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Siavash Sameni 7a616744f4 docs: complete code-reality alignment for remaining docs + reconcile issue set

Remaining docs updated to match code (the docs that the first pass had not covered):
- Flows: Chat, Referral, Rating, Registration, Google OAuth, Negotiation, Payout,
  Trezor Safekeeping — corrected endpoints, socket events, status enums, auth gaps
- API Reference: User API, Trezor API — admin route prefix/verb/status corrections,
  added undocumented endpoints (ton-proof challenge, profile email verify,
  GET /trezor/account, POST /trezor/verify-operation)
- Data Models: Chat, Notification, Payment, PointTransaction, User — corrected
  enums (PaymentProvider, escrowState, PointTransaction.type, User.status),
  90-day notification TTL, soft-delete semantics, wallet fields

Trezor "zero frontend" finding (audit C31/C32) corrected as STALE:
- Verified current code HAS a full frontend Trezor implementation (admin/trezor
  page, TrezorSettingsView, trezorConnector via @trezor/connect-web,
  TrezorSignDialog, actions/trezor.ts building the {message,signature} object)
- Fixed Trezor Safekeeping Flow doc (removed false "no frontend" warnings)
- Reclassified ISSUE-012 as invalid/superseded with explanation

Issue set reconciled to a single canonical numbering (ISSUE-001..054):
- Adopted the comprehensive 51-issue set (long-slug, fully indexed)
- Removed 35 superseded short-slug duplicates from the first pass
- Removed a duplicate ISSUE-046 file
- Added 3 issues the 51-set lacked: ISSUE-052 (completed-not-counted-in-stats),
  ISSUE-053 (axios 401-only interceptor), ISSUE-054 (rate limiter counts all attempts)
- Regenerated Issues Index: 53 open (14 critical, 39 major) + 1 invalid

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-05-29 15:15:02 +04:00

1.3 KiB

Raw Blame History

issue, title, severity, domain, labels, status, created, source

issue

title

severity

domain

labels

status

created

source

029

No brute-force protection on delivery code verification endpoint — 900,000 combinations are enumerable

major

Delivery

security

bug

backend

major

brute-force

open

2026-05-29

Doc vs Code Audit 2026-05-29

🟠 No brute-force protection on delivery code verification endpoint — 900,000 combinations are enumerable

Severity: major Domain: Delivery Labels: security, bug, backend, major, brute-force

Description

The 6-digit delivery code verify endpoint (routes.ts lines 2790-2847) has no rate limiting, lockout counter, or attempt count maximum. Failed attempts are recorded to deliveryInfo.deliveryAttempts[] but no enforcement exists. A malicious actor could attempt all 900,000 combinations without being blocked.

Current Behavior

Unlimited guesses are permitted. No rate limiting or lockout is applied to the verify endpoint.

Expected Behavior

After N failed attempts (e.g., 5), the endpoint should return 429 or lock the code for a period. The deliveryAttempts[] array already tracks attempts — enforcement just needs to be added.

Affected Files

backend/src/routes/routes.ts
backend/src/services/deliveryService.ts

References

Doc vs Code Audit Report

1.3 KiB Raw Blame History