fix(wzp-crypto): derive AEAD nonces from MediaHeader.seq, not recv_seq

The previous scheme built ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonces from an internal
recv_seq counter that incremented once per decrypt() call. Under
in-order delivery recv_seq stayed in sync with the sender's send_seq,
but any out-of-order or lost packet caused them to diverge permanently —
every subsequent packet then used the wrong nonce and AEAD decryption
failed for the rest of the session.

Fix: parse the MediaHeader at the top of both encrypt() and decrypt()
and use header.seq as the nonce input. Both sides now derive the nonce
from the same wire field, surviving reordering by construction.

send_seq / recv_seq are kept as pure packet counters for the rekey
interval trigger; they no longer affect nonce derivation.

All tests updated to pass valid v2 MediaHeader bytes instead of raw
byte literals (the new code requires a parseable header for nonce
derivation). New test decrypt_survives_out_of_order_delivery encrypts
5 packets and delivers them out of order (indices 0,2,1,4,3); this
test would have failed under the old counter-based scheme.

Fixes audit finding C1 from AUDIT-2026-05-25.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

crates/wzp-crypto/src/handshake.rs

@@ -209,18 +209,34 @@ mod tests {
         let mut alice_session = alice.derive_session(&bob_eph_pub).unwrap();
         let mut bob_session = bob.derive_session(&alice_eph_pub).unwrap();
 
-        // Verify they can communicate: Alice encrypts, Bob decrypts
-        let header = b"call-header";
+        // Verify they can communicate: Alice encrypts, Bob decrypts.
+        // Use a valid v2 MediaHeader — encrypt/decrypt now derive the nonce from
+        // header.seq and will reject raw byte slices shorter than WIRE_SIZE.
+        use wzp_proto::{CodecId, MediaHeader, MediaType};
+        let header = MediaHeader {
+            version: 2,
+            flags: 0,
+            media_type: MediaType::Audio,
+            codec_id: CodecId::Opus24k,
+            stream_id: 0,
+            fec_ratio: 0,
+            seq: 0,
+            timestamp: 0,
+            fec_block: 0,
+        };
+        let mut header_bytes = Vec::new();
+        header.write_to(&mut header_bytes);
+
         let plaintext = b"hello from alice";
 
         let mut ciphertext = Vec::new();
         alice_session
-            .encrypt(header, plaintext, &mut ciphertext)
+            .encrypt(&header_bytes, plaintext, &mut ciphertext)
             .unwrap();
 
         let mut decrypted = Vec::new();
         bob_session
-            .decrypt(header, &ciphertext, &mut decrypted)
+            .decrypt(&header_bytes, &ciphertext, &mut decrypted)
             .unwrap();
 
         assert_eq!(&decrypted, plaintext);

crates/wzp-crypto/src/session.rs

@@ -101,10 +101,14 @@ impl CryptoSession for ChaChaSession {
         plaintext: &[u8],
         out: &mut Vec<u8>,
     ) -> Result<(), CryptoError> {
-        let nonce_bytes = nonce::build_nonce(&self.session_id, self.send_seq, Direction::Send);
+        // Derive nonce from the wire-level seq in the header, not from an
+        // internal counter. This ensures the receiver can reconstruct the
+        // same nonce using the header it receives, regardless of delivery order.
+        let header = parse_header(header_bytes)
+            .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::Internal("header too short to derive nonce".into()))?;
+        let nonce_bytes = nonce::build_nonce(&self.session_id, header.seq, Direction::Send);
         let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
 
-        // Encrypt with AAD
         use chacha20poly1305::aead::Payload;
         let payload = Payload {
             msg: plaintext,
@@ -117,7 +121,7 @@ impl CryptoSession for ChaChaSession {
             .map_err(|_| CryptoError::Internal("encryption failed".into()))?;
 
