---
title: Scanner Architecture
tags: [architecture, scanner, payment]
created: 2026-05-30
---

# Scanner Architecture

AMN Pay Scanner is a standalone Go microservice that watches on-chain payment events and notifies the backend via webhook when a payment is confirmed. It replaces the Request Network integration with an in-house polling scanner that supports EVM chains, Tron, and TON.

> [!info]
> Repo: `scanner/` within the escrow monorepo. Binary: `scanner`. Written in Go 1.25. SQLite (WAL mode) for state. No external dependencies beyond the chain APIs.

---

## 1. Responsibilities

- Accept payment **intents** from the backend (POST /intents)
- Watch the relevant chain for matching on-chain transfers
- Track confirmation depth (EVM) or rely on finality from the chain API (Tron, TON)
- Deliver a signed webhook to the backend callback URL when confirmed
- Retry failed webhook deliveries
- Expire stale pending intents on a configurable TTL

---

## 2. Component map

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                       scanner binary                    │
│                                                         │
│  main.go                                                │
│  ├── loadConfig()          config.go                   │
│  ├── initDB()              intent.go (SQLite schema)   │
│  ├── startup reconcile     intent.go                   │
│  ├── newServer()           api.go                      │
│  │   └── startWorkers()   api.go                       │
│  │       ├── ChainWorker   chain.go        (EVM)       │
│  │       ├── TronChainWorker tron_chain.go (Tron)      │
│  │       └── TonChainWorker  ton_chain.go  (TON)       │
│  ├── HTTP routes           api.go / main.go            │
│  ├── intent TTL expiry     main.go + intent.go         │
│  └── webhook retry loop    main.go + webhook.go        │
│                                                         │
│  reference.go  — payment reference / topic hash math   │
│  webhook.go    — delivery, HMAC signing, retry         │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

---

## 3. Chain worker model

All three chain types implement the `Worker` interface:

```go
type Worker interface {
    start()
    stop()
    getHead(ctx context.Context) (int64, error)
}
```

One worker goroutine is spawned per chain marked `"verified": true` in `supported-chains.json`. Workers are selected by `chainType`:

| chainType | Worker struct | API used |
|---|---|---|
| `evm` (default) | `ChainWorker` | JSON-RPC 2.0 (`eth_getLogs`, `eth_blockNumber`) |
| `tron` | `TronChainWorker` | TronGrid REST (`/v1/contracts/{contract}/events`) |
| `ton` | `TonChainWorker` | TonCenter v3 REST (`/jetton/transfers`) |

Workers poll on `POLL_INTERVAL_SEC` (default 15 s). On first run, each worker starts scanning from the current chain head minus a small buffer (10 blocks for EVM, 24 h for Tron/TON).

---

## 4. EVM scanning detail

```
for each tick:
  head   = eth_blockNumber
  from   = max(checkpoint − ReorgBuffer(), 0)
  chunks = split [from..head] into 2000-block ranges
  for each chunk:
    logs = eth_getLogs(proxyAddress, EventTopic, from, to)
    for each log:
      topicRef = Topics[1]  (keccak256 of paymentReference — pre-indexed)
      intent   = DB lookup by topicRef WHERE status='pending'
      validate(log.Data, intent)  ← token + destination + amount check
      confirmIntentPending()      ← status → 'confirming'
    saveCheckpoint(to)
  checkConfirmations():
    for each confirming intent:
      confs = head - blockNumber + 1
      if confs >= required: finalizeIntent(capped at required) + deliverWebhook()
```

**Reorg protection**: `ReorgBuffer()` re-scans `3 × confirmationThreshold` blocks before the checkpoint (clamped 20–500). This catches any log that appeared in a block that was later reorganised off the canonical chain.

**Event signature**: `TransferWithReferenceAndFee` keccak256 = `0xbc8b749850bdc0c5e4a49d50f87ec40dca2acdb70a84e7c6823ccdc7b3b3d4b3`

---

## 5. Tron scanning detail

TronGrid does not expose a fee-proxy contract. Each intent is assigned a unique HD-derived destination address. The scanner watches TRC20 `Transfer` events on the USDT contract and matches by `to` address.

- Checkpoint: block timestamp in milliseconds (`last_scanned_block` column)
- TronGrid addresses arrive as `41xxxx` hex (21 bytes); normalized to `0x` (20 bytes EVM style)
- Tron transactions reported by TronGrid are already confirmed; status goes directly to `confirmed` (no multi-block wait)
- Pagination follows `meta.links.next` until empty

---

## 6. TON scanning detail

TON uses TonCenter v3. Per-intent polling: for each pending TON intent, a separate HTTP call fetches incoming Jetton transfers to that destination since the checkpoint.

- Checkpoint: Unix timestamp in seconds
- TON addresses are base64url (`EQ…`/`UQ…`) — case-sensitive, never lowercased
- `proxyAddress` = USDT Jetton master address (`EQCxE6mUtQJKFnGfaROTKOt1lZbDiiX1kCixRv7Nw2Id_sDs`)
- TonCenter returns only finalized transactions; status goes directly to `confirmed`
- Lag is reported in seconds, not blocks
- Known scaling limitation: O(pending intents) API calls per scan cycle

---

## 7. Intent lifecycle

```
pending ──(tx seen)──► confirming ──(enough blocks)──► confirmed ──(webhook ok)──► [done]
   │                       │                               │
   │                       │ (deep reorg / TTL)            │ (all retries fail)
   └───────────────────────┴──────────► expired      webhook_failed
```

- **Tron / TON** skip `confirming` and jump directly to `confirmed`.
- `webhook_failed` intents are retried every `WEBHOOK_RETRY_HOURS` (default 6 h) and on `POST /admin/webhooks/retry`.
- **Startup reconciliation**: on startup, `confirmed` intents with `webhook_delivered_at IS NULL` and created in the last 7 days have their webhook re-delivered. This recovers from a crash between `finalizeIntent` and `deliverWebhook`.

---

## 8. Payment reference math (EVM)

```
paymentReference  = last8Bytes(keccak256(lower(intentId + salt + destination)))
topicRef (index)  = keccak256(paymentReferenceBytes)
```

The ERC20FeeProxy indexes `paymentReference` so `Topics[1]` in the log is `topicRef`, not the raw reference. The DB stores `topic_ref` pre-computed per intent so the scan loop is a single indexed SQL lookup instead of O(n) hashing.

---

## 9. Database schema (SQLite WAL)

Two tables:

**`intents`** — one row per payment intent

| Column | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `intent_id` | TEXT PK | caller-supplied UUID |
| `chain_id` | INTEGER | numeric chain ID |
| `chain_type` | TEXT | `evm` / `tron` / `ton` |
| `token_address` | TEXT | EVM/Tron: lowercase 0x hex; TON: base64url |
| `destination` | TEXT | receiving address |
| `amount` | TEXT | base-10 wei / token smallest unit |
| `payment_reference` | TEXT | 8-byte hex (EVM only) |
| `topic_ref` | TEXT | keccak256 of paymentReference (EVM index) |
| `status` | TEXT | `pending` / `confirming` / `confirmed` / `expired` / `webhook_failed` |
| `callback_url` | TEXT | backend webhook endpoint |
| `callback_secret` | TEXT | HMAC key (not returned in GET) |
| `confirmations_required` | INTEGER | from chain config or caller override, floored at the chain acceptance threshold |
| `tx_hash` | TEXT NULL | transaction hash once seen |
| `log_index` | INTEGER NULL | log position within tx (EVM) |
| `block_number` | INTEGER NULL | block / timestamp when seen |
| `confirmations` | INTEGER | current depth while confirming; capped at the accepted threshold after confirmation |
| `salt` | TEXT | 32-byte random hex for reference derivation |
| `webhook_delivered_at` | TEXT NULL | RFC3339 timestamp of successful delivery |
| `created_at` / `updated_at` | DATETIME | |

Unique index on `(tx_hash, log_index)` prevents duplicate intent confirmation.

**`checkpoints`** — one row per chain, tracks scan progress

| Column | Notes |
|---|---|
| `chain_id` | PK |
| `last_scanned_block` | block number (EVM), ms timestamp (Tron), unix seconds (TON) |

---

## 10. Security model

- All non-health endpoints require `Authorization: Bearer <SCANNER_API_KEY>` (constant-time compare).
- If `SCANNER_API_KEY` is unset the server logs a warning and allows all requests — intended for local dev only.
- Webhooks are signed with HMAC-SHA256: `X-AMN-Signature: hex(hmac(body, callbackSecret))`.
- The `callbackSecret` is stored in the DB but excluded from all JSON responses (`json:"-"` tag).
- Request bodies are limited to 64 KB.
