.spk_secret_hex();
let bob_bundle = bob.bundle_bytes().unwrap();
// Alice → Bob
let mut a_session = WasmSession::initiate(&alice, &bob_bundle).unwrap();
let wire_a2b = a_session
.encrypt_key_exchange_with_id(&alice, &bob_bundle, "hi bob", "a1")
.unwrap();
let r1 = decrypt_wire_message(&bob_seed, &bob_spk, &wire_a2b, None).unwrap();
let p1: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&r1).unwrap();
assert_eq!(p1["text"].as_str().unwrap(), "hi bob");
// Bob → Alice
let mut b_session = WasmSession::initiate(&bob, &alice_bundle).unwrap();
let wire_b2a = b_session
.encrypt_key_exchange_with_id(&bob, &alice_bundle, "hi alice", "b1")
.unwrap();
let r2 = decrypt_wire_message(&alice_seed, &alice_spk, &wire_b2a, None).unwrap();
let p2: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&r2).unwrap();
assert_eq!(p2["text"].as_str().unwrap(), "hi alice");
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# Copy to .env and fill in values
# Cloudflare API token (Zone:DNS:Edit permission for manko.yoga)
# Also create cf_api_token.txt with the same token for Docker secrets
# echo "YOUR_TOKEN" > cf_api_token.txt
CF_API_TOKEN=
# DNS records to create:
# voip.manko.yoga → A 172.16.81.135 (dev)
# voip.manko.yoga → AAAA 2a0d:3344:692c:2500:14f2:5885:d73c:b0a1 (ipv6 test)
# voip.manko.yoga → A 63.250.54.239 (production)
# voip.manko.yoga → AAAA 2602:ff16:9:0:1:3d9:0:1 (production ipv6)

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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
{
email admin@manko.yoga
}
# Wildcard cert for all subdomains
*.voip.manko.yoga {
tls {
dns cloudflare {$CF_API_TOKEN}
}
reverse_proxy wzp-web:8080
}
# Main domain — featherChat server
voip.manko.yoga {
tls {
dns cloudflare {$CF_API_TOKEN}
}
handle_path /audio/* {
reverse_proxy wzp-web:8080
}
# WZP WASM module (needed by audio variants loaded from /audio/js/)
handle /audio-wasm/* {
uri strip_prefix /audio-wasm
reverse_proxy wzp-web:8080
}
reverse_proxy warzone-server:7700
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
{
email admin@manko.yoga
}
# Wildcard cert for all variant subdomains
*.voip.manko.yoga {
tls {
dns cloudflare {$CF_API_TOKEN}
}
# Route each subdomain to wzp-web with the right variant
@v1 host v1.voip.manko.yoga
@v2 host v2.voip.manko.yoga
@v3 host v3.voip.manko.yoga
@v4 host v4.voip.manko.yoga
@v5 host v5.voip.manko.yoga
@v6 host v6.voip.manko.yoga
# Rewrite root path to include variant param
rewrite @v1 / /?variant=pure
rewrite @v2 / /?variant=hybrid
rewrite @v3 / /?variant=full
rewrite @v4 / /?variant=ws
rewrite @v5 / /?variant=ws-fec
rewrite @v6 / /?variant=ws-full
# All subdomains proxy to wzp-web
reverse_proxy wzp-web:8080
}
# Main domain — featherChat server
voip.manko.yoga {
tls {
dns cloudflare {$CF_API_TOKEN}
}
handle_path /audio/* {
reverse_proxy wzp-web:8080
}
reverse_proxy warzone-server:7700
}

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# Caddy with Cloudflare DNS plugin — builds for any arch
FROM caddy:2-builder AS builder
# Force IPv4-only for Go module downloads (Docker build may lack IPv6)
ENV GOFLAGS="-mod=mod"
RUN echo 'precedence ::ffff:0:0/96 100' > /etc/gai.conf && \
xcaddy build \
--with github.com/caddy-dns/cloudflare
FROM caddy:2
COPY --from=builder /usr/bin/caddy /usr/bin/caddy

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# featherChat server — multi-stage build
# Build context: featherChat repo root (../../..)
FROM rust:latest AS builder
WORKDIR /build
# Copy warzone workspace
COPY warzone/Cargo.toml warzone/Cargo.lock ./warzone/
COPY warzone/crates ./warzone/crates
WORKDIR /build/warzone
# Build WASM first (server embeds it via include_str!/include_bytes!)
RUN cargo install wasm-pack && \
wasm-pack build crates/warzone-wasm --target web --out-dir /build/warzone/wasm-pkg 2>&1 || true
# Build server (now wasm-pkg exists at the expected relative path)
RUN cargo build --release --bin warzone-server
# Runtime
FROM debian:trixie-slim
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y ca-certificates && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY --from=builder /build/warzone/target/release/warzone-server /usr/local/bin/
WORKDIR /data
EXPOSE 7700
ENTRYPOINT ["warzone-server"]
CMD ["--bind", "0.0.0.0:7700"]