         out.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
-        self.send_seq = self.send_seq.wrapping_add(1);
+        self.send_seq = self.send_seq.wrapping_add(1); // packet counter for rekey trigger only
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -127,9 +131,14 @@ impl CryptoSession for ChaChaSession {
         ciphertext: &[u8],
         out: &mut Vec<u8>,
     ) -> Result<(), CryptoError> {
-        // Use Direction::Send to match the sender's nonce construction.
-        // The recv_seq counter tracks which packet from the peer we're decrypting.
-        let nonce_bytes = nonce::build_nonce(&self.session_id, self.recv_seq, Direction::Send);
+        // Parse header before decryption — needed for nonce derivation.
+        // Using header.seq (not recv_seq) means the nonce is always derived
+        // from the same wire field as the sender, surviving out-of-order delivery.
+        // A recv_seq counter diverges from the sender's send_seq on any reorder,
+        // causing every subsequent decryption to fail for the rest of the session.
+        let header = parse_header(header_bytes)
+            .ok_or_else(|| CryptoError::Internal("header too short to derive nonce".into()))?;
+        let nonce_bytes = nonce::build_nonce(&self.session_id, header.seq, Direction::Send);
         let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
 
         use chacha20poly1305::aead::Payload;
@@ -145,20 +154,17 @@ impl CryptoSession for ChaChaSession {
 
         let plaintext_len = plaintext.len();
         out.extend_from_slice(&plaintext);
-        self.recv_seq = self.recv_seq.wrapping_add(1);
+        self.recv_seq = self.recv_seq.wrapping_add(1); // packet counter for rekey trigger only
 
-        // Anti-replay check: if header parses as a v2 MediaHeader, verify seq
-        // is not a replay for this (stream_id, media_type).
-        if let Some(header) = parse_header(header_bytes) {
-            let window = self
-                .anti_replay
-                .entry((header.stream_id, header.media_type))
-                .or_insert_with(|| default_window_for_media_type(header.media_type));
-            if let Err(e) = window.check_and_update(header.seq) {
-                // Roll back the plaintext we just appended.
-                out.truncate(out.len() - plaintext_len);
-                return Err(e);
-            }
+        // Anti-replay check: header already parsed above.
+        let window = self
+            .anti_replay
+            .entry((header.stream_id, header.media_type))
+            .or_insert_with(|| default_window_for_media_type(header.media_type));
+        if let Err(e) = window.check_and_update(header.seq) {
+            // Roll back the plaintext we just appended.
+            out.truncate(out.len() - plaintext_len);
+            return Err(e);
         }
 
         Ok(())
@@ -198,24 +204,42 @@ impl CryptoSession for ChaChaSession {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
+    use wzp_proto::{CodecId, MediaType};
 
     fn make_session_pair() -> (ChaChaSession, ChaChaSession) {
         let key = [0x42u8; 32];
         (ChaChaSession::new(key), ChaChaSession::new(key))
     }
 
+    /// Build a minimal valid v2 MediaHeader serialised to bytes.
+    fn make_header_bytes(seq: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
+        let header = MediaHeader {
+            version: 2,
+            flags: 0,
+            media_type: MediaType::Audio,
+            codec_id: CodecId::Opus24k,
+            stream_id: 0,
+            fec_ratio: 0,
+            seq,
+            timestamp: seq.wrapping_mul(20),
+            fec_block: 0,
+        };
+        let mut bytes = Vec::new();
+        header.write_to(&mut bytes);
+        bytes
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn encrypt_decrypt_roundtrip() {
         let (mut alice, mut bob) = make_session_pair();
-        let header = b"test-header";
+        let header = make_header_bytes(0);
         let plaintext = b"hello warzone";
 
         let mut ciphertext = Vec::new();
-        alice.encrypt(header, plaintext, &mut ciphertext).unwrap();
+        alice.encrypt(&header, plaintext, &mut ciphertext).unwrap();
 
-        // Bob decrypts (his recv matches Alice's send)
         let mut decrypted = Vec::new();
-        bob.decrypt(header, &ciphertext, &mut decrypted).unwrap();
+        bob.decrypt(&header, &ciphertext, &mut decrypted).unwrap();
 
         assert_eq!(&decrypted, plaintext);
     }
@@ -223,14 +247,18 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn decrypt_wrong_aad_fails() {
         let (mut alice, mut bob) = make_session_pair();
-        let header = b"correct-header";
+        let correct_header = make_header_bytes(0);
+        // Different seq → different nonce AND different AAD bytes: decryption must fail.
+        let wrong_header = make_header_bytes(1);
         let plaintext = b"secret data";
 
         let mut ciphertext = Vec::new();
-        alice.encrypt(header, plaintext, &mut ciphertext).unwrap();
+        alice
+            .encrypt(&correct_header, plaintext, &mut ciphertext)
+            .unwrap();
 
         let mut decrypted = Vec::new();
-        let result = bob.decrypt(b"wrong-header", &ciphertext, &mut decrypted);
+        let result = bob.decrypt(&wrong_header, &ciphertext, &mut decrypted);
         assert!(result.is_err());
     }
 
