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Siavash Sameni 51e893590c feat: WarzonePhone lossy VoIP protocol — Phase 1 complete

Rust workspace with 7 crates implementing a custom VoIP protocol
designed for extremely lossy connections (5-70% loss, 100-500kbps,
300-800ms RTT). 89 tests passing across all crates.

Crates:
- wzp-proto: Wire format, traits, adaptive quality controller, jitter buffer, session FSM
- wzp-codec: Opus encoder/decoder (audiopus), Codec2 stubs, adaptive switching, resampling
- wzp-fec: RaptorQ fountain codes, interleaving, block management (proven 30-70% loss recovery)
- wzp-crypto: X25519+ChaCha20-Poly1305, Warzone identity compatible, anti-replay, rekeying
- wzp-transport: QUIC via quinn with DATAGRAM frames, path monitoring, signaling streams
- wzp-relay: Integration stub (Phase 2)
- wzp-client: Integration stub (Phase 2)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-03-27 12:45:07 +04:00

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FeatherChat: Voice/Video Calling Integration with Warzone Messenger

Overview

Voice/video calling system designed to integrate with the existing E2E encrypted Warzone messenger. Reuses the same identity, addressing, and key exchange infrastructure.

Identity Model (reuse, not duplicate)

Identity: 32-byte seed derives both keypairs via HKDF:
- Ed25519 (signing)
- X25519 (encryption)
Fingerprint: SHA-256(Ed25519 public key)[:16], displayed as xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx
Backup: BIP39 mnemonic (24 words) for seed recovery
Storage: Seed encrypted at rest with Argon2id + ChaCha20-Poly1305
Future: Ethereum address as fingerprint (secp256k1 derived from same BIP39 seed)

Addressing (reuse)

Method	Format	Resolution
Local alias	`@manwe`	Server resolves to fingerprint
Federated	`@manwe.b1.example.com`	DNS TXT record → fingerprint + server endpoint
ENS	`@manwe.eth`	Ethereum address → fingerprint (Phase 2-3)
Raw fingerprint	`xxxx:xxxx:...`	Direct lookup (always works as fallback)

Key Exchange (can extend)

X3DH for session establishment:
- Ed25519 identity key
- X25519 ephemeral key
- Signed pre-keys
Double Ratchet for forward secrecy on data channels
Pre-key bundles stored on server, fetched by callers

Server Infrastructure

Stack: Rust (axum), sled DB, WebSocket for real-time
Trust model: Server is untrusted relay — never sees plaintext
Groups: Named, auto-created, per-member encryption
Federation: Via DNS TXT records (Phase 3)

Calling System Requirements

Signaling: Reuse existing WebSocket connection and identity
Key derivation: SRTP/DTLS keys derived from existing X3DH shared secret (or new ephemeral exchange per call)
Call initiation: WireMessage::CallOffer, CallAnswer, CallIceCandidate variants
NAT traversal: STUN/TURN server integration
Group calls: SFU (Selective Forwarding Unit) vs mesh topology for up to 50 users
Codecs: Opus for audio, VP8/VP9/AV1 for video
E2E media encryption: Insertable streams API (WebRTC) or custom SRTP
Unified addressing: A user calls @manwe the same way they message @manwe

Degradation Strategy

Calls should degrade gracefully under unreliable/warzone network conditions:

Video (full) → Video (low res) → Audio (high quality) → Audio (low bitrate)

Support opportunistic cooperation
Fall back to TURN/TCP through the existing WebSocket when UDP is blocked

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