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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
# WZP relay + web bridge — multi-stage build
# Build context: featherChat repo root (../../..)
FROM rust:latest AS builder
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y cmake pkg-config libssl-dev && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /build
# Copy warzone-phone workspace (feature/wzp-web-variants branch)
COPY warzone-phone/Cargo.toml warzone-phone/Cargo.lock ./warzone-phone/
COPY warzone-phone/crates ./warzone-phone/crates
# wzp-crypto depends on warzone-protocol via deps/featherchat/warzone/...
COPY warzone/crates/warzone-protocol ./warzone-phone/deps/featherchat/warzone/crates/warzone-protocol
# Build both binaries
WORKDIR /build/warzone-phone
RUN cargo build --release --bin wzp-relay --bin wzp-web
# Runtime — use same distro as builder to match glibc
FROM debian:trixie-slim
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y ca-certificates && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY --from=builder /build/warzone-phone/target/release/wzp-relay /usr/local/bin/
COPY --from=builder /build/warzone-phone/target/release/wzp-web /usr/local/bin/
# Copy static files for wzp-web (HTML, JS, WASM)
COPY --from=builder /build/warzone-phone/crates/wzp-web/static /data/static
WORKDIR /data

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# IPv6 overlay — use with:
# docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.ipv6.yml up -d
#
# Requires Docker daemon IPv6 support:
# /etc/docker/daemon.json: {"ipv6": true, "fixed-cidr-v6": "fd00::/80"}
services:
caddy:
ports:
- "[::]:80:80"
- "[::]:443:443"
- "[::]:443:443/udp"
networks:
frontend:
enable_ipv6: true
ipam:
config:
- subnet: fd00:cafe:1::/64
backend:
enable_ipv6: true
ipam:
config:
- subnet: fd00:cafe:2::/64

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@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
# featherChat + WZP full stack
# Usage:
# echo "YOUR_CF_API_TOKEN" > cf_api_token.txt
# docker compose up -d
#
# DNS: voip.manko.yoga → your IP
# Test: https://voip.manko.yoga
services:
# ─── Caddy reverse proxy (TLS termination) ───
caddy:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: Dockerfile.caddy
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- "80:80"
- "443:443"
- "443:443/udp" # HTTP/3 (QUIC)
volumes:
- ./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro
- caddy_data:/data
- caddy_config:/config
secrets:
- cf_api_token
entrypoint: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "export CF_API_TOKEN=$(cat /run/secrets/cf_api_token) && caddy run --config /etc/caddy/Caddyfile --adapter caddyfile"]
depends_on:
- warzone-server
- wzp-web
networks:
- frontend
- backend
# ─── featherChat server ───
warzone-server:
build:
context: ../../..
dockerfile: warzone/deploy/docker/Dockerfile.server
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
WZP_RELAY_ADDR: "voip.manko.yoga/audio"
RUST_LOG: "info"
volumes:
- server_data:/data
command: ["--bind", "0.0.0.0:7700", "--enable-bots"]
networks:
- backend
# ─── WZP QUIC relay (audio SFU) ───
wzp-relay:
build:
context: ../../..
dockerfile: warzone/deploy/docker/Dockerfile.wzp
restart: unless-stopped
entrypoint: ["wzp-relay"]
command:
- "--listen"
- "0.0.0.0:4433"
networks:
backend:
ipv4_address: 172.28.0.10
# ─── WZP web bridge (browser WS ↔ QUIC relay) ───
# No --tls (Caddy handles TLS), no --auth-url (Caddy terminates)
# Variants: ?variant=pure|hybrid|full
wzp-web:
build:
context: ../../..
dockerfile: warzone/deploy/docker/Dockerfile.wzp
restart: unless-stopped
entrypoint: ["wzp-web"]
command:
- "--port"
- "8080"
- "--relay"
- "172.28.0.10:4433"
depends_on:
- wzp-relay
networks:
- backend
secrets:
cf_api_token:
file: ./cf_api_token.txt
volumes:
caddy_data:
caddy_config:
server_data:
networks:
frontend:
backend:
ipam:
config:
- subnet: 172.28.0.0/24

