Complete task 4 backend security architecture docs
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title: Task 4 Backend Security Architecture Verification Report
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tags: [taskmaster, verification, security, backend]
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created: 2026-05-24
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status: complete
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---
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# Task 4 Backend Security Architecture Verification Report
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Taskmaster task 4 is complete as an advisory architecture and handoff package.
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The task defines how the backend security/refactor assessment is converted into
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implementation criteria without rewriting or disrupting the current backend
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model.
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## 1. Deliverable map
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| Taskmaster item | Deliverable |
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|---|---|
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| 4.1 Security ownership and launch criteria | [[Security Ownership and Launch Decision Criteria]] |
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| 4.2 Escrow platform threat model | [[Threat Model - Amanat Escrow Platform]] |
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| 4.3 Funds ledger and escrow state machine | [[Funds Ledger and Escrow State Machine Specification]] |
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| 4.4 REST and Socket.IO authorization matrix | [[Authorization Matrix - REST and Socket.IO]], [[Realtime Authorization Spec]] |
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| 4.5 Session, passkey, and admin step-up architecture | [[Session and Authentication Architecture Decision]] |
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| 4.6 Webhook security and payment adapter contracts | [[Webhook Security Spec]], [[Payment Provider Adapter Spec]] |
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| 4.7 Secure build and supply-chain policy | [[Secure Build and Supply-Chain Policy]] |
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| 4.8 Backend-core stack decision | [[Backend Core Stack Decision Record - 2026-05-24]] |
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| 4.9 Migration and operational runbooks | [[Backend Funds Migration and Operational Runbooks]] |
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## 2. Architecture decisions verified
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- The current TypeScript/Node backend remains the production delivery path for
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the next security-hardening phase.
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- A full backend rewrite is explicitly out of scope until ledger, webhook,
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provider, auth/session, and reconciliation contracts are stable and observable.
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- Payment providers are optional and provider-neutral behind adapter contracts.
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- Webhooks must use raw-body signature verification, replay prevention,
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idempotency, and dead-letter capture.
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- Funds movement must be derived from the canonical ledger and escrow state
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machine, not provider metadata.
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- Admin release, refund, payout, role, and destructive account operations require
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step-up authentication and audit logging; high-risk payouts require
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two-person approval.
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- Socket.IO room membership must be server-derived and authorization checked,
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with global financial broadcasts prohibited.
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## 3. Verification commands
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Executed from `nick-doc` on 2026-05-24:
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```bash
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npx task-master show 4
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npx task-master set-status --id=4.6 --status=done
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npx task-master set-status --id=4.7 --status=done
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npx task-master set-status --id=4.8 --status=done
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npx task-master set-status --id=4.9 --status=done
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npx task-master set-status --id=4.3 --status=done
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npx task-master set-status --id=4.4 --status=done
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npx task-master set-status --id=4.5 --status=done
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npx task-master set-status --id=4 --status=done
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node - <<'NODE'
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const fs=require('fs');
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const data=JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('.taskmaster/tasks/tasks.json','utf8'));
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const t=data.master.tasks.find(x=>String(x.id)==='4');
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console.log(JSON.stringify({
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task:t.status,
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subtasks:t.subtasks.map(s=>({id:s.id,status:s.status,title:s.title}))
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}, null, 2));
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NODE
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```
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A one-off Node link checker also parsed Task 4 wiki links and verified they
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resolve to markdown files; threat IDs such as `[[T05]]` were treated as allowed
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shorthand references.
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## 4. Verification result
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- Taskmaster JSON reports task 4 as `done`.
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- Taskmaster JSON reports subtasks 4.1 through 4.9 as `done`.
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- `Authorization Matrix - REST and Socket.IO` now links directly to [[Realtime Authorization Spec]].
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- Task 4 wiki links resolve to existing markdown files, excluding threat-ID
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shorthand references such as `[[T05]]`.
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- Incident ownership in the task 4 runbook was replaced with explicit role owners
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that can be mapped to named responders before production launch.
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- Remaining implementation tests belong to follow-up backend tasks because task
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4 is a documentation and architecture handoff task.
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## 5. Follow-up implementation test requirements
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Implementation tasks derived from task 4 must include:
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- ledger invariant unit tests for every escrow transition,
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- payment provider adapter contract tests for SHKeeper, Request Network, manual
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wallet, and disabled-provider modes,
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- webhook signature, replay, duplicate, and DLQ tests,
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- REST authorization tests for every gap listed in the authorization matrix,
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- Socket.IO handshake, room authorization, targeted emission, and rate-limit
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tests,
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- session rotation, revocation, passkey disabled/enabled, and admin step-up
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tests,
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- runbook drills for provider outage, leaked webhook secret, stuck release,
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suspicious payment proof, and compromised admin.
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## 6. Residual risk
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This report verifies the Task 4 architecture package, not production behavior.
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Backend implementation work must still enforce these controls before launch.
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