---
title: Task 4 Backend Security Architecture Verification Report
tags: [taskmaster, verification, security, backend]
created: 2026-05-24
status: complete
---

# Task 4 Backend Security Architecture Verification Report

Taskmaster task 4 is complete as an advisory architecture and handoff package.
The task defines how the backend security/refactor assessment is converted into
implementation criteria without rewriting or disrupting the current backend
model.

## 1. Deliverable map

| Taskmaster item | Deliverable |
|---|---|
| 4.1 Security ownership and launch criteria | [[Security Ownership and Launch Decision Criteria]] |
| 4.2 Escrow platform threat model | [[Threat Model - Amanat Escrow Platform]] |
| 4.3 Funds ledger and escrow state machine | [[Funds Ledger and Escrow State Machine Specification]] |
| 4.4 REST and Socket.IO authorization matrix | [[Authorization Matrix - REST and Socket.IO]], [[Realtime Authorization Spec]] |
| 4.5 Session, passkey, and admin step-up architecture | [[Session and Authentication Architecture Decision]] |
| 4.6 Webhook security and payment adapter contracts | [[Webhook Security Spec]], [[Payment Provider Adapter Spec]] |
| 4.7 Secure build and supply-chain policy | [[Secure Build and Supply-Chain Policy]] |
| 4.8 Backend-core stack decision | [[Backend Core Stack Decision Record - 2026-05-24]] |
| 4.9 Migration and operational runbooks | [[Backend Funds Migration and Operational Runbooks]] |

## 2. Architecture decisions verified

- The current TypeScript/Node backend remains the production delivery path for
  the next security-hardening phase.
- A full backend rewrite is explicitly out of scope until ledger, webhook,
  provider, auth/session, and reconciliation contracts are stable and observable.
- Payment providers are optional and provider-neutral behind adapter contracts.
- Webhooks must use raw-body signature verification, replay prevention,
  idempotency, and dead-letter capture.
- Funds movement must be derived from the canonical ledger and escrow state
  machine, not provider metadata.
- Admin release, refund, payout, role, and destructive account operations require
  step-up authentication and audit logging; high-risk payouts require
  two-person approval.
- Socket.IO room membership must be server-derived and authorization checked,
  with global financial broadcasts prohibited.

## 3. Verification commands

Executed from `nick-doc` on 2026-05-24:

```bash
npx task-master show 4
npx task-master set-status --id=4.6 --status=done
npx task-master set-status --id=4.7 --status=done
npx task-master set-status --id=4.8 --status=done
npx task-master set-status --id=4.9 --status=done
npx task-master set-status --id=4.3 --status=done
npx task-master set-status --id=4.4 --status=done
npx task-master set-status --id=4.5 --status=done
npx task-master set-status --id=4 --status=done
node - <<'NODE'
const fs=require('fs');
const data=JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('.taskmaster/tasks/tasks.json','utf8'));
const t=data.master.tasks.find(x=>String(x.id)==='4');
console.log(JSON.stringify({
  task:t.status,
  subtasks:t.subtasks.map(s=>({id:s.id,status:s.status,title:s.title}))
}, null, 2));
NODE
```

A one-off Node link checker also parsed Task 4 wiki links and verified they
resolve to markdown files; threat IDs such as `[[T05]]` were treated as allowed
shorthand references.

## 4. Verification result

- Taskmaster JSON reports task 4 as `done`.
- Taskmaster JSON reports subtasks 4.1 through 4.9 as `done`.
- `Authorization Matrix - REST and Socket.IO` now links directly to [[Realtime Authorization Spec]].
- Task 4 wiki links resolve to existing markdown files, excluding threat-ID
  shorthand references such as `[[T05]]`.
- Incident ownership in the task 4 runbook was replaced with explicit role owners
  that can be mapped to named responders before production launch.
- Remaining implementation tests belong to follow-up backend tasks because task
  4 is a documentation and architecture handoff task.

## 5. Follow-up implementation test requirements

Implementation tasks derived from task 4 must include:

- ledger invariant unit tests for every escrow transition,
- payment provider adapter contract tests for SHKeeper, Request Network, manual
  wallet, and disabled-provider modes,
- webhook signature, replay, duplicate, and DLQ tests,
- REST authorization tests for every gap listed in the authorization matrix,
- Socket.IO handshake, room authorization, targeted emission, and rate-limit
  tests,
- session rotation, revocation, passkey disabled/enabled, and admin step-up
  tests,
- runbook drills for provider outage, leaked webhook secret, stuck release,
  suspicious payment proof, and compromised admin.

## 6. Residual risk

This report verifies the Task 4 architecture package, not production behavior.
Backend implementation work must still enforce these controls before launch.
