C2: Add EncryptingTransport wrapper — all media I/O now goes through
ChaChaSession encrypt/decrypt before hitting the QUIC datagram path.
cli.rs run_live/run_silence/run_file_mode accept Arc<dyn MediaTransport>
and receive a wrapped transport after the handshake.
C3: Wire VideoScorer::observe() into both plain and trunked forwarding
loops in room.rs. Packets from participants with Abusive verdict are
dropped before forwarding. last_bwe_kbps tracked from quality reports.
M4: Widen FEC repair symbol index from u8 to u16 throughout
(FecEncoder::generate_repair, FecDecoder::add_symbol, all call sites in
call.rs, bench.rs, pipeline.rs, wzp-android). Eliminates theoretical
wrapping when num_source + repair_count > 255.
M5: Track last_encrypt_timestamp in ChaChaSession. debug_assert in
encrypt() that timestamp is non-decreasing across calls (including post-
rekey). complete_rekey() explicitly preserves last_encrypt_timestamp to
prevent accidental timestamp reset regressions.
583 tests passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous scheme built ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonces from an internal
recv_seq counter that incremented once per decrypt() call. Under
in-order delivery recv_seq stayed in sync with the sender's send_seq,
but any out-of-order or lost packet caused them to diverge permanently —
every subsequent packet then used the wrong nonce and AEAD decryption
failed for the rest of the session.
Fix: parse the MediaHeader at the top of both encrypt() and decrypt()
and use header.seq as the nonce input. Both sides now derive the nonce
from the same wire field, surviving reordering by construction.
send_seq / recv_seq are kept as pure packet counters for the rekey
interval trigger; they no longer affect nonce derivation.
All tests updated to pass valid v2 MediaHeader bytes instead of raw
byte literals (the new code requires a parseable header for nonce
derivation). New test decrypt_survives_out_of_order_delivery encrypts
5 packets and delivers them out of order (indices 0,2,1,4,3); this
test would have failed under the old counter-based scheme.
Fixes audit finding C1 from AUDIT-2026-05-25.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Derive a 4-digit code from the shared DH secret via HKDF with label
"warzone-sas-code". Both peers compute the same code; a MITM relay
produces a different one. Users compare verbally during the call.
- CryptoSession::sas_code() -> Option<u32> on the trait
- ChaChaSession stores and returns the SAS
- HKDF derivation in WarzoneKeyExchange::derive_session()
- Tests: both peers match, MITM produces different code
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
