Commit Graph

66 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Siavash Sameni
cfb227a93d Server auth (challenge-response) + OTP key replenishment
Authentication:
- POST /v1/auth/challenge {fingerprint} → {challenge, expires_at}
- POST /v1/auth/verify {fingerprint, challenge, signature} → {token}
- Client signs challenge with Ed25519 identity key
- Server verifies against stored public key
- Returns bearer token valid for 7 days
- Web clients get token without sig verify (Phase 2: WASM)
- validate_token() helper for protecting endpoints

OTP Key Replenishment:
- GET /v1/keys/:fp/otpk-count → {otpk_count}
- POST /v1/keys/replenish {fingerprint, otpks: [{id, public_key}]}
- OTPKs stored individually: otpk:<fp>:<id> → public_key
- Returns total count after replenishment

Phase 1 complete:
- [x] Seed-based identity + BIP39
- [x] X3DH + Double Ratchet (forward secrecy)
- [x] Pre-key bundles
- [x] Server (keys, messages, groups, aliases, auth)
- [x] CLI TUI + Web client
- [x] Aliases with TTL + recovery
- [x] Seed encryption (Argon2id + ChaCha20)
- [x] Server auth (challenge-response + tokens)
- [x] OTP key replenishment

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 07:55:02 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
7fe6de0ba1 Alias TTL renews only on authenticated actions (sending messages)
- Sending a message includes `from` fingerprint
- Server renews alias TTL on send (proves identity: you encrypted it)
- Polling/receiving does NOT renew (anyone can spam messages to you)
- Key registration does NOT renew (separate concern)

This prevents alias keepalive attacks where someone spams a user
just to keep their alias from expiring.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 07:39:15 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
bf67566b0c Alias TTL, recovery keys, and reclamation
Aliases now have a lifecycle:
- 365-day TTL from last activity (send/receive/renew)
- 30-day grace period after expiry (only recovery key can reclaim)
- After grace: anyone can register the alias
- Recovery key generated on first registration, rotated on recovery
- Auto-renew on activity via POST /v1/alias/renew

New endpoints:
- POST /v1/alias/recover {alias, recovery_key, new_fingerprint}
  Reclaim alias with recovery key, even if expired. Works across
  identity changes (new seed → new fingerprint, same alias).
  Recovery key is rotated on each recovery.
- POST /v1/alias/renew {fingerprint}
  Heartbeat — resets TTL. Returns days until expiry.

Resolve now returns expiry info:
- GET /v1/alias/resolve/:name → includes expires_in_days, expired flag
- GET /v1/alias/list → includes expiry status per alias

Phase 2: DNS automation — separate DNS authority manages parent zone,
servers update delegated records via API. Recovery key maps to DNS
record ownership for out-of-band reclamation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 07:18:10 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
29c059cebf Aliases: human-readable names mapped to fingerprints
Server:
- POST /v1/alias/register — claim an alias (one per fingerprint)
- GET /v1/alias/resolve/:name — alias → fingerprint
- GET /v1/alias/whois/:fingerprint — fingerprint → alias (reverse)
- GET /v1/alias/list — list all aliases
- Bidirectional mapping in sled (a:name→fp, fp:fp→name)
- One alias per person, re-registering replaces old alias

Web client:
- /alias <name> — register your alias
- /aliases — list all registered aliases
- /info — now shows alias alongside fingerprint
- Peer input accepts @alias (resolved before sending)
- Received messages show @alias instead of fingerprint
- DM: paste @alias or fingerprint in peer input

CLI TUI:
- /alias <name> — register alias
- /aliases — list all aliases
- /peer @alias — resolves alias to fingerprint
- Alias resolution displayed in system messages

Addressing model:
- @manwe (local) → server resolves → fingerprint
- @manwe.b1.example.com (federated) → DNS resolve (Phase 3)
- Raw fingerprint → always works, no resolution

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 07:01:35 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
b90155c3b7 Fix web client: gracefully handle CLI members in groups
- fetchPeerKey: catch JSON parse error for CLI bincode bundles,
  show clear "CLI client — needs WASM bridge" message
- Group send: silently skip CLI members instead of showing
  error per member (mixed groups work, web members get messages,
  CLI members are skipped without noise)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 23:20:25 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
5cf7e8a02f Auto-join groups: /g and /gjoin auto-create if group doesn't exist
- Server: /join endpoint creates the group if it doesn't exist
- CLI TUI: /g <name> auto-joins before switching
- Web: /g <name> auto-joins before switching
- No more "group not found" errors — just /g ops and go

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 23:17:03 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
f3e78c6cff Group chat with E2E encryption for both web and CLI clients
Server:
- POST /v1/groups/create — create named group
- POST /v1/groups/:name/join — join group
- GET /v1/groups/:name — get group info + member list
- GET /v1/groups — list all groups
- POST /v1/groups/:name/send — fan-out encrypted messages to members
- Groups stored in sled, members tracked by fingerprint

Web client:
- /gcreate <name> — create group
- /gjoin <name> — join group
- /g <name> — switch to group chat mode
- /glist — list all groups
- /dm — switch back to DM mode
- Group messages encrypted per-member (ECDH + AES-GCM for each)
- Group tag shown on received messages: "sender [groupname]"

CLI TUI client:
- Same commands: /gcreate, /gjoin, /g, /glist, /dm
- Group messages encrypted per-member (X3DH + Double Ratchet for each)
- Automatic X3DH key exchange with new group members on first message
- Sessions established and persisted per-member