@@ -239,29 +267,29 @@ mod tests {
         let mut alice = ChaChaSession::new([0xAA; 32]);
         let mut eve = ChaChaSession::new([0xBB; 32]);
 
-        let header = b"hdr";
+        let header = make_header_bytes(0);
         let plaintext = b"secret";
 
         let mut ciphertext = Vec::new();
-        alice.encrypt(header, plaintext, &mut ciphertext).unwrap();
+        alice.encrypt(&header, plaintext, &mut ciphertext).unwrap();
 
         let mut decrypted = Vec::new();
-        let result = eve.decrypt(header, &ciphertext, &mut decrypted);
+        let result = eve.decrypt(&header, &ciphertext, &mut decrypted);
         assert!(result.is_err());
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn multiple_packets_roundtrip() {
         let (mut alice, mut bob) = make_session_pair();
-        let header = b"hdr";
 
-        for i in 0..100 {
+        for i in 0..100u32 {
+            let header = make_header_bytes(i);
             let msg = format!("message {}", i);
             let mut ct = Vec::new();
-            alice.encrypt(header, msg.as_bytes(), &mut ct).unwrap();
+            alice.encrypt(&header, msg.as_bytes(), &mut ct).unwrap();
 
             let mut pt = Vec::new();
-            bob.decrypt(header, &ct, &mut pt).unwrap();
+            bob.decrypt(&header, &ct, &mut pt).unwrap();
             assert_eq!(pt, msg.as_bytes());
         }
     }
@@ -281,6 +309,57 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(alice.send_seq, 0);
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn decrypt_survives_out_of_order_delivery() {
+        // Regression test for nonce derivation using recv_seq instead of
+        // MediaHeader.seq. If nonces are tied to a local counter, any reorder
+        // causes the counter to diverge from the sender's seq and every
+        // subsequent packet fails decryption permanently.
+        use wzp_proto::{CodecId, MediaType};
+
+        let key = [0x55u8; 32];
+        let mut alice = ChaChaSession::new(key);
+        let mut bob = ChaChaSession::new(key);
+
+        let plaintext = b"audio payload";
+
+        // Encrypt 5 packets in order (seqs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14).
+        let seqs = [10u32, 11, 12, 13, 14];
+        let mut ciphertexts: Vec<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)> = Vec::new();
+        for &seq in &seqs {
+            let header = MediaHeader {
+                version: 2,
+                flags: 0,
+                media_type: MediaType::Audio,
+                codec_id: CodecId::Opus24k,
+                stream_id: 0,
+                fec_ratio: 0,
+                seq,
+                timestamp: seq * 20,
+                fec_block: 0,
+            };
+            let mut header_bytes = Vec::new();
+            header.write_to(&mut header_bytes);
+            let mut ct = Vec::new();
+            alice.encrypt(&header_bytes, plaintext, &mut ct).unwrap();
+            ciphertexts.push((header_bytes, ct));
+        }
+
+        // Bob receives them out of order: 0, 2, 1, 4, 3
+        let delivery_order = [0usize, 2, 1, 4, 3];
+        for &idx in &delivery_order {
+            let (ref hdr, ref ct) = ciphertexts[idx];
+            let mut pt = Vec::new();
+            let result = bob.decrypt(hdr, ct, &mut pt);
+            assert!(
+                result.is_ok(),
+                "out-of-order packet (original idx={idx}, seq={}) must decrypt successfully",
+                seqs[idx]
+            );
+            assert_eq!(&pt, plaintext);
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn per_stream_anti_replay_rejects_duplicate() {
         use wzp_proto::{CodecId, MediaType};