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@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
#!/bin/bash
set -e
HOST="${1:-voip.manko.yoga}"
SCHEME="${2:-https}"
echo "=== featherChat Stack Test ==="
echo "Host: $HOST ($SCHEME)"
echo ""
# 1. Web UI
echo -n "1. Web UI (GET /)... "
STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$SCHEME://$HOST/")
[ "$STATUS" = "200" ] && echo "OK ($STATUS)" || echo "FAIL ($STATUS)"
# 2. API health
echo -n "2. API health... "
STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$SCHEME://$HOST/v1/health")
[ "$STATUS" = "200" ] && echo "OK ($STATUS)" || echo "FAIL ($STATUS)"
# 3. WASM module
echo -n "3. WASM module... "
STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$SCHEME://$HOST/wasm/warzone_wasm.js")
[ "$STATUS" = "200" ] && echo "OK ($STATUS)" || echo "FAIL ($STATUS)"
# 4. WZP relay config
echo -n "4. WZP relay config... "
RELAY=$(curl -s "$SCHEME://$HOST/v1/wzp/relay-config")
echo "$RELAY" | grep -q "relay_addr" && echo "OK ($(echo $RELAY | python3 -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get("relay_addr","?"))' 2>/dev/null))" || echo "FAIL"
# 5. Audio bridge (wzp-web via Caddy /audio path)
echo -n "5. Audio bridge (GET /audio/)... "
STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$SCHEME://$HOST/audio/")
# wzp-web returns 200 for its landing page
[ "$STATUS" = "200" ] && echo "OK ($STATUS)" || echo "WARN ($STATUS — wzp-web may not serve GET /)"
# 6. WebSocket upgrade test
echo -n "6. WS upgrade test... "
WS_STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -H "Upgrade: websocket" -H "Connection: Upgrade" "$SCHEME://$HOST/v1/ws/test")
echo "($WS_STATUS)"
# 7. TLS cert check
if [ "$SCHEME" = "https" ]; then
echo -n "7. TLS cert... "
ISSUER=$(echo | openssl s_client -connect "$HOST:443" -servername "$HOST" 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer 2>/dev/null)
echo "$ISSUER" | grep -q "Let's Encrypt\|Cloudflare\|R3\|E1" && echo "OK ($ISSUER)" || echo "$ISSUER"
fi
# 8. IPv6 test
echo -n "8. IPv6... "
if curl -6 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --connect-timeout 3 "$SCHEME://$HOST/" 2>/dev/null; then
echo " (IPv6 reachable)"
else
echo "not available (IPv4 only)"
fi
echo ""
echo "=== Done ==="

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#!/bin/bash
# Updates voip.manko.yoga DNS records with current public IPs.
# Usage:
# ./update-dns.sh Loop every 5 minutes
# ./update-dns.sh --once Run once and exit
#
# Reads CF_API_TOKEN env var or deploy/docker/cf_api_token.txt
DOMAIN="voip.manko.yoga"
ZONE="manko.yoga"
INTERVAL="${DNS_UPDATE_INTERVAL:-300}"
get_token() {
if [ -n "${CF_API_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
echo "$CF_API_TOKEN"
elif [ -f /run/secrets/cf_api_token ]; then
cat /run/secrets/cf_api_token | tr -d '\n'
else
echo "ERROR: no CF token" >&2
exit 1
fi
}
get_zone_id() {
curl -4 -s "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/zones?name=$ZONE" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $(get_token)" | \
python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['result'][0]['id'])" 2>/dev/null
}
get_public_ipv4() {
curl -4 -s --connect-timeout 5 https://api.ipify.org 2>/dev/null || \
curl -4 -s --connect-timeout 5 https://ifconfig.me 2>/dev/null || echo ""
}
get_public_ipv6() {
curl -6 -s --connect-timeout 5 https://api6.ipify.org 2>/dev/null || \
curl -6 -s --connect-timeout 5 https://ifconfig.co 2>/dev/null || echo ""
}
upsert_record() {
local zone_id="$1" type="$2" content="$3" token
token=$(get_token)
local existing
existing=$(curl -4 -s "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/zones/$zone_id/dns_records?name=$DOMAIN&type=$type" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $token")
local rec_id current
rec_id=$(echo "$existing" | python3 -c "import sys,json; r=json.load(sys.stdin)['result']; print(r[0]['id'] if r else '')" 2>/dev/null)
current=$(echo "$existing" | python3 -c "import sys,json; r=json.load(sys.stdin)['result']; print(r[0]['content'] if r else '')" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$current" = "$content" ]; then
echo " $type: $content (unchanged)"
return
fi
if [ -n "$rec_id" ]; then
curl -4 -s -X PUT "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/zones/$zone_id/dns_records/$rec_id" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $token" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data "{\"type\":\"$type\",\"name\":\"$DOMAIN\",\"content\":\"$content\",\"ttl\":120,\"proxied\":false}" > /dev/null
echo " $type: $current -> $content (updated)"
else
curl -4 -s -X POST "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/zones/$zone_id/dns_records" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $token" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data "{\"type\":\"$type\",\"name\":\"$DOMAIN\",\"content\":\"$content\",\"ttl\":120,\"proxied\":false}" > /dev/null
echo " $type: $content (created)"
fi
}
update() {
echo "[$(date -u +%H:%M:%S)] Updating DNS for $DOMAIN..."
local zone_id
zone_id=$(get_zone_id)
if [ -z "$zone_id" ]; then
echo " ERROR: cannot get zone ID"
return 1
fi
local ipv4 ipv6
ipv4=$(get_public_ipv4)
ipv6=$(get_public_ipv6)
[ -n "$ipv4" ] && upsert_record "$zone_id" "A" "$ipv4" || echo " A: no IPv4"
[ -n "$ipv6" ] && upsert_record "$zone_id" "AAAA" "$ipv6" || echo " AAAA: no IPv6"
}
# Main
if [ "${1:-}" = "--once" ]; then
update
else
update
while true; do
sleep "$INTERVAL"
update
done
fi

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@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
{
"server_id": "kh3rad3ree",
"shared_secret": "7cfe41395062d939a36d9debe7d70f528ccd2efaccddca139c19603fe40df8f4",
"peer": {
"id": "mequ",
"url": "http://10.66.66.129:7700"
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
{
"server_id": "mequ",
"shared_secret": "7cfe41395062d939a36d9debe7d70f528ccd2efaccddca139c19603fe40df8f4",
"peer": {
"id": "kh3rad3ree",
"url": "http://10.66.66.253:7700"
}
}

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# /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/warzone.conf
# Cap journal storage to avoid filling disk on mequ
[Journal]
SystemMaxUse=50M
SystemMaxFileSize=10M
MaxRetentionSec=7day

60
warzone/deploy/setup.sh Executable file
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
# Setup script — run as root on each server.
# Usage: ./setup.sh <mequ|kh3rad3ree>
HOSTNAME="${1:-}"
if [ -z "$HOSTNAME" ] || { [ "$HOSTNAME" != "mequ" ] && [ "$HOSTNAME" != "kh3rad3ree" ]; }; then
echo "Usage: $0 <mequ|kh3rad3ree>"
exit 1
fi
echo "=== Setting up featherChat on $HOSTNAME ==="
# Create warzone user if it doesn't exist
if ! id warzone &>/dev/null; then
echo "[1/4] Creating warzone user..."
useradd -r -m -s /bin/bash warzone
else
echo "[1/4] User warzone already exists"
fi
# Create data directory
echo "[2/4] Creating directories..."
mkdir -p /home/warzone/data
chown -R warzone:warzone /home/warzone
# Copy binaries
echo "[3/4] Installing binaries..."
cp warzone-server warzone-client /home/warzone/
chmod +x /home/warzone/warzone-server /home/warzone/warzone-client
cp "federation-${HOSTNAME}.json" /home/warzone/federation.json
chown warzone:warzone /home/warzone/warzone-server /home/warzone/warzone-client /home/warzone/federation.json
# Copy environment file
if [ -f "warzone-server.env.${HOSTNAME}" ]; then
cp "warzone-server.env.${HOSTNAME}" /home/warzone/server.env
chown warzone:warzone /home/warzone/server.env
echo " Environment: $(cat /home/warzone/server.env | grep -v '^#' | grep .)"
fi
# Install systemd service + journald log cap
echo "[4/5] Installing systemd service..."
cp warzone-server.service /etc/systemd/system/
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl enable warzone-server
echo "[5/5] Capping journal logs (50MB max, 7 day retention)..."
mkdir -p /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d
cp journald-warzone.conf /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/warzone.conf
systemctl restart systemd-journald
# Vacuum existing logs
journalctl --vacuum-size=50M 2>/dev/null || true
echo ""
echo "=== Done ==="
echo "Start: systemctl start warzone-server"
echo "Status: systemctl status warzone-server"
echo "Logs: journalctl -u warzone-server -f"
echo "Stop: systemctl stop warzone-server"

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