---
issue: 076
title: "Scanner: SSRF via unvalidated callbackUrl on intent creation"
severity: high
domain: Scanner
labels: [security, scanner, ssrf]
status: open
created: 2026-05-30
source: Full Codebase Audit 2026-05-30
---

# Scanner: SSRF via unvalidated callbackUrl on intent creation

**Severity:** high
**Domain:** Scanner
**Labels:** security, scanner, ssrf

## Description

`scanner/api.go:143` accepts a caller-supplied `callbackUrl` without validating the scheme, host, or whether it points to an internal/RFC-1918 address. A caller can set `callbackUrl` to any internal service URL and receive webhook deliveries from the scanner, enabling server-side request forgery.

## Options

1. Allowlist schemes (`https` only) and reject RFC-1918/link-local/loopback hosts at create time and at dial time via a custom `DialContext`.
2. Restrict callbacks to a configured set of backend hostnames.
3. Route webhooks through an egress proxy that blocks internal ranges.

## Recommendation

Enforce `https`-only + block private/loopback/link-local at both validation and dial time (custom `DialContext`), ideally plus a host allowlist.

## Affected Files

- `scanner/api.go:143`
- `scanner/webhook.go` — dial path

## References

- [Full Codebase Audit 2026-05-30](../09%20-%20Audits/Full%20Codebase%20Audit%20-%202026-05-30.md) — DEC-57