Architecture:
- Client-side fan-out encryption: message encrypted N times (once per member)
- Server stores one copy per recipient in their message queue
- Reuses existing 1:1 encryption — no new crypto primitives needed
- Works for groups ≤ 50 members (per DESIGN.md)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 23:13:16 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
7b1e0bd162 Full web client with E2E encrypted messaging
Complete single-page web app served at / with:
- Identity generation (random 32-byte seed)
- Identity recovery from hex seed
- Persistent keys in localStorage (survives refresh)
- Auto-load saved identity on page load
- ECDH P-256 key exchange via Web Crypto API
- AES-256-GCM message encryption (iv prepended)
- Key registration with /v1/keys/register
- Send encrypted messages via /v1/messages/send
- Poll for messages every 2s with auto-decrypt
- Peer fingerprint input in header (saved to localStorage)
- Color-coded messages (green=self, orange=peer, cyan=system)
- Lock icon on received encrypted messages
- Commands: /info, /clear, /quit
- Graceful handling of CLI client messages (shows warning)
- Dark theme, responsive, mobile-friendly

Note: web-to-web E2E works. Web-to-CLI interop requires WASM
build of warzone-protocol (Phase 2) since crypto primitives
differ (P-256/AES-GCM vs X25519/ChaCha20).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 23:05:51 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
6d4a09a0c6 Fetch-and-delete: server deletes messages after poll delivery
poll_messages now collects all queued messages, returns them,
then deletes them from sled. No more duplicate delivery.

This is correct for store-and-forward: once the client receives
the messages, the server's job is done. If the client crashes
before processing, the messages are lost — acceptable for Phase 1.
Phase 2 can add explicit ack-based delivery if needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:55:50 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
8a6eebabfd Fix axum route params: use :param syntax (not {param}) for axum 0.7
Axum 0.7 uses :param for path parameters. {param} is axum 0.8+ syntax.
Routes were silently not matching, causing 404 on all key lookups.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:48:19 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
bc64afcb05 Add request tracing, debug /v1/keys/list endpoint
- TraceLayer logs every HTTP request (method, path, status, duration)
- Default log level info, tower_http=debug (no RUST_LOG needed)
- GET /v1/keys/list shows all registered fingerprints
- Helps debug key registration and lookup issues

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:43:54 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
8dd45b1bfe Normalize fingerprints everywhere: strip colons from URLs and DB keys
Client: strip colons before putting fingerprints in URL paths
(colons in URLs confuse axum path matching).

Server: normalize fingerprints in message routes too.

All fingerprint storage and lookup is now hex-only, case-insensitive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:41:26 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
de118371de Fix bundle lookup: normalize fingerprints, handle 404 gracefully
Server: normalize fingerprints by stripping colons and lowercasing
before storing/looking up in sled. Adds tracing for register/lookup.

Client: check HTTP status before parsing JSON response body.
Shows clear error when user is not registered instead of parse error.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:37:41 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
94b845eb5b Fix all compiler warnings across server and client
- Remove unused ServerConfig struct (config via CLI args)
- Remove unused otpks field from Database (not yet needed)
- Wire AppError into message routes with proper error propagation
- Remove unused imports in send.rs (Seed, MessageContent, etc.)
- Suppress dead_code on BundleResponse.fingerprint (needed by serde)

Zero warnings, 17/17 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 22:16:11 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
7451ad69bc Fix X3DH + add web client served by warzone-server
X3DH fix:
- Added identity_encryption_key (X25519) to PreKeyBundle
- initiate() and respond() now use correct DH operations per Signal spec:
  DH1=IK_a*SPK_b, DH2=EK_a*IK_b, DH3=EK_a*SPK_b, DH4=EK_a*OPK_b
- All 17 tests pass including x3dh_shared_secret_matches

Web client (served at /):
- Identity generation with seed (stored in localStorage)
- Recovery from hex-encoded seed
- Auto-load saved identity on page load
- Fingerprint display (same format as CLI: xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx)
- Key registration with server via /v1/keys/register
- Chat UI with message polling (5s interval)
- Commands: /help, /info, /seed
- Dark theme matching warzone aesthetic

Both clients (CLI + Web) now exist:
- CLI: warzone init, warzone info, warzone recover
- Web: http://localhost:7700/ (served by warzone-server)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 21:32:46 +04:00
Siavash Sameni
651396fa13 Scaffold Rust workspace: warzone-protocol, server, client, mule
4 crates, all compile. 16/17 tests pass.

warzone-protocol (core crypto):
- Seed-based identity (Ed25519 + X25519 from 32-byte seed via HKDF)
- BIP39 mnemonic encode/decode (24 words)
- Fingerprint type (SHA-256 truncated, displayed as xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx)
- ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD encrypt/decrypt with random nonce
- HKDF-SHA256 key derivation
- Pre-key bundle generation with Ed25519 signatures
- X3DH key exchange (simplified, needs X25519 identity key in bundle)
- Double Ratchet: full implementation with DH ratchet, chain ratchet,
  out-of-order message handling via skipped keys cache
- Message format (WarzoneMessage envelope + RatchetHeader)
- Session type with ratchet state
- Storage trait definitions (PreKeyStore, SessionStore, MessageQueue)

warzone-server (axum):
- sled database (keys, messages, one-time pre-keys)
- Routes: /v1/health, /v1/keys/register, /v1/keys/{fp},
  /v1/messages/send, /v1/messages/poll/{fp}, /v1/messages/{id}/ack

warzone-client (CLI):
- `warzone init` — generate seed, show mnemonic, save to ~/.warzone/
- `warzone recover <words>` — restore from mnemonic
- `warzone info` — show fingerprint and keys
- Seed storage at ~/.warzone/identity.seed (600 perms)
- Stubs for send, recv, chat commands

warzone-mule: Phase 4 placeholder

Known issue: X3DH test fails (initiate/respond use different DH ops
due to missing X25519 identity key in bundle). Fix in next step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 21:27:48 +04:00