audit: 2026-05-30 full-codebase audit — report, issues, docs, runbooks
Full-codebase-audit 2026-05-30 outputs: - Audit report: 09 - Audits/Full Codebase Audit - 2026-05-30.md - 81 issue files ISSUE-055..135 (decisions + 1 skipped no-brainer). - Scanner docs from scratch (was zero): architecture, data model, API ref, payment flow, operations runbook + repo README. - Doc-sync updates across API reference, data models, flows, design system. - Secret Rotation Runbook (08 - Operations) for the exposed credentials. - Reusable workflow guide (07 - Development) + .claude/workflows/full-codebase-audit.js. Issues remain status:open intentionally — the code fixes are uncommitted-then-committed working-tree changes per repo and aren't "resolved" until merged/deployed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Issues/ISSUE-076-scanner-ssrf-via-unvalidated-callbackurl.md
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Issues/ISSUE-076-scanner-ssrf-via-unvalidated-callbackurl.md
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issue: 076
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title: "Scanner: SSRF via unvalidated callbackUrl on intent creation"
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severity: high
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domain: Scanner
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labels: [security, scanner, ssrf]
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status: open
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created: 2026-05-30
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source: Full Codebase Audit 2026-05-30
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---
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# Scanner: SSRF via unvalidated callbackUrl on intent creation
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**Severity:** high
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**Domain:** Scanner
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**Labels:** security, scanner, ssrf
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## Description
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`scanner/api.go:143` accepts a caller-supplied `callbackUrl` without validating the scheme, host, or whether it points to an internal/RFC-1918 address. A caller can set `callbackUrl` to any internal service URL and receive webhook deliveries from the scanner, enabling server-side request forgery.
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## Options
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1. Allowlist schemes (`https` only) and reject RFC-1918/link-local/loopback hosts at create time and at dial time via a custom `DialContext`.
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2. Restrict callbacks to a configured set of backend hostnames.
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3. Route webhooks through an egress proxy that blocks internal ranges.
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## Recommendation
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Enforce `https`-only + block private/loopback/link-local at both validation and dial time (custom `DialContext`), ideally plus a host allowlist.
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## Affected Files
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- `scanner/api.go:143`
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- `scanner/webhook.go` — dial path
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## References
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- [Full Codebase Audit 2026-05-30](../09%20-%20Audits/Full%20Codebase%20Audit%20-%202026-05-30.md) — DEC-